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Abstract 
This study examines the foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its 
member states, in particular Qatar, towards the peace process in the Middle East 
between1991 and 2005. The study aims to identify, and critically engage with, a set of 
internal and external determinants, which influenced the foreign policy orientations of 
the GCC states towards the Middle East peace process after the Madrid conference in 
1991 and until 2005. This time frame was selected because significant changes took 
place in the patterns of alliances among leading Arab states after 2005. Moreover, the 
study focuses on the extent to which Qatar’s foreign policy has been consistent, or 
inconsistent, with the rest of GCC foreign policy, and the reasons for both consistencies 
and inconsistencies. 
The study posits three main questions. First, what are the main determinants, internal 
and external, facing the GCC states while formulating their foreign policies towards the 
Middle East peace process, particularly between 1991 and 2005? Second, what was the 
overall foreign policy agreed between the GCC states towards the Middle East peace 
process during the same period? Finally, to what extent was Qatari foreign policy 
convergent with, or divergent from, the foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
with regard to the peace process?. 
To explore these questions, the study adopts a qualitative research methodology and 
archival document analysis strategy. A wide range of documents was used throughout 
the study, including UN documents, media data, official statements made by GCC 
ministers of foreign affairs, closing statements of GCC summits, speeches by the Emir 
of Qatar, and statements by Qatari diplomats and officials. 
The data analyses revealed, first, that the foreign policies of the GCC states and Qatar 
have converged when it ultimately came to supporting Palestinian rights and the US 
efforts on the peace process, and, second, that the foreign policies of Qatar and the 
GCC states have diverged on two significant issues: first Qatar’s desire to normalize 
economic and diplomatic ties with Israel, and, second, US and Qatari initiatives to push 
political reform agenda (democratization came first, among other objectives) in the 
region as a possible policy to resolve the Middle East conflict. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
This study investigates the foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its 
member states, with special reference to Qatar’s foreign policy towards the peace process 
in the Middle East between1991 and 2005. 
The main rationale for conducting this research lies deep in my own personal and 
professional context. After receiving my first diploma in international relations from Cairo 
University, and my second in inter-Arab relations from the Arab League, I became more 
interested in Qatar's foreign policy, but I was unable to find conclusive and clear 
explanations to verify the validity of some of my observations. These experiences led me 
to pursue some of these issues during my studies towards a master's degree at the 
University of Exeter in the UK. While writing my dissertation on the obstacles to unity 
and integration facing the GCC states, I drew a conclusion based on Ernst Haas’s 
definition of unity. Haas has argued that “political actors in several distinct settings are 
persuaded to shift their political loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a 
new centre whose institutions possessor demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing state.”1 
In my conclusion, and similar to his assertion that democracies do not go to war with other 
democracies, I have argued that authoritarian regimes do not unite with each other either. 
In addition, by making observations about the general trends of GCC foreign policies, I 
concluded that Qatar's foreign policies were almost always a source of controversy and 
debate.  
I was further intrigued by this topic while working as a political analyst and weekly 
columnist for a number of Arabic periodicals and newspapers. In all these situations, I 
continued to make observations about the foreign policies of GCC states, particularly on 
                                               
1Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p.16. 
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the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process, and made correlations with 
international and regional developments whenever possible. In short, the more I 
investigated this topic, the more I realized that further research was needed to find 
satisfying answers that bridge the gap caused by the scarcity of literature on this subject. 
Therefore, the current study aims to fill this gap. 
 
1.2 Research context: The origins and evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict  
Rory Miller (2016) offers a comprehensive analysis of the rapid rise to power of the Arab 
Gulf states over the last half-century. Miller also draws attention to the daunting 
challenges that they confront today.
2
 In this regard, it must be noted that within the 
international order after the Second World War, the Arab-Israeli conflict has emerged as 
one of the most significant sources of threat affecting the stability of the Middle East and 
global peace. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Arab-Israeli conflict has 
occupied a central position in the foreign policies of many Western and Arab countries. 
Throughout these tumultuous years of conflict, there have been several peace initiatives to 
resolve it. Led mainly by the United States and to a lesser extent by the European Union, 
these initiatives have been subject to numerous scholarly studies.
3
 
These initiatives were partly due to some dramatic changes in the international order and 
the Middle East that took place at the end of the last century. Two major events stand out 
as causing these changes: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. These two events greatly affected the security and stability of the Middle East, 
and the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they stimulated an unprecedented 
spread of the phenomenon of terrorism, in terms of its geographical breadth, the 
multiplicity of the tools that were used, and new, previously unimaginable, targets. The 
                                               
2Rory Miller, Desert Kingdoms to Global Powers: The Rise of the Arab Gulf, (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2016). 
3Neill Lochery, The Difficult Road to Peace: Netanyahu, Israel and the Middle East Peace Process, 
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 2000). 
Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace,(New York: Farrar 
Straus and Giroux, 2004). 
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Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, in particular, was a new and serious threat to the security 
and stability of GCC territory, and replaced the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major source of 
threat to the GCC region. The new international order, led by the United States, swiftly 
and decisively responded to these new regional changes and security threats. For their 
part, the Arab states demanded US intervention to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which 
from their perspective was at the heart of the security threats and instability in the region, 
as well as the root cause of the rise of terrorism. Along with Russia, the European Union, 
and the United Nations, the US began to make arrangements to hold the Middle East 
Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991.The GCC states also responded to the rapidly 
changing threats to security and stability in the region, and participated in the Middle East 
Peace Conference. The development of these new threats forced them to assume a share of 
responsibility for this comprehensive and long trajectory, and actively engage in the 
Middle East peace process. 
With the peace process ongoing, divergences in foreign policies between GCC states 
began to surface, albeit faintly and quietly. These divergences mainly revolved around the 
role played by Qatar in the Middle East peace process, especially its policy regarding the 
rapid normalization of trade relations with Israel and the exchange visits with Israeli 
officials, despite the deterioration of the peace process. Nonetheless, these divergences 
were of the type that the GCC states have long been accustomed to dealing with quietly 
and sagaciously in order to contain any discords without jeopardizing their solidarity, 
particularly with regard to regional security arrangements.  
With the Middle East peace process beginning to face more arduous challenges, the 
capabilities of the parties to arrive at a comprehensive peaceful settlement began to 
diminish. At that point, the US floated new proposals and nonconventional remedies for 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the “Middle East Democratization Initiative”, which 
aimed at achieving a number of US foreign policy objectives. In addition to protecting 
American interests in the region, the initiative was geared towards settling the Middle East 
conflict by democratizing the political system of the Arab states. This idea was based on 
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the premise that “democracies do not fight each other”, and therefore that a democratic 
Arab world would not go to war with Israel, thought of as the “only democracy” in the 
Middle East. 
While Qatar unconditionally accepted the US initiative, the rest of the GCC states did so 
cautiously and with a great deal of suspicion. Accordingly, Qatar formed its own foreign 
policy orientation. This eventually led to divergence within the GCC itself, which 
culminated in a wide rift in 2014, when, in an unprecedented move, the governments of 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from 
Qatar. 
As has been discussed, this study explores the regional and international political variables 
that have shaped the Middle East and influenced the foreign policy of the GCC towards 
the peace process during, and immediately after, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. One of the key results of these changes in the Middle East was 
that the GCC states attended the Madrid conference. This was significant because it made 
the GCC states focus their efforts on dealing with their own issues of security and 
stability, which began to be seriously challenged from new sources of threat, such as 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and the rising security risk from terrorism. From this perspective, 
this study aims to critically explore the foreign policy of the GCC towards the Middle East 
peace process, particularly Qatar's foreign policy. This is based on the assumption that 
comparing and contrasting the foreign policies of Qatar and the other GCC states will lead 
to a better understanding of the causes behind their differences and similarities. 
The dilemmas of security, stability, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Middle East peace 
process have become important concerns for the GCC countries, and occupy a central 
place in their foreign policy. The interwoven structure of these variables represents the 
core of the research problem, which will be presented in detail below. 
It is important to highlight that the period of the study (1991-2005) was chosen because, 
first, it marks the beginning of the first ever “multiple talks” between the Arab countries 
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and Israel, including the GCC member states, and, second, it signifies the dismantling of 
the alliance's traditional pattern in the Arab world, which previously included Riyadh, 
Cairo, and Damascus, but later became Riyadh and Cairo, when Damascus was distanced 
because of its support of Hezbollah and its active role in the war of Lebanon in that year.
4
 
1.3 The research problem, questions, and objectives 
As discussed above, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990resulted in extremely complex 
and far-reaching threats to the national and regional security and stability of the GCC. The 
tragic 11 September attacks in the USA in 2001 have intensified this threat, as the rise of 
religiously motivated international terrorism, often invoking grievances over the plight of 
Palestinians, has been directly linked with the region. The main consequences of these 
events can be found in the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the deepening 
threat that this conflict poses to regional security and global peace. As a result, both the 
regional actors and global powers have felt the need to launch peace initiatives to address 
the Middle East conflict that clearly has serious implications for global peace. The peace 
process had originally promised to improve security and stability in the Middle East in 
general, and the GCC region in particular. By taking into account the complexity 
surrounding the Middle East conflict, the present study identifies two general questions as 
defining its research focus. First, does Qatar’s controversial foreign policy with regard to 
the peace process and the circumstances surrounding it such as Qatari-Israeli and Qatari-
US relations represent a threat to the stability of the GCC region and the unity of the 
GCC? Second, were opportunities to improve the prospects of achieving peace lost 
because of Qatar’s foreign policy? The research problem can therefore be summarized in 
the three following specific intertwined questions. 
  
                                               
4Elie Podeh, Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative, 2002-2014: A Plausible Missed Opportunity,  
Middle East Journal, vol. 68, no. 4, Autumn 2014, p.592. 
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1.3.a Research questions  
First, what were the main determinants, internal and external, facing the GCC states while 
formulating their foreign policies towards the Middle East peace process, particularly 
between 1991 and 2005? 
Second, what was the overall foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process agreed 
upon by the GCC states during the same period? 
Finally, to what extent was Qatari foreign policy convergent with, or divergent from, the 
foreign policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council with regard to the peace process between 
1991 and 2005? 
1.3.b Research objectives 
1- To critically explore the determinant factors, internal and external, facing the GCC 
states’ foreign policy decision making towards the Middle East peace process after 
the Madrid conference in 1991 and up until 2005. 
2- To analyse and explain the broad GCC foreign policy towards the Middle East 
peace process between the Madrid conference and 2005. 
3- To critically investigate Qatari foreign policy towards the Middle East peace 
process, and to explore the extent to which it was consistent with the rest of GCC 
foreign policy within the same timeframe. 
1.4. The research focus and limitations of the study 
This study falls within the scope of political science in general, and foreign policy focus in 
particular. As this study lies in the foreign policy domain, it only considers the policies or 
programmes that were carried out by the state or group of states towards another state and 
regarding a particular case. In this context, foreign policy is in contrast with international 
relations, which studies sets of actions and reactions, including policies and programmes 
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that are a reaction or response from the other state to the first international unit. Thus, this 
study will be concerned only with the programmes, policies, stances, and orientations that 
the GCC states (with special reference to Qatar) take towards the peace process or relevant 
issues. 
It is important to highlight that the Middle East conflict, and the subsequent attempts to 
address the conflict, have complex historical and political dimensions that cannot be 
addressed within the confines of a single study. The current research, while 
acknowledging the complexity of the dynamics informing the Middle East conflict, 
singles out the foreign policy of the GCC (with special reference to Qatari foreign policy) 
towards the Middle East peace process within the period 1991 to 2005.  
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, on methodology, the research design of 
the study also reflects this clear focus. The study adopts an overall qualitative research 
methodology in engaging with and exploring the central research questions mentioned 
above. The research design includes multiple data collection methods, including the 
document analysis of primary sources, such as the officially recorded statements of the 
leaders of the GCC countries, final statements of the GCC summits and ministerial 
meetings, and statements of Qatari officials on different levels extracted from semi-
governmental Qatari newspapers, United Nations General Assembly meetings, and 
minutes of the Security Council that have not been used for this purpose before. 
It is important to note that despite the fact that this study focuses on Qatar, and contrasts 
its foreign policy with the foreign policy of the rest of the GCC, it has not been framed as 
a comparative study as such. Considering the wider research context, it is possible to 
single out the foreign policies of both Qatar and Oman for a critical and comparative 
analysis, as they have shown clear signs of divergence from the rest of the official GCC 
foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process and Middle East conflict. However, 
due to the fact that the researcher is most familiar with Qatari foreign policy, and is in a 
unique position to have access to the related original documents that have so far not been 
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brought to bear on the topic, research is consciously focused on the case of Qatari foreign 
policy. The researcher suggests that by building on the findings of the current study, a 
further research project should critically compare divergent patterns of foreign policy 
exhibited by selected GCC member states regarding the Middle East conflict and peace 
process. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
The main contribution of the current research is to fill the gap in the existing literature 
regarding GCC foreign policy towards the Middle East conflict and the peace process. It 
examines the political environment and developments affecting the decision-making 
process informing GCC foreign policy, paying special attention to Qatari foreign policy, 
with respect to the Middle East peace process, which has not been discussed in previous 
research on the subject. 
Furthermore, the research seeks to explore the main differences between the foreign policy 
of Qatar and that of the other GCC states towards the peace process in the chosen 
timeframe. It also aims to demonstrate how this chasm deepened as underpinned by 
external factors driven by Qatar’s supportive stance of US policy, and also how Qatari 
foreign polices served to intensify the differences inside the GCC. In addition, the thesis 
sheds light on issues that have so far remained unclear and unexamined, such as the deep 
ripple effect on GCC regional integration and the formation of a common foreign and 
regional security policy. With the above outline as the clear focus, the study aims to make 
an original contribution to both scholarly research on Middle East conflict in general, and 
foreign policy-related academic discussions on the topic in particular. 
1.6 Organization of the study 
This study consists of eleven main chapters and conclusion chapter. The eleven chapters 
are divided into five parts. Part one is theoretical, and includes this introductory chapter, 
and a literature review and methodology chapters. 
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The introductory chapter presents the study questions and the objectives, and the wider 
research context that informs the central research problem. The chapter clearly outlines the 
research focus by discussing the limitations of the study and its overall significance.    
The second chapter explores, discusses, and critically reviews existing literature on three 
interrelated aspects of the topic. First, it examines discussions that were held on the 
subject, both at the theoretical and the conceptualization levels, including foreign policies 
and the regional balance of power and order. Second, it reviews the literature related to 
selected, significant research on the Middle East peace process after the Madrid talks until 
2005, in terms of the opportunities and the challenges that appeared before the political 
leaders of the region and the world. Finally, the third research area revolves around the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the notion of bringing democracy to the Middle 
East to help resolve the Middle East conflict and, on the other hand, the influence of this 
very same concept in reshaping the Middle East. 
Chapter Three discusses the methodological framework and research design that the study 
adopted to explore the central research questions. This includes the data collection and 
analysis processes, specifically the compilation of data into serialized tiers that are used in 
exploring the research questions. The chapter also discusses the issues related to research 
ethics.   
The second part of the thesis consists of Chapters Four and Five, which address the 
operational environment of making foreign policy at the internal and external levels in the 
GCC region. They also address the factors that determine decision making in foreign 
policy towards the peace process and how these factors, first, contributed to 
conceptualizing initiatives to advance negotiations and hold the international, sponsored 
peace conference and, second, to supporting engaging the GCC as a political body and the 
individual states, meaning the motives of each particular GCC member state to push the 
Middle East peace process forward at times of deadlock. 
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The third part of the thesis, Chapters Six and Seven, examines the foreign policy of GCC 
states towards the peace process and discusses how these states used the foreign policy 
tools in backing legitimate Arab rights and condemning Israel whenever it tried to elude 
peace obligations, as well as how they encouraged Israel to adopt a certain foreign policy 
that brought peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The fourth part consists of Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten, which are based on the main 
original documents, i.e., UN documents, the official addresses of the Emir of Qatar, and 
official statements as reported within the semi-official Al Raya and Al Watan newspapers. 
These three chapters present the main bulk of the original documentary evidence 
supporting the overall argument of the thesis. Chapter Eight deals with diverse aspects of 
Qatari foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process since its inception in the 
early 1990s, the position of the State of Qatar on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Qatar’s 
welcoming of the concept of an international peace conference on Middle East peace, 
against the odds and against the many states in the GCC and, more vehemently, in the 
Arab world. Chapter Nine examines the issue of how Qatar used its diplomatic and 
economic clout to build bridges of trust with Israel, provide it with incentives to continue 
and advance the peace process, and to soften Israeli attitudes towards the peace process. 
Chapter Ten explores the period after the deadlock and a series of derailments, when the 
US introduced new objectives, including the creation of a new opportunity for peace 
through changes in establishments in the Arab world.  
The fifth part, Chapter Eleven, offers a focused discussion on the central study findings. 
The main research conclusions, recommendations for further research, and wider policy 
implications of the study are presented in Chapter Twelve.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
The Arab-Israeli conflict has been studied from diverse disciplinary perspectives, including 
those from history and political science. Because of the complex aspects of the conflict, the 
research focused on foreign policy has, on the whole, adopted an interdisciplinary 
methodological perspective. This chapter maps out and critically engages with the relevant 
literature that deals with GCC and Qatari foreign policy towards the peace process in the 
Middle East. The first group of literature deals with the theoretical components and the 
analytical framework that was used to shape the framework, set up the dimensions of the 
study, and establish its limitations. The second group of studies includes a large body of 
literature dealing with various issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the initiatives 
made by international and regional parties to peacefully resolve the Middle East conflict. 
These studies examine the difficulties of the implementation of these initiatives and the 
complex relations between the original parties to the conflict, and provide a reflection on the 
Middle East peace process. The third group of literature provides a discussion and analysis of 
the foreign policy of the GCC states in general, and Qatari foreign policy in particular, 
towards the peace process. 
The fourth set of related studies discusses the relationship between the concept of 
democratization in the Middle East as one of the tools to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict on 
one side, and protecting US interests in the region on the other side. This set of works also 
discusses the criticism of the concept of introducing democracy and political reform in the 
Middle East, and easing the tension and peacefully resolving the conflict. It further suggests 
that there is an absence of a correlation between democratization in the Middle East and the 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict because the conflict is not only a conflict between two 
different political systems. The reasons behind the conflict are much broader and more 
complex, relating as they do to religion, culture, history, the economy, human rights, and 
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geography. This chapter offers a critical analysis of the previous relevant literature, and is 
structured and presented around the four broad themes mentioned above. 
2.2 Exploring the analytical concepts informing the related literature on foreign policy 
studies   
The first group of studies mainly examines the central theoretical concepts and the main 
analytic frameworks that explore the diverse aspects of the foreign policy dimensions and 
regional studies that are fundamental to understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict and, 
consequently, the peace process.  
Mattar and Helal’s study (1996)1 emphasizes the importance of classifying the Middle 
Eastern region into two broad theoretical categories, in order to properly identify the overall 
foreign policy patterns of the countries in this large geographical context. Their study 
suggests the existence of a broader “Arab regional system” and a more specific “Gulf sub-
regional system”. The research highlights the implications of this division for how the 
countries of the GCC manage their foreign policy towards the peace process in the Middle 
East.This thesis has benefited from Mattar and Helal’s research in building an understanding 
of how the dynamics of the regional system work, and how international and regional power 
influences the security and foreign policy of the regional system.  
The impact of any foreign policy largely depends on the overall power of the state or group 
of states. The significance and power of the GCC countries within the region, and 
particularly towards the Middle East conflict, have been studied (Korany and Dessouki, 
1991).
2
 Essentially, the foreign policy of a country largely reflects the national interest of the 
state. Accordingly, there is an inevitable element of “rational/pragmatic calculation” in any 
foreign policy development. Some studies, such as that of Holsti (1998),
3
 have analysed the 
                                               
1Gamel Matter and AliEldenHelal, Arab Regional System: Study in Inter-Arab Relations, (Beirut: 
MarkzDersatAlwehdaAlarabia, 1996). 
2Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hill Al Dessouki (eds), The Foreign Policies of the Arab States: The Challenge of 
Globalization, (Cairo: AUC Press, 1991). 
3K.J Holsti, International Politics: A Frame Work For Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,1988). 
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function of the rational/pragmatic calculation in shaping the foreign policy of the GCC 
countries towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
It should be noted that the concepts of “Middle East” and “Near East” are primarily Western 
depictions attempting to define a geographical region that has a complex cultural and 
political diversity (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009).
4
 As some studies, such as those of 
Hinnebusch (2003)
5
 and Holsti (1998),
6
 have shown, the idea of the nation-state itself is quite 
new within Arab-Islamic culture. Western-style secularism has not been influential enough to 
shape the overall political culture within the region. On the contrary, religion (Islam) 
continues to be an important social force, and is a recognized as a source of law within most 
of the GCC countries. Therefore, sentiments of Arab nationalism, as well as Islamic 
sensitivities, appear to have a notable impact on the foreign policy of the GCC countries 
towards the Middle East conflict. For example, the images of the daily humiliation of the 
Palestinians shown on Gulf Arab satellite channels, such as Al Jazeera, inevitability anger the 
Arab and Muslim populations across the region. The foreign policies of the Gulf states are in 
turn shaped by this popular anger, which often leads to policy positions that are quite 
reactionary. On the other hand, the study also refers to other, more important and less 
important, elements in the internal determinants that influence the decision making around 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Hinnebusch argues that some of the internal determinants, 
such as public opinion, are less important than other factors, especially in rich countries such 
as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, where foreign policy makers can mislead people, and can also 
change their point of view. He states that “public opinion plays little direct role in the foreign 
policy formulation… the majority of the population is often inattentive, uninformed, and 
divided by class or ethnically, hence easily manipulated by the elite on the foreign policy.”7 
                                               
4William L.Cleveland and Martin Bunton, History of the Modern Middle East, (Colorado: West View Press, 
2009). 
5Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2003).  
6
Holsti, op.cit.pp.55-56. 
7Hinnebusch, op.cit., pp.111-113. 
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Hinnebusch assumes that the root causes of conflict in the Middle East, and much of the 
behaviour of the states, can be attributed to the nature of the structure of the regional system, 
the imperialist intervention, and the distorted form of core-periphery relations. This might be 
correct overall, but it is not applicable to the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hinnebusch 
also points out that national security bureaucracies constitute the most important elements, 
which play pivotal roles in the Middle East, more than anywhere else in the world. 
Furthermore, he assumes that there is an inverse relationship between the coherence of the 
professional institutions of foreign policy decision making and the ability of leaders to make 
foreign policy alone: “The less efficient the institutions, the greater ability of the leaders of 
the individuals to make foreign policy alone
8
 This is true to a large extent in most of the Gulf 
countries, because foreign policy decision making is characterized by personalization as the 
institutes are weak compared with the leaders, and therefore it is appropriate for the study to 
examine the personal attitude of the leaders in order to understand the foreign policy of GCC 
states, including Qatar, towards the peace process. 
The study by James Bill (1996)
9
 suggests another interesting theoretical concept, which uses 
a geometrical metaphor to account for the security tensions within the Gulf region. Bill 
identifies the presence of a “rectangle shaped tension” structure directly influencing the 
security and foreign policy concerns in the Gulf. The state actors that define the rectangle are 
Iran, Iraq, the GCC states, and the US, with one of the interests of the US in the region being 
maintaining Israeli security. Bill excludes Israel from the tensions equation in the Gulf 
region, stating that “Israel's leaders are completely clear on their position in this regard, as 
they consider Iran their number one enemy and have mobilized their political and research 
entities to propagate this idea.”10 
This statement seems to be an omen for the possibility of an Iran-Israel-US military conflict, 
in which GCC states may find themselves embroiled. This view gains more credibility given 
                                               
8Ibid.pp.110-120. 
9James Bill, in Jamal Sanad Al Sewedy (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: Searching for Stability, (Abu Dhabi: Centre for 
Strategic Research and Studies,1996).  
10Ibid. p,161. 
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the existence of US military bases in the GCC region, which may give Iran the pretext of 
self-defence to target these bases, if either Israel or the US launched strikes against Iran, 
therefore pushing GCC states into the centre of the confrontation. This explains the dual 
nature of the sources of security, which may under certain conditions be seen as sources of 
threats.  
Al Mashat’s study (1994),11 while exploring the causes of tension within the Gulf states, 
singles out the Western military presence in the region as the central factor contributing to 
the escalation of the tension. Al Mashat shows the shortcoming of James Bill's paper in 
omitting the role of the Western Allied/US military intervention in the GCC region, and the 
nature of the US/Israeli alliance, as a source of threat to the security of the GCC region, 
which affects GCC foreign policy decisions towards the Israeli conflict and, consequently, 
the Middle East peace process. This thesis benefited from the study of Al Mashat in defining 
the sources of the changes of the national threats to the GCC. 
2.3 The literature exploring the Arab-Israeli conflict  
The second group of literature is a large body of literature that has examined the nature of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and specifically analysed the peace initiatives to resolve the conflict. In 
this regard, as Miller (2012) observes, it is important to bear in mind that the Middle East 
conflict has preoccupied a substantial part of US foreign policy, which in turn has made the 
US a salient actor in the emergence of peace initiatives.
12
In addition to examining the 
historical emergence of the conflict and the wider dynamics informing the conflict, this group 
of studies also discusses the implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the national security 
of the GCC states. Finally, these studies highlight the potential positive implications of the 
peace process for all parties involved.  
                                               
11Abdelmonem Al Mashat, Arab Gulf's Security: A Study in Perceptions and Policies, (Cairo: Center for 
Political Research and Studies, 1994). 
12Rory Miller, US Foreign Relations and the Middle East, in Timothy Lynch (ed.), The OxfordEncyclopedia of 
American Military and Diplomatic History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.203-226. 
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The study by Uzi Rabi (2005),
13
 while exploring the threats facing the Gulf states, points out 
the importance of bearing in mind the internal security risks facing each state. He argues that 
the internal security threats do influence the overall involvement of the GCC countries with 
the Middle East peace process. The author illustrates his point by giving the example of the 
Sultanate of Oman, which remained quite distant from the Arab-Israeli conflict until recently, 
largely because it was preoccupied with its internal security crisis centred on its Dhofar 
region. Rabi’s study, based on a model constructed to interpret why the Sultanate of Oman 
distanced itself from intervening in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the consequences of this 
conflict due to the internal security situation in Dhofar province, found that it was due to the 
good Omani-Iranian relations, which effectively eliminate any direct Iranian threat to the 
Sultanate of Oman, perhaps because of the sectarian similarities between the two nations. 
Therefore, the Western military presence in the Gulf region and the Israeli-Western alliance 
constitute a source of pressure on Iran that may require some kind of intervention from Iran 
to minimize it. But, at the same time, the Sultanate of Oman is relatively safe from any 
Iranian reactions to the Israeli or Western threats that may destabilize other GCC states. This 
thesis has benefited from Rabi's paper in terms of how it views security and internal stability 
as key elements to enable understanding GCC foreign policy determinants. 
Lochery's (1999)
14
 study provides a presentation of the complicated dynamics of the peace 
process, and the nature of Palestinian-Israeli relations since its launch in Madrid and until the 
end of Netanyahu’s first government. Lochery’s work is based on two assumptions: first, that 
it is unlikely that the peace process will achieve success in the foreseeable future, and 
second, even if Rabin had not been assassinated he would not have been able to take the 
peace process further than the point at which it stopped after his death. The study criticizes 
academics’ blaming Netanyahu personally for the collapse of the peace process. Lochery 
argues that the collapse of the peace process was inevitable after the demise of the euphoria 
that had followed the handshake between Rabin and Yasser Arafat.  
                                               
13Uzi Rabi, Oman and Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Reflection of a Pragmatic Foreign Policy, Israeli Affairs, vol. 
2, no. 3, July 2005. 
14
Neill Lochery, The Difficult Road to Peace: Netanyahu, Israel and the Peace Process in the Middle East, 
(London: Ithaca, 1999). 
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In contrast with Lochery's argument proposing the inevitability of the collapse of the peace 
process, Eisenberg and Caplan (2010)
15
 argue that achieving a breakthrough in the peace 
process was possible only if some of the leaderships stopped playing what they called the 
“dynamics of deadlock”, which means that the leaders must stop calling their people to 
sacrifice their homeland and the national conflict with the enemies. This is the condition 
when the leader fails to prepare the people for difficult choices and compromises. Eisenberg 
and Caplan assert that there was always a window for peace, but the process usually came to 
a halt because of the inability of the different parties to imagine a reduction in the level of the 
hostility. Their study suggests two considerations to overcome the deadlock of the process. 
First, they argue that the leaders must acknowledge the difficult task of building a supportive 
political base and shaping a political environment that will support their diplomatic 
overtures. Second, they state that leaders must come to a conclusion that peace will serve 
their personal and national interests. The main criticism of this study is that it depends on the 
psychological dimension and perspectives of the leaders to explain the reasons behind the 
stopping of the peace process, while there are two important factors in determining the state 
of war and peace, namely the security and cost/benefit of the conflict, which are almost 
absent from the calculations of the study. This thesis makes use of the work of Caplan and 
Eisenberg in interpreting the halting of the peace process.  
More generally, Ross’s (2004)16 book describes the peace process in the Middle East and the 
missed opportunities, as well as the efforts of the US administration to push the peace 
process forward and to convince all concerned parties in the Middle East to sit together and 
achieve progress in the peace process. Ross describes his personal role in the efforts of the 
United States in the peace process, and describes the psychological dimensions, fears, and 
hopes of the leaders of the Middle East he met during his mission in the region. He also 
provides an explanation of the difficulties that faced all US initiatives, in which he took part 
as envoy of the US administration. He also describes how the Israelis see the Arabs and vice 
                                               
15Lura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace:Pattern, Problems, 
Possibilities,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
16
Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, (New York:Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2004). 
18 
 
versa, and explains the extent of the negative view they have of each other. He emphasizes 
the sincere willingness of the parties to reach a just peace, but he also underscores the lack of 
the ability of any of them to take a courageous decision that could make a breakthrough in 
the peace process. For this thesis, Ross’s study has provided an accurate chronicle of the 
peace process, which helped in the formation of the main structure of the study of the peace 
process.  
Efraim Karsh claims in his study (1996)
17
 that Yasser Arafat’s intention to declare the 
independent Palestinian state in the wake of Netanyahu assuming power in 1996 was a clear 
violation of the Oslo accord, which precluded a unilateral decision on the future of the 
occupied territories and provided for the negotiated Israeli-Palestinian settlement. The point 
here is that Karsh states only that Arafat’s “intention” is a violation of the Oslo accord, while 
he does not consider Israeli practice on the ground, such as the expansion of the existing 
settlements or building more new settlements in the occupied territories, which is clearly a 
violation. 
2.4Literature discussing the role of the GCC and Qatar in the peace process 
The third type of emerging literature focuses on the role of the GCC and Qatar in the peace 
process. There is now a growing interest in examining the role of the GCC countries in 
international politics and foreign policy, and the role of Qatar especially. However, only a 
few studies have examined the role of the GCC and Qatar in the peace process in depth 
which are reviewed below.   
The study by Abdul-Aziz Al Thani (2005)
18
 documents the change that has occurred within 
Qatari foreign policy since the former ruler, Shaikh Hamad, assumed power in 1995. It 
appears that Shaikh Hamad has shown real interest in the peace process and therefore has 
contributed significantly to the emergence of an active Qatari foreign policy towards the 
                                               
17
Efraim Karsh (ed.), From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's Troubled Agenda,(London: Frank Cass,1996). 
18Abdul-Aziz Al Thani, Qatari Foreign Policy:1995 to 2005, (no place of publishing: no publisher, 2005). 
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Arab-Israeli conflict. This study will fully explore this active Qatari foreign policy vis-à-vis 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and discuss its implications for regional stability and world peace.  
Christopher Davidson (2011)
19
explores how the presence of oil and gas in the Gulf states has 
been a primary force in shaping their economies and consequently their politics. On the one 
hand, Davidson connects the security concerns of the Gulf states and their foreign policies, 
and argues that their foreign policies were shaped to serve security interests. On the other 
hand, he claims that Qatar and Bahrain, despite their US naval and air bases, have pursued 
active neutrality to maintain communication channels with both Iran and Western powers. He 
claims that Qatar wants to play the role of Switzerland and, therefore, the contradiction 
between the two roles that Qatar wants to play is clear: there is a clear contradiction between 
the hosting of US bases and at the same time wanting to be neutral, because the US is the 
main foe of Iran. This role that Qatar wants to play is almost impossible to maintain; 
somehow Qatar will join the American pact in its method of seeking a solution for its 
national security concerns. Steven Wright, also in Davidson (2011), indicates how Qatari 
foreign policy presents a fascinating example of a small state achieving an international 
presence far beyond its size. He also indicates that Qatar’s geopolitical position underlines 
systemic security challenges. He also assumes that Qatari political reform was a product of 
the power of the new generation, not an effect of external, or even internal, power. If that 
assumption is correct, why was political reform not accomplished? Why did the public 
election that the prime minister, Hamad bin Jassem, promised in 2004 in the wake of the 
conference on democracy and free trade  in Doha, not take place? The reason mostly is to 
show Qatar’s willingness to accept the idea of the US administration of introducing political 
reform in the Middle East and spreading democracy, to avoid the potential pressure that may 
be exerted by the US on the Qatari regime. Davidson’s study has contributed to this thesis in 
interpreting the relationship between the US and Qatar in the light of the security issue.  
                                               
19
Christopher Davidson (ed.), Power Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, (London: Hurst and Company, 
2011). 
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Steven Wright, in Held and Ulrichsen (2012),
20
 highlights the issues related to Qatar’s 
systematic security problem, and indicates how the Saudi and Iranian governments are able 
to pose varying degrees of threat to its national security. This security problem has called for 
Qatar to seek a protective alliance or security umbrella from external powers. 
Qatari foreign policy is described in these two studies as pragmatic, independent, and 
autonomous. These characteristics are the pillars of Qatari foreign policy, which focuses on 
efforts towards conflict resolution in order to enhance international peace and security. There 
is a paradox between being independent and autonomous on the one hand, and seeking a 
protective alliance on the other. Hence, a weak state seeks protection from another state but 
does not want to fall under its political tutelage. 
Davidson’s and Held and Ulrichsen’s studies have contributed to this thesis in their 
interpretation of the relationship between the US and Qatar in the light of the security issue, 
as well as in understanding the often contradictory relationship between how the sources of 
threat to the GCC region can simultaneously be a source of security. That is the dual nature 
of the sources: the source of security can also be the source of threat. 
 
In the context of studying the missed opportunities to reach a peaceful settlement for the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and the role of  Saudi  Arabia in the peace process, the study of Elie 
Podeh (2014)
21
 quoted Abba Eban, the Israeli historical figure who served as Foreign Affairs 
Minister, saying “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity”,22 referring to 
how the  Arabs used to refuse every offered  peace opportunity. This point of view is also 
applied to the Israeli governmental stance towards the Arab peace initiative (API). 
 
Podeh’s study offers, in many dimensions, an examination of the Arab peace initiative 2002, 
which was first introduced as Prince Abdullah’s initiative for peace, then adopted by the 
Arab league. The first dimension is the international circumstances that accompanied it; the 
second is the Saudi objectives behind the initiative; the third is the secret relationship 
                                               
20Steven Wright, in David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen (eds), The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics 
Economics and the Global Order, (London: Routledge, 2012). 
21Elie Podeh, Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative, 2002-2014: A Plausible Missed Opportunity, Middle East 
Journal, vol.  68, no. 4, autumn 2014, pp.584-604. 
22https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Abba_Eban 
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between Saudi officials and their Israeli counterparts; and the final dimension is the Israeli 
response to the initiative, or rather, the lack of response. It posits an explanation of why 
successive Israeli governments failed to respond to the dramatic change in the Arab position 
towards Israel, from the three “noes” of the Khartoum summit in 1967 to the three “yeses” of 
the (API).The study offers four reasons behind the Israeli failure to respond to the API. First 
was that Sharon, Netanyahu, and many right-wing politicians ideologically objected to the 
API as a possible basis for negotiations because they were unwilling to face its implications 
in terms of territorial concessions (a return to the 1967 borders, even with swaps) and the 
division of Jerusalem, or accept an “agreed” solution to the refugee problem based on United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 194. Even a more moderate prime minister, such as 
Olmert, was unwilling to openly confront Israel’s right-wing constituency. Second was that 
the Israelis in general did not believe in Arab willingness to sign a peace agreement, which 
led Israelis to be suspicious of declarations in favour of peaceful solutions. Third was the fact 
that the API is associated with the Arab League and Saudi Arabia, which both suffer from a 
negative image in Israeli society, which cast doubt on its sincerity. Finally, polls indicate that 
many Israelis are simply unaware of the existence of the API. This fact reflects the general 
Israeli fatigue about, and resignation towards, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The study 
concludes that the API was and remains a historic opportunity to achieve peace in the Middle 
East, but that Israel missed this opportunity. 
 
Elie Podeh in his study, which is chronologically located between the two studies of 
Guzansky (2015)
23
 and Yoel Guzansky and Clive Jones (2017)
24
, refers to the idea of an 
alliance emerging between moderate Arab states and Israel to build a tacit security system 
against Iran, Syria, and Hamas, starting in 2006. The study takes a different approach to that 
of Elisheva Rosman- Stollman
25
 in discussing the nature of the rapprochement between the 
Gulf states and Israel, Stollman believes that the rapprochement was due to the desire of the 
Gulf states to approach the United States by approaching Israel, while Podeh argues that the 
approach of the Gulf states to Israel was primarily for tactical security reasons. 
 
                                               
23
 Yoel Guzansky, Israel and the Arab Gulf States: From Tacit Cooperation to Reconciliation? Israel Affairs, 
vol. 21, no. 1, 2015, pp.131-147. 
24 Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, Israel Relations with Gulf States: Towards the Emergence of Tacit Security 
Regime?, Contemporary Security policy,2017 
25
 Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, Balancing Acts: The Gulf States and Israel, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.40,no.4, 
July, 2004, pp.185-208 
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In the same context of the foreign policy of the GCC states towards Israel and the peace 
process, and in the light of the various kinds of pressure(domestic, regional, and 
international) which the GCC states were facing while formulating their foreign policy, the 
study of Elisheva Rosman-Stollman (2004)
26
raises significant  questions: how can weak 
states such as  Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman deal 
with their weaknesses, and how can they handle various sources of coercion when 
developing their foreign policy towards Israel and the peace process. The study also draws 
attention to the tendency of the weak Gulf states to view Saudi Arabia with suspicion, and 
sometimes see it as a cause of tension, due to its clearly powerful position in the region. They 
do not regard it, however, to be as threatening as Iran or Iraq. The study further argues that 
there are three different major defence strategies that weak state, as well as any other political 
entity, may choose when dealing with a given international situation: balancing, 
“bandwagoning”, and “omnibalancing”. The balance strategy consists of aligning oneself 
with another power against the source of a given threat, so as to achieve a balance of power. 
These states tend to choose a balancing strategy in foreign relations, turning to the United 
States as a hegemonic yet unthreatening power, and using Israel as a way of currying favour 
with the US. The study suggests that weak Gulf states have chosen to use the strategy of 
limited normalization with Israel to approach the United States. Rosman-Stollman’s study 
points out that Israel could not be an effective potential ally in its own right.  
 
The two studies by Yoel Guzansky (2015) and Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky (2017)
27
 
argue that the Gulf states were seeking to build a Tacit Security Regime with Israel to face 
the threat of the nuclear Iran in the context of the receding American security role in the 
Gulf. 
 
The study of Yoel Guzansky (2015)
28
suggests that the idea of a nuclear Iran has become a 
source of threat for both sides, the GCC states and Israel. Therefore, it plays a role in the 
rapprochement between the Arab Gulf states and Israel, stipulating that the establishment of 
“normal relations” remains dependent on progress in the peace process between Israel and 
the Palestinians. The study of Guzansky, in the context of the normalization of the relations 
                                               
26 Ibid, pp.185-208. 
27Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky,op.cit.,2017,p.9. 
28
Yoel Guzansky,op.cit., 2015, pp.131-147. 
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between Israel and the GCC countries, examines the nature of existing relations between 
Israel and a number of Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. 
Guzansky’s study concludes that there are two important forces determining the nature of the 
relationship between Israel and the Gulf states: the first is the power that attracts them to 
build tactical relations to preserve their security from the threat of nuclear Iran, and the 
second is the nature of the relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, which may 
represent a force for exclusion that works to keep them apart, and limit the extent of the 
achievements realized on the ground from the various agreements of the peace process. The 
study assumes that the GCC states are unlikely to recognize Israel officially by establishing 
diplomatic relations, at least until a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty is reached. 
Until then, diplomacy based on converging interests between the Jewish state and the GCC 
will probably remain tacit in nature. 
 
More recently, building on Guzansky’s previous study, Yoel Guzansky and Clive Jones 
(2017)
29
have developed an analytical framework that can be used to understand and to 
explain the practical concerns of Iran, its nuclear programme, and its allies in the region. It 
discusses the mechanism and the nature of the security cooperation between Israeli and GCC 
states, especially Saudi Arabia. The study also offers contextualization of how the tacit 
security regime (TSR) emerged as a pattern of unwritten tactical alliance that may be 
followed to counter the common sources of threat from the nuclear Iran, and to maintain the 
strategic interests for both sides. The study concludes that the alliance between Israel and the 
Gulf states is closely linked to their common understanding of Iran as a major threat to both 
sides. Another important conclusion of the study asserts that the relationship between Israel 
and the Palestinians, and the extent to which they achieve an acceptable formula for peace 
between them, is a determining factor for the ability of the tacit security regime to emerge, 
continue, and become an institution. 
 
The study of Uzi Rabi (2009)
30
 explores the Qatar-Israel relationship and argues that this 
relationship is only one dimension of the regional foreign policy of the State of Qatar. The 
study iterates that it is imperative to understand the Qatar with its neighbouring states in the 
Gulf to perceive the Qatar-Israel relationship as part of the parcel of the complex foreign 
                                               
29 Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, ibid. 
30Uzi Rabi, Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms, Middle East Journal, vol. 63, no. 
3, summer 2009, pp. 443-459. 
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policy of Qatar. It evaluates how Qatar had faced and resisted the pressures from some of the 
regional states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, in order to maintain relations with 
Israel. 
 
Rabi’s study refutes the arguments that explain the Qatar-Israel relationship, on the one hand 
as an attempt by Qatar to cultivate its relations with the US and, on the other hand, that Qatar 
was willing to maintain its relationship with Israel for economic reasons. It sets out an 
alternative point of view that argues that Qatar maintained its relationship with Israel for two 
reasons. First, Qatar wanted to demonstrate its independence to execute its foreign policy in 
the eyes of its neighbouring states. Second, Qatar wanted to portray itself as one of the only 
neutral brokers capable of winning the trust of all parties. However, the rational calculations 
of gain and loss for these motives indicate the high cost-low return for this position, 
especially as no party had challenged Qatar in exercising its independence in the making of 
its foreign policy. These identified motives, however, remain inadequate to justify Qatar’s 
insistence in maintaining its relations with Israel. The real motives for Qatar's continued 
relationship with Israel are not fully clear, but the 2009 war in Gaza and its aftermath, of 
severing its relationship with Israel, may indicate some of these reasons, which are related to 
Qatar's close ties with Hamas and the controversial Muslim Brotherhood. 
2.5 Studies examining regional democratization and peace in the Middle East  
The fourth group of studies attempt to link the spread of democracy in the Middle East to 
regional peace and security. Three major studies have discussed the intertwined relationship 
between democracy and peace from two different perspectives. These were authored by 
David Garnham and Mark Tessler (1995),
31
 Kaim Markus (2008),
32
 and Karen Smith and 
Margot Light (2001).
33
 
In the first study, based on the argument that democracies do not fight each other, Garnham 
and Tessler claim that introducing democracy in Arab countries will lead to alleviating the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict or perhaps even resolving it. They assume that democratic countries 
often have the same foreign policy goals and, from this perspective, they differ from non-
democratic countries. If Arab countries adopt democracy in their polity then, the argument 
goes, the chances of achieving peace will consequently increase.  
From another perspective, the study refers to the possible serious concerns stemming from 
the inability of the democratic systems to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, therefore 
increasing the chances of Islamists reaching power, or at least increasing their influence over 
the rulers and, consequently, the risk of starting military operations against Israel. 
The main criticism of the studies that propose that introducing democracy to the Middle East, 
or the process of democratization, will boost the chances of easing the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
and perhaps even of arriving at a final resolution, is that they assume that the conflict stems 
from reasons related to culture, civilization, and the economy. However, these assumptions 
are not fully fit to be seen as part of the reasons behind the Arab-Israeli conflict, since the 
real and underlying reason for this decades-old conflict is the nature of the creation of the 
state of Israel and its relationship with the Palestinians, as it is seen as an occupation of Arab 
land by force, forcing Palestinians to take on refugee status, or become prisoners in cantons 
or citizens with incomplete rights.  
In the second approach, Michael Hudson
34
 takes a different view from Tessler and Garnham. 
Hudson argues that the relationship between the nature of the political system (democratic or 
totalitarian) and foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East, especially with regard to the 
Arab conflict, cannot be proven. In sharp contrast to Tessler and Garnham, he concludes that 
democratic systems will be less inclined to make peace with Israel than totalitarian regimes. 
He argues that democratic regimes may be more belligerent when dealing with non-
democratic regimes. He asserts that the argument “democracies do not go to war against each 
other” within the Middle East context in general is incorrect with respect to the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict, since the causes of the conflict are real grievances, security issues, and ideological 
factors. 
The third study is by Karen Smith and Margot Light (2001).
35
 The study concludes that some 
countries initiate and promote democracy in other countries for different reasons. There are 
mainly three reasons: first, there is the belief that democracy is a good way to rule; second, 
there is a belief that it is easier for the governments of democratic countries to deal with 
foreign governments who share the same values than with those who do not; and finally, 
there is the conviction that democracy establishes appropriate and necessary conditions for 
investment and free trade. From this perspective, democratic governments are seen as the 
best trading partners. Democracy constitutes a barrier to prevent sudden changes in policies 
and plans. Holders of democratic principles believe in the ease of doing business with states 
who share the same values and principles. They also argue that countries with democratic 
systems are more peaceful than their undemocratic counterparts. 
The study by Smith and Light shows the US governmental prespective adopted by Anthony 
Lake, who believes and asserts that the expansion of the values and practices of democracy is 
in the interest of the US because it would bring greater security and prosperity. Once again, 
the logic is that democracies are less prone to waging war, let alone waging war against the 
US. 
Spreading democracy in the Arab countries has emerged as a strategic US foreign policy tool 
to advance long-term US interests in the region. However, as Steven Cook argues, policy 
makers in Washington have found themselves in an awkward position regarding this often 
overtly stated democratizing policy when it comes to the Gulf region 
While the US has committed itself to promoting democracy in the Arab states in general, and 
the Gulf region in particular, the US has found it difficult to trade off with its security 
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options, which do not match democratic values. Consequently, this contradiction has raised 
the following question for policy makers: will promoting democratic reforms in the Gulf 
compromise US interests? There is no easy answer to this question, but it is certain that “the 
process of political reform in the Gulf and the region in general will be the result of internal 
political dynamics, which will set some countries on a democratic political trajectory, while 
the status quo remains in the other, and limited reform becomes hallmark of still others.”36 
The main criticism of this approach can be found in the concepts raised by Tessler and 
Granham (1995) and Salame (1994), who propose that the democratization of Arab regimes 
may lead to the ascent to the helm of power of political forces that do not believe in 
democracy,
37
 which may further complicate, rather than resolve, the crisis.  
Therefore, we are confronting a situation that dictates that democracy must be selective in 
terms of who is allowed to rise to the helm of power, which contradicts the dynamic nature of 
democracy based on free and unrestricted competition. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified and critically reviewed different types of literature related to the 
topic. The analysis of the works exploring the construction of the analytical framework and the 
theoretical concepts revealed the meaning of the regional and sub-regional systems, the 
international world order, and the relations and interactions between these systems and how 
these relations affected GCC regional security and pushed the GCC into adopting a certain 
foreign policy with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process.  
The second set of literature discussed in this chapter aimed to explore the development of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict until the peaceful settlement phase, and how the conflict affected the 
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security of the GCC region, as well as the positive impact that may result in the Middle East 
in the case of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The examination of the third set of literature showed gradually emerging research interest in 
discussing GCC foreign policies in the light of regional and international developments, and 
the role of Qatar’s foreign policy, and the motives, objective, and main premise informing 
Qatar’s foreign policy. 
The fourth set of literature discussed the relationship between democratization and peace and 
security in the Middle East, and argued how democratization may be instrumental in 
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, taking into consideration that the results of the 
democratization process might conflict with US interests in the region. 
Overall, the critical analysis of the relevant literature revealed that no previous study has 
directly examined GCC foreign policy with specific focus on Qatari foreign policy towards 
the Middle East conflict and the related peace process between 1991 and 2005. Thus, the 
literature review shows the originality of the current study. The next chapter will discuss the 
methodological orientation and the data sources the study relied upon, and present the data 
collection and analysis procedures.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology and Research Design of the Study  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological orientation and details of the research design 
adopted to explore the central study questions. After a brief discussion of some of the 
central theoretical concepts in social sciences, particularly related to the political sciences 
and foreign policy studies, the overall qualitative methodological framework of the study is 
presented. The specifics of the research design, including the data collection and analysis 
procedures together with the ethical issues related to the research, are discussed in detail. 
 
 
3.2 Defining the concept of foreign policy  
 
Before explaining how this research will address the three research questions, it is 
appropriate to first discuss some of the various foreign policy definitions in the literature, 
and how this research defines the term. 
According to one approach in the literature, led by Seabury, foreign policy is defined as a 
synonym for state objectives: 
The set of objectives and connections and relations through which the state 
tries, and through the authorities and powers vested in the state under the 
constitution, to interact with foreign states and issues shaping world 
environment using influence, power and sometimes military might and 
violence.
1
 
Another approach defines foreign policy as the process of transforming inputs into 
activities (programmes) that aim to achieve specific objectives and purposes. George 
Modelski is among the proponents of this approach, and he defines foreign policy as “A 
system of activities developed by communities to change the behaviour of other states and 
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to regionalize its activities according to the international environment. Within this 
framework, there are two main activity trends, namely inputs and outputs.”2For his part, 
Charles Hermann defines foreign policy implemented by statesmen and official decision 
makers as “consisting of the official and distinctive attitudes upheld by official decision 
makers or other duly authorized representatives and which are intended to influence the 
attitudes of foreign world units.”3Patrick Morgan defines foreign policy as “official and 
specific acts executed by authoritarian decision makers in national governments or their 
representatives with the aim of influencing the behaviour of other active international 
players.”4Walter Carlsnaes defines foreign policy as “the acts expressed in the form of 
expressly declared directives executed by duly authorized government representatives 
acting on behalf of their sovereign communities and clearly directed towards objectives, 
circumstances and active government and non-government players out of reach and beyond 
the scope of the regional legitimate boundaries of such communities.”5Jonathan Wilkenfeld 
et al.define foreign policy as “consisting of official actions (or reactions) initiated (or 
received and responded to later) by sovereign states with the intent of changing or creating 
new conditions (or issues) outside its sovereign boundaries.”6Another definition of foreign 
policy, based on the elements of planning and national interest, was proposed by Plano and 
Olton, who defined foreign policy as “a planned work methodology developed by decision 
makers with regard to other states or international units for the purpose of achieving 
specific objectives within the framework of national interest.”7 
From this brief discussions of some of the various definitions found in the literature, this 
research will adopt the following definition of foreign policy, which encompasses the 
different dimensions of the study: Foreign policy is a set of programmes, policies, and 
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patterns of relations adopted by an international actor, whether state or non-state, vis-à-vis 
another international actor, and on a specific issue, with the aim of achieving specific 
objectives within the national interest and/or maintaining a preferred international situation. 
3.3 Methodological concepts and orientations in political science 
According to the American Political Science Association, political science is the study of 
governments, public policies and political processes, systems, and political behaviour. 
Political scientists are engaged in revealing the relationships underlying political events 
and conditions, and from these revelations they attempt to construct general principles 
about the way the world of politics works. Subfields of political science include 
comparative politics, international relations (IR), and political theory and philosophy.
8
 
Foreign policy is a subfield of international relations; therefore, what applies to 
international relations from the methods of empiricism or interpretive and methodological 
approaches, also applies to foreign policy. 
Within the framework of social sciences research, the nature of the research topic 
undertaken plays a crucial role in constructing an appropriate research design to study a 
particular set of research questions and aims. Before discussing the research design of the 
study, it is important to note that research is essentially about the production of new 
knowledge that is reliable and accurate. Both qualitative and quantitative research 
paradigms are necessary to reach conclusions about the nature of events, issues 
investigated (usually referred to as ontological assumptions), and what can be known or 
whether the knowledge produced can be trusted (usually recognized as epistemological 
concerns). In more detail, ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, 
becoming, reality, or existence, as well as of the basic categories of being and their 
relations, meaning what exists or the reality that is being investigated by the researcher. 
Epistemology is concerned with the way in which we can come to know about the world 
around us. As such, methodology refers to the wider framework and the means of acquiring 
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knowledge, or the design and techniques used by the researcher to investigate the reality 
under exploration Anderson, Healy and Perry
9
. 
There are two main epistemological traditions in studying IR and foreign policy: 
empiricism and interpretivism. Both traditions seek the type of knowledge and disciplinary 
value that research should produce. 
Empiricism, originally shaped and advocated by the methodological orientation known as 
positivism, which gradually gave way to quantitative-experimental research design, is 
concerned with using the application of the methods of natural science to social science in 
general, and international relations in particular. It is based on the broad assumption that 
knowledge can be accumulated through experience and observation, and is also often 
referred to as positivism. Empiricism aims to advance cumulative knowledge through 
observation and hypothesis testing. As IR is part of the social sciences, it should be studied 
in a systemic, replicable, and evidence-based manner.
10
 There are three core characteristics 
of IR empiricism: 
 (1) international politics can be studied as an objective reality; that is, there is a 
world “out there “that is distinct from the researcher; 
 (2) Theories are held to the standard of predictive validity; and  
(3) Hypotheses tested in IR research should be falsifiable.
11
 
It must be noted that the contemporary concept of empirical methodology, as distinct from 
the notion of “positivist empiricism”, has been widely used in social science, including in 
political science. By exploring the views of certain study participants, most of the 
qualitative research designs are qualified as empirical studies. As such, the questions and 
objectives of the current research, which seek to explore the developments and foreign 
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policy events and behaviour of GCC countries towards the Middle East peace process, can 
be addressed by adopting a qualitative and empirical research design.
12
 
As will be discussed below, qualitative methodology is often depicted as interpretive in 
nature, and as not accepting the rigid application of the methods of natural science to the 
social sciences. Rather, it calls for the interrogation of the ideas, norms, beliefs, and values 
that underlie international politics.
13
 It does not necessarily seek to explain events within 
the framework of cause and effect. Rather, it is referred to as “reflectivism” or “post-
positivism”, as it focuses on understanding social meanings embedded within international 
politics. Interpretivists aim to reveal the core assumptions that underlie the positivist image 
of the world in an attempt to counter the perceived empiricist orthodoxy in IR. 
Interpretivist research agendas seek to understand identities, ideas, norms, and culture in 
international politics. 
In addition to the qualitative methodology mentioned earlier, there are two more major 
methodologies used in international relations and foreign policy: 
1. Quantitative methods in international relations: What are they and why do we 
use them? Quantitative methods refer to data collection and analysis strategies 
where numeric data are collected in order to determine whether or not a 
relationship exists between two or more variables. This can be done either 
through attempting to predict the value of one variable on the basis of another 
known variable, or through attempts to model interactions among actors. Thus, 
quantitative methods encompass both statistical analysis and formal modeling. 
When attempting to understand the relationship between variables, this 
relationship is usually deduced from some form of theoretical proposition.
14
 
2. Mixed methods research is commonly defined as research that combines 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Mixed methods have been used for a 
number of purposes, from complementarily, to triangulation, to simply 
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gathering more information on a given topic. In order to effectively make use 
of mixed methods, the researcher should have a clear idea as to why they are 
using mixed methods from the outset. Furthermore, in addition to bringing 
together methods across the quantitative–qualitative divide, innovative 
methodology is one more methodology that can be included among the 
methodologies, such as agent-based modeling, which is hard to categorize as 
either quantitative or qualitative, since it combines elements of both types.
15
 
3.4 Qualitative methodology  
The nature of the research problem, and the questions posed, usually help to identify the 
type of research methodology and research design in a given study. The concept of 
methodology refers to the way in which one may acquire knowledge in a systematic way. In 
more detail, qualitative methods are data collection and analysis techniques or strategies 
that rely upon the collection of, and analysis of, non-numeric data.
16 
Qualitative methods are used in order to better understand how we make sense of the world 
around us, and as such require us to focus on the meanings and processes that make up 
international politics. Often this is done through in-depth studies of particular events, 
phenomena, regions, countries, organizations, or individuals, while qualitative methods in 
international relations are sometimes conflated with case study research design. Qualitative 
methods here are meant to describe the diverse set of tools and resources that we can draw 
upon to collect and analyse data that come in the form of spoken or written language that is 
not formalized into numbers. Qualitative methods often rely on inductive reasoning 
because qualitative researchers commonly generate theoretical propositions out of 
empirical observations.
17 
To understand the meaning and the dimensions of methodology, it would be useful to have 
an overview of the term and its different definitions. Sahin refers to methodology in 
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general terms as “the process, principles and procedures used in order to approach life-
problems and come up with their possible solution. As a technical term, it can be explained 
as the way a research project is carried out.”18Silverman, on the other hand, refers to the 
choices of methodology we make about the case to study, the methods of data gathering, 
forms of data analysis, and so on, in planning and executing a research study. So our 
methodology defines how we will go about studying phenomena. It can be defined very 
broadly as qualitative or quantitative, or more narrowly as grounded theory or conversation 
analysis.
19
 
Both Sahin and Silverman agree on the procedural nature of methodology, but what Sahin 
summarizes as “the procedures”, Silverman elaborates on and sets out broadly as “Methods 
of data gathering, and forms of data analysis.”20In other words, Silverman does not restrict 
methodology to its procedural nature, but goes beyond that to state that methodology 
comprises a preference for certain methods among many other methods: the theory of 
scientific knowledge or set of assumptions about the nature of reality; the role of the 
researcher, and the concept of action and social actors; the range of solutions, devices, and 
stratagems used in tackling a research problem; and, finally, the systematic sequence of 
procedural steps to be followed once the method has been selected.
21
 
The second point that should be discussed is qualitative analysis, which, along with 
quantitative analysis, is one of the two main analytical methodologies. This research makes 
use of overall qualitative analysis techniques, which means that the data describe or 
interpret the subject of the research using words, images, or diagrams, rather than statistics, 
digits, and numbers. The reasons that qualitative analysis was the selected methodology for 
this research are that, first, this approach offers a deep understanding of the subject of the 
study and, second, this approach can provide answers to questions beginning with “Why”, 
instead of just settling for describing the phenomenon or the frequency of its occurrence. In 
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other words, this approach provides a more efficient framework that enables us to interpret 
and discuss the subject of the study. 
The research was carried out in a number of phases. The first phase was before the start of 
the main research and involved determining the research problem, the research questions, 
and the research objectives behind the research questions. The second phase included 
specifying the types of sources required the sources suitable for this research, and the 
procedures to be followed for the collection, extraction, and analysis of data. The last phase 
was the writing up of the discussions, findings, and conclusions 
3.4.1Construction of the research design in the study  
Before discussing the construction of the research design in the current study, it is 
important first to define the concept of research design. Research design refers to the 
overall strategy that one may choose to integrate the different components of the study in a 
coherent and logical way, thereby ensuring one will effectively address the research 
problem; it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data. 
The other important point is the function of the research design, which can be summarized 
by stating that the function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained 
enables one to effectively address the research problem as logically and as unambiguously 
as possible.
22
 
Another definition refers to the research design as “the proper choice of cases (number and 
types), the type of indicator and the mode of analysis that are needed to provide a proper 
answer to the research questions asked.”23 Another, simpler, definition for the research 
design can be found in Lamont’s work. He refers to the research design as “setting out the 
steps you need to take in order to complete your research essay.”24 
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Van Evera’s definition of theory is a useful illustration: “Empirical researchers draw some 
form of proposition out of a relationship between two or more variables. In fact, for 
empirical researchers, this proposition defines positive theory
25
. Theories are general 
statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes of phenomena. They 
are composed of causal laws or hypotheses, explanations, and antecedent conditions. In 
short, theories describe or explain causes or effects. For students of international relations 
trained in political science, this is likely how they will approach the question of theory. 
From the perspective of an empirical researcher, theories lend themselves to empirical 
testing and are falsifiable. There are two broad strategies that one can employ in order to 
test one's theory: observation and experimentation. The most frequently used strategy in IR 
is observation. When designing empirical research as a study grounded in observation, 
there are two further choices: to observe a large number of cases, or just a few. When a 
large number is observed, this is referred to as “large-n research”; when looking at just a 
few, this is known as “case study research”.26 
Based on the nature of the research questions, and the nature of the knowledge that it is 
expected that the answers will produce, the nature of the research design will be 
determined. If the research is seeking to explore and examine causal relations between two 
or more variables, or to explain phenomena, the research is empirical. However, if the 
research is focused on ideas, concepts, or meaning, or on ontological givens that we take 
for granted, such as sovereignty and justice,
27
 the research will be interpretive in its design 
as well.  
Types of research design in international relations and, of course, in foreign policy do not 
differ much compared with those in political science, in general terms, and the rest of the 
social sciences. Each of these types has advantages and disadvantages; the researcher can 
choose which best suits the research in terms of subject, the amount of data required for 
research, the cost/benefit, and researcher skills. The most important types of research 
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design can be summarized as case study design, descriptive design, experimental design, 
exploratory design, historical design, observational design, and sequential design.
28
 
3.4.2 Engaging with the research questions 
First, what were the main determinants, internal and external, facing the GCC states while 
formulating their foreign policies towards the Middle East peace process between 1991 and 
2005? 
Second, what was the overall foreign policy agreed upon by the GCC states towards the 
Middle East peace process during the same period? 
Finally, to what extent was Qatari foreign policy convergent with, or divergent from, GCC 
foreign policy regarding the peace process between 1991 and 2005? 
The first research question is addressed by drawing on the literature that explores various 
issues related to the nature of foreign policy dynamics, especially that dealing with the 
security threats in the Gulf region. Engaging with the main internal and external 
determinants facing the GCC states as they develop their foreign policies towards the 
Middle East peace process will help further to clarify the wider research context of the 
study. 
The research assumes that the internal determinants, such as political and security relations 
among GCC member states, public opinion, and some of the regional incidents that led to 
international interference in the region, had an impact on the GCC and the foreign policies 
of its member states with respect to the peace process. From this perspective, the study 
examines the influence of such internal and external determinants in the formulation of the 
foreign policies of the GCC. This study, however, expects that these determinants had 
various degrees of influence on GCC foreign policies. 
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In addition, this study examines a number of external determinants that constitute sources 
of tensions and threats to GCC security. For example, it investigates how the threat from 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which had been one of the most important sources of threat to 
GCC security, had receded and was nearly fully replaced by the Iraqi and the Iranian 
threats, and how this new development further increased the tensions in US-Iraqi relations, 
on the one hand, and US-Iranian relations on the other. Finally, it looks at how these new 
tensions affected GCC security, and consequently reshuffled their foreign policy 
objectives. 
Another external determinant is the effect of the 11 September attacks in 2001, and the 
subsequent pressures exercised by the US on GCC member states for the purpose of 
applying the US-proposed democratic model on GCC regimes. It is important to highlight 
that this model was based on the assumption that democracies possess a means of 
expressing anger other than violence, and, consequently, it is possible and easier to build 
real and long-term political partnerships with democracies than with autocracies.  
The second question of the study revolves around the broad GCC foreign policy towards 
the Middle East peace process between the Madrid Conference in1991 and 2005. To 
address this question, the study will also examine GCC foreign policy towards the Middle 
East peace process since the start of the process through closely analysing the statements 
issued by GCC annual summit meetings, as well as the statements released after ministerial 
meetings with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process. 
Furthermore, the study examines GCC foreign policy with respect to the Palestinian 
Intifada and the Roadmap, as well as the more recent developments in the aftermath of the 
death of Yasser Arafat. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the study focuses on the State of Qatar to critically 
investigate its foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process and to explore the 
extent to which it was consistent with the rest of GCC foreign policy between 1991 and 
2005. To address this issue, the study briefly examines Qatar’s foreign policy orientations 
prior to the Middle East peace process and after the first Lebanon invasion in 1982, and its 
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attempts to encourage the US to engage in direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), as well as its foreign policy with respect to the Middle East peace 
process, through which Qatar sought to support Arab rights in general, and Palestinian 
rights in particular, with a special emphasis on the issue of Jerusalem. The study then 
moves to examine how Qatar’s foreign policy shifted and began to engage with Israel, 
encouraging the latter to adopt certain policies to assist in the success of the Middle East 
peace process. The study will also explore how such policies asserted for Israel the 
importance of reaping the dividends of the peace process, in case Israel succeeded in 
achieving permanent peace with its Arab neighbours, and how Qatar’s foreign policy was 
also consistent when it came to condemning Israel and its policies from the Qatari 
perspective. 
From another perspective, this part of the study examines how US foreign policy has 
influenced Qatar’s foreign policy with respect to two particular issues. First, the 
normalization of Qatari trade relations with Israel, which entailed inviting the Israeli 
government led by Benjamin Netanyahu to attend the Middle East and North Africa 
Economic Cooperation Conference held in Doha in 1997, despite Netanyahu’s extremist 
policies, which Qatar viewed as detrimental to the Middle East peace process, as well as 
the dissatisfaction of major Arab states such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
and Egypt with this invitation. Second, it investigates Qatari support for the US Middle 
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which aimed, among other things, to support 
democratic values in the Middle East, despite the fact that, at the time of writing, Qatar still 
has not fully democratized its own methods of governance.  
In comparing the findings of this study regarding the GCC member states and Qatar’s 
foreign policy orientations, particularly with respect to the Middle East peace process, the 
relationship with Israel, and the US, the study will identify the extent of Qatar’s foreign 
policy convergence with, or divergence from, GCC foreign policies, thus reaching some 
recommendations that could help ease the tension within the GCC. Furthermore, this study 
offers conclusions to assist in achieving peace between both the Arab and Israeli sides 
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3.4.3 Data sources and data collection/analysis procedures 
Within qualitative research designs, there are many strategies used for collecting data in 
international relations and foreign policy. These include interviews, focus groups, internet-
based research, and archival or document-based research. Moreover, they also include non-
textual forms of work, such as studying monuments, maps, art, or other social 
artefacts.
29
There are also two more strategies: the questionnaire and the survey.
30
 For the 
purpose of validation of the collected data, it would be useful to triangulate the techniques 
used to collect the data. As discussed above, the main data that the current study will 
generate are primarily contained within the official documents produced by the UN, as well 
as by GCC countries (mainly the Qatari government). Therefore, document analysis 
constitutes an important part of the data collection strategy in this study. The procedures of 
the document analysis and the main data sources in this study are discussed below. 
3.4.4 Document analysis  
As this research is mainly engaging with documents produced by institutes and officials, 
and media and policy documents, it makes use of archival and document analysis of 
primary sources.It is important, therefore, to shed light on the definition of document 
analysis: 
Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating 
documents both printed and electronic (computer-based and internet-
transmitted) material. Like other analytical methods in qualitative research, 
document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to 
elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge. 
Documents contain text (words) and images that have been recorded without 
a researcher’s intervention.31 
                                               
29Op.cit. Lamont, p.79. 
30
 Op.cit, Pennings et al., p.78. 
31Op.cit., http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3316/QRJ0902027 
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Atkinson and Coffey (1997) refer to documents as “social facts”, which are produced, 
shared, and used in socially organized ways. Documents that may be used for systematic 
evaluation as part of a study take a variety of forms. They include advertisements, agendas, 
attendance registers, minutes of meetings, manuals, background papers, books and 
brochures, diaries and journals, event programmes (that is, printed outlines), letters and 
memoranda, maps and charts, and newspapers.
32
 
3.4.5 Introducing the primary sources  
A number of primary sources are used within this research, such as the statements of the 
leaders of the GCC countries, closing statements of the GCC summits and ministerial 
meetings, statements of Qatari officials on different levels extracted from semi-
governmental Qatari newspapers, and some governmental archives, United Nations 
General Assembly meetings, and the minutes of the Security Council that have not been 
used before in research. 
The documents of the final statements of the GCC summit were used for two purposes: to 
explore the general frame and the guiding trends established by the Supreme Council in 
dealing with the relationship between the GCC states and Israel, and to examine the foreign 
policy stances of the Council on the issues related to the peace process. 
The UN documents, whether from the General Assembly or the Security Council, were 
used to explore Qatar's diplomatic stance towards the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Arab rights, and then the various issues pertaining to the peace process. It must be noted 
that the overall tone of the language has always been pragmatic. For example, the Emir’s 
addresses to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) reflect quite a harsher tone 
than the other Qatari officials’ statements delivered before the UN Security Council while 
discussing the situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  
The selected semi-official Qatari newspapers, and the statements of the Qatari 
governmental officials, have generated rich data to explore and understand the nature of the 
                                               
32http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3316/QRJ0902027 
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goals, strategies, and manoeuvres that Qatar adopted to achieve its objectives regarding its 
relationship with Israel and the peace process, and to take certain positions related to the 
peace initiatives, including the initiative for political reform in the Middle East. 
The official documents used in the study are described below.  
3.4.5.a UN documents 
UN documents used include two types of documents: the addresses delivered by Qatari 
officials (Emirs, foreign ministers, diplomats) before the UN General Assembly during the 
ordinary or extraordinary sessions, and verbatim documents of UN Security Council 
meetings. These documents were collected from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library in New 
York with the assistance of a friend who helped the researcher to work in the library. These 
documents were photocopied, before data were collected and analysed. The documents 
obtained from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library covered the period from 1991 to 2002. 
Documents relevant to the later period covered by the study (2002 to 2005) were collected 
from electronic sources when these documents were made available on the internet. 
3.4.5.b  The Emir of Qatar addresses 
The researcher obtained the addresses delivered by the Emir of the State of Qatar from the 
Emiri Palace Library in Doha, to which the researcher was granted access. The author 
requested permission to access the speeches delivered by Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad and 
Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa. The speeches of Khalifa Bin Hamad were not available; 
however, the speeches of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa were available, and were provided to 
the researcher as separate, unpublished documents for each speech, grouped in a number of 
pages. This phase only required two days. These speeches covered the period from 1996 to 
2005. This was followed by the data collection and analysis of data as detailed below.  
The Emir’s addresses covered the issues concerning the peace process. These addresses 
indicated the Qatari understanding and the role played by Qatar based on such an 
understanding, as well as the orientations of Qatar’s foreign policy with regard to these 
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issues and Qatar’s relationship with its neighbours and the world’s superpowers. The main 
substance of the discussion in Chapters Eight to Ten is also mainly based on a close 
analysis of the Emir of Qatar addresses, as mainly reported in the official archive and the 
semi-official AL Raya and Al Watan newspapers. These newspapers are described in detail 
below. 
3.4.5.c The Qatari press  
The Qatari press contained the largest quantity of primary documents, which were also the 
most enriching. Statements by Qatari officials, such as ministers, ambassadors, and 
diplomats, regarding the subject of the research, which were published in Qatari 
newspapers such as Al Raya and Al Watan, were of great importance because for a long 
time, Qatar did not have a department in each ministry to archive the statements made by 
officials of these ministries, nor a state institute like the Public Record Office in England. 
Therefore, the semi-official Al Raya and Al Watan newspapers were considered as the most 
credible and reliable media to research the opinions, views, and statements of the State of 
Qatar. 
No newspaper in Qatar is permitted to publish news or even photographs regarding the 
Emir or the ministers, or to quote statements, without referring to either the Emiri Palace or 
the Secretariat General of the Council of Ministers of the relevant ministry for approval of 
publication.  
The statements by Qatari foreign ministers and ambassadors, and other Qatari diplomats, 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process covered nearly the whole time span of 
the study, except for a few months of 2000, which were missing from the archives of the 
Qatar National Library. These documents were also not available from its publisher.  
It was not possible to access old issues of the Al Arab and Al Raya newspapers through the 
internet; to find them required researching the archives of the Qatar National Library. This 
was not an easy task, as officials at first refused to extract these issues, which were kept in 
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a special archive. When these officials realized that the researcher was not asking for 
specific issues but all the issues kept in the archive from 1970 to 2005, their answer was 
adamantly negative. Through contacts with Qatari officials in the Publication and 
Information Department of the Ministry of Culture, Arts, and Heritage, the researcher was 
granted a permit to use all the resources of the Qatar National Library, and officials in that 
department began cooperating. The author agreed with library staff that they would bring 
all the issues covering a three- or four-month period, and that these would be left for the 
researcher to extract the issues that were needed.  
The researcher began extracting the data related to the subject of the research, placed Post-
it notes to mark the newspapers, and recorded the headline, page, and date of publication in 
a separate notebook. Then the newspaper articles were photocopied, before returning the 
original issues to the archive. The researcher transferred the photocopies into special files, 
which were serialized in a primary manner according to date. This process took nearly one 
year. This work required photocopying nearly one hundred kilograms of documents and 
statements published by Al Raya and Al Watan Al Arab.  
After the collection of data, the documents were serialized chronologically, and then 
photocopied again. A copy of the documents was kept in Doha, and a second copy was 
shipped by airfreight to Cairo, where I began collecting the data. The reason the researcher 
photocopied the documents and kept a copy in Qatar was that the researcher feared that all 
or part of the documents might be lost during airfreight to Cairo. 
3.4.5.d The statements of the GCC summits and GCC ministerial meetings 
Statements of the GCC summits and GCC ministerial meetings were obtained from the 
website of the GCC and the newspapers. These documents were treated in the same way as 
the documents used to collect the data for the addresses delivered by the Emir of Qatar.  
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3.5. Data analysis procedures: identification of the main themes 
According to the research questions and objectives, the data to be collected were classified 
into two main types related to the general subject of the study and its timeframe. These 
types were: data related to the GCC and GCC member states, and data related to the State 
of Qatar.  
The issues relevant to the subject of the research were classified into: 
A: The Middle East peace issues during the timeframe of the study, which are the issues 
supported by the foreign policy of the GCC and GCC member states, including: the Madrid 
Conference; the multiparty talks; the Oslo Principles Accord; the Gaza-Jericho Accord; the 
Second Oslo Agreement; the Redeployment Protocol; the Economic Cooperation in Middle 
East and North Africa; normalizing relations with Israel; the Wye Plantations Accord; the 
Wye River Accord; the Second Camp David Agreement; the issue of Jerusalem; the 
Second Intifada; the American stance versus the stances of the GCC member states with 
regard to terrorism; the right of self-determination; the Roadmap; and the stances of the 
GCC member states with respect to the US drive to promote democracy in the Middle East 
as a means of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and protecting US interests in the Middle 
East.  
B. Data related to the issues mentioned above in addition to smaller secondary issues, 
which aim to clarify and detail Qatar’s foreign policy.As Miles and Huberman propose, 
analysis “is made up of three types of follows of activities: data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing.”33 Miles and Huberman refer to data reduction as: Simply the 
elimination of redundant and useless data to answer research questions and to keep data 
simple, abstract and focused on the research subject and questions so that such data would 
later be presented as readable and meaningful data.
34
 
                                               
33
 Mathew B. Miles and Michael Hubermann, Qualitative Data Analysis,(Sage:London,1994), p.10. 
34 Ibid.pp.10-11. 
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This analysis process continued for the entire duration of the research. For example, in the 
case of the addresses of the Emir of Qatar, a document may consist of a number of pages 
but only a few lines are useful to help in producing answers to the research questions. 
Therefore, all the document data that contain important information but that are outside the 
scope of the research are eliminated. Practically, these phrases are usually in the form of 
complete sentences or paragraphs that are placed inside a coloured frame until the more 
advanced analysis phase. The same applies to UN documents, statements from GCC 
summits, and statements from GCC ministerial meetings.  
With regard to data extracted from newspapers, which included the statements of 
government officials or official statements, such data were reduced in a primary way at the 
data collection site and a coloured mark was placed on the news item and another frame on 
the part relevant to the research. The entire item was then re-examined after the completion 
of the data collection process. 
3.5.a Document summary form  
During the process of data collection, when each document used in the research was 
accessed, a document summary form was attached to the document detailing the data 
collected, the site of collection, who was involved, a description of the document, a brief 
summary of the content, which page of the document was relevant for the research, and 
finally the importance of the document. 
3.5.b Engaging with the data: Discerning patterns of meaning from the data  
After the completion of the data collection process, assigning codes to documents and to 
issues, and assigning other codes to data inside documents and categorization, it was 
necessary to display such data in a readable form that gave meaning to the subject of the 
study. This was achieved through the coding method explained above. Having provided 
preliminary conclusions about the phenomenon being studied, at an early stage the 
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researcher suggested expanding the research to cover unexplored areas, such as the 
relationship between the US, Qatar, and democracy. 
This previous issue resulted in a shift in explanation of what, how, and why the foreign 
policy of Qatar regarding the Middle East peace process differed from that of the rest of the 
GCC member states. This is in line with Gherardi and Turner’s statement that “Data are 
used to fill in gaps in puzzle”,35 and with Miles and Hubermann’s view that “Qualitative 
studies are often mounted for exploring a new area and to build or emerge a theory about 
it.”36 
Contrast-comparison tactics were adopted throughout the writing up of the findings and 
conclusion. 
What emerges at this point is the comparison between what types of data there are and to 
which issues they are relevant. Comparisons were first made between the statements of the 
makers of foreign policy and the actual policies implemented, and between the GCC 
foreign policy orientations and Qatar’s foreign policy, and even between the statements 
made by a particular official and the statements of the same official at a later time.  
In conclusion, the choice of the qualitative approach methodology for this study was made 
for objective reasons related to the ability of this methodology to reveal new facts, as well 
as to discuss old and established facts, and its ability to provide an interpretation of the 
subject of the study, namely foreign policy. 
This approach was adopted throughout the study while complying with the standard rules, 
and introducing a few modifications to the analysis tools to fit the nature of the study. 
 
 
                                               
35Silva Gherardi and Barry Turner, Real Men Don’t Collect Soft Data, (dipartainto di politica social, 
Universita di Trento:Trento,1987). 
36Mathew B. Miles and Michael Hubermann, Qualitative Data Analysis,(Sage:London,1994), p.90. 
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3.6 Research ethics 
The researcher observed the standard ethical procedures of impartiality and objectivity 
throughout the study. The primary or secondary sources originally in Arabic were 
translated into English with the utmost care. In order to avoid any possible bias reflecting 
the views of the researcher concerning the ideas in these sources, the translation was 
overseen by an independent expert translator. Similarly, the researcher did not deliberately 
conceal or avoid any sources that might have been contrary to his perceptions or 
intellectual conviction. The researcher has maintained "critical reflectivity” throughout the 
study in order to avoid the possibility of the researcher’s own views influencing the use of 
the original sources. In addition, the data have been safeguarded and maintained in the best 
possible way in their raw and analysed forms, to protect them from the risks of loss or 
misuse. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the overall research methodology of the study and offered a 
rationale for adopting a qualitative research design to explore the central research 
questions. After a brief discussion on the nature of research methodology and the types of 
research design used in political sciences and international relations, the main data sources 
and specific data collection and analysis procedures were presented. The documents and 
other archival data sources were also explained in terms of their importance and how they 
were collected. The chapter explained the procedures of data analysis and the related 
ethical issues. 
The next chapter will discuss a number of internal determinants that contributed to shaping 
the political environment under which foreign policy decisions for GCC states were made 
with respect to the Middle East peace process.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Internal Foreign Policy Determinants of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 
Peace Process (1991-2005) 
4.1Introduction 
This chapter discusses the internal determinants that influenced the foreign policy of the 
GCC states towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process since the Madrid 
Conference, and up until 2005. The chapter will discuss security and political cooperation 
among GCC states, the dilemma of regional security and sub-regional threats, and the 
conflicting US-Iranian interests in the Gulf. It will also discuss the influence of public 
opinion on the GCC countries regarding the Palestinian question. Finally, it will shed light 
on the attitude of the Palestinian leadership towards the GCC policy regarding the 
Palestinian cause after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
The discussion in this chapter is primarily based on the existing relevant literature gleaned 
from different sources, including journals, academic papers, and books, that can be 
regarded as secondary sources, as well as primary sources, such as final declarations issued 
after GCC summit meetings and official diplomatic statements published by various 
newspapers. 
4.2The concept of ‘determinant ‘factors in foreign policy studies  
This chapter and the next chapter explore what are known as the external and internal 
determinant factors in foreign policy studies, which interact to produce effects on foreign 
policy decision makers that vary in strength. The political science literature on foreign 
policy suggests that foreign policy is a product of interwoven and overlapping factors that 
interact to formulate general foreign policy frameworks that prudent foreign policy 
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decision makers must respect and observe.
1
 These factors differ, with different foreign 
policy issues being important for different states. For example, the internal and external 
determinants that influenced the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding 
the apartheid regime in South Africa will differ from the internal and external determinants 
that shape Saudi Arabia's foreign policy on the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, and 
so on.
2
 
Internal and external determinants influencing the formulation of foreign policy are 
affected by a broad spectrum of factors, including population, economic strength, military 
and media capabilities, security issues and borders, external influence and clout and its 
effect on the political decision-making process, disputes and rivalry, and finally internal 
stability. 
Since its establishment in 1981, the GCC has tried to manage foreign policy, and maintain 
coherence and balance between each country's wish to shape foreign policies reflecting its 
national interest (which is of central importance for the foreign policy of any country) and 
its political, economic, and security capabilities. It has demonstrated its awareness of the 
sources of external threats, the necessity of unifying the GCC's foreign policies in a way 
that will establish security and stability in the region, and the importance of putting into 
effect Arab coordination on the external level. 
4.3 The internal determinants influencing the political and security cooperation of 
GCC countries  
There are two types of relationships among the GCC countries: the first one consists of 
bilateral relationships that interact outside the GCC's framework, which attempt to solve 
the border disputes among various countries of the Council and represent them in their 
truest form; the second type is represented in the multilateral relationships among the GCC 
countries. The most important governing determinants of the relationships at this level are 
                                               
1
Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,1982), pp.3-12. 
2Mohamed S. Saliem, Analysis of Foreign Policy, (Cairo: Al-Nahdah Al Masryeh,1988), p.137. 
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border disputes on the one hand, and extreme adherence to the national sovereignty of 
every country on the other hand.
3
 This is attributable to the tribal nature of the Gulf 
countries, whose regimes usually stabilize under the settlement of the patriarchy system, 
based on taking care of the tribe as a whole, and the patriarch's ability to influence 
individuals and the environment surrounding his tribe, as well as his ability to distribute 
sources of wealth within the tribe.
4
 
Since its formation, the GCC has acted as a framework wherein the various views and 
conceptions of its member countries are blended to bring them closer together in an attempt 
to unify them and to find a network of joint interests. The aim of this joint Gulf framework 
has been to endeavour to provide the optimal degree of interaction and coordination among 
its countries at the official and public levels, and some aspects and indicators refer to the 
intensity of the breadth and the depth of the political situation between the GCC states. The 
intensity of interaction among the GCC countries was represented in summits or bilateral 
meetings, and the nature of Council convention at its various levels, starting from the 
Supreme Council, which represents the leaders passing through ministerial councils, sub–
committee meetings, and so on.
5
 
4.3.a Political cooperation among GCC countries 
In addition to the alarming structural deficiencies in the executive mechanisms, which limit 
the actions and successes of the GCC, and also the deficiencies in the executive apparatus 
of the GCC that could well derive from weakness in official political administration among 
the leadership of the Council,
6
there is also a disparity in tendencies and political viewpoints 
on many issues among the GCC countries. This pragmatic divergence has had a negative 
effect on the potentiality for crystallizing joint views and common conceptions of the GCC, 
                                               
3Ali Mohamed Fekhro, Reality and Future of the Gulf-Gulf Relations, Al Mostakbal AlArabi, (Beirut: Centre 
for Arab Unity Studies, vol. 268, June 2001), pp.125-126. 
4Mohamed El Remeihy, Gulf Security and GCC Arab Countries, in Gamal Sanad El Sewedy (ed.), GCC Arab 
Countries on the Verge of the 21st Century. (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Centre for Researches and 
Strategic Studies,1999), p.174. 
5Mamdouh Saber, Manama Summit: A Perusal of Challenges and Consequences, Shoa'uon Khalejeh, (Cairo: 
Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, vol. 40, winter 2005), p.98. 
6Ali Fakhro, Contemporary Arab Affairs,vol. 5, no. 4, October–December 2012,p.517. 
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in spite of not yet reflecting the Gulf’s unanimity. However, there is a problem if the 
individual policy of a country has an influence on the general entity, namely the Council. 
This appeared in the boycott by Bahrain of the Gulf summit held in Doha between 7 and 9 
December 1996.As seen in the border dispute between Qatar and El-Bahrain, this step had 
a dangerous effect on the course of the Council's action. 
Also, democratic development in the GCC countries has advanced gradually, as has been 
manifest in the developments witnessed by Shura councils year after year, whether 
concerning the constitution or competency, and the best example of which is the 
consultative body affiliated to the Council,
7
 which was formed at the 18th summit held in 
Kuwait from 20 to 22 December 1997.
8
This body is considered to be one of the 
mechanisms that has led to the enhancing of the Gulf meetings and councils on various 
levels.
9
 It is also an important step on the road to acting on and activating public 
contributions to the decision-making process at the group level, and in the future this will 
be developed to become a “Gulf Parliament, whose members can be gradually elected by 
direct free election. 
It is noteworthy that emphasis on the political development of GCC countries is not taken 
as a symmetrical political unit, as each of the Council's six countries has a special 
developmental political context through which differences and various realities have been 
formed.
10
 This can be explained by the circumstances of origination of each country, its 
internal political structure, the degree of its political stability, and the nature of its 
relationship with its geographical surroundings.
11
 
                                               
7
For more information, see Mohmaed Alswied, The Gulf Cooperation Council: A Model of Regional 
International Regime, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988),pp.186-203. 
8Salah Salem Marzouka, El Doha Summit and Gulf Cooperation Challenges, As-Siyasah Ad-Dawliyyah 
(Cairo: El Ahram Establishment, vol. 127, January 1997), p.197. 
9Ashraf Saad El-Eissawi, Gulf in the 21stCentury: Towards a Comprehensive Strategic Security, Shoa'uon 
Khalejeh, (Cairo: Gulf Strategic Studies, Cairo, vol. 4, April 1999), p.18. 
10Mohamed Khalifa, Arab Gulf: Conciliation Aspects that should be Invested In. Shoa'uon Khalejeh, (Cairo: 
Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, vol. 6, June 1999), p.14. 
11
Ghanim Al-Najar, Reality and Future of Gulf States’ Political Situation, Al Mostakbal AlArabi, (Beirut: 
Centre for Arab Unity Studies (Issue) no. 268, June 2001), pp.90-91. 
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As the reciprocal visits were the most prominent interaction pattern among GCC countries 
at the bilateral level, the ministerial meetings, which issue similar data or that adopt some 
distinct attitudes towards regional or international issues, are still considered to be the most 
important methods of interaction at the annual collective level within the GCC framework. 
This is without ignoring the central importance of the annual summit that is held at the end 
of each year, and the consultative summit agreed upon by the GCC in the first half of every 
year. (Council members agreed to hold two yearly meetings at the top level for GCC 
countries, instead of only one meeting.)Thereupon, the first consultative summit for GCC 
leaders was convened in Jeddah on 10 May 1999.Themechanism of this type of summit 
suits the nature of GCC countries and agrees with their structures, as it provides freedom of 
discussion and an atmosphere giving a suitable opportunity for engaging in dialogue, 
through which viewpoints on pending issues are exchanged to reach a unified attitude 
towards them.
12
 
The meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Jeddah from 8 to 9 April 2000 was held in the 
light of important developments that occurred at the relationship level among the states of 
the GCC, which reflects the common willingness to build additional economic integration, 
and the potentiality for progress in projects that would realize more political cooperation 
and convergence between the GCC states. The most important aspects of this can be 
crystallized in four points:
13
 first, the mutual feeling of relief in Bahrain and Qatar after the 
mutual visits of the leaders of the two countries; second, diplomatic and consular 
cooperation between Bahrain and Oman; third, the establishment of the Higher Joint 
Committee between the UAE and Bahrain; and fourth, the development that took place in 
relations between the UAE and Oman after the settlement of the border issue between the 
two countries. 
 
                                               
12Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, Fourth Gulf Consultation Summit in Jeddah: An Assessment, Shoa'uon 
Khalejeh, (Cairo: Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, Issue no. 30, summer 2002), p.130.  
13
Mohamed Khalifa, Gulf meeting in Jeddah and the Re-affirmation of the Fixed Standards, Shoa'uon 
Khalejeh, (Cairo: Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, Issue no. 16, May 2000), p.42. 
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Furthermore, the events of 11 September 2001 imposed pressure on GCC countries to 
adopt political and democratic reforms. US President George W. Bush delivered a speech 
to the American Research Institution on 26 February 2003 about re-mapping the Middle 
East,
14
 encouraging the spread of democracy in the region, and making broad political and 
economic reforms. He declared that the new Iraq after the downfall of Saddam Hussein's 
regime in March 2003 would be part of a good pattern of democracy in the Middle East 
and would be, as he expressed it, the motive for implementing changes, modernization 
processes, and political exposure in exchange for marginalizing extremist factors, so that a 
new Middle East could be born.
15
 Also, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote an 
article in the Washington Post on 7 August 2004, addressing American persistence in 
changing the Middle East, and saying that the new Iraq, which was to be built from the 
debris of Saddam Hussein's regime, would be a fundamental element in building a new, 
different Middle East.
16
What was also emphasized was the differences between the GCC 
countries regarding their relations with Israel, at least at the public level. Qatar's foreign 
minister, Hamad bin Jassem, asserted that he met with Israeli officials on26 occasions up 
until 2006.
17
However, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, for example, never met with any 
Israeli official, at least publicly, although it was claimed that some Saudi officials met with 
their counterparts or other Israeli officials at intervals.
18
 
The relations between GCC countries and Israel range from public and repeated visits (in 
the case of Qatar) to the full refusal and denial of the existence of the state of Israel, and the 
lack of any cooperative interaction between them in public (as in the case of Saudi 
Arabia).
19
 
                                               
14 Ibid. 
15Mohamed Kamal, Democracy in the American Agenda, Aldemocratiyah (Cairo: Centre for Political 
Researches and Studies, Issue no. 13, January 2004),p.34.  
16Pakinam El-SharKawy, Democracy in the American Vocabulary, Aldemocratiyah (Cairo: Centre for 
Political Researches and Studies, Issue no. 13, January 2004),p.44.  
17An interview with Hamad Bin Jasem, Qatari Foreign Minister, 2004. 
18
Elie Podeh, Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative, 2002-2014: A Plausible Missed Opportunity, Middle East 
Journal,vol.68, no. 4, autumn, 2014, p.592. 
 
19Clive Jones and Yoel Guzansky, Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States: Toward the Emergence of a Tacit 
Security Regime?, Contemporary Security Policy,2017, p.13. 
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Therefore, processes of democratic reform and development have come to have an 
advanced standing from the point of view of the security of the GCC, considering the fact 
that the development of political systems towards democracy and political reform is a 
necessary condition for increasing the ability of these systems to deal with such internal, 
regional, and international variables for establishing national security as a broad concept.
20
 
Under this framework, it can be said that methods of integrated interactions among the six 
GCC members are limited, whether at the bilateral level or the collective level. The 
Council has remained a mere consultative field for its members, not being entitled to issue 
resolutions, regardless of the ambition to carry them out and follow-up their execution, as 
resolutions are still sovereign ones issued by the absolute will of GCC countries on the 
basis of their wishes of recommendations passed by the GCC. Therefore, it is noted that the 
most important achievements that took place under the auspices of the Council were 
executed within the frame of bilateral relations only, with the exclusion of collective 
relations.
21
However, on the institutional level the GCC showed some success in building 
cooperation at different levels between its member states.
22
 
This conclusion applies to the two most important events that the GCC experienced before 
11 September 2001, namely, the Bahrain-Qatar agreement on the verdict pronounced by 
the International Court of Justice concerning the border disputes between the two countries, 
and launching thereafter the development of a considerable integrated framework between 
them. Also, there was the signing by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar of 
demarcation plans concerning border disputes between the two countries. 
4.3.b Dilemma of Gulf defence and security arrangements in the region 
The countries that became members of the GCC faced several threats before the GCC was 
established. Some of these were local, territorial, and international threats that urged them 
                                               
20Mohamed Saad Abu-Amoud, Democratic Development of the Arabic World and Arab National Security, 
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to think carefully about finding ways to secure their national security, protection of 
sovereignty, and independence against foreign threats of all types. Hence, when Gulf 
security, we should first mention the sources of tension and instability in each country, and 
then the efforts exerted by the GCC to overcome these problems. 
4.3.b.i Sources of tension and instability in the Gulf
23
 
There are three countries that particularly constitute either a threat or a possible threat to 
the national security of the GCC counties: 
1) Iran and its ambitions constituted a threat to GCC countries for a long time, in spite 
of the improvement in relations that occurred during the reign of Mohammad 
Khatami, and yet there are several obstacles that stand in the way of the evolution 
of Iranian-Gulf relations. The Iranian nuclear programme is one of the concerns for 
GCC countries regarding their policy of refusal to support the spread of nuclear 
armaments. 
2) Iraq is a source of tension in several respects, starting with dissension between the 
Iraqi people and the populations of other Gulf countries and ending with the 
American occupation of Iraq, in addition to the instability resulting from this 
occupation, namely the disturbance inside Iraq, and also the nature of American-
Iranian relations. In addition, the continuity of instability in Iraq will negatively 
affect its neighbouring countries, the GCC countries foremost among them. 
3) The continuous occupation of Arab lands, which has led to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
has remained a source of tension, hampering the negotiations of the peace process, 
and putting obstacles in the way of solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 
addition, there is the unsolved question over highly sophisticated Israeli nuclear 
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capabilities. At different levels, all of these elements have represented a threat to 
Middle East stability. 
4.3.b.ii Security and defence cooperation among GCC countries 
Immediately after the end of the second Gulf War, with regard to a new security system in 
the Gulf, it was essential to express the actual and the real balance of power in the region, 
as well as to reflect the ambitions and political aims of all parties. 
Therefore, a set of projects and independent judgements were, as per their originators’ 
perspective, all aimed, in one form or another, at establishing security in the Gulf. The 
most important perceptions of these were those of the Americans, Europeans, Iranians, 
Egyptians, and the Gulf states.
24
 
4.3.b.iii The three important different points of view concerning Gulf security 
There are three main countries that contribute, collectively or individually, to forming and 
maintaining the security of the Gulf region: the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These states do 
not share the same point of view regarding the regional security of the Gulf. Their specific 
points of view concerning the security of the Gulf region can be summarized as follows: 
The American perspective
25
 
The American perspective focuses on the protection of the Gulf region against risks and 
threats that may impact on its countries. This can be done by virtue of security agreements 
with such countries, provided that security can be maintained through various factors: first, 
to maintain the military presence of the US and some other Western countries in the Gulf 
region to ensure realization of stability in the area and maintain a regular flow of oil at 
suitable prices; second, to maintain the political stability of the counties of the region, 
providing various guarantees for preventing conflict from escalating and ensuring human 
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rights; third, to free the Gulf region of terrorist elements and organizations; and finally, to 
take appropriate measures for the limitation of armaments in the region, particularly 
weapons of mass destruction. 
The Iranian perspective
26
 
After the second Gulf War, the Iranian view of Gulf security centred on four pillars: first, 
that security arrangements in the region must be based on the common historical, religious, 
and economic relations between its countries; second, it is solely the responsibility of 
countries lying on the two banks of the Gulf to keep the region secure; third, the GCC has 
to refuse any kind of foreign interference in Gulf security arrangements; and finally, the 
convocation to dissolve the GCC and proposition of a security system in which Iran 
assumes a leading role according to its capabilities relative to its neighbours. 
The Saudi perspective
27
 
Saudi Arabia considers that defending the Kingdom and GCC countries can be effected 
within a framework consisting of a number of circles sharing one fixed central point, 
interacting with, and enhancing, one another. Saudi Arabia and its armed forces are located 
in the first circle; the six countries of the GCC are in the second circle with regard to the 
fact that the GCC is considered as the basic source of its members’ solidarity; the third 
circle is formed of the countries’ friends within the broader boundaries of the Middle East 
and South Asian region (Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, and Turkey)such countries should work in 
cooperation with GCC states in performing an important role, as well as acting as a contact 
channel with regional allies and Western friends, and carrying out joint military training. 
The security of GCC countries is crystallized in their ability to protect and develop various 
capabilities and potentialities in a collective way (in all economic, social, political, and 
military fields), taking into consideration regional and international variables, and provided 
that such countries should be able to face diverse threats towards them, recognizing that 
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concepts of security in the Gulf region vary according to the views of countries having vital 
interests in this area. Essentially, Gulf security means establishing stability and tranquillity, 
and avoiding
28
 disturbance or change that threatens the countries internally or externally. 
The perspective of GCC countries concerning Gulf security is based on their conception 
and awareness of the nature of the risks imposed by the regional environment, which are 
basically a result of their relations with the active and influential parties in the region, in 
addition to the internal risks of the region. Although there is general agreement on some 
principles governing the overall security situation in the region, there is still a disparity in 
the ideas put forward about the mechanisms for establishing security. The Gulf countries 
did not reach an agreement on the mechanisms that crystallize such a defensive policy, 
demonstrated clearly in the postponement of the study of a project for structuring a unified 
Gulf army and in partially replacing this idea by supporting, arming, and training the Island 
Shield’s armed forces.29 
It can be seen that the tendencies of GCC countries have varied, whether with regard to the 
determination of allies, or confidentiality, publicity, and content of this alliance. In 
addition, in spite of the one aim of providing the foreign guarantee of the security of such 
countries, the slogan of ‘collective security’ collapsed, to far extent, due to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Thus, the GCC countries did not hesitate to request or accept, directly, 
foreign protection, and to change the system of collective Gulf security into a strategic 
alliance with Western countries, especially the United States.
30
 
In turn, this resulted in a radical change in the structure of the new Gulf security system, 
where the majority upheld territorial security over collective security, and there was a 
divergence in views concerning its optimal framework. 
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4.4 The most significant GCC resolutions regarding security and military matters 
between 1991and 2005 
The second Gulf crisis had a role in encouraging the GCC countries to take an interest in 
the defensive and military aspects of security, whether at the interrelationship level or the 
foreign level. The GCC countries had reconsidered the integrated procedures between 
them, which led these states to adjust some of their attitudes related to security 
coordination, while keeping the unity of the Gulf region and preventing it being disbanded. 
They also took the initiative, through the Doha Summit of 22-25 December 1990 and the 
Kuwait Summit of 23-25 December 1991, of discussing the security situation in the 
region.
31Such meetings reflected a relative disparity in the GCC’s points of view regarding 
security arrangements. 
From 19 to 21 December 1994, the GCC leaders at the El-Manama Summit called for the 
adoption and establishment of self-defence power steps via a unified strategy and 
developing the peninsula’s armed forces to be capable of effective movement, but this 
summit failed to accomplish the unified security project.
32
 
In the summit held in Kuwait in 1997, the Gulf leaders approbated two important projects 
at the level of military coordination and joint defence. One project was the security belt 
project, with its first phase actually ending in 2000. This aimed at connecting GCC 
countries to a unified early warning network and setting up a joint operation monitoring 
room for any foreign attack that these countries could be exposed to. There was also a 
secured communication project in order to edit intelligence communications in a secure and 
confidential manner.
33
 
The GCC leaders signed the Gulf joint defence agreement at the El-Manama Summit held 
in Bahrain from 30 to 31 December 2000. This agreement expressed the common wish to 
achieve military cooperation in the way the region's countries and populations were 
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aspiring, and confirmed a courageous step in the transition towards the creation of a joint 
self-defence strategy, and the gradual removal of the American security and defence 
umbrella.
34
 
4.4.a Joint Defence Agreement  
The Gulf joint defence agreement contains 12 articles in addition to the preamble, and 
focuses upon a group of principles concerning the collective security of the GCC countries, 
and the enhancement of their unity to maintain the region’s security and peace in 
accordance with the GCC’s fundamental system provisions, the Arab League countries 
treaty, and the United Nations Charter.
35
 
This agreement includes important trends and concerns: state members of the GCC deem 
any attack against one of them as an attack against them all, and any risk threatening one of 
them as a menace against them collectively; importance must be given to the establishment 
and development of a military industry base; the constitution of a supreme council for joint 
defence and higher military committee, besides other military committees; state members 
have to(should) take the initiative immediately for assisting the state(s) being attacked by 
driving away any aggression or threat thereto, together with adopting any procedure, 
including resorting to military force, for warding off such an attack; the necessity for 
mutual consultation between member countries when one or more states perceives that 
their regional safety or political integrity faces external threat; and finally, that the 
members should engage in the development of armed forces for the peninsula and in 
assuring military cooperation among their forces by conducting joint training. 
It may be perceived that this agreement would meet the security requirements of GCC 
countries, as they have no other option but to unify and interweave their efforts, other than 
coordination in all fields, particularly in the collective security determined by the terms of 
this agreement.  
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Furthermore, this agreement is not directed against any one country; On the contrary, it is 
related to the improvement of the collective security concept and perspective of GCC 
countries,
36
 and thus it could be acknowledged as a first step towards finding a joint 
defence strategy with a legal dimension.  
This requires working on issuing a joint defence policy for GCC countries, possessing 
sufficient deterrent weapons to create the required balance of power in the region, unifying 
the military system, and coordinating foreign policies, in addition to operating the Island 
Shield (Deraa Al Jazeera) armed force role, and its participation in joint training inside 
GCC countries and establishing a Gulf military industrial base. 
The defensive and security cooperation among GCC countries and the US assumed new 
dimensions after the events of 11 September 2001, as these events attenuated the tension, 
enhanced correlation and cooperation, developed the Island armed forces and diminished 
the dependence on foreign forces.
37
This was due to the American war against Iraq in March 
2003, which had created several developments constituting, as a whole, the controlling 
determinants of the GCC view of Gulf security, the most important of which was the US 
tendency to inaugurate a new regional security system that firmly established its presence 
in the region. Such a presence represents a worry to some GCC countries, particularly the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
38
 
Furthermore, the Gulf countries continued to work on creating direct political interaction 
among individuals and political authorities. This was due to several factors, including the 
tribal structure and increase in per capita income for Gulf citizens compared to that of their 
peers in the remaining Arab states, and the head of state’s absolute authority over 
distributing its proceeds,. 
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This was confirmed by Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah through the speech he gave to the 
Arab summit in Riyadh in March 2007, in which he described the American presence in 
Iraq as illegitimate. This reflected Saudi Arabia’s worries concerning the American role in 
Iraq and its consequences for the Kingdom’s security as a result of intensifying the Iranian 
role in Iraq, and the inability of the US to curb ever-increasing Iranian power. 
In spite of the increasing fears and threats regarding internal security and the Gulf 
Ministers of the Interior agreement, in their 19th meeting in Riyadh on 25 October 2000 to 
endorse a joint security strategy aiming at formulating an effective security cooperation 
between GCC countries,
39
 the 24th GCC Summit, held in Kuwait from 22 to 23 December 
2003, failed to conclude the unified security agreement and referred it to the Ministers of 
the Interior for discussion.
40
 
In this respect, the GCC Ministers of the Interior signed the Gulf joint security agreement 
for combating terrorism on 4 May 2004, which was considered an important step towards 
fighting terrorism, which had begun to spread extensively in the Gulf territory and Arab 
nations.
41
 In general, this created a greater and better mutual information exchange between 
the security organizations with a maximum speed, instead of the previously dominating 
administrative routine in this field.
42
 
This decision was preceded by the GCC’s attitude, adopted by their foreign ministers, at 
their extraordinary meeting held in Jeddah on 23 September 2001, regarding terrorism
43
and 
its consequential significance that appeared thereafter with the American view of what lay 
beyond 11 September 2001, and its campaign against what it called terrorism. 
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At the 25
th
Supreme Council Summit held in El-Manama, Bahrain from 20 to 21 December 
2004, the leaders of the GCC countries succeeded in reaching an agreement on the 
enhancement of coordination, security cooperation, and combating terrorism in all its 
forms, and called for the necessity to distinguish between terrorism and people’s legitimate 
right to resist occupation in virtue of international legitimacy resolutions. 
4.4.b Problems of political and military cooperation 
Observers identify the following problems facing political and military cooperation 
between GCC countries:
44
 
i. The disparity of power and importance between GCC members, leading to the creation 
of a dominant competitive atmosphere in relations between nations in the region, 
which has resulted in a lack of confidence to find a joint collective security system for 
GCC countries. 
ii. Adherence to regional sovereignty and the absence of political will among GCC 
leaders, which hinders defensive policies unification. 
iii. The border problems among some GCC countries, and their inability to find solutions 
for most of these disputes. 
iv. Foreign interference in GCC affairs due to the international importance of the Gulf 
region. 
v. Lack of national human and technical cadres resulting from a lack of population 
density, and a resulting reliance on an imported labour force. 
vi. Relative weakness of GCC collective military forces, whether compared with Iran’s or 
Iraq’s military capabilities at the regional level. 
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vii. Differences between GCC countries in defining the foreign dangers that threaten their 
security, and disparity from one state to another; perhaps a basic part thereof may be 
attributed to the GCC countries disagreement about evaluating the regional security 
threat.
45
 
viii. Dissimilarity of armament systems, training, and organization methodologies among 
the armies of GCC countries.
46
 
Therefore, it may be said that the level of political coordination was less than predicted in 
confronting regional and international development. In order that every effort would be 
used in helping to support the GCC foreign policy movement, it would be necessary to 
develop a practical mechanism for collectively coordinating strands to serve the joint 
strategic concerns.
47
 
In other words, it is difficult to talk about a unified Gulf military front if there is no 
coherent political one, and in order for such a front to be effective and influential, 
observance should be given to unified policies, and Gulf leaders should not be content with 
issuing only non-enforceable statements, declarations, or resolutions. 
The future of Gulf political and security cooperation will depend on many factors, the most 
important of which are: the enhancement of security, stability, and democracy; confidence 
building among GCC countries at the political, security, and military levels, as well as the 
agreement upon sources of internal and external threats; the future prospects for the 
peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the potential form of future interactions 
between Arabs and Israelis, with or without a comprehensive settlement; and developments 
in the Iranian internal situation and their repercussions for Iranian foreign policy, in 
particular towards the US and the GCC countries.
48
Finally, it also depends on the 
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development of the situation in Iraq after the death of Saddam Hussein, a new Iraqi regime 
came to exist, and the continuation of the American presence in both Iraq and the region.  
Upon following up the Gulf security relations network before and after 11 September 2001, 
it was observed that they were concerned with four security concerns:
49
 
i. The concerns related to GCC countries, which develop in its independent context, 
based essentially on military methodologies project unification, weapon purchases, 
the joint Gulf defence agreement, the Island Shield armed forces, joint manoeuvres 
between GCC armies, early warning projects, and secured communications, as well 
as the proposed project for launching a Gulf space satellite to provide intelligence 
and reconnaissance capabilities for GCC countries. 
ii. The second security concern comes with the US presence via the bilateral defence 
agreements between each country and the US, which actually existed before the 
second Gulf War, which supported such an existence. This correlation had not 
previously conflicted with GCC countries’ first independent correlation, which was 
mentioned before, being in harmony with the first correlation because it was achieved 
under US supervision. It is notable that there has been a kind of merging between the 
two, and thus the US has been the connecting link between GCC countries’ security 
correlation, although the independent and security structure of this Council's states 
started to develop in the late 1990s. 
iii. The third security concern relates to the Damascus Declaration project between the 
GCC countries, Egypt, and Syria. This is the project that met a stumbling block, 
failing to build an Arab structure for Gulf security. A form of military cooperation 
with Egypt had started in 2001. 
iv. The fourth security concern is connected to relations between GCC countries and 
Iran. This relationship was in some ways supporting the internal security of the Gulf 
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States, and also supporting some aspects of military understanding and decreasing 
fears. 
Before 11 September 2001, there were no problems between the GCC countries and 
the US that would create a crisis of confidence about future relationships. As such, 
the GCC intra-member states security correlation was an extension of its collective 
security correlation with the US. In addition, as the internal security understanding 
among GCC countries with Iran had their particularity, Iran, therefore, did not feel 
disparaged and the GCC states did not see their security understanding with Iran as a 
burden on their relations with the US. However, after the events of 11 September 
2001, the general crisis of political confidence between the US, Saudi Arabia, and the 
GCC states led to another crisis of confidence between the collective security 
structure of the Council and the structure based on security relations between each of 
the GCC countries and the US. On the other hand, winning the war against terrorism 
(according to the American concept) had its reflections in Gulf-Iranian and 
American-Iranian relations, and all this imposed new challenges on the GCC 
countries.
50
 
4.5.a The dichotomy of the US and Iran, and the conflict of interests 
After11 September 2001, the American administration adopted a more flexible policy 
towards Tehran, focusing on talks about opening channels for dialogue between the two 
countries. Some American diplomats conducted a series of unprecedented discussions with 
Iranian officials, the first since the revolution in Iran in 1979, and this was performed 
without any exaggerated media clamour. However, there were events hindering this 
orientation, such as the detention by Israel of the ship Karine A on 3 January 2002.The ship 
was loaded with Katyusha missiles and explosives, which Tel Aviv claimed had been 
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dispatched from Iran in cooperation with Hezbollah to the Palestinian Authority. This, in 
turn, had an impact on the American stance.
51
 
On the other hand, the US and Iran successively launched accusations at each other. The 
US described Iran as one of the countries most active in attempting to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction, placing it on the list of countries in its “axis of evil”. The Iranian reply 
was manifested in former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's speech on 30 January 2002:  
Bush describes people of Palestine, Lebanon and resistance organizations as 
terrorists although he is the one who supports terrorism ...And that the day 
has come where the Islamic world possesses similar weapons to those in 
Israel's possession.
52
 
4.5.b Conflicting Iranian attitudes towards American interests  
It had become obvious that there were various conflicting issues between Iran and the US, 
and these issues had, directly or indirectly, had a strong influence on the security of the 
Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Edmond Ghareb wrote: 
Iranian continuous opposition to the settlement process; its support of the 
Palestinian resistance and of Islamic Jihad and Hamas organizations; the 
Iranians supporting Hezbollah and providing it with sophisticated weapons 
and funds for continued pressure on Israel; the attempts of Iran to acquire 
mass destruction weapons and to develop its missiles and nuclear 
capabilities. Iran nurtures terrorism; it is considered by some circles in the 
American administration and others supporting Israel as the first terrorism 
keeper. Thus, the sanctions shouldn’t be ended unless Iran changes its 
attitudes and language towards Israel. Reactions was continued to El-
Khubar explosion on 1996, and Iran's role therein, a matter that raised and 
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still raises questions within the American administration, which objects to 
any normalization with Iran or any lifting of sanctions before ascertaining 
its role in this process.
53
 
In addition to this, there is the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme. Iran’s non-
submission to the wishes of the international community, by its defiance of the UN 
Security Council’s resolutions with regard to monitoring its nuclear programme and halting 
uranium enrichment, is a matter that constitutes a challenge to Gulf security and to Israeli 
security. 
After the American emphasis on continuing the occupation of Iraq until the new American 
project’s completion in the Middle East, the following question emerged: what system of 
regional Gulf relations would impose itself in the future? The answer to this depends on the 
new predicted variables in the region, and, of course, the most important of these concern 
future Iranian-American relations. 
4.5.c Public opinion and the Palestinian question in the GCC countries  
There are different definitions of public opinion. For example, it can be seen as “a set of 
individuals’ opinions on a topic of public importance, which can influence the attitudes of 
persons, groups and governments’ policies.”54 It is one of the effective political powers 
within the political entity in determining the nature of the relationships between the 
governors and the governed. In this framework, public opinion fulfils a number of 
fundamental functions
55
 and it cannot carry out its expected role except under the umbrella 
of democratic regimes and in an atmosphere that gives the opportunity for expressing both 
the opinion of oneself and the other, thus aiming at achieving comprehensive social 
development. Under such regimes, public opinion has a direct influence on directing and 
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specifying the political process, and in contributing therein, whether through mass media or 
via conferences and symposiums, or by means of direct free elections.
56
 
It is noteworthy that most regimes in GCC countries have not known the political 
multiplicity yet. Many considerations play an influential role in determining the degree of 
influence of public opinion in political affairs, such as the economic level and education of 
the population, which assumes a great role in specifying societal orientations, and the effect 
of public opinion on political decision makers. Furthermore, culture is concerned with the 
surrounding current events and therefore is acquainted with events occurring at the political 
level, while media and religion both play an important role in defining the size of the role 
played by individuals in directing the country’s political affairs. 
Meanwhile, the Gulf press has played a prominent role in the pressure to halt all 
normalization procedures with Israel and in closing the representative and commercial 
cooperation offices in some GCC countries, such as Qatar and Oman.  
Moreover, before holding the Arab summit in Cairo, the Sultanate of Oman promptly 
closed the Israeli representational office in Muscat, and Qatar’s response to the calls to 
close the association office in Doha came late and shortly before the Islamic summit in 
Doha.
57
 
Since its emergence, the Palestinian issue has gained overwhelming and ever-increasing 
Arab popular support and compassion. The Arabs and Palestinians had constantly 
complained about the lack of Western support, whether it is true or not, either from the 
Europeans or Americans, and at the governmental and popular levels.
58
However, this 
situation started to change, and European public support shifted in favour of the Palestinian 
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issue and people.
59
 In the UK, for example, the support has increased to the rate of two to 
one in favour of the Palestinians.
60
 
Therefore, if this was the situation in Europe, then the increased public support for the 
Palestinian issue will be understood. Moreover, the support of Arab public opinion for the 
Palestinian issue reached its peak during the two Intifadas, especially after the extreme 
Israeli violence that accompanied the First Intifada. 
Also, Ariel Sharon's visit to the Holy Sanctuary was, for the Arabs, like adding oil to fire 
and gave the Intifada a religious dimension in addition to a national one. This was reflected 
in the Arab public’s support for the Second Intifada, and, therefore, the Gulf countries were 
not distant from such huge support, and the launch of the Arab satellite channels apparently 
contributed to the crystallization of Arab public support towards the Palestinian issue, 
through wide broadcasting coverage of the events occurring between the Palestinians and 
Israelis.
61
 
In such coverage, the satellite channels were not alone; the press also contributed by 
providing analysis, information, and news related to the latest developments of the 
Palestinian issue. This contributed to increasing people’s awareness of the Arab issue, 
albeit giving an unbalanced view, as the Arab press coverage was always for the 
Palestinian side, with little coverage of the Israeli viewpoint due, of course, to a set of 
understandable considerations. 
Many findings indicate a specific shift in the attitude of the Gulf people and public opinion 
towards the Second Intifada in an unprecedented way, as people tended to condemn the 
Israeli massacres, calling for effective Arab support for Palestinian rights, confirming the 
Jerusalem issue of Arabism and Islamism, and calling on the Arab governments to cease all 
forms of normalization with Israel.  
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In this respect, the following notes have to be taken into consideration:
62
 
i. Unification of Gulf governmental political discourse with the popular view, which is 
relatively rare. Likewise, the Gulf popular view itself witnessed a high degree of 
coherence and harmony regarding issues, suggestions, and slogans, especially towards 
three causes (normalization, El-Aksa Mosque, and Israeli practices). 
ii. Demonstrations in the Gulf represented a qualitative change in political practice in the 
region, as traditional political systems view demonstrations, however peaceful, with 
suspicion. The fact that such demonstrations were permitted may be ascribed to the 
similarity between the official and popular attitudes. 
iii. Some Gulf capitals witnessed many demonstrations against the United States, so much 
so that Washington even closed some of its embassies for a time, indicating the start of 
a shift in Gulf-American relations at the popular level, when considering the defensive 
and security agreements with Washington. This can be explained by the Gulf people’s 
dissatisfaction about relations with Washington in contrast to the previous periods of 
the early 1990s. However, this has not stopped some writers especially in the Kuwaiti 
press rejecting any assault against Washington, and reminding readers of its prominent 
role in the Kuwaiti liberation war. Moreover, the same press published articles calling 
for a reconsideration of relations with Washington. 
iv. In relation to the demonstrations and processions, it was noted that most of the 
demonstrators were in the age group of youths attending school or university. Also, 
women were present, particularly in Qatar and the UAE. This would help in creating a 
new, highly elevated public political awareness to work on changing the traditional 
perception of Gulf citizens.  
v. There was an emergence of convocations with practical characteristics concerning the 
endorsement of the Intifada, the most prominent of which was fighting and boycotting 
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of American products, in addition to countries associated with Israel. This was surely a 
greatly different attitude than the formal one that expressly refused to utilize the oil 
weapon. 
One may say that a large sector of the Gulf population was dissatisfied with the biased 
American political approach towards Israel, and that it is of benefit to the US and out of 
support for its interests in the Arab nation, in general, and in the Gulf area, in particular, to 
try to gain the confidence of Arab countries via recognition of the Palestinian population’s 
rights through implementing its proposed Roadmap to establish the Palestinian State on the 
territories occupied since 1967.
63 
In the same context, the US called for Palestinians to be given their rights, and the whole 
Gulf and Arab regimes were called upon to exert faithful efforts to support the Palestinian 
cause through intensive official communications and through conducting negotiations with 
the American side, in addition to other countries and institutions, such as the United 
Nations, Russia, and the European Union. The governments of Gulf states were also called 
upon to allocate a part of their budgets to various media channels, visual, audio, and print, 
together with convening conferences, symposiums, publishing books, and other means of 
confronting the Israeli publicity. Otherwise, the American stance towards the Palestinian 
cause will not change and the US will definitely remain the supporter of Israel. 
When the events of 11September 2001 occurred, the Arab countries were adopting peace as 
a strategic choice due to two factors. First, the Arab engagement in the peace process that 
started with the Madrid conference and what followed, and second, the limitation of other 
choices. In fact, they proceeded in the peace process, with only some support for the 
Palestinian resistance movements from certain radical regimes such as Syria and Iraq, 
which became a burden both for the rest of the Arab regimes and for Israel.
64
 
Then, 9/11 created a chance that Israel made use of i.e., the US listed the FATH’s fighting 
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group as the Force Seventeen besides Hamas and the El Jihad terrorist movement, this is 
meant to include one of the representatives of the National Authority’s in the terrorist list 
as on the eve of the events of11 September. The American Foreign Office terrorism lists 
included every voice using the armed resistance against Israeli occupation in the 
Palestinian arena, starting from the resistance organizations and ending with the PLO 
itself.
65
Hence, popular reaction was dominated by a deep disappointment with the 
American policy of duality, and was expressed in the popular response to the Israeli 
invasion of the Palestinian territories following 11 September. This was manifested in 
protest demonstrations and solidarity processions with the Palestinian population, as well 
as convening intellectual, celebratory, and solidarity symposiums to reinforce its 
endurance, in addition to collecting financial contributions and blood donations, and calling 
for a free jihad, and the total severing of diplomatic relations between Egypt, Jordan, and 
Qatar with regard to Israel, along with a complete boycott of American/Israeli products. 
After the events of 11 September, a public opinion poll published by a Qatari newspaper
66
 
revealed that the majority of Qatari citizens rejected the foreign military presence in the 
Gulf area: 76% of the participants stated their rejection of the foreign presence, while 14% 
declared their approval, and the rest declared their total ignorance of the matter.  
Moreover, another poll in Kuwait was conducted by a Kuwaiti newspaper,
67
which 
published its results showing that 61% believed that the American policy in the Middle 
East had caused these aggressions, while 31% opposed the idea, and 8% did not express a 
defined opinion.  
In Saudi Arabia, an opinion poll found that only 16% of Saudis positively evaluated the 
US. The main reason for this was the abstention of the American administration from 
criticizing Israeli aggression against Palestine.  
In Bahrain, the Ministry of Information developed a website to explore Bahrainis’ opinions 
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about the continuation of the Intifada. The questionnaire found that 97% of the participants 
believed that the Intifada should continue, 95% wished that the Arab leaders would sever 
all relations with Israel, 88% wanted to restore the Arab economic boycott, and 73% 
deemed that the stagnation in the situation may lead to a comprehensive war in the Middle 
East. Only 52% were proponents of the Saudi plan known as “Land in return for peace”, 
and 48% expected that the Arab Summit in Beirut would be of no consequence.
68 
4.5.d Methods and aspects of popular Gulf interaction with the Intifada 
Public opinion played an effective role in the Intifada of 2000. Voices exhorting people to 
fully boycott any Israeli products that could have penetrated the Gulf markets, in addition 
to American goods and stores in the Gulf area, increased. Such calls mobilized Gulf public 
opinion against American stores, goods, and restaurants in the region, synchronizing with 
the issuance of religious opinions (Fatwa) by popular Islamic scholars such as Sheikh El-
Qardawi, who encouraged the boycott.
69
 
The Second Intifada helped in demolishing any indifference in the attitude of the Kuwaiti 
population towards the Palestinian issue. Also, Kuwaiti newspapers positively reacted to 
cover the events and developments of the Intifada, confirming that the Kuwaiti stance 
regarding the Palestinian issue was firm.  
Moreover, Kuwaiti people sympathized with the Intifada to the point that some took part in 
demonstrations that marched towards the Nation's Assembly (Parliament), in addition to 
other manifestations and oratorical gatherings inside Gulf universities. Finally, this was 
reflected in the official Kuwaiti stance, which resulted in Kuwait offering US$150 million 
as a subsidy to both the Intifada and Jerusalem funds.
70
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4.5.e Formation of anti-Israeli popular movements 
The popular Gulf movement against normalization with Israel, and carrying into effect 
boycott of Israel on all political, economic, and cultural levels, showed how strong the 
popular Gulf rejection of this affair was, as the GCC countries witnessed the appearance of 
many anti-normalization movements, such as: 
i. “The Popular Conference for Resisting Normalization with the Zionist Being in the 
Gulf”, which was established in Kuwait in April 2000 and has formed, since its 
beginning, informational, cultural, and political committees in addition to a centre for 
collecting data about Israeli activity in the Gulf and means of confrontation. Also, 
Kuwait sponsors “The Normalization Resistance Committee”, which is an organized 
committee formed by Kuwait from the political currents for the purpose of intensifying 
anti-normalization activity with Israel on all levels. 
ii. The “Emirati Committee for Normalization Resistance” was founded in the United 
Arab Emirates in February 2001.
71
According to its by-laws, the committee’s objective 
is resisting normalization with the Israeli enemy by all pacific forms and means. 
iii. “The Bahraini Association for Resisting Normalization with the Zionist Enemy” was 
established in May 2001
72
 as a national open association for all Bahrainis and Arab 
residents who support the rights of the Palestinian people.  
The most important conferences are:
73
 
i. The Popular Conference on Normalization Resistance, which held several meetings on 
8 April 2000 and on 31 May 2001 in Kuwait. These meetings were attended by 
delegations from several Arab countries. 
ii. Bahrain hosted the third popular conference for normalization resistance on30-31 May 
2001, a conference that called for the forming of an Arab mechanism between the 
                                               
71http://www.islam-online.net/Arabic/news/2001-05/05/article27.shtml 
72The association's website: http://bahrainrb.8m.com/ 
73
Foutouh Abu-Dahab Haykal, Gulf-American Political Relationships, Shoa'uon Khalejeh, (Cairo: Gulf 
Centre for Strategic Studies, Issue, no. 38, summer 2004),p.71. 
78 
 
working Arab committees in all domains related to the Palestinian issue, such as 
supporting the Intifada, normalization resistance, and boycotting American and Israeli 
goods. 
iii. Doha, the Qatari capital, hosted the fourth popular conference on resisting 
normalization with the Zionist entity in the Gulf, on 4January 2005.  
iv. The United Arab Emirates hosted the agenda of the first popular conference on the 
boycott on 13-14May 2002, organized by the Emirate National Committee for 
Boycotting American Goods. This conference was attended by nine Arab committees 
for boycott action. 
It is worth mentioning that these associations and popular conferences played an important 
role in leading the popular action, refusing all aspects of normalization through their 
organized symposiums, publications, and data, besides other means and mechanisms. Such 
conferences reveal the popular awareness of resisting normalization with Israel by those in 
the Gulf. This means that there is a Gulf perception of how dangerous Israeli expansion in 
the GCC countries would be.
74
 
The Second Intifada led to an unprecedented popular solidarity with the Palestinian 
population, to the extent that Palestinian flags were flown in Kuwait for the first time since 
the Iraqi invasion. Furthermore, popular movements for boycotting American and Israeli 
goods have also been stimulated, besides the contributions campaign offered by Kuwaiti 
citizens to Palestinians, with many flights taking foodstuffs, medicines, and humanitarian 
aid from GCC countries to Palestine. This campaign expanded to reach Gulf princes and 
leaders, who offered millions of dollars to support the reinforcement and endurance of 
Palestinian people.
75
 
Despite the fact that it faded quickly, Gulf public opinion proved to be an important factor 
in formulating the relationship of the Gulf countries with Israel, as the Gulf States felt 
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helpless in facing the popular rage resulting from the ever-expanding Israeli attacks to 
suppress the Palestinian Intifada. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf 
countries depended on diplomacy to exercise pressure on their powerful ally, Washington, 
to contain Israel instead of resorting to severe procedures, such as imposing a petroleum 
embargo.
76
 
It is noteworthy that there is an element of Gulf public opinion in favour of normalization, 
involving some liberals, business people, daily newspaper journalists, cultured people, and 
the intelligentsia, whose viewpoints may be summarized as follows.
77
 
The Palestinian population agreed the peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, as they are the 
group concerned, why would we differ from them?. Nowadays, wars are extremely 
expensive and the Gulf countries spent too much supporting the Palestinian resistance, but 
no tangible results were obtained. The United States, the sponsor of the peace process, the 
ally of the GCC countries, and defender of Gulf security, stated it would be unreasonable, 
as it reiterated that these countries oppose the US. 
Some of them believe that it would benefit the Gulf countries to form a new, different 
regional regime than the one existing before the Kuwait liberation war, under the auspices 
of a greater American role coupled with the marginalization of Iraqi and Iranian roles, and 
the penetration of new forces into the regional regime, namely Turkey and Israel.  
4.6The Palestinian Leadership and the GCC policy towards the Palestinian cause 
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) attitude towards the Kuwaiti occupation, then 
the Kuwait liberation, was confusing. Although the PLO appeared to support Iraq on the 
surface, its leader Yasser Arafat’s declarations, contradictions, and inconsistency in 
information, together with a divergence in Palestinian perceptions, had a negative impact 
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on Palestinian residents in the occupied lands and those living in GCC countries or in other 
Arab nations.  
Based on a brief overview, we can have an overall look at the different Palestinian 
attitudes, hoping that this could lead us to the governing factors that helped to shape those 
attitudes. 
4.6.a Various Palestinian attitudes
78
 
There are many Palestinian groups that engage in the resistance movements, and they had 
differing stances towards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These stances can be summarized as 
follows:  
A- Attitude of the PLO 
i. The first reaction to the invasion was the reserved attitude of the Palestinian State, 
expressed in the Arab League meeting in Cairo regarding the decision to condemn 
Iraq and demand its immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. The Palestinian justification 
for such reservation was that this condemnation could open the door for foreign 
interference in the region. 
ii. The Palestinian view was repeated during the Arab Summit in Cairo on 10 August 
1990, when it voted against the summit’s resolution that condemned the invasion. 
The PLO declared afterwards that it did not object to the resolution but only 
abstained from voting in order to calm the situation and until the adoption of 
acceptable resolutions by all the Arab parties. 
iii. Yasser Arafat suggested the constitution of an Arab committee assigned to travel to 
Baghdad to reach an understanding with the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, but this 
suggestion was rejected by all Arab parties. 
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iv. Then there was the Palestinian stumbling block and its submission to waves of 
contradictions and biddings, in addition to the disparity of PLO attitudes according to 
the geographical location of the Palestinian leadership, keeping in mind that some of 
them strove also to rectify the path and improve the image of the PLO’s image at the 
Arabic level. 
B. Other Palestinian organizations 
i. The Popular Front, the Democratic Front, the General Commandment, the Popular 
Struggle Front, and the Palestinian Liberation Front had opposed the presence of 
foreign forces in the area and issued statements inciting the public to confront such 
forces. On the other side, from their location in Damascus, the opposition movements 
of FATH solely criticized both the United States and Yasser Arafat. 
ii. The General Secretary of the Palestinian Liberation Front, Abu Abbas, had 
commanded the cadres, members, fighters, and partisans of the PLO to fight the 
American interests and Arab nations’ traitors. 
It is worth mentioning that the GCC granted Kuwait the opportunity to move more freely in 
confronting several issues, as it completely backed Kuwait’s attitude towards Iraq and all 
the countries that also supported Iraq. This would spare Kuwait, and any other GCC 
country, the consequences of adopting individual stands that may have appeared 
intransigent. Kuwait issued statements clearly outlining its Arab policy: “Those countries 
who sided with us, we shall stand by them and we shall deal otherwise with those who 
supported the occupation the opponent countries but our relations with the Arab world shall 
stay the same.”79Therefore, Kuwait would treat the supporting countries with equal value 
regarding such support, while dealing with countries and organizations that stood by Iraq, 
including the PLO, in a different way than before.  
Thereupon, the GCC contributed to peace efforts sustained by the United States in the 
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Madrid conference the regional conference – as a supervisor, represented by the General 
Secretary of the Council, and without offering any support to the Palestinians in the 
negotiations due to its tense relations with the PLO following the Gulf crisis.
80
 
After the liberation of Kuwait, the relations between the PLO and the GCC countries 
remained generally positive at the common levels, marked by pushes and pulls concerning 
different aspects of the organization’s financing. This has been an ongoing issue with some 
countries, in particular Kuwait, whose policy used to be continuously dissatisfying to the 
PLO leadership, contrary to the policies of other Gulf countries, such as those of Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE.  
Also, Kuwait was the sole country having great numbers of Palestinians and did not 
approve of the transfer of 5% of the salaries of Palestinian workers to the PLO, which led 
to significant damage to the Gaza and West Bank economy as a result of severing the 
Kuwaiti, or perhaps the Gulf, support to some service institutions depending on such aid. 
This imposed a new financial responsibility on the PLO to compensate some institutions 
for their losses. The first indications of this financial crisis for the PLO appeared in its 
leadership procedures to cut down its general expenditure by 30%.
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The Palestinian community in the Gulf countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, used to contribute financially to supporting the 
Palestinian cause through diverse methods.  
The Palestinian population in Kuwait was 400,000, but suddenly they were attacked and 
their sons were deported in 1991 in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The 
economic disaster that was inflicted on these Palestinians was catastrophic.
82
 
Via agreements between the PLO and GCC countries, Palestinians were permitted to 
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participate in organized celebrations and meetings, and allocated for collecting funds and 
the like, in support of the Palestinian political movement. However, because of the doubtful 
and unconfident view regarding this community, the Palestinian political activity in 
Kuwait, which had been so strong before the Gulf War, was exposed to extreme 
restrictions.
83 
After Yasser Arafat’s demise, Mahmoud Abbas declared to a Kuwaiti newspaper that “The 
attitude adopted by PLO towards Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion was wrong and we must 
opt for another one”, thus rejecting Farouk El-Kodoumy’s announcements that Kuwait had 
unduly confiscated the Palestinians’ funds, as “this offended us – the Palestinians – prior to 
the others.”84 
Also, it may be stated that the first step to building a path for resuming Kuwaiti-Palestinian 
relations would be the right move given the situation. In light of this, the PLO had been 
mistaken and biased in its attitude towards the Iraqi invasion and did not exert any effort, 
as some had said. The consent upon the previous fact was the important and frank 
requisites necessary for conciliation. Moreover, the recurrence of Kuwaiti relations with 
each of Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan delivered many beneficial lessons for the 
Palestinian side. The most important of these was the high-level movement undertaken by 
these countries to eliminate the effects of their attitudes and to prove their good intentions 
within the frame of a strategic orientation; therefore they disregarded all formalities. Then, 
there was the reporting of the declaration of Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the 
Executive Committee of the PLO, in Kuwait on 12 December 2004, concerning the 
organization’s apology to the Kuwaiti population for its attitude towards the Iraqi 
occupation of the Kuwaiti state in 1990.
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Thereupon, the Kuwaiti Government decided to resume Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations, 
relying on three steps: first, to reopen the Palestinian Embassy in Kuwait; then to permit 
                                               
83Samih Farsoun, p.234. 
84)El-Rai El-Aam: 12-5-2004) 
85(El-watan: 13-12-2004) 
84 
 
the Palestinian qualified labour to, gradually, work inside Kuwait; and finally, to contribute 
to activating the Palestinian economy through purchasing Palestinian goods and helping the 
Palestinian population in restoring its infrastructure. 
This was deemed a step forward in returning Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations to their normal 
form. The implementation of these steps began immediately after the Palestinian 
presidential elections. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown a number of results related to the effect of the internal determinants 
on the foreign policy decision-making process for GCC states with regard to the peace 
process and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The GCC states had different foreign policy approaches when it came to relations with 
Iran. GCC states also differ in their degree of democratization. However, and despite these 
differences, the GCC states maintained a minimum degree of foreign policy agreement 
when it came to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Middle East peace process, from the 
onset.  
The chapter has shown that the GCC states were confronted with a security dilemma after 
the first Gulf War and the invasion of Kuwait. Despite attempts to enter into joint security 
pacts within the GCC, the agreements failed to resolve the security problem and, therefore, 
GCC states again turned to Western powers to execute security agreements that restored the 
security balance in the region, agreements that brought with them a heavy Western military 
presence, and especially an American presence, in the region.  
The tensions in relations between the US and Iran affected the GCC region in two ways. 
First, the US military presence gave the GCC relative security against military threats from 
Iran and Iraq. At the same time, this military presence increased tensions with Iran, which 
saw the US military as a threat to its security. The increased US military presence in the 
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GCC also increased US political influence in the region in its capacity as the main 
protector.  
Public opinion in the GCC constituted a form of pressure on foreign policy makers, with 
public opinion always pushing for GCC support of the Arab side in conflict with Israel and 
the Middle East peace process. However, these pressures were transient and were linked to 
one specific condition, namely the Palestinian Intifada, as well as other occasions and 
events of lesser importance.  
Public opinion also played a specific role in shaping GCC foreign policy approaches with 
respect to the Middle East peace process after the launch of this process. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the pro-Iraq stance adopted by PLO leaders, and the calls to 
resolve the situation within the pan-Arab circle without Western interference created a state 
of rage against the PLO leadership in GCC states that even escalated into state-sponsored 
retaliatory measures against the PLO and the Palestinians living in GCC states.  
Nevertheless, this rage, and the measures adopted by some GCC states, were very limited 
and did not last for any considerable length of time before GCC states resumed support of 
the PLO and the Arabs in conflict with Israel. These determinants pushed GCC states to 
call on the US to start more serious efforts to launch the Middle East peace process and 
defuse the tensions in the region, especially after the emergence of sub-regional security 
threats in the GCC, which were closer than the threat from the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
The next chapter will discuss the external factors that influenced the decision making of the 
foreign policy of the GCC states towards the peace process after Madrid until 2005. This 
set of factors will include a wide range of elements, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
American-Iranian relations, and the Israeli approach to the Gulf region.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The External Determinants of the Foreign Policy of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council between 1991 and 2005 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the external determinants that shaped the foreign policy of GCC 
states on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process from the Madrid Conference until 
2005. Such external determinants include the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, which 
intensified the security dilemma faced by GCC states and culminated in the direct US 
military presence in the region. The research explores US-GCC relations following these 
developments, and how the increased US influence in the region intensified tensions with 
Iran, which already had a complex relationship with the US. It also explores how the 11 
September attacks further increased US influence in the region and how the US and GCC 
were split over the US vision of the war on terror and the GCC vision regarding the 
definition of terrorism. 
In addition, this chapter discusses relations between Israel and GCC states, and the 
diverging GCC stances on the relationship with Israel. The chapter also examines the 
impact of the 11 September attacks on the US political drive to introduce changes in the 
Middle East through two US initiatives launched to reshape the Middle East socially, 
culturally, and politically, and which were received with cautious reserve by GCC states 
except for Qatar, which welcomed the US initiatives.  
Finally, this chapter aims to put all these factors together to examine the impact of the 
external determinants on GCC foreign policy and the peace process, and how these 
determinants contributed to formulating certain policies on the peace process.  
Similarly to the previous chapter, this chapter relies on primary sources, such as closing 
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declarations announced after GCC summit meetings, GCC ministerial meetings, and 
official diplomatic statements, and secondary sources, including academic journals and 
papers, and media news articles. 
5.2.a Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a great challenge to GCC countries, constituting an 
unprecedented security threat
1
 for them. Likewise, the crisis had revealed how vulnerable 
the security measures were in these states, and put an end to the Saudi assertion that Gulf 
security depended on its own countries, as it was forced to call upon Western forces to help 
in warding off the aggression and liberating Kuwait.
2
However, such a situation did not 
prevent the Council from establishing a unified attitude, at least on the outlines. Other than 
that, the GCC, on the collective level, moved forward, politically at the regional and 
international levels, in order to maintain the international mobilization and unanimity 
against the Iraqi invasion.
3
 
The GCC made use of all its financial and military capabilities to liberate Kuwait, and 
agreed on completing the security and defence arrangements of the GCC countries, which 
guaranteed the protection of the national and regional security of each of the six GCC 
countries, while increasing coordination between them in the internal, regional, Arab, and 
international domains. 
The first collective reaction by GCC countries towards the crisis was in the statement 
issued by the GCC Ministerial Council meeting in Cairo on 3 August1990. 
The GCC attitude was being formulated in different strategies. First, there was the warding 
off of Iraqi aggression and the attempt to prevent it expanding to other countries. Second, 
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there was the evacuation of the occupying forces from Kuwaiti territories, liberating it and 
restoring legitimate rule. Third, the existence of foreign forces in the region was temporary, 
and they were not occupational forces as Iraqi leadership claimed, but these were forces to 
support the Gulf countries and protect their lands, contending that the original problem was 
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
4
 Finally, there was the assertion that Iraq had to engage in 
implementing all the UN Security Council resolutions concerning the crisis before lifting 
the siege.
5
 
Furthermore, the GCC expressed its support and consideration for all efforts and 
procedures adopted by the international alliance countries so as to guarantee that Iraq 
would totally and accurately comply with UN Security Council resolutions.
6
 
It was noteworthy that the Iraqi invasion left a number of negative impacts on GCC 
countries. The most important of these were, first, the emergence of new foreign alliances 
and political differences among GCC members, which influenced the Council’s role in 
coordinating the Gulf policies. Second, the Gulf security problem appeared from a different 
perspective in the light of the new sources of threats, as the military liaisons with the 
United States and Damascus Declaration both constituted repercussions of the new pattern 
of relationship with the US and Egypt and Syria. Third, there was the emergence of a new 
Iran, challenging regional politics after withdrawing from the war against Iraq, particularly 
after the Iraqi regime’s disappearance from the regional political arena. Fourth, there was 
the commencement of a new armament race in this region. Fifth, GCC countries tended to 
turn towards peace with Israel, through supporting the Madrid Conference and participating 
therein as observing members,
7
 so there was retrogression of both Arab and Gulf collective 
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security.
8
 Finally, there was the reshaping of the political map in the region, reformulating 
the essential issues and calling upon the GCC to choose new paths at the territorial, Arab, 
regional, and international levels.
9
 
An intense disagreement between the Arab states resulted from the Iraqi occupation of 
Kuwait, which also led to further deterioration in inter-Arab relations. This disagreement 
caused more receding of the general Arab causes in which the Arab countries used to share 
interest and, in particular, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. 
The second Gulf War had a negative impact on the Palestinian cause. Before the crisis, the 
Palestinian cause enjoyed financial and moral support in the GCC, along with the Arab 
world. This strong support had enabled the Palestinian cause to be relatively recognized at 
the international level.
10
 The invasion led, consequently, to a reduction in the priority of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict on the agenda of the GCC and the Arab world.
 
Soon after the situation became relatively stable following the crisis, a new GCC political 
orientation was crystallized that aimed at maintaining a reduced level of association with 
the rest of the Arab world.
11
Such a change resulted from two types of factors: internal 
factors from inside the GCC, and external ones represented in the United States and its 
complicated relations with regional powers. 
It is worth mentioning that the US had, with many other elements, contributed in separating 
the Council from the Arabs’ joint security arrangements. It also seemed that the US exerted 
effort to prevent the execution of the Damascus Declaration.
 
The Doha Summit (22-25 September 1990), which was the first Gulf Summit after the Iraqi 
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invasion of Kuwait, reflected the beginning of the disintegration of the Arab-Gulf 
agreement with regard to the security arrangements. GCC countries started in establishing a 
perception of non-Arab security measures that did not exclude the participation of Western 
and Islamic parties, and approbated the regional role of Iran. Thus, GCC countries 
preferred to conclude bilateral security agreements with some Western countries, namely 
the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. 
In this summit, the Gulf states stressed the necessity to coordinate strategies among GCC 
countries. A document was signed, recognizing the exigency to build up the joint military 
force, to develop the joint marine and air forces, to unify the joint air defence systems, to 
establish joint martial industries, to change the weaponry system, and to diversify its 
sources.
12
 Afterwards, the members of the GCC participated effectively, whether by 
offering all military facilities, or by receiving military alliance forces granting them 
military bases to centralize and take action for the liberation of Kuwait. Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates participated in financing the international 
military mobilization and in compensating some damaged countries, while others, such as 
Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, became involved by sending some symbolic troops to stand by 
the alliance forces in the war.
13
 
5.2.b The consequences of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait for the Arab-Israeli conflict  
Some results of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait at the Arab level were as follows: the 
regionalism concept appeared in Arab political life on account of the Arab joint interest; 
the recurrence of the Arab cold war and the formation of side blocs and alliances that could 
include some non-Arab parties; there was an increase of severe political and social 
instability, and the diminution of Arab national feeling and the unified Arab work.
14
 
In addition, there were some deficiencies in the Arab League Charter, with regard to the 
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legality of taking decisions, and the non-compliance of members with the resolutions 
adopted by the League, contrary to what happened with the United Nations and the 
Security Council.
15
Finally, there was a reduction in the priority of Israel as one of the 
expected sources of threat to the regional and sub-regional system in favour of Iraq which 
was seen as a new and more imminent source of threat.
16 
Hence, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was followed by the second Gulf War, and both had 
the effect of complicating the possibilities of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
17
 
Likewise, the Gulf crisis, with the deterioration in relationships it brought about, assured 
the international public of the importance and necessity of reaching a just settlement for the 
Arab-Israeli and the Palestinian issue,
18
 and that Middle East political stability had no 
future without achieving equitable solutions for all problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
especially the Palestinian issue. 
In such a sequence, one may say that the Gulf crisis had a double effect on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which could be considered positive on one side from the Arab perspective and 
which includes international unanimity on the importance and urgency of reaching a 
peaceful settlement for all the problems of the Middle East. The most crucial of these 
problems was the Palestinian cause and the interest of different influential international 
parties, particularly the United States, in making serious attempts to prepare an appropriate 
atmosphere for the international movement to establish a peaceful solution.
19
 
It was agreed to hold a Middle East Peace Conference, and Madrid was chosen as the host. 
However, in spite of the favourable circumstances for the success of the peace negotiations, 
and Madrid represented a breakthrough on the wall of hostility between the Arabs and 
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Israel, the Conference achieved limited outcomes. However, even these limited outcomes 
were considered to be a good base that could be built on later. Then, suddenly, the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement was declared and signed in Oslo on 20 August 1993, and was 
celebrated in Washington on 13 September 1993. 
After the Gulf War ended, the Middle East region started a new stage of its history with 
regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian issue. The American suggestions for 
solving this conflict and convening a regional conference for peace were brought up. 
Therefore, the Palestinians did not have any choice but to interact with these suggestions. 
Meanwhile, the attitude in the Gulf was demonstrated by Youssef Bin Alawy, the Omani 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who said that: 
It is for the interest of the Arab countries, including those in the Gulf, to 
reinforce the American attitude as it conforms with the Arab states and 
population’s wish to terminate the conflict status with Israel, reclaim the 
Arab lands and consider a better future for the relationship between Israel 
and the Arabs.
20
 
The United States tried on many occasions to convince the GCC countries to participate in 
the regional conference. As a result, the Gulf States agreed to participate as an observer of 
the conference and were represented by its General Secretary. Moreover, these countries 
participated efficiently in the sub-committee’s work concerning water and security 
problems and economic issues. Although there are no common borders between Israel and 
the Gulf countries, considering that the negotiations would continue in two separate yet 
unlinked lines this could lead to a complete normalization of relations between the Arab 
countries and Israel without establishing a settlement for the Palestinian cause, or even 
controlling the armaments in the region.
21
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The Arabs approbated what the US asked the GCC countries with regard to their 
relationship with Israel, and as a result of this participation, some Gulf countries 
established relations with Israel. Thus, the United States purposely worked to invest in the 
psychological status of the governments of these countries, expressing their gratitude to the 
US regarding their efforts in the war against Iraq. This was for the sake of realizing the 
normalization of Arab relations with Israel and nullifying the economic boycott, without 
stipulating any settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue, the essence 
of the conflict in the region.
22 
In fact, the GCC countries officially nullified the Israeli boycott of the third and second 
degree; some of them even made a significant step towards Israel and received and sent 
official delegations.
23
GCC countries issued a statement on 1 October 1994, which marked 
the end of the indirect boycott of Israel. Such a boycott of the second and third degrees was 
imposed on the companies dealing with Israel and on their branches, assuring the 
continuity of their direct boycott with Israel.  
The statement reported the justifications of such an attitude by saying:  
The GCC approved the peace process in the Middle East since its launch at 
the Madrid Conference and it perceived the importance of the lessening of 
tension, particularly on the Palestinian and Jordanian sides, which includes 
agreements covering the economic cooperation aspects between Israel and 
both Jordan and Palestine. The Council considers with interest the issue of 
revising the rules of the Arab boycott of Israel taking into consideration the 
realized progress and the objective requirements of the peace process.
24
 
The Gulf attitude continued to be confused in handling the Iraqi issue in the light of the 
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American role of escalation and stabilization of its presence in the region. This was 
obvious in the US agreement with the State of Qatar at the end of 2000,which stipulated 
that the US was to remain on its lands for 20 years, an issue that would realize America's 
interests and that represents a threat to the region on one hand, and a maintenance of its 
security on the other.  
The 1990s were loaded with many variables that directly affected the American view. The 
Madrid Conference and Shimon Peres project represented two main indications of the 
American strategy in the region. Moreover, the Oslo agreement and its different 
derivatives, the outbreak of the Intifada, the events of 11 September, the Afghan war, and 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its occupation all had their severe effects on formulating 
the American strategy, which considered a merging of Israel and Turkey therein and 
excluded Iran. 
5.3.a Plans towards democracy in the Middle East  
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the events of 11 September had a significant impact on 
the US, leading it to reconsider its goals and priorities in the Middle East. It started to think 
that the introduction of democracy to the Middle East and connecting the region to the 
global economy could be a way of calming conflicts; thus it proposed several plans to 
implement these goals and made them targets of US foreign policy in the Middle East. 
 5.3.b New Middle East peace plan 1991  
The Foreign Policy Institute in Washington published a report entitled “Peace Follow-Up – 
An American strategy for the Israeli-Arab Peace Process”, which stressed the following:25 
1- Obtaining petroleum with appropriate prices and free trade between countries. 
2- Adherence to Israeli security and supremacy. 
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3- Maintaining the security of the Arab countries’ friends and working on regional 
stability. 
4- Settlement of regional conflicts. 
Besides these, the Strategic and International Studies Institute in Washington issued its first 
report, entitled “The United States and the New Middle East”. The editors of the report 
concentrated on the corroboration of the former Secretary of State James Baker for:
26
 
1- Establishing a multinational bank for development in the Middle East. 
2- Concentrating on the issues of armament limitation. 
3- Issues of democracy and peace talks. 
4- American compliance with Israel’s security. 
These points were manifested afterwards, in the conferences on economic cooperation for 
the Middle East and North Africa. 
Also, the United States was concerned to establish a new system of security arrangements 
after the second Gulf War, for the purpose of ensuring the region's stability and protecting 
US economic and strategic interests. It was notable that reaching a settlement for the 
Middle East conflict would serve US strategy in the region and pave the way for the United 
States to move forward in implementing its security plan in the area.
27
 
This point was clear in two paragraphs of the speech by the American President George 
H.W. Bush, in the inaugurating session of the Madrid Conference,
28
 as he stressed the 
essence of American policy, which was not confined to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
but also was focused on working on the normalization of relations between the two parties 
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in all domains in order to reach bilateral and regional relationships that allowed the 
restructuring of the Middle East. The American administration started to set up new 
perceptions for establishing the “Middle Eastern regime”, depending on the multilateral 
negotiations and on the summit conferences of economic development in the Middle East 
and North Africa, in which GCC countries participated and hosted one of their committees 
in addition to Qatar, which hosted one of these conferences.  
5.3.c Broad Middle East initiative: March 2004 
The 11 September events were an opportunity to expose the US plans for reformulating the 
Middle East; as the American targets were demonstrated throughout “the cosmic strategy”, 
which the American President declared on 20 September 2002 in memory of the first 
anniversary of the 11 September events. He said that: 
The United States used to agree upon and adapt with the disorder in the 
Middle East region and that its first and last concern focused only on the 
petroleum and Israel security as the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict was 
deemed non-threatening to the strategic balances. Moreover, the non-
stability used to serve the United States to put all under its influence in the 
region.
29
 
Therefore, the eight superpowers summit held in Georgia, USA, at the beginning of 
January 2004, under the title of “Partnership for progress and a common future with the 
Great Middle East and North Africa region”, adopted the plan, after introducing several 
important amendments. Even though the GCC countries confirmed the necessity of the 
political and democratic reform steps as being the basis for realizing security and social 
stability, and then supporting these countries’ capability to confront challenges that 
obstructed them, they refused the externally imposed reform projects, stating that they 
would pursue any efforts or movements to effect reform from inside, which, in turn, had to 
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respect the characteristics and circumstances of such countries from political, economic, 
cultural, and religious sides.
30
 
It is evident that Bush named most of the GCC countries in his speech on “democracy in 
the Middle East”, given in November 2003.  
It is important to mention the Saudi attitude here, as it was obvious that the Kingdom’s 
refusal of the American initiative was due to it being considered as a project that would be 
imposed on the Arab countries from abroad and that would fail to observe the 
particularities, values, cultures, and social situations of such states, in addition to ignoring 
the Palestinian issue.  
But, as regards the Kuwaiti attitude, Prince Sabah El-Ahmed El-Gabber, when he was the 
Prime Minister, called for an understanding of the claims requiring reform, saying that “We 
must be cautious of refusing matters and sticking to old stuff just because one party 
mentioned that he wishes to change them.”31 
Other than that, the Bahraini attitude confirmed the importance of interaction between the 
United States and the Arab countries in respect of the reform initiative until it achieved the 
hoped for targets.
32 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait sent their apologies for not attending the Summit of 
the Eight, while Bahrain participated therein to explain the Gulf attitude, which accepted 
the reforms originating from inside and not imposed from abroad.
 
The attitude of the GCC countries towards the Great Middle East initiative was clear in the 
rejection by its General Secretary, Abd El-Rahman El-Atteya, of the democratic reform 
initiatives imposed from abroad. He emphasized that reform should come from inside and 
must comply with the Arab customs and traditions, as well as with cultural, social, and 
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national heritage.  
Yet, El-Atteya requested that we should not negatively judge the American initiative or 
other initiatives, and said that it had to be understood in depth. He also called to open the 
dialogue between the Arab countries and the other parties, confirming the necessity of not 
disregarding the Arab-Israeli conflict so as to establish the region’s stability. Furthermore, 
he indicated the reform steps in the Gulf region via installing numerous mechanisms for 
popular participation and the advancement of education and social and economic 
conditions.
33
 
5.4.a Gulf-American relations 
The political relations between the GCC countries and the US have been characterized for a 
long period by strength and solidity and were described by “A Strategic” in view of the 
volume and weight of mutual interests, which represented firm ground for the development 
of the relationship between them since the British withdrawal from the region in the 1970s. 
This cooperation reached its peak in the second Gulf War in 1990, after which the United 
States concluded a series of security treaties with the GCC countries. However, this did not 
prevent the occurrence of some differences and tensions between them as a result of the 
disparity in their attitudes towards some issues. This became more acute after 11 
September 2001, which, in turn, constituted a turning point in the American policy 
regarding the region as a whole.
34
 
5.4.b The second Gulf War and its impact on Gulf-American relations: 
The American role expanded during the era of the American President George Bush senior, 
who, immediately after the end of Kuwait liberation war, in his famous speech on 16 
March 1991, declared his project for the new Middle East, which included as one of its 
elements the establishment of security arrangements in the Gulf that would help the United 
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States in performing military training with the region's countries and permit its permanent 
marine existence therein.
35
 Through this, Washington aimed at holding back Iraq and 
preventing its appearance as a regional force capable of threatening the region’s stability, in 
addition to protecting the security of the region's countries against any threats.
36
 
Then, the GCC countries made it clear about their inclination not to join the collective 
alliance with the United States and their preference for a bilateral type of agreement, which 
Washington encouraged. In fact, the GCC countries signed a series of defence cooperation 
treaties with the United States, as with a number of allied countries, such as the UK and 
France. These treaties stipulated the engagement of GCC countries in the following: the 
prior storage of military equipment to be used for defending the GCC countries that signed 
the treaty; performing joint periodical manoeuvers and training; and finally, offering other 
aid to be agreed upon by the concerned parties.
37
 
5.4.c The American military existence in the Gulf region 
The United States greatly succeeded in making use of the Gulf War to realize its interests. 
The effects of the second Gulf War led to a change in the formula of the US appearance in 
the Gulf countries, which turned out to be required after previously being undesirable, in 
addition to a great alteration in the form of the military presence in the Middle East and the 
Gulf region, particularly in two directions.
38
 First there was the expansion of the military 
facilities given to American forces on bases, stations, ports, airports, camps, and centres of 
the majority of the region’s countries that have relations with the United States, or even 
some of the other countries that did not hold strong political relations with it. Such facilities 
include the right to use the airfields, the ports, military airports, air transportation 
operations, advanced deployment, fuel services, and maintenance and weapons storage in 
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addition to joint military manoeuvres.
39
 Moreover, there was an unprecedented increase in 
the main military bases to reach a total of five in the Gulf countries alone. The importance 
of such bases is attributed to the fact that they constitute quasi-complete and fundamental 
military operations centres that benefit from a relative independence and a general 
capability to support air, land, or marine fighting operations, whether through the actual 
centralization of such forces therein, or via preparing the base for their deployment 
whenever needed. These troops are managed by virtue of military treaties with their hosting 
countries, thus enabling the American forces to rapidly conduct basic military operations in 
different directions with no need for large mobilization plans or requirement that they be 
completed in a short time.
40
 
Then, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries stopped opposing the direct American military 
presence in the region. They all started to carry out joint military manoeuvres with the 
United States and to host units of the marines and American air force regiments. Moreover, 
these countries permitted the American administration this presence. The former Secretary 
of Defence, William Cohen, declared in 1995 that “Our existence in the Middle East region 
has tremendously increased.”41 
5.4.d The security and defence agreements between GCC countries and the United 
States 
Between 1991 and 1995, no GCC country was excluded from signing security agreements 
with the United States, following which the American presence in the region has been 
intensified. Such treaties were characterized by being individually and bilaterally 
concluded between the United States and each of the GCC countries separately. Thus, the 
GCC countries found themselves obliged to rely on foreign countries in the security and 
protection fields, due to their weak individual military capability in general, and the weak 
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security arrangements between each other.
42
 
The presence of foreign military in any country will influence the policies, sovereignty, and 
free decisions of the host country, and the influence of foreign power may even extend 
beyond the host country to the neighbouring countries, regionally and nationally. While 
this discussion concerns the American military presence in the Gulf region, the fact of this 
presence affects the rulers’ decisions and consequently limits their freedom in making 
decisions, meaning, practically, that it restrains state sovereignty and independence.  
These agreements engendered Arab reactions. Some Arabs understood the US motives but 
others viewed it as an indirect occupation of the GCC countries and an influence on the 
sovereignty of the Gulf states. As General Yassin Soayed said, “The American military 
existence over here is no less than a camouflaged occupation according to the signed 
agreements, with which the United States did not comply, stipulating that the signatory 
GCC countries do not have the right to sign military treaties with other countries.”43 It is 
this fact that has hindered the Damascus Declaration, signed directly after the war between 
the six GCC countries, Egypt, and Syria, deeming that Gulf security was exclusively a US 
responsibility, with no participation by any other country.  
In the light of the aspiration of the United States for the neighbouring countries to the Gulf, 
such as Iraq, which had been subject to an American forces assault and occupation 
launched from Gulf territories in March 2003, this military existence continued to threaten 
other countries such as Iran, Syria, and Lebanon.  
The most important objectives of the US in the Gulf region can be summarized as follows: 
1- Keeping a continuous oil supply from the Arab countries, particularly those in the 
Gulf, as well as providing the allied industrial countries with the quantities required 
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for the economies of these states, their communities and military needs during peace 
and wartime.
44
 
2- Providing Israel with comprehensive protection at the political, economic, and 
military levels, and offering assistance that realizes this objective.
45
 
3- Supporting the moderate Arab regimes that help in realizing the first and second 
objectives.
46
 
4- Establishing regional economic cooperation among all the Middle East countries, 
including Israel, and working on creating a joint market among these countries.
47
 
The US conducted many attempts to persuade the Gulf capitals that the peace they were 
enjoying was due to the huge military presence in the region, which began in 1986 to 
protect the petroleum tankers.
48
 To a great extent, it is true that the policy of containing 
Iraq and Iran has succeeded, and that it managed to ward off these two enemies, as from an 
American viewpoint, at the present stage they were considered a source of threat. There is 
also the other part of the view of the US, which it tries to promote, which stresses that the 
establishing of stability in the region in the long term requires a continuous American 
military presence in the area.
49
 
 5.4.e  Post-Gulf War American-GCC relations 
As a direct result of the second Gulf War, the American administration adopted what 
Martin Indyk revealed in May 1993, in his lecture about the intention of the administration 
of the American President Bill Clinton as the “double containment” strategy of both Iraq 
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and Iran.
50
 This policy aimed at enabling the US to push forward the peace process 
between Israel and the Arabs, blockading the military ambitions of Iraq and Iran, especially 
with regard to weapons of mass destruction, with the exclusion of Israel from this matter, 
ensuring the flow of the oil in wartime and a low-priced flow in peacetime. Finally, it 
aimed at supporting a more democratic and prosperous Gulf region. 
These security relations between the United States and the GCC Arab countries serve two 
important and interwoven interests from the American viewpoint, one of which is
51
to 
create a military base for operations in the expectation that any adversary of the Middle 
East peace process could launch an aggression against any participant in this process. The 
other motive is to prevent Iran and Iraq from realizing military and political domination in 
this strategically important region.
 
The double containment policy of Iraq and Iran came to exist and developed, and could not 
be understood without referring to the ever increasing anxiety of the US about Israeli 
security, when there was no peace between Israelis and Arabs.
52
 Therefore, Gulf security 
has been separated from the peaceful settlement in the Middle East.  
Also, the United States appeared as a main player for all policies and relations in the Gulf, 
whereas many contradictions in interests and views among Gulf countries themselves exist 
regarding differences in Gulf foreign policy, as well as in the concerned strategic 
perspective. At that time, it was not possible to talk about one Gulf bloc, and that is in the 
United States favour, which shows the US as a strong dominating party while the Gulf 
countries represent the weaker side. Peace in the Middle East is a strategic target for the 
United States, as it is for all parties including Israel, and negotiations are the way to reach 
solutions for the problems resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States exerts 
constant efforts in the ongoing peace process, and the success of such efforts in realizing an 
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international legitimate peace would have its impact on Arab-American relations in the 
near and far future.
53
However, the Israeli refusal to implement its part of the agreed peace 
plan stands in the way of achieving any progress in solving the conflict's main issues. 
The United States strives to develop its relationships with GCC countries to serve the peace 
process, particularly in respect of normalization with Israel when there is no clear Gulf 
stand regarding the settlement process and confronting the United States with the 
determined attitude of GCC states,
54
 As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has 
played an important and main role in serving the American strategy in the Arab region 
whenever it met with Saudi national interests, one of the long-range American targets in 
this respect is the continuous support from the Kingdom for the role of the United States in 
searching for a peaceful solution for the Palestinian issue, and the Kingdom enjoys the 
security protection that the American umbrella provides in the region. 
 5-4-f The events of 11 September and their impact on Gulf-American relations 
The 11 September events occurred, and they were exploited intelligently to make use of the 
Saudi weight to exert pressure in the direction of a comprehensive solution for the Arab-
Israeli conflict, through cooperation with regional partners such as the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, which offered an initiative, similar to what had happened at the Arab Summit in 
Beirut at the end of March 2002.
55
 
Basically, the GCC countries followed the same course as the Arab countries regarding the 
condemnation of the 11 September attacks. In Jeddah on 28 September 2001, an 
extraordinary meeting for the GCC ministers of foreign affairs was held, which confirmed 
the main aspects of the Council's attitude towards according full support to the United 
States in its war against “terrorism”. It also adopted the necessary arrangements in this 
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respect, provided that the movement against “terrorism” had defined targets to be 
implemented under an international cover, and was not invested in offending the reputation 
of Arabs and Islam.
56
 
Generally speaking, the Gulf view of terrorism and the war against it have been 
characterized by rationalism and balance, both before and after 11 September. Also, the 
Gulf side seemed to be keen to keep the Arab and Islamic regional dimension together with 
the international dimension for combating terrorism, based on a set of principles:
57 
Condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, a distinction between terrorism 
and resistance, rejection of the idea of connecting Islam with terrorism and 
terrorism confrontation is a joint international responsibility, not to be 
assumed solely by a country with the exclusion of others. 
It is worth mentioning that the GCC countries had previously approved the International 
Treaty for Combating Terrorism adopted by the United Nations in 1999. Moreover, the 
official Saudi declarations confirmed the connection between terrorism and the unbalanced 
American policy in addition to the ignorance of the Palestinian issue, expressing through 
such statements the disappointment of GCC leaders regarding the mode of treatment that 
Washington was following in relation to the Palestinian cause.
58
 
On the other hand, Saudi-American contradictions appeared and were manifested in the 
stringent speech of the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah against the American policy towards 
the Palestinian issue. His address reached the point of public rejection of the invitation to 
visit the White House in June 2001.
59
Moreover, the Saudi prince complained of the 
slackness of the American role regarding the aggressive policy of the Israeli government. 
He went as far as sending a letter in August 2001 to the United States. The content of this 
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letter was disclosed in October of the same year for the purpose of denouncing the 
American policy with respect to the Palestinian issue, and warning the United States that 
the Kingdom may re-evaluate their joint relations, as the letter included the point that 
“There is a time may come where people and countries break off.”60 
Two days before the 11 September attacks, responsible Saudi sources ascertained that 
postponing the joint high military committee meeting, due to be held at the end of August 
2001, stood as an expression of the Kingdom’s disappointment with the American policy in 
the Middle East.
61
 Also, the noticeable change in Gulf-American relations since the Second 
Intifada was revealed by studying the official and popular Gulf attitudes towards the 
Intifada and Israel.
62 
On the other side, Saudi Arabia declared that it was taking strict measures to control what 
was described as “illegitimate remittance” and froze the accounts of the persons and 
associations suspected to be linked to funding terrorism. Meanwhile, Kuwait reinforced the 
supervision of various Islamic charity organizations and the function of these organizations 
was submitted to a high committee dependent on the Minister of Social Affairs. However, 
in the United Arab Emirates, where the national associations had been subject to the 
control of the Ministry of Social Affairs since 1993, a statute was promulgated to put a 
ceiling of 1,000 dirham for their money transfers abroad. At the same time, in Bahrain the 
Bahrain Monetary Organization investigated the bank accounts suspected to be dealing 
with financing terrorism.
63 
Moreover, after the 11 September events, the American objectives in the Arab Gulf region 
and the Middle East were exceeded by two more objectives, which can be summarized as 
working on a reformulation of the security arrangements in the Gulf area via establishing a 
pro-American regime in Iraq, and working on bringing Israel within the Gulf Security 
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equation after resuming the peace process in the region, and putting political, 
informational, economic, and security pressures on Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia as well 
as the effectiveness of the role of the close Arab countries to the United States regarding 
the Iraqi crisis, such as Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.
64
 
The defence agreements concluded by the GCC countries with the United States after the 
second Gulf War gained more importance after the events of 11 September. The American 
war in Afghanistan gave these agreements new dimensions that drove them out of their 
targets, in which GCC countries used to believe once they were concluded. Their main 
concern was the Gulf security challenges that were encountered by regional powers such as 
Iraq and Iran. The GCC states found themselves providing facilities to the United States in 
its war against “terrorism”, rather than the main concern of the GCC states. In this respect, 
the positions of the Council's states were not unified; while both Bahrain and Kuwait 
approved these facilities, the Sultanate of Oman and the United Arab Emirates were 
hesitating. Saudi Arabia maintained a reserved attitude and clearly refused to grant military 
facilities to the United States in its campaign in Afghanistan.
65 
Therefore, the United States bitterly criticized Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries under 
the pretext that they did not completely cooperate with the American military campaign in 
Afghanistan. Thus, the American military presence, intended to be for the purpose of 
consolidating Saudi security, became a double burden in terms of its safety for the 
following two reasons.
66
First, the US military presence, which is intended to enhance the 
security of Saudi Arabia become a burden on the two states security. Second, the US 
reached a stage of imposing additional responsibilities on the Kingdom for providing its 
security. 
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5.4.g The Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian issue, and the 11 September attacks 
During the previous American administration, and throughout the eight years of Bill 
Clinton’s presidency from 1993 to 2000, the United States worked on completing the Arab-
Israeli conflict settlement, especially regarding reaching an agreement in respect of the four 
key issues, which were: the land, the settlements, the refugees, and Jerusalem.  
Also, in the course of the second Camp David negotiations in July 2000, President Clinton 
tried to reach a final settlement before leaving office. Clinton's failure, occurring at the 
same time as the Intifada and the deviation of Israeli public opinion in the direction of 
rightism and extremism, then the election of Sharon as Israel's Prime Minister, led to a 
hesitating attitude from the new administration concerning any interference in the conflict 
after George W. Bush assumed power on 20 January 2001, after three months of the 
Second Intifada.
67
 
Other than that, if the 11September attacks had crystallized what may have been similar to 
a crisis in the relations of some GCC countries with the United States, particularly in 
Saudi-American relations, this was partially attributable to the biased American attitude in 
respect of the region’s problems, and especially with regard to both Palestinian and Iraqi 
issues.  
As for the Palestinian cause, after 11 September, the US started looking at the Arab conflict 
with Israel as a war between Israel and terrorism.
68
Consequently, the Palestinian cause 
remained in the background, as Israel endeavoured to make use of the crisis, comparing the 
Palestinian Intifada with “terrorism”, and “Arafat” with “Bin Laden”. They set up its 
publicity on what it called “its right to defend itself against Palestinian terrorism similar to 
the method followed by the United States in Afghanistan”. Simultaneously, the Palestinian 
official response was to reject any terrorist attacks against the United States and Bin 
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Laden’s declarations, which hinted at these attacks being retaliation for the American 
policy towards the Palestinian cause.
69
 
During the first stages of the crisis, it appeared that the international arena was prepared for 
great transformations in the Palestinian issue, similar to those which occurred after the 
second Gulf War, as the Madrid Conference for Peace was held followed by the Oslo 
operation.  
Furthermore, in October 2001, nearly a month after the 11 September attacks, President 
Bush declared that “the Palestinian State has been always a part of the American perception 
for solving the Arab-Israeli conflict.” His statement was followed by a statement from the 
Secretary of Defence, Colin Powell, at Lewisville University in Kentucky on 19 November 
2001, in which he defined the main aspects of the United States plan for settling the 
conflict in the region.  
Powell’s viewpoint regarding the Pacific Settlement in the Middle East was manifested in: 
the recuperation of Madrid's spirit, the establishment of two states willing to survive, the 
termination of the “occupation”, the cessation of all violent actions, the exchange of land 
for peace according to the UN resolutions 242 and 338, and the implementation of 
Mitchell’s recommendations and Tenet’s plan.70 
The future of the relations between the two parties will depend, in the first degree, on a 
unified Gulf attitude, as the GCC countries’ positions of contradictions and disparities, 
regarding the way of dealing with the American policies, weaken the Gulf attitude 
supporting the Palestinian cause, and accord Washington the opportunity to realize its 
interests and target, whereas the coordination and the unification of Gulf attitudes will 
consolidate their interests when confronting foreign pressures. 
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5.5.a Gulf-Israeli relations 
The Gulf region is of central importance in the Israeli strategic conception. In general, it 
could be said that Israelis’ concern about the Gulf region is based on three fundamental 
considerations, the most important of which are
71
 first, the significant strategic location of 
the Gulf and its control over some important water passages in the world, such as the 
Hormuz Strait; second, the wish to open large consumer markets for its economic products 
in the region; and finally, if Israeli has a foothold in the Gulf it would make it near Iraq, 
Iran, and Pakistan, as it strives to observe their movements. 
Also, there are two factors that could have given Israel hope that Gulf countries would 
open up for them. The existence of the US in the Gulf would help in bringing the Arabs 
and the Israelis closer, and help them to establish normal relations when the peace process 
progressed. The Israelis view the Gulf communities from the perspective of a generation of 
conflict and they believe that the younger generation who did not live in the days of the 
armed conflict, and are more open to the Western lifestyle and ideas, may be more capable 
of accepting the idea of the Israeli presence.
72
 
In fact, Israel basically aspires to stabilizing its economic role in the Arab region, as one of 
its main targets has been to become one of the players in the area. From an Israeli 
viewpoint, this means that peace with the Arabs implies, in the first place, the 
establishment of mutual economic relations with neighbouring countries for the purpose of 
taking advantage of the region’s natural resources. In other words, this would be the peace 
of achieving economic integration for the Middle East, relying on what would be Israel’s 
industrial base, and the Arab nations would be the supplier of the raw materials plus a 
market to merchandize the industrial products. Hence, it would be a peace imposed by 
force, where Israel would not strive to reach an official pacific status with the Arab 
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countries. What would significantly contribute to this is the Gulf economic policy, which 
stands as an inducing factor to more cooperation with Israel in the future.
73
 
5.5.b The nature of the Israeli approach towards GCC countries: An overview 
One can perceive an important fact that some of the Israeli objectives maintain the factor of 
continuity regarding the regional and international political reactions, yet also throughout 
the Arab-Israeli conflict demarche.  
The most noticeable political dimensions of the Israeli move towards GCC countries are 
ensuring the continuation of moderate Arab countries and governments, herein meaning the 
GCC countries, at the head of which is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Following the second 
Gulf War, Washington started a diplomatic campaign for establishing a strategic base in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and inciting Gulf people to assume a more effective role in a regional 
peace process aimed at founding Arab-Israeli relations
74
 and the Israeli adoption of a policy 
that creates a regional security fence, meaning that it considers all the GCC countries as 
being a regional security barrier, which surrounds the Arab regional regime; and this would 
constitute a protection wall for confronting any direct threat to it or to its allies.
75
 
On the other hand, the most notable elements of the Israeli economic movement, 
specifically in the mid-1990s, can be indicated as follows: first, there was the establishment 
of commercial relations via opening commercial representation offices in Qatar and 
encouraging cooperation with companies in the Sultanate of Oman. Moreover, an Israeli 
researcher saw that under the wing of peace, some natural commercial relations would be 
established, and he suggested the possibility of spreading international cooperatives 
between the Arabs and Israel.
76
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Another economic dimension was the participation in the economic conferences in GCC 
countries, such as the Doha Economic Conference in 1997, and engaging in joint 
committees with these states for the purpose of cooperating in common economic projects 
in the fields of water desalination, petroleum and gas transportation, and thus being in 
favour of creating economic correlations with the Gulf private sector.
77
 Third, there was the 
need to approach the Gulf markets economically, as it seemed that Israel had implemented 
the GCC resolution in 1994 by ending the boycott of second and third degrees on any 
indirect goods and purchases, with the aim of engendering more means of penetrating the 
Gulf markets. For example, US companies had been completely exempted from submitting 
the certificate of origin, and some companies, such as Coca Cola, work freely in the Gulf, 
regardless of their large investments, affiliates, and businesses in Israel.
78
 
With the hope of reaching a comprehensive peace, in 1997 Israel issued a comprehensive 
plan for the 21st century entitled “Israel in 2020”, comprehending a number of future 
probabilities or options. The most important of these is related to Israel’s economic future 
and it can be summarized, in reaching what is called peace with the Arab countries within 
the frame of open boundaries, which will be positively reflected in transferring Israel from 
an isolated island in an Arab sea to a great economic intersection point in the Middle East. 
This reveals that Israel, later with the help of the US, seeks to bind the wheel of GCC 
economies to that of the global economies, including the Israeli economy.
79
 
5.5.c The Israeli methods to approach the GCC countries 
The Israeli methods, which aimed to open new channels with GCC countries, were various, 
according to several considerations. The most apparent of these methods could be the 
international and regional political atmosphere that extended through most of the world, in 
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general, and the region, in particular, during the 1990s. The Israeli methods of movement 
focused on: 
i. Political methods and its dimensions  
The political methods can be demonstrated in four methods. First, there were the bilateral 
meetings in April 1994; the Sultanate of Oman was the first Arab Gulf country to officially 
hold Israel responsible in the frame of multilateral negotiations concerning the water 
resources in the Middle East. Also, on 6 November 1994, the Israeli Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Youssey Beline, paid a short visit to Muscat and spoke about opening two 
departments to protect interests in both Muscat and Tel Aviv. In addition, on 23 September 
1995, Omani and Israeli experts, besides other counterparts from the European Union and 
Japan, concluded meetings in Muscat to agree upon establishing the Middle East Centre for 
water desalination research.
80
Furthermore, in July 1996 Duri Gold, the counsellor of the 
former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, conducted talks in Doha, discussing the means of 
pushing forward the normalization process.
81
 Second, there were the meetings in 
international circles and bilaterally between Qatari officials and their counterpart, Hamad 
Bin Jassem and Barrack, on 10 January 1996 in Paris. The talks between these parties dealt 
with the methods of encouraging economic development in the region.
82
 Moreover, Hamad 
Bin Jassem met with Silvan Shalom, the former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 
margins of the UN General Assembly periodical meetings in September 2005.
83
 This point 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter nine. Third, there were secret and official visits. 
Israeli sources mentioned that the former Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in the middle of 
an atmosphere of extreme concern about the peace process, paid a visit to the Sultanate of 
Oman, without defining the visit's details.
84
 In addition, at the peace conference at Sharm 
el-Sheikh held on 13 March 1996, representatives of GCC countries were attending, and 
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the Qatari representative, in his address, invited Peres to visit his country.
85
 In addition, on 
31January 1997, an Israeli Qatari newspaper confirmed that two of Netanyahu’s assistants 
visited Qatar,
86
 as will be discussed in Chapter Ten.  
The fourth and final method was the inauguration of offices of commercial representation 
and interest protection. In October 1995, the Sultanate of Oman became the first GCC 
country to establish official relations with Israel via exchanging their commercial 
representatives. Other than that, Qatar agreed upon inaugurating an Israeli commercial 
representation office; this opening was consequent to Peres's visit to Qatar, on 2 March 
1996, in which they signed an agreement implying the establishment of two similar 
offices.
87
 Of note is the fact that in January 2005, Israel reopened its commercial 
representation offices in both Oman and Qatar that had been closed previously as a result 
of the Israeli policy towards the Palestinians. 
ii. Economic approaches : 
The economic methods, which Israel had followed in targeting GCC countries, had several 
forms, part of which was, first, goods and merchandise exchange. Israel is convinced that 
GCC countries could offer a sizeable capital to be invested in joint projects, and also that 
they are in need of Israeli technology, particularly in the domains of water preservation, 
irrigation, agriculture, and energy, and perhaps, in the field of weapons transactions if 
necessary in the future. Also GCC countries are considered as the biggest consumer 
markets in the world. These are markets that care about products of quality and advanced 
technology, such as those sold by Israel.
88
 
Second, there is participation in economic summits and conferences. Israel and GCC 
countries participated in several economic conferences and summits, including the 
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Casablanca summit held under the title of “The Economic Summit Conference for 
Development in the Middle East and North Africa” on 30 November 1994, in addition to 
the Oman Economic Summit, held as the second economic gathering for development in 
the Middle East and North Africa from 29 to 31 October 1995. In this summit, it was 
reported that the Israeli delegation had submitted a document in which one could perceive 
its orientation towards the Gulf countries. This document confirmed that the main Israeli 
goal was to establish a common market similar to that of the European market.
89
 Also, 
there was the Cairo Economic Summit, which was held from 12 to 14 November 1996, 
after the Oslo agreement trajectory became complicated the Arabs blamed the Israeli 
government for being the reason behind this complications. In addition, Israel submitted a 
paper entitled “Programs for Regional Cooperation”, which focused on Jordan, particularly 
the Jordan valley and Akaba areas, and stressed the idea of making Jordan a gateway for 
Israel to GCC countries.
90
Furthermore, there was the Doha Economic Conference, held on 
16 November 1997, which was convened as a result of American pressures, under the 
pretext that such matters represented an international obligation that must be put into effect. 
However, the KSA, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates refrained from attending it, as 
did Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, and others.
91
It was noteworthy that this attitude led to 
media contention between Egypt and Qatar, where the two countries both put obstacles to 
the free movement of diplomats and individuals. Hence, it seems that the prominent 
objective of all these convened conferences focused on creating relations, and ending the 
Arabic boycott prior to engaging with settlement negotiations on various levels. 
5.5.d The reactions of GCC countries towards the Israeli policy (1991-2005) 
Some indications were manifested inside GCC countries since the beginning of the1990s, 
thus representing an official and popular reaction regarding the Israeli movement towards 
them. In this respect, a crucial problem was raised, meaning that part of the official view in 
the GCC was characterized by an obvious diversity, as some of the Council's countries 
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strove to create a connection between their officials and those of Israel. For pragmatic 
reasons, some of the Gulf states were willing to open communication channels with Israel, 
and to create structural, institutional, and popular relations to facilitate the cooperation with 
Israel.
92
However, other countries refused the idea of beginning communications with 
Israel. 
Some of the GCC governments justified establishing relations with Israel on the basis of 
two different kinds of logic. First, GCC countries saw no justification for the political 
norms related to the Arab-Israeli conflict affecting the establishment of economic relations 
with Israel. Second, there was no probability that they could be invaded by struggle or 
instability from their western side, as the security issues that preoccupied these countries 
according to their governments' perception were restricted to normal phenomena, such as 
the regional power balance in the Gulf. Another logic was adopting the opinion that some 
of the Arab Gulf governments, which precipitated the normalization of their relations with 
Israel, were pushed in this direction by fear or self-interest. Qatar and Oman rushed to sign 
agreements with Israel after reaching agreements with both the Palestinians and Jordanians, 
for different sets of reasons. One reason was to secure political position for the two states 
in any future arrangements in the region, and the other reason could be attributed to the 
strategy of balances with different regional and international pressure,
93
that after attaining a 
comprehensive settlement on the Syrian and Lebanese paths. However, concerning the 
beneficial side of the attitudes of some Gulf governments, these countries were convinced 
that they would achieve direct and fruitful economic and commercial results.
94
 
Likewise, there was another official Gulf opinion that feared the rapprochement and 
normalization with Israel, based on several arguments. First, the argument that the GCC 
countries feared becoming the big financer of Tel Aviv's political and economic projects in 
the region. Second, the argument concerning the hesitation of GCC countries, which is due 
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to the extreme rapidity in the course of the normalization, before a comprehensive 
settlement of the conflict has been reached.
95
 
The other opinion claims that some of the GCC countries were fearful that some Israeli 
plans could endanger Gulf projects, with other parties having the same objectives in the 
future. 
It is noticeable that there was no unified Gulf policy in respect of dealing with Israel, and 
that Gulf relations in this regard still relied, to a great extent, upon the initiatives of 
individual states. 
The attitudes of GCC countries towards the normalization process differ from one country 
to another, according to each country’s benefits and their own interpretation of their 
national interests,
96
 although, as is shown in its issued statements, the Council as a whole 
actually opposed the direct establishment of relations with Israel before reaching a 
comprehensive and equitable peace in the region, or at least striking agreements at the 
Syrian and Lebanese levels.  
Akram El-Aghbari
97
 argues that, based on his understanding of  the Saudi Arabia Peace 
initiative articles,  Saudi Arabia stipulated the settlement of Jerusalem’s situation as a 
condition for receiving Israeli officials in the future, as well as the Israeli commitment to 
the non-execution of any changes in the demographic and geographic characteristics that 
had disrupted Jerusalem since 1967. Furthermore, countries such as the UAE, Bahrain, and 
Kuwait correlate their relations with Israel with the act of concluding agreements on the 
two paths,
98
 while Israel strives to entangle the Gulf countries, collectively or separately, in 
direct and indirect relations relying on its geopolitical interests in the region and its 
strategic views aimed at reformulating the Arab region's aspects, so as to guarantee the 
realization of Israeli objectives therein.
99
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Guzansky raises a counterargument that the Arab Gulf states and Israel were willing to 
establish a kind of reciprocal understanding and cooperation security towards the nuclear 
threat that the region faces from Iran. However, some of the Arab Gulf states stipulated to 
Israel that a remarkable progress needed take place first on the peace process, especially on 
the Israeli-Palestinian track, before taking the cooperation to a higher level.
100
 
On the other side, the argument of countries undertaking relations with Israel
101
 is based on 
the fact that normalization with Israel aims at supporting the peace process and the bilateral 
negotiations on different paths in addition to the multilateral negotiations. 
The justifications in such countries are based on idea that the normalization of relations 
with Israel is, in fact, connected to the amount of progress realized in the negotiations. This 
contradicted the view opposing normalization, which, in turn, sees that these relations 
would grant Israel gratuitous advantages other than encouraging it to adopt intransigent 
attitudes in the talks. 
Aside from that, Israeli interests in the Gulf were consolidated during the years following 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as well as the start of the peaceful settlement, along with the 
attempt at getting involved, in one way or another, in the Gulf security situation. Also, 
endeavoured to use an economic approach as a gateway to build security regime.
102
 
In this context, Israel had submitted the project of the “Middle Eastern” market, to which 
Shimon Peres referred in 1993, in his famous book, The New Middle East.  
The reference of Peres can be summarized in establishing a regional economic group, 
including the Arab states and other countries of the Middle East plus Israel, to share a joint 
market and central productive organizations, in which Israel would be the leader in the light 
of its technological and economic supremacy.
103 
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In October 1992, at the National Institute for Middle East Studies, and in front of Egyptian 
intellectuals during his visit to Cairo, Shimon Peres summed up Israel’s attitude regarding 
cooperation in the Middle East in the following considerations: 
We must not observe the political negotiations by focusing on the past. We 
must put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and build a new Middle 
East…The new Middle East should be, economically, an open area for all 
inhabiting nations…We could establish a Jordanian-Palestinian 
Confederation, or an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation, or an 
alliance according to the form of Benelux.
104
 
Thereupon, Israel has been working on founding big regional projects that make economic 
connections between Israel and the Arab countries, that represent the essence of the 
political settlement desired by Israel, the Israeli main concept of peace is “peace for peace”; 
in other words, an economic peace
105
 supported by the United States. Meanwhile, the Arab 
viewpoint stressed that normalization is a related issue of sovereignty; the Arabs’ main 
concept of peace was “peace for land”, as each country determines the suitable degree of 
normalization with the other country.
106 
This matter is explained by Israel's endeavours during the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, 
and launched at the Madrid conference in 1991, in order to let the multilateral negotiations, 
which were concerned with economic and water cooperation affairs and other issues that 
were relevant to the normalization process, precede the bilateral negotiations related to land 
and security. Thus, Israel justified its viewpoint by the fact that the progress in the first 
round of negotiations would enhance the mutual confidence between the two sides, and 
consequently facilitate the achievement of satisfactory solutions in the second round issues. 
In fact, during this time, Israel succeeded in penetrating some closed doors within the Arab 
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world, particularly in the Gulf region. 
Also, when the Pacific Settlement began to falter in the region when Benjamin Netanyahu 
came to power in 1996, some GCC countries began to reconsider their steps adopted with 
regards to the normalization with Israel, and began to work on putting into effect the 
official and popular boycott. This was demonstrated in the boycott by the GCC countries of 
the Doha Economic Conference for the Middle East and North Africa held in 1997, as Gulf 
representation was at its minimum level due to Israel's participation when it had retracted 
from the peace process. Moreover, the GCC countries refused to participate with Israel in 
any forums or conferences held on its land. The Sultanate of Oman abstained from 
participating with Israel in the water conference in 1997 and the Emirates also refused to 
allow the Israelis to attend its annual exhibition for weapons, “AEDEX”, on 16 March, 
1997. In addition, both the Sultanate of Oman and Qatar closed their offices in Israel, as 
well as the Israeli offices in their capitals, in October and November 2000 respectively, as a 
protest against the repressive practices and in solidarity with the Second Intifada, which 
erupted in September 2000.
107
 
5.5.e The role of international factors in Gulf-Israeli relations 
It is impossible to separate the Gulf-Israeli relations (that is, the normalization issue) from 
all the regional and international developments that occurred after the events of11 
September, including the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and ending with the Israeli 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, in addition to Israeli attempts to benefit from 
such developments. 
It is noteworthy that the events of 11 September took place at a time when the Gulf 
criticisms of Israeli practices against Palestinian rights had become more and more acute, 
and the Council's countries continued their support for the Second Intifada. In addition, 
there was the discomfort of the Gulf side regarding American policy in the peace process 
and its biased attitude towards Israel. Then, the US and Israeli pressure on the Gulf 
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countries began and the Western media started to accuse some Gulf countries of exporting 
extremism and terrorism abroad, other than supporting some terrorist groups (from the 
American perspective), such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The Gulf response to such 
pressures on two obvious behaviours was first, the Saudi initiative for the settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, through which the Arab countries expressed their acceptance of total 
normalization with Israel in return for its complete withdrawal from the occupied 
territories, including Jerusalem. Such an initiative later became, in the Beirut Summit in 
2002, an Arab initiative. Second, the GCC countries rejected the voices claiming that 
petroleum was being used as a political weapon to exert pressure on the United States and 
Israel.
108
 
This study has noticed that the United States submitted several initiatives calling for 
“reforms” in the cultural, educational, political, and economic fields. Therefore, the Middle 
Eastern partnership initiative intervened at the end of 2002, launched by Colin Powell, the 
Secretary of State, followed by Bush’s call, in June 2003, to establish an American-Middle 
Eastern free trade zone by the year 2013. In addition, in February 2004 the American 
administration proclaimed the “Broad Middle East project”. 
These projects aimed at realizing certain targets, the most important of which was the 
breaking of the power of the extremist religious currents, which carried out the resistance 
against the Israeli occupation and practices. Moreover, such projects sought to integrate 
Israel in the region, politically and economically, via opening the Arab markets for Israeli 
exports, regardless of the level of progress in the political settlement between the Arabs 
and Israel.  
At this point, one could say that the “Broad Middle East Project” did not differ from the 
revealed Israeli view, as stated by Peres in his book The New Middle East, on the basis that 
the two initiatives aspired to establishing a new Middle Eastern regime as a substitute for 
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the Arab regional system.
109
 
Of note is the fact that the American occupation of Iraq did indeed result in important 
indirect benefits for Israel. The most crucial of these was the exclusion of Iraq as being a 
powerful military state from the circle of war against Israel, and the loss of Syria to a 
hypothetical strategic depth, which was useful in its conflict with Israel, in spite of the 
violent ideological disagreement between Iraq and Syria.  
On the other side, the Israelis perceived these developments as a radical change in the 
regional power balance in the Middle East in favour of Israel.  
The Israelis also considered that the fall of Baghdad constituted an extra hit to the Arab 
national current, which was still suffering from an intense crisis; the matter that strengthen 
the stream of  the state national interest for each Arab country individually. Thus, this state 
individualism may lead to increase the self-seclusion of each Arab country and its 
renunciation of Arab national issues. The priority in this regard was the conflict with Israel, 
particularly as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had lowered morale, enfeebled the political 
significance of the concept of Arab national security, and led to its decay. 
In the same context, there were fears that American pressures on any new Iraqi government 
would lead to establishing strong friendship relations with Israel that might have echoes in 
the relations between the GCC countries and Israel, particularly from the side of some 
countries who intensified their military relations with the United States, such as Qatar, 
Oman, and Bahrain.
110
 In addition, if Israel succeeded in this regard, then it would have 
divided the general Gulf attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This fact required the 
GCC countries to sense such surrounding danger and to work to coordinate mutually for 
the purpose of confronting the Israeli threats, which began to develop after the American 
occupation of Iraq, targeting the Arab Gulf countries, and attempting to deepen its 
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economic relations with some of the Gulf states. 
From the aforementioned discussion, it seems that the Gulf reactions towards the Israeli 
plans could progress to reach an advanced stage in order to prevent and limit Israel's 
penetration inside the region. Also, Israel succeeded in building up diplomatic or 
commercial relations with some Arab and Islamic countries.
111
 
This meant that it was necessary to call for the reconsideration of the feasibility of the 
supposition raised along with the development of the peace process. This supposition 
implies the importance of the Arab and Gulf countries encouraging Israel, in the mid-
nineties, to go forward in the peace process by offering incentives through speaking about 
normalization with the Israelis. These Arab political efforts to encourage Israel went in 
vain, as Israel did not respond to these efforts, even though it claimed normalization 
without presenting any meaningful concessions, and without stopping its policy, which the 
Arabs considered as being aggressive against the Palestinians. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a range of external factors that contributed to the formation of 
the foreign policy decisions of the Gulf Cooperation Council. These factors included Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait and its consequences, Gulf-US relations, and, finally, Gulf-Israeli 
relations. 
The discussion revealed that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait created an exceptional dilemma for 
the security of the Gulf, where presumed friendly regional power turned out to be a source 
of threat, and at the same time, the international power that intervened to restore the 
security of the Gulf formed a new threat through provoking the strong regional neighbour, 
Iran. The US military presence in the GCC countries following the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait complicated the security situation and forced GCC states to seek to execute 
bilateral security agreements with Britain, France, and the US. The permanent allies in the 
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GCC further complicated the security situation because it simply put GCC states into an 
indirect military confrontation with Iran, who saw the US military bases on GCC territory 
as a direct threat to its security. 
Consequently, this increased the US political influence in the GCC, and this affected the 
decision-making process with respect to the Middle East peace process. However, this 
influence only produced a limited impact when it came to the relations between GCC states 
and Israel except for Qatar, as has been briefly discussed in this chapter and as will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
The 11 September attacks were taken by the US as a strong pretext to intervene to create a 
new Middle East through a number of initiatives that were mainly founded on the premises 
of democratization and establishing the principles of embracing diversity of opinion and 
denouncing violence in its broad definition. These initiatives were not accepted by GCC 
states without reserve, but Qatar was the exception, as the study has discussed and as it will 
discuss in more detail in the coming chapter. Acting on such premises, the US attempted to 
persuade GCC states to adopt a stance that condemned terrorism. The GCC states, 
however, were deeply split with the US over the definition of terrorism, as the US wanted 
to include armed resistance against occupation, a definition that GCC states rejected as 
contradicting the immutable and legitimate right of all people to armed struggle against 
occupation, including the Israeli occupation of Arab territories 
The next chapter will explore GCC foreign policies towards the Middle East peace process 
and the Palestinian cause as a central issue in the Middle East conflict. 
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                                            CHAPTER SIX 
The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Peace Process Projects: From 
Madrid to Camp David II (1991-2004) 
6.1 Introduction 
In the two previous chapters, this study investigated a set of internal and external 
determinants that had a key influence on GCC foreign policy making with respect to the 
Middle East peace process (1991-2005), including the relationship between the US and 
GCC states, the impact of the tense relations between the US and Iran, the Iraqi occupation 
of Kuwait, the PLO’s stance on this occupation and the effect of the PLO’s stance on its 
relationship with GCC states, as well as US attempts to introduce democratic reforms in 
the Middle East.  
This chapter aims at highlighting key foreign policy stances adopted by the GCC with 
respect to fundamental issues and milestone events over the course of the Middle East 
peace process from the Madrid Conference until 2004.  
The events and initiatives explored in this chapter that relate to the central research 
question in the current study include the Madrid conference, the Oslo Accords, the Gaza-
Jericho agreement, Camp David, and finally the Roadmap 
This chapter has also relied on a number of sources, including academic books, articles 
that examined the events of this significant historical period, and official documents, such 
as declarations made after GCC summits.  
6.2 The Madrid Conference  
A new phase of Gulf-Palestinian relations began in the early 1990s, specifically at the 
Kuwaiti-Palestinian level, in the shadow of the Palestinian stand towards the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, which was not expected by the Gulf countries. Yet, the GCC states did not 
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relinquish their responsibilities towards the Palestinian cause and supported the invitation 
for an international peace conference under the auspices of Washington and Moscow. The 
GCC member states also issued a statement to the effect that the Council was ready to 
participate in the peace conference as an “observer”, should it receive an invitation to that 
effect and: 
to support holding an international peace conference on the Palestinian 
cause, while abiding by the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and to establish their own independent state on their land, 
and to confirm the necessity of exerting more efforts with friendly and 
Arab countries to hold such a conference.
1
 
Furthermore, the Council state members will participate in any guarantees that shall 
include the countries of the region in order to discuss issues related to armament reduction, 
the decommissioning of weapons of mass destruction, water sources and environmental 
protection.
2
 
The Secretary General of the Council declared its support towards the conference in the 
extraordinary ministerial meeting held in Riyadh on 27 October 1991 and charged the 
Secretary General of the Council to attend the opening session as an observer on behalf of 
the Council’s states in addition to declaring the agreement of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council states to participate in the multilateral negotiations. More than once, the states of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council declared their support for the course of the peace process in 
the Council sessions or in the resolutions issued by each of the Gulf states.
3
 
The Madrid Peace Conference in the Middle East was held on 30 October 1991 under the 
auspices of the US and the USSR, along with symbolic European attendance. Most Arab 
countries (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and the six Gulf Cooperation 
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Council states) participated in the conference. However, the PLO was prevented from 
officially participating in the conference. Palestinian representatives of the West Bank 
(with the approval of the PLO) under a Jordanian covering and among a common 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation participated in the conference.
4
 
With regard to the closing statement of the Twelfth Session of the Supreme Council of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council states held in Kuwait from 23 to 25 December 1991,
5
 the 
Council praised the peaceful efforts exerted by the world community, expressing its 
pleasure with the results of the peace conference held in Madrid, in which it participated as 
an observer. It asserted its support for the efforts exerted to achieve peace and the intention 
of its states to participate in the multilateral negotiations, as an attempt by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council states to support the regional security by reaching fundamental 
solutions to all conflicts in the region in accordance with the international legitimacy. 
This was the first time that the Gulf states had participated as part of the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. They then participated in the Moscow Conference in the multilateral negotiations 
on 28 and 29 January 1992, as the complementary section of the peace conference 
negotiations and the bilateral negotiations. Such negotiations aimed at facilitating the 
Arab-Israeli peace process through overcoming some thorny issues that had had a bad 
influence on the course of the bilateral negotiations between the direct conflicting parties.
6
 
In this conference, the idea of leading two courses regarding the settlement process came 
into existence:
7
 
- The bilateral course: This involved the Arab parties that are in direct conflict with 
Israel, such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.  
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- The multilateral course: This aimed at creating comprehensive international 
sponsorship of the settlement process by means of involving the most influential 
countries of the world as well as all regional and Arab parties to participate in the 
settlement process. Also, it aimed at creating a change in the general status quo in the 
Middle East to allow Israel to become a normal entity in the region. In addition, this 
course began to deal with some critical issues to remove any obstacles in the bilateral 
course, such as the refugees, water, security, limiting armaments, the environment, 
economy, and regional cooperation, with five committees formed to discuss these 
issues. 
However, the real aim of the settlement process was to segment the Arab-Israeli conflict 
into two sections; the first one pertained to the Arab countries and Israel while the second 
related to the Palestinians and Israel, commensurate with the Israeli desire to isolate the 
Arabs from the Palestinian cause and turn it into a cause that concerns only the 
Palestinians. 
6.3 Oslo Peace Accord (The Palestinian-Israeli Framework Peace Accord) 
There is no doubt that the Oslo Peace Accord has caused a crack between the official 
Palestinian view and the official Arab view regarding how this trajectory should be 
settled. This is attributed to the fact that the official Palestinian attitude has gone beyond 
the Arab tradition of non-negotiable positions on accepting most of the terms and 
demands of the US administration and Israel. In addition, the Oslo Peace Accord has 
obliged the generalized official Arab attitude to relinquish some principles in order to 
cope with the Palestinian attitude regarding its relations with Israel.
8
 
The Oslo Peace Accord was officially signed in Washington on 13 September 1993. It 
was the first agreement to be signed by both the Palestinians and the Israelis, and through 
which a peaceful settlement was carried out. A large segment of Palestinians and Arab 
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nationalists saw it as reflecting the enormous cessions the leadership of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) was obliged to offer to get an accord that was similar in 
essence to the Camp David Peace Accord signed in 1978.However, the fact is that the 
accord was arranging mutual cessions on the both sides, and also, this accord affirmed the 
separation between the course of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the course of the 
Arab-Israeli negotiations, a matter that has led both the Arabs and the Palestinians to be 
unable to coordinate attitudes and shoulder a collective agreement. 
The Oslo Peace Accord was first known as the Palestinian-Israeli Framework Peace 
Accord or the Gaza-Jericho Accord. All the following agreements were signed between 
the PLO and the Israeli entity in accordance with this accord. Then, the Palestinian 
Authority took the place of the PLO regarding the representation of the Palestinian 
people. The most outstanding items of the Oslo Peace Accord are as follows:
9
 
1- A limited self-rule authority for the Palestinians is established in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip for a period of five years. 
2- Before the beginning of the third year of self-rule, negotiations begin on the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a matter that is supposed to lead to a permanent 
settlement on the basis of the Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and No. 338. 
3- Two months after the agreement comes into force, the two parties are supposed to 
reach an agreement on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho that includes giving the 
Palestinians limited authority covering some sectors such as education, culture, health, 
social affairs, direct taxes, and tourism. 
4- Direct elections are held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to elect a Palestinian self-
rule council nine months after the application of self-rule. Shortly before the elections, 
the Israeli forces withdraw from the populated districts and redeploy in the West Bank. 
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5- An interim self-rule Palestinian Authority covering the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 
formed, but its power does not include exterior security, Israeli settlements, and foreign 
relations, Jerusalem or the Israelis living on these lands. 
6- Israel has the right to veto any legislation issued by the Palestinian Authority during 
the interim stage. 
7- Any matter that is not settled by means of negotiations can be settled through a 
compromise mechanism agreed upon by the two parties. 
8- Self-rule will gradually extend from Gaza and Jericho to the West Bank districts, 
according to later detailed negotiations. 
9- The accord affirms that the PLO and the Palestinian Authority will reject “terrorism” 
and “violence”, preserve security, and prevent any armed acts against the Israeli entity. 
With regards to the official Arab attitude, the Oslo Accord was met with semi-full 
support although it was first rejected by some Arab countries. However, it was later 
supported by the same countries, particularly because it was supported by the US and 
under its auspices.
10
 In the closing statement of the Fourteenth Session of the Supreme 
Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council States held in Riyadh from 20 to 22 December 
1993, the Gulf Cooperation Council States welcomed the Oslo Framework Peace Accord 
signed by the PLO and Israel on the basis that it was a first step on the way to realizing a 
just, comprehensive, and permanent solution to the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, depending on Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and No. 338, the basis of 
land for peace, the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab-occupied lands, as well as the issue 
of returning Jerusalem and securing the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.
11
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 6.4 The Palestinian-Israeli agreement on self-rule (First known as the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement) 
The Palestinian-Israeli framework peace accord signed in Washington on 13 September 
1993 opened the way for holding negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, 
which resulted in their signing the agreement on self-rule in Cairo on 4 May 1994. One of 
the fruits of this agreement was the return of the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to 
the Gaza Strip in June 1994.
12
 
The Palestinian-Israeli agreement stipulates that a limited interim self-rule Palestinian 
Authority be established in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for a period of no more 
than five years, during which and before the beginning of the third year, negotiations on 
the final status will be held. Such negotiations are supposed to lead to a permanent 
settlement on the basis of the International Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and No. 
338.  
The Palestinian-Israeli framework peace accord was a turning point in the Palestinian 
cause from the Arab and Islamic dimension to the bilateral regional dimension. The 
agreement was drawn up in secret over a period of more than a year and a half. For the 
first time, the Palestinians officially acknowledged the existence of an Israeli state on 
Palestinian land. Also, the Palestine Liberation Organization pledged to stop all armed 
acts against Israel and the Israelis living in the self-rule areas and to do its best to prevent 
such acts before they are carried out, a matter that gave some Arab countries the excuse 
to have peace with Israel and to acknowledge it as a Middle Eastern country, removing 
the main obstacle to Israel's possibility of becoming a nation like any other nations (as 
said in Hebrew). This agreement led to the breaking of the historical state of deadlock in 
Arab-Israeli relations, which led some Arab countries to have normal relations with 
Israel. These Arab countries, including some Gulf countries such as Qatar and Oman,  
that by reaching a solution to the problem of the Palestinian people, which is the core of 
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the Arab-Israeli conflict, it became possible to reform Arab relations with Israel under the 
pretext that the Palestinian people had got their rights and that they respected the 
independent Palestinian decision.
13
 
At this stage, the declaration issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council states came after the 
meeting of the representatives of the GCC states with the  American Secretary of State on 
1 October 1994, and called for putting an end to the indirect boycott of Israel, the 
“boycott of second and third classes”, indicating in the same statement that the 
Cooperation Council would support any initiative proposed by the Arab League on the 
topic of boycott and that this agreement should be reconsidered to take into consideration 
the recent aspects and requirements of the peace process in the Middle East. 
In the same context, some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and 
Bahrain, just supported the peace process and the Arab view on Jerusalem, but they 
suspended the process of having normal relations with Israel and linked it with the 
complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab occupied lands and giving all the rights 
back to the Palestinian people. With regard to Qatar and Oman, they took some steps to 
have normal relations with Israel at the official level in the framework of having attitudes 
and policies that are different from those adopted by the other members of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. 
6.5 The Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
1995 
This refers to the interim agreement known as the Oslo Second Accord, which offered a 
comprehensive vision of the West Bank and a plan for a gradual Israeli withdrawal. 
Although a lot of steps were taken to set up a Palestinian parliament in the light of this 
agreement, through holding elections in the Palestinian occupied lands for the first time, 
the most important item of the Oslo Second Accord was the special arrangement 
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concerning Palestinian land, which was prepared side by side with suggestions of 
Palestinian self-rule.
14
 
Despite the agreement of the two parties in the introductory talks on the Oslo Second 
Accord to abide by the Security Council Resolution No. 242, the interim agreement 
offered convincing evidence that Israel intended to withdraw from some parts of the West 
Bank. In 1995 and 1996, Israel made a complete withdrawal from zone (A) with the 
exception of Hebron, and gave the Palestinian Authority some control over the 
Palestinians living in zone (B). However, there was an item among the conditions of this 
agreement pertaining to zone (C) that Israel would withdraw from zone (C) with the 
passage of time but it would not withdraw from parts that would be negotiated in the talks 
on the final status.
15
 
Some critical issues, such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, 
borders, relations and cooperation with neighbouring countries, and other issues of 
common interest were included in some items of the accord. Settlements and security 
arrangements were among the issues that are most related to the occupied lands. With the 
existence of hundreds of settlements and military watch points in zone (C), Israel 
negotiated to have the right to stay forever in a big part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
even after the interim period. This is because the establishment of watch points and 
settlements needs legal or military permission from Israel. Thus, Israel saw that these 
Israeli parts of zone (C) would not be settled through negotiations but through Israeli 
political will alone.
16
 
Contrary to the aim stipulated by the Oslo Accord as represented in returning all the 
occupied lands to the Palestinians according to Security Council Resolution No. 242, the 
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documents signed in September 1995 gave Israel the right to keep no less than 75% of the 
lands of the West Bank.  
As for the closing statement of the Sixteenth Session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council States held in Muscat from 4 to 6 December 1995,
17
 the states of the 
Cooperation Council stipulated that peace should be comprehensive, just, and permanent, 
and that it should be a basis for security, stability, and development in the region and 
exchange of interests among the states of the region. They would also welcome signing 
the second stage agreement, which aims at extending Palestinian self-rule in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. They asserted that they were ready to support all possible efforts to 
hasten the final settlement between the parties of the peace process in the Middle East, 
according to the international legal resolutions and the Madrid Conference resolutions. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council states still call for the Security Council to take all possible 
and suitable measures to force Israel to refrain from causing any change to the 
characteristics of the geography and population of Jerusalem with its well-known borders 
before 4 July 1967, and secure its adherence to the international legitimacy resolutions 
concerning Jerusalem, especially Security Council Resolution No. 242.
18
 
At this stage, it was noticed that there was the development of some aspects of 
cooperation between some Gulf states (Qatar and Oman) and Israel on a national level, 
and not as a Gulf bloc through the Cooperation Council. The two years 1994 and 1995 
witnessed active communications between those two countries and Israel. As a result of 
such communications and mutual visits, Qatar and Oman agreed to have mutual 
representative and commercial offices with Israel in 1996. This occurred as a result of 
different regional and international circumstances that will be discussed in relation to 
Qatar in detail in a later chapter. 
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6.6 Redeployment protocol in Hebron 1997  
The process of withdrawal and redeployment continued during the rule of the Prime 
Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, but the assassination of Rabin by Yigal Amir on 5 
November 1995 led to the stopping of the mechanism of withdrawal. This is because 
Shimon Peres, who succeeded Rabin, froze the process of carrying out the agreement 
during the six months (from November 1995 to May 1996) in which he assumed power 
as the Prime Minister of Israel. The elections held in May 1996 resulted in the victory of 
the candidate of the Israel Likud Party, Benjamin Netanyahu, to be the Prime Minister of 
Israel. 
When the Likud party assumed power in June 1996 it inherited a policy of limited 
withdrawal and extension of settlements from Rabin and Peres. It immediately developed 
a plan to establish thirty thousand buildings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During the 
period from June 1996 to October 1998, eleven thousand buildings were built, especially 
in East Jerusalem. In addition, there was the project of Greater Jerusalem, which was 
ratified by the Israeli government, and under which 10% of the lands of the West Bank 
were annexed to the municipal borders of Jerusalem.
19
 
Generally, the Likud policy of negotiations was founded on the basis of negotiation for 
negotiation, making use of the element of time to carry out the Israeli plans represented in 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and judaizing Jerusalem and Hebron when 
possible. Netanyahu dropped out of his dictionary the word “land”, thus the principle of 
“land for peace” turned into “security for peace” and consequently, “peace for peace”. 
This policy was grounded on extending and deepening the concept of Israeli security 
from the security of the state as a whole to the security of each individual, without giving 
any attention to Palestinian security, either in terms of groups or individuals. He 
expressed his bad intentions regarding the Palestinian ambitions to have an independent 
state and the future of the settlement process in the final negotiations (on Jerusalem, 
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settlement, water, borders, and refugees). This could be realized from the extension of 
settlements vertically and horizontally, and the freezing of the multilateral negotiations 
on the issue of refugees, as well as the obscurity of the Israeli conception of the borders 
of the Palestinian state and its political framework, and the extent of independence given 
to the Palestinian state.
20
 
The Extraordinary Arab Summit held in Cairo from the 21 to 23 June 1996 aimed at 
supporting the Arab parties participating in the negotiations with Israel, especially Syria. 
Twenty Arab countries participated in this Arab Summit. They all supported the peace 
efforts on the basis of the Security Council Resolutions. The closing statement of the 
summit asserted that the Palestinian cause was the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
and that peace could not be realized without the Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab 
lands, including Jerusalem, and enabling the Palestinians to have the right of self-
determination and to have an independent state whose capital is Jerusalem. The most 
important resolutions issued by this summit regarding the Palestinian cause were the 
following:
21
 
- Israel's withdrawal from the occupied lands and Jerusalem as a condition to achieve 
peace. 
- Reconsidering their agreements with Israel. 
According to what was realized in the Arab summit conference in Cairo, and in 
conformity with the Arab summit's resolutions mentioned above, the seventeenth Gulf 
Summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council was held in Doha from 7 to 9 December 1996. 
In this summit, Arab leaders studied the developments of the peace process and what it 
had undergone because of the Israeli practices, which give a warning of the return to 
tension and violence. This led the Gulf Cooperation Council to reconsider the steps to be 
taken towards Israel regarding the peace process. The Council demanded Israel abide by 
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its commitments regarding the accords signed with the Palestinian Authority and the full 
withdrawal from Jerusalem, as well as enabling the Palestinian people to have all their 
legal rights and the right to establish an independent state.
22
 
It became clear from Netanyahu’s attitude that he could not recognize the signed accords, 
and that he would do his best to freeze them or abolish them. Netanyahu began his 
management of the crisis by making Jerusalem a part of the battle by asserting that Israel 
has the right to build settlements on any land. The Second Intifada that took place in 
September 1996, among many other factors, was a reaction to the Israeli archaeological 
excavation works attempting to explore what was underneath the western wall, that is, the 
western wall tunnel, a matter that exerted pressure on Netanyahu. So, he signed the 
Protocol of Redeployment in Hebron on 15 January 1996.Its most important items are the 
following:
23
 
- The Israeli forces will redeploy according to the protocol in a period that does not 
exceed more than ten days after signing it. 
- The Palestinian Authority will be responsible for the area dedicated to it, as is the 
case with any of the cities of the West Bank. 
- Israel keeps its security rights in the area dedicated to it in the city. 
- A security coordination centre should be established for running common patrols that 
are equal, to some extent, in terms of armaments. 
- The civil authorities and responsibilities in Hebron are assigned to the Palestinians in 
the area dedicated to them. As for the area dedicated to the Israeli control, the civil 
authorities and responsibilities are assigned to the Palestinians except for the matters 
related to the Israelis and their possessions.  
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The Arab foreign ministers held their meeting on 1 April 1997, taking into consideration 
the strong attitudes adopted against Israel by the Islamic Summit, the activities of 
Jerusalem’s Committee and the meetings of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a matter that 
obliged the Arab League to have a clear and decisive attitude against Israeli provocative 
practices. The Arab League Resolution No. 107, at the level of the foreign ministers, 
stipulated the following:
24
 
- Stopping the steps of normalization taken with Israel in the light of the current peace 
process, including the diplomatic offices and missions to force Israel to adhere to the 
resolutions of the Madrid Conference and the principle of “land for peace”. 
- Suspending Arab participation in the multilateral negotiations, and keeping the first 
class boycott and activating it against Israel. 
In this meeting, the Gulf Cooperation Council focused on the trend of the necessity of 
taking strong and decisive resolutions to force Israel to lead the way of peace, or for them 
to adopt a boycott against Israel. As for the second theme of the meeting, this emphasized 
not blocking negotiations between the Arabs and Israel completely.
25
 
Through the words of its foreign minister, Oman launched a fierce attack against the 
Israeli practices. Also, the Qatari Foreign Minister stressed the necessity of freezing 
relations with Israel until it changed its attitude towards the peace process and the 
establishment of settlements. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had more 
conservative attitudes, whereas the UAE’s attitude went beyond the Arab League as 
Sheikh Zayed called the Arab countries to have a decisive attitude regarding Palestinian 
rights, even if this would lead Israel to freezing negotiations for years.
26
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It is worth mentioning that the enthusiasm for making such decisions was followed by 
less enthusiasm by the Arab countries to freeze the relationship with Israel, as they had 
diplomatic missions in Israel.  
The closing statement of the Eighteenth Session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council held in Kuwait from 20 to 22 December 1997
27
 expressed the 
Council’s rejection of the policies and practices of the Israeli government and demanded 
that it fulfil its commitments towards the agreements concluded with the Palestinian 
Authority, on top of which was the completion of the redeployment specified phases and 
the immediate initiation of negotiations concerning the permanent status with the 
Palestinian side. The statement also called upon the US administration to continue its 
efforts with a view to resuming the negotiations on all tracks and to further restore the 
peace process to its normal course. However, the GCC states remained unable to 
introduce fixed tangible mechanisms to push the negotiation process forward. 
6.7 Wye Plantation Memorandum  
Conditions were deteriorating during Netanyahu's term of office, and he significantly 
impeded the negotiation process in a manner that led to the cessation of the Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations for 19 months due to the continued Israeli operations towards the 
Palestinian Authority and people. Therefore, the US administration invited the two sides, 
the Palestinians and the Israelis, to enter into direct negotiations at Wye Plantation in the 
US state of Maryland to end the deadlock of the negotiations. During this round of 
negotiation, the two parties reached some points of agreement and the Wye Plantation 
Memorandum was thereby signed in the White House on 28 October 1998. The 
memorandum included the following points:
28
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- Redeployment: the first two phases of redeployment would be implemented as part of 
the Hebron Agreement concluded in January 1997, but the third phase specified in that 
Agreement would be considered through an ad hoc committee. 
- Security: all necessary actions would be taken to combat terror and to prevent 
aggressive crimes against both sides. 
- Human rights and the rule of law: the Memorandum addressed these issues very 
concisely and provided for the fact that the Palestinian Police would exercise powers and 
responsibilities to implement this Memorandum with due regard to internationally 
accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law. 
- Economic issues: economic relations would be fostered between both parties, 
supporting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza, re-activating the 
permanent committees formed as per the Interim Agreement and the establishment and 
operation of the international airport in the Gaza Strip, as well as resuming the 
negotiations on the Safe Passage. 
- Permanent Status Negotiations: the two sides would immediately resume permanent 
status negotiations on an accelerated basis and would make a determined effort to achieve 
the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by 4 May 1999. The negotiations would be 
continuous without interruption. The US had expressed its willingness to facilitate these 
negotiations. 
As soon as the US declared the conclusion of the Memorandum, both the Palestinians and 
the Israelis released different statements. While the official Palestinian opinion affirmed 
that it was an advanced step on the way to the implementation of the Oslo Accords, the 
opposition factions, for their part, affirmed that this was the first step towards the 
concession of the national legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The Israeli side was 
divided over the Memorandum inside the governing right wing, as the Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu embarked upon defending himself and the Memorandum, affirming 
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that the inheritance of the previous cabinet, the Labour cabinet, would not allow the 
conclusion of a better agreement and that this Memorandum had diminished much of the 
Palestinian ambitions.
29
 
The stance of the GCC was clearly embodied in the closing statement of the Nineteenth 
Session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council held in Abu Dhabi from 
7 to 9 October 1998.
30
 In the statement, the Council welcomed the Wye Plantation 
Memorandum concluded on 23 October 1998 between the Palestinians and the Israelis, 
and considered it as an important positive step to be followed by more steps towards the 
full implementation of all agreements made and signed between both sides. 
6.8 The Wye River (2) Memorandum  
Despite the agreements made between the Palestinian and the Israeli sides, the conditions 
inside Israel were not stable and they deteriorated. The extremist right parties raged 
against Netanyahu because he had entered into the negotiations with the Palestinians, and 
they accused him of lying and fraud. However, in the following early elections, proposed 
by Netanyahu, Barak won the elections, but the conditions became worse as Barak came 
to power.  
While Barak pledged to implement the remaining steps of the Wye Plantation 
Memorandum signed by Netanyahu’s Cabinet on 23 October 1998, only the first phase of 
the Memorandum was implemented, and then the Cabinet abstained from implementing 
the rest of the phases. However, Barak said that there were essential amendments deemed 
necessary to be included in the text of the Memorandum. He clearly called for the 
insertion of the remaining steps of the Wye Plantation to be included within the 
Permanent Status Agreement.
31
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On 4 September 1999, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, also known as “Wye River 
II”, was signed. The most important points of the Memorandum32 are: 
- Permanent Status Negotiations would be started within a period not later than 13 
September, while work to conclude the Permanent Status Agreement would be done 
within a one-year term at most. 
- The Israeli Forces would withdraw from the West Bank territories in three stages in 
five months. 
- The release of a number of Palestinian prisoners in three phases. 
- The construction works of Gaza Port would start as of 1 October 1999.  
- The opening of the Safe Passage from the Gaza Strip along the route to the southern 
West Bank. 
The stance of the GCC stand towards this Memorandum was embodied in the closing 
statement of the Twentieth Session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council held in Riyadh from 27 to 29November 1999.
33
 In the statement, the Council 
welcomed the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum concluded on 5 September, which called 
for the implementation of the Wye Plantation Memorandum, of which Netanyahu had 
frozen the implementation only two months after its conclusion. 
Once the implementation process of the Memorandum had started, Barak, who declared 
that the provision of the timelines specified in the Memorandum did not mean that they 
were obligatory, made certain manoeuvres. He deliberately changed the sites of 
withdrawal and redeployment as he made amendments to these sites at the last minute. 
The Palestinian side therefore had to choose either to accept the offer or the 
implementation of the Memorandum had to be frozen. In March 2000, he offered to 
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include the third stage of redeployment within the Permanent Status Agreement. As a 
result, redeployments were ceased as he refused all attempts that aimed at implementing 
the third stage of redeployment and insisted on its inclusion within the Permanent Status 
Agreement.
34
 
6.9.a  Camp David II 
The preparations for a significate agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis to 
reach a mutual understanding for the pending issues left behind from the previous 
accords such as the Palestinian state and its capital, and to break the deadlock of the 
peace process, were reported when the US administration invited both the Palestinians 
and Israelis to enter into intensive and behind-closed-doors negotiations at the Camp 
David resort in order to conclude a permanent agreement. The negotiations were held 
from 11 to 25 July 2000, and ended with the declaration of US President Bill Clinton that 
the negotiations for concluding a permanent agreement had failed, and that he held 
President Yasser Arafat responsible for this failure. At the same time, he praised Barak’s 
courage and readiness for providing the Palestinians with unprecedented concessions in 
order to potentially reach a political settlement. The failure of the Camp David 
negotiations led to the breakout of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000.
35
 
The Camp David Summit II was not only a summit that brought both the Palestinians and 
Israelis together. Instead, it aimed to put some pressure from the US on the both sides to 
convince the Palestinians and the Israelis to take painful decisions about the settlement 
stages and the issues of higher sensitivity, such as the borders, settlements, refugees, and 
Jerusalem. The use of the interim solution technique as a basis of permanent peace in the 
Middle East on the part of Clinton led to the mismanagement of the talks. This was due to 
the fact that the UN resolutions became null and void and issues decided by the UN, such 
as the right of return, Jerusalem, self-determination, and disassembly of settlements 
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became subject to discussions and arguments. It is worthy of mention that these issues are 
of great importance to the Palestinians.
36
 
Factual events showed that the Israeli proposals made by the Israeli Prime Minister at that 
time, Barak, did not provide for withdrawal to the June 1967 borders, the recognition of 
the right of the Palestinian people to an independent sovereign state, the acceptance to 
withdraw from East Jerusalem – the capital of the Palestinian state – or the recognition of 
the refugees’ right to return to their homeland and their own properties.37 This means that 
in the Camp David negotiations, Barak refused to commit himself to the UN Resolutions 
194, 338, and 242, resolutions that constituted the basis of a balanced settlement of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He insisted on starting from one of the Oslo principles that 
reads “The agreement made and signed by both parties shall be the practical application 
of the UN resolutions relevant to the solution.” This was a new situation that substituted 
the legitimacy of direct negotiations with the legitimacy of the resolutions adopted by the 
UN on behalf of the two parties. 
The Palestinians took a hard-line stand towards Jerusalem, without providing any 
concessions related to the basic issues. This situation can be considered as one of the 
Palestinian red lines, and it was rejected at both the official and popular levels. 
Consequently, it was not expected that the Palestinian leadership would give up the issues 
of Jerusalem and refugees, or barter both for the declaration of the Palestinian state, as 
this is a matter of historical and serious responsibility. No Palestinian leadership would 
dare to waive these two issues. The most powerful reactions came from outside, and not 
from Yasser Arafat, perhaps due to the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
38
 
The Palestinian stand towards the Jerusalem issue involved the demand for the return of 
East Jerusalem under full Arab sovereignty to be the capital of the Palestinian state. But 
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the Israeli stand is completely the opposite, where an Israeli political consensus that 
considers the unified whole, east and west, city of Jerusalem as the capital of the state of 
Israel can be seen easily. This was the Israeli consensus red line, posed before the 
Palestinian negotiator in the Camp David negotiations. This stand is also supported by the 
US administration, which considers the unified whole, east and west, city of Jerusalem as 
the capital of Israel. Therefore, it was not expected that Israel would make concessions in 
the context of negotiations over such a stand.  
It is useful to observe that the acceptance to start negotiations ever since the beginning of 
the peace process in Madrid was outside the framework of the UN. This was in itself an 
implied approval of the controversial parties to substitute an alternative legitimacy and 
new terms of reference for peace, other than the ones that govern the Arab-Israeli conflict 
since its initiation until all parties agreed to the new reference.  
Some in the Palestinian intelligentsia are of the opinion that the Palestinian leadership 
should not enter into negotiations alone over Jerusalem, for the reason that Jerusalem is 
not only a Palestinian issue and, therefore, the Palestinians alone should not be held 
responsible for the consequences of the negotiations as, in their view, Jerusalem is an 
Arab, Islamic, and a Christian cause that has not been given this collective nature. 
Consequently, the balanced negotiations should demonstrate material, political, and 
media assistance to the Palestinian negotiator at the official and popular levels at all 
tracks and the pre-agreed limits given to him.
39
 
However, Barak went to the Camp David negotiations with no radical or magic solutions 
for the issue of Jerusalem. Instead, he went with a specific suggestion or scenario that he 
tried to impose on the Palestinians by virtue of joint Israeli-US pressures. The Israeli 
scenario is about a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control. The Palestinians will be given 
broad autonomy in some Arab districts in the city and not in the old town of Jerusalem, 
and they are permitted to observe the holy sites and to raise a Palestinian flag over these 
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sites. In addition, the territories of the Palestinian Authority are to be linked to the Holy 
Shrine through a safe passage established for this purpose.
40
 
International opinions concerning Jerusalem are divided into individual strands adopted 
by specific countries on the one hand, and other international strands embodied in the 
international resolutions adopted by various international organizations on the other hand. 
Concerning the international resolutions, there are more than 100 resolutions adopted by 
the UN Security Council or by the UN on Jerusalem. All the adopted resolutions consider 
Jerusalem as an occupied city that must be returned to its owner after the occupation has 
ended. However, such resolutions are kept in the archives and have not been put into 
practice. Moreover, the UN has not forced Israel to implement such resolutions. For their 
part, neither the Palestinians nor the Arabs have tried to make initiatives to demand the 
application of the resolutions, although the resolutions constitute a huge asset that 
emphasizes the Palestinian rights in the holy city. 
The classical Gulf stance, both collective and individual, towards the Jerusalem issue 
stresses the basic principles relating to the status of the city that must be adhered to by the 
Palestinian negotiator and that must be understood by the Israeli and US parties. These 
principles are embodied in the necessity of full Palestinian control over East Jerusalem 
including all Muslim, Christian, or Jewish holy sites in the city being on equal footing 
based on international legitimacy, as expressed by the relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions, the most important of which are Resolution No. 242, adopted by the Security 
Council on 22 November 1967, Resolution No. 338, adopted on22 October 1973, 
Resolution No. 252, adopted on 21 May 1968, and Resolution No. 478, adopted on 20 
August 1980.
41
 
The collective stand of the Gulf States towards Jerusalem was embodied in the closing 
statement of the Twenty-First session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation 
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Council, held in Bahrain from 30 to 31 December 2000.
42
 The statement stressed the 
main joint stance of the Gulf states in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on 
sovereignty over the city of Jerusalem. The statement also affirmed that the realization of 
peace in the region and the subsequent normalization with the Israeli party were 
connected to the retrieval by the Palestinian people of all their legitimate rights, the most 
important of which was their right to establish a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as the 
capital. The Council also declared full support for the Palestinian Authority, and for 
President Arafat as an elected leader. This was the first time that the Palestinian 
Authority and its president had been mentioned. 
The statement also embodied the absolute denial of the US declarations considering 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which contradicts the international legitimacy 
resolutions. The statement further rejected the US intention to move its embassy from Tel 
Aviv to occupied Jerusalem, a matter that led to hindering the peace efforts and impeding 
the progress of the peace process.
43
 
The GCC leaders continued to affirm their stance towards Jerusalem. In his speech before 
the Arab summit, Sheikh Zayed Ben Sultan, President of the United Arab Emirates, 
stressed that “The Palestinian cause is the essence of the conflict and there is no peace 
without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its 
capital.”44As it was reported in the semi-official Egyptian newspaper AlAhram, the 
Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia at that time, King Abdullah, in the speech he delivered 
before the summit stressed that “Eastern Jerusalem is an Arab and Islamic territory that is 
not subject to concession or bargain and it cannot, in any way, be given up as it is an 
integral part of the Arab lands that fall under the relevant UN Security Council 
resolutions.”45 
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Concerning the stance of individual countries, the US for example, even if it is just a 
media viewpoint, considers Jerusalem as an occupied city. But, in practice and in alliance 
with Israel, such a stance considers Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel. The US 
administration dealt with this, saying as a matter of fact, and this was explicitly expressed 
during the course of the Camp David negotiations when the US posed Barak's thoughts 
and negotiated in the name of Israel.
46
 
The US President at that time, Bill Clinton, used the method of intermediate solution as a 
basis for permanent peace in the Middle East. As mentioned, these issues are of great 
importance to the Palestinians and include the issues of the right of return, the status of 
Eastern Jerusalem, the right to self-determination and the elimination of Jewish 
settlements established on the occupied territories.
47
 
Therefore, the summit failed to achieve positive outcomes due to the sensitivity of the 
issues posed for negotiations, as each party considered them to be a matter of national 
security. Consequently, the summit came to an end, while the swirl of violence continued 
in the occupied territories. Thus, the scene of the negotiations in Camp David seemed to 
be a clear conflict of “red lines” and hard-line rejections by the Israeli party against 
demands and “red lines” and corresponding rejections by the Palestinians. As the 
confrontation between the Palestinian demands and the Israeli “red lines” and rejections 
were obviously set out, the specified objectives of the negotiations held in Camp David II 
were as follows:
48
 
 6.9.b Barak's objectives 
Nawaf al-Zour, who has studied the context of Camp David in detail, identified the 
objectives of the two leaders, Barak and Arafat. Barak’s objectives can be summarized as 
follows: 
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- Concluding an agreement over the permanent issues according to the Israeli red lines. 
- Including the third phase of withdrawal into the Permanent Agreement.  
- Working to delay the due declaration of the Palestinian state date by the deferred time,  
13 September 2000. 
- Putting an end to the national Palestinian demands and ambitions with regard to the 
basic issues. 
- Bringing the century-long dispute with the Palestinians to an end. 
- Barak’s personal ambitious goals. 
- Stopping the breakout of the Intifada and the violent confrontations in the Palestinian 
occupied territories. 
 6.9.c Arafat's objectives  
Arafat had more narrow objectives than Barak. The objectives of Arafat were centred on 
two points: 
- The commitment of Israel to the international resolutions, especially Resolutions No. 
242 and No. 388, relating to the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian lands, and 
Resolution No. 194, relating to the Palestinian refugees. 
- Obtaining international guarantees for, and supervision of, the application of any 
agreement by Israel. 
6.10.a  The Gulf Cooperation Council’s stand towards the Second Intifada and the 
Roadmap 
From its very beginning, the peace process aimed at bringing the tension in the region to 
an end, and attempted to entrench new pillars and bases to achieve stability. However, the 
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Israeli hard-line policy and the US flagrant bias towards Israel were the reason behind the 
failure to conclude any peaceful agreement to establish stability. 
6.10.b The Second Intifada  
After Sharon’s visit to the Holy Mosque Shrine on 28 September 2000, and on the 
following day, Israeli soldiers killed five Palestinians and seriously injured many others, 
and the Second Intifada broke out.
49Then, Barak’s cabinet fell and Sharon was elected as 
Prime Minister; he gained 60% of the vote in the cabinet elections that took place in 
February 2001, and he took office on 5 March 2001.
50
 
This visit was heavily rejected and condemned by Saudi Arabia, expressing its denial of 
the policy of silence adopted by the US towards the Israeli violations. Through its 
Foreign Minster, Saud Ben Faisal, Saudi Arabia demanded that the US put pressures on 
Israel to end the crisis and to go back to negotiations.
51
 
The Intifada represented an obvious and explicit declaration of the rejection of the Israeli 
proposals for a solution, and an invitation to resist the pressures exerted by the US and 
also the condemnation of its apparent bias in favour of Israeli policies. The Second 
Intifada rearranged the hierarchy of the Arab priorities anew to get the Palestinian cause 
back at the top of the political agenda, as it is basically an Arab cause that cannot be left 
for the Palestinians alone due to the its impacts on the security, stability, and balance in 
the Arab region as a whole. 
In another context, the US, in its capacity as the sponsor of the negotiation process 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis, began to work towards containing the Intifada. 
The US movement was embodied in an international and regional conference held in 
Sharm el-Sheikh on 17 October 2000, a few days after the breakout of the Intifada. The 
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statement delivered by Bill Clinton pointed out three main issues. First, the immediate 
cessation of the Intifada under the slogan of stopping all forms of violence. Second, the 
two parties, the Palestinians and the Israelis, were to commit to not taking unilateral 
steps. Third, that the two parties would resume negotiations as the sole way to conclude 
an agreement to end the conflict between them. 
Starting from the findings reached in Sharm el-Sheikh on 17 October 2000, the US 
continued sponsoring the Palestinian-Israeli bilateral negotiations based on the draft 
solution presented by Washington named “the Proposals of President Clinton”, and most 
of its items were in harmony with Barak and his cabinet’s visions of the solutions, and 
this was the reason for the negotiation round held in Taba.  
In this context, the GCC states had both official and popular significant stands that 
expressed the depth of their sense of belonging to the Arab nation. These stands also 
expressed an objective understanding of the Arab higher interests in the wake of 
contemporary international and regional events.
52
 As the Second Intifada broke out, a 
new stage of the GCC reaction to the Palestinian cause began to embody the Gulf stands 
supporting the Intifada, including:
53
 
- On 10 October 2000, the GCC Ministers of Justice pleaded for the international 
community and the UN Security Council member states to assume their 
responsibilities and to take actions necessary to stop the terrible crimes committed by 
Israel against the bare-handed Palestinians. 
- Prior to the Arab Summit, in October 2000 the Sultanate of Oman declared the closure 
of its commercial office in Tel Aviv, and similarly the closure of the Israeli office in 
Muscat. 
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- The GCC states launched a broad donation campaign. Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan 
donated a sum of US$ 8 million for the sake of the Intifada victims. Also, King Fahd 
donated a sum of SAR 30 million, as did the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Prince 
Abdullah, who contributed a sum of SAR 5 million. Qaboos Ben Said demanded the 
dispatch of emergency medical aid and donations to support the Palestinians in their 
confrontations with Israel. 
According to Al-Ahram newspaper, the GCC states established three levels of supporting 
the Intifada to ensure its continuity. These levels included a number of political, financial, 
and media mechanisms detailed as follows: 
6.10.b.i The political and media aspects 
Many officials and politicians in the Gulf states participated in the popular 
demonstrations that broke out in the wake of the Intifada, expressing political and popular 
solidarity with the Palestinian people. In addition, the governments of the GCC allowed 
the marches and protest campaigns against Israel aimed at providing support for the 
Intifada.
54
 
6.10.b.ii The financial and economic aspects 
The GCC states established two main channels for providing financial and economic 
support to the Palestinian people with a view to supporting the Palestinians economically 
during the Intifada, working towards the disengagement between the Palestinian and the 
Israeli economies and eliminating the reasons for the economic loyalty of the former to 
the latter, as well as upholding the Palestinian negotiating position during the 
negotiations for a permanent solution. These two channels were embodied in an official 
channel, where the Gulf governments adopted decisions to make donations in favour of 
the Intifada Fund adopted in the Arab Summit held in Cairo in 2000. The second channel 
was a popular “unofficial” channel, as the Gulf authorities permitted the formation of 
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popular committees for collecting donations for the Palestinians in coordination with 
other Arab bodies.
55
 
6.10.b.iii The diplomatic aspect 
In this context, it is noted that there are two secondary levels: 
The regional level: The regional level was made through two main tracks: 
The first is the Arab track, which was represented in achieving Arab solidarity as Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait participated in the Arab and Islamic summits side by side with the 
Iraqi delegation, despite their known political stance towards the former regime in Iraq, 
with a view to giving a push to supreme Arab national interests over individual interests. 
In this framework, the call for the unity of the Arab stand and will was the main focus of 
the speeches delivered by Sheikh Zayed Ben Sultan, President of the United Arab 
Emirates, in the opening of the two Arab summits held in Cairo and Doha, in addition to 
the visit paid by the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan Ben Abdul Aziz, to Syria and 
Jordan in January 2001, during which he stressed that “Saudi Arabia will not stand 
hands-off in case any Arab country is at risk by Israeli threats.”56 
The second track was represented in the Islamic track, through which the Arab states in 
general and the Gulf states in particular put pressure on the Islamic delegation 
participating in the Eighth Islamic Summit held in Doha in November 2000. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also pressurized the African delegations, which had established 
relations with Israel, and Saudi participated in the Summit in order to push the 
delegations towards cutting such relations and stopping all forms of normalization with 
Israel until it complied with the UN resolutions in relation to the Palestinian cause and 
Jerusalem. These pressures demanded that some financial aid and assistance be provided 
to make up for the aid provided for Israel by countries.
57
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The international level: The target of the GCC states was represented in two main 
objectives: 
First objective: Delivering decisive messages to Washington concerning its stand 
towards the Israeli aggression against the Islamic rights in the city of Jerusalem, and 
holding Washington and the international community responsible for the events taking 
place in the Palestinian occupied territories. This was obviously expressed in the 
statements made by Prince Abdullah during the opening of the Cairo Summit in 2000, in 
which he held the US fully responsible for the events taking place in the Palestinian 
occupied territories. Also, Sheikh Zayed’s announcements on 13 December 2000 stressed 
the responsibility of Washington for what was happening in the Palestinian occupied 
territories and also for offensive aggressions against the bare-handed Palestinians.
58
 
Second objective: Working towards providing international protection for the Palestinian 
people against the Israeli army and the settlers. Prince Abdullah pleaded for the 
international community to put an end to the dangerous violations committed by Israel 
against the Palestinians, particularly as the confrontation between the two sides was 
totally unequal and was close to deliberate killing. Also, the Bahraini Information 
Minister, Ibrahim Al-Mutwa, pleaded for the international community to assume its 
human and ethical responsibility towards the legal pursuit of the people who committed 
massacres and crimes against the Palestinians, and to bring them to international 
courts.
59
For its part, the United Arab Emirates, in a statement provided to the UN 
Security Council, demanded the formation of an urgent and neutral international fact-
finding committee to be entrusted with identifying the persons responsible for the 
massacres committed against the Palestinian people.  
In its speech in an unusual session of the UN Security Council on 5 October 2000 
considering the Israeli violations, Kuwait expressed its condemnation of the UN’s stance 
towards the massacres committed by Israel in the Palestinian territories. Kuwait also 
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called upon the UN Security Council to assume its responsibilities towards stopping the 
Israeli practices against the Palestinian people, and to conduct an international 
investigation into these crimes.
60
On 9 April 2002, Oman also pleaded for the UN 
Security Council to adopt all necessary measures to punish Israel and to hold it 
responsible for the destruction it was causing in the Palestinian occupied territories.
61
 
Following the Israeli obstinacy came the failure of the international community to force 
Israel to accept the UN Security Council resolutions, and the flagrant and unprecedented 
bias of the US towards Tel Aviv, to the extent that the US President described Sharon as 
“a man of peace”, a statement that inflamed the feelings of anger among the Arab 
citizens. At this stage, King Abdullah, the then Crown Prince, established the goals of his 
visit to the US in 25 April 2002 after the declaration of the Arab Peace Initiative in the 
Beirut Summit. He demanded that the Israeli military operations in the West Bank be 
brought to an end and he also demonstrated the importance of the existence of 
international forces to protect the Palestinians, as well as explaining the principles on 
which the relations between the US and the Arab world are based. In this context, the 
accompanying delegation with King Abdullah sought to give special prominence to 
specific points for the US officials, including major point. This can be summarized in the 
fact that the relations between Saudi Arabia and the US are deeply split due to the 
policies of President Bush’s administration in the Middle East, based on the principle of 
indirect interference save in case of extreme necessity. The second point was that there 
were critical consequences for the security and stability of the region unless the US 
restrained the whims of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon.
62
 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia introduced an eight items draft aimed mainly at restoring 
confidence in both the US and Israel on one hand, and in the Arab world on the other. 
The draft also aimed at paving the way for the parties concerned with the peace process 
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to enter into negotiations in an attempt to turn the Arab initiative into a reality through 
renewing confidence among all parties.
63
 
Saudi Arabia introduced a proposed draft for the closing statement of the first regular 
Arab Summit held in Amman in March 2001. The proposed statement charged the 
Boycott Bureau with holding a meeting to activate the Arab boycott against Israel. The 
proposal was amended to provide for the demanding of the activation of the boycott 
through holding boycott meetings summoned by the Main Boycott Bureau with a view to 
preventing dealings with Israel.
64
 
On 27-28 March 2002, the Arab Summit in Beirut approved the Arab Peace Initiative, 
based on the conviction of the Arab countries that the armed solution to the conflict had 
neither achieved peace nor security for each of the parties concerned in the region. This 
Arab Peace Initiative included seven basic points, as follows:
65
 
1- Israel should reconsider its policy and choose peace, declaring that a just peace is its 
strategic choice as well. 
2- Israel shall do the following: 
- Withdraw from the Arab occupied territories including the Syrian Golan Heights to the 
line of 4 June 1967, as well as the other lands occupied in Southern Lebanon. 
- Reach a just and agreeable solution of the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance 
with the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 194. 
- Agree to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with sovereignty on the 
pre-occupied Palestinian lands since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with 
its capital as Eastern Jerusalem. 
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3- In response to that, the Arab countries shall: 
- Consider that the Arab-Israeli conflict has reached its end, and consequently they shall 
enter into a mutual peace agreement with Israel that guarantees security for the countries 
of the entire region. 
- Set up natural relations with Israel within this comprehensive peace frame. 
4- Absolute denial of all forms of Palestinian resettlement that contradicts the special 
status of Arab countries. 
5- Inviting the Israeli government and all Israelis to embrace this initiative for the 
purposes of protecting peace opportunities and the prevention of bloodshed that would 
enable the Arab countries and Israel to peacefully live side by side, and provide future 
generations with a secure, stable, and flourishing future. 
6- Calling upon the international community, including all countries and organizations, to 
support the above-mentioned initiative. 
7- Forming a special committee comprising the Arab League Secretary-General and a 
number of member states to make the communications necessary for such an initiative, 
and to acquire the assured support on all levels, most important of which are the Security 
Council, the United Nations, the United States, the Russian Union, and the European 
Union.  
Thus, the basic idea that was introduced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was clarified, 
and the Arab viewpoint in relation to the peace prerequisites was set out.  
The articles of the Arab Summit communiqué in regard to the Palestinian cause included 
the following:
66
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1. The Arab leaders highly regard the Palestinian people’s distinguished fortitude, their 
gallant Intifada and their legal leadership by President Yasser Arafat. 
2. The Arab leaders hold Israel to be fully, legally, and thoroughly responsible for the 
problem of the Palestinian refugees and their displacement, and they express their 
thorough denial of the attempts regarding their settlement out of their original homes 
and lands. At the same time, the Arab leaders confirm their adherence to the Security 
Council Resolution with regards to Jerusalem, especially Resolutions Nos. 242, 267, 
465, and 478. 
3. In the light of the relapse of the peace process, the Arab leaders confirm their 
commitment to halt any kind of relations with Israel, and to activate the Arab Bureau 
boycotting of Israel until it complies with international legitimate resolutions and the 
Madrid reference, as well as withdrawing from all Arab lands occupied after the June 
4, 1967. 
4. The Arab leaders once again reaffirm their previous decisions related to their 
adherence to a just and comprehensive peace as a strategic goal and choice that 
should be fulfilled in the light of carrying out international legitimacy, and they 
demand that Israel resume the peace negotiations on all levels and routes in 
accordance with the Security Council resolutions including Resolutions Nos. 242, 
338 and458, and the General Assembly Resolution No. 194, in addition to the 
Madrid Conference and the “Land for Peace” Principle. 
5. In the light of the events of 11 September 2001, the Arab leaders reviewed the 
international circumstances that resulted in the launching of a global anti-terrorism 
campaign in accordance with the Security Council No. 1,373 dated 28 September 
2001.
67
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The Arab leaders reviewed the tragic conditions that the Palestinian people are 
undergoing due to the ongoing occupation and Israel’s destruction of the Palestinian 
infrastructure, imposing a siege on both the people and their leadership. Hence, the Arab 
leaders confirmed their ongoing support of the Palestinian economy and its infrastructure 
through supporting the Palestinian Authority budget with a gross amount of US$ 330 
million to be granted on the basis of 55 million per month for a period of six months 
starting from 1 April 2002, and to be automatically renewed as long as the aggression 
exists. The grant is renewed every six months, and these grants are non-reimbursement 
grants.
68
 
6.11 The American view of terrorism and its effect on the Palestinian status quo 
In accordance with the US declaration of war on what it called “terrorism”, with its 
slogan, “He who is not with us is against us”, the meaning of the US President's 
statement on the Middle East in his speech on 24 July 2002 was effectively that the 
establishment of a Palestinian state was always a permanent constituent of the American 
perspective of the solution, as long as the right of Israel to exist was regarded. He assured 
his audience that negotiations were the sole way to establish such a state. Later, his 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, reaffirmed such a view in his famous speech in 
Louisville University, Kentucky State. Consequently, the Intifada and resistance were 
stigmatized with terrorism, and the Palestinian leadership represented by the authority 
was to apprehend those who practice terrorism and put them to trial, and to bear its 
responsibility in halting violence according to the US government. 
Although the majority of Arab countries expressed their conservative reception of the 
speech acknowledging the importance of establishing a Palestinian state and halting the 
settlement, they refused the American condition of a change of Palestinian leadership in 
response to a foreign will, rather than the will of the Palestinian people. This was 
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reflected by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Maher, in his statement on 4 July 
2002, following his talks with Prime Minister Tony Blair in London. 
Also, the Arab countries’ declared viewpoint towards supporting Arafat was analogous to 
that of Egypt, as he was the Palestinian people’s elected President. The Arab stance also 
demanded a time frame for the achievement of the implications of the speech and the 
mechanism to carry them out, as well as the demand to synchronize the halting of 
violations by the Palestinian side, and their shift of strategy in conducting the conflict, 
with an Israeli withdrawal to the prior 28 September positions, and the removal of all 
traces of aggression.
69
 
The Palestinian Authority did not comply with the pressures from the American side to 
the effect of dissolving the Intifada and the resistance under the slogan of “terrorism 
deterrence and the declaration of belonging to the civilized world”. The green light was 
given for Sharon's government to carry out the preventive wall operation on 29 
September 2002, right after the Arab Summit was concluded and after the declaration of 
the Arab Peace Initiative in Beirut. That operation won American political cover and the 
Israeli armed forces re-occupied Palestinian cities and camps in the West Bank. The most 
devastating Israeli operation was in Jenin Camp, which started at dawn on 2 April 2002 
and lasted until 10 April.
70
 The US submitted a resolution to the Security Council that 
was unanimously approved to the effect of forming a fact-finding committee in Jenin 
Camp. However, this resolution was frozen only one week after its date of issue. On the 
other hand, Washington confirmed that such a resolution had been formulated through 
mutual consultation with Israel, which had expressed its readiness to cooperate in the 
light of its implications.
71
 
According to the London-based Al-Hayah newspaper, there were three main stances 
adopted by GCC states towards the Preventive Wall operation and the Palestinian cities 
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re-occupation, in addition to Arafat’s siege embodied in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
declaration: the Saudi Crown Prince declared on 6 April 2002, “We have called upon the 
American Secretary of State to the effect that the United States of America move towards 
calling for the prompt Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian occupied lands.” In his 
meeting with US President Bush on 25 April 2002, he did his best to refute Sharon’s 
allegation that Israel was fighting terrorism just like the US. The effect of this visit was 
Sharon's consent to an American offer of American-British protection of six wanted 
Palestinians against untying the siege imposed on Arafat,
72
 in addition to support from 
Bahrain, whose Defence Minister, Khalifa Ben Mohamed Al Khalifa, on 2 April 2002, 
called upon the Arab countries that had relations with Israel to cut them off in protest 
against the aggression. He also criticized the Security Council member states and called 
upon them to stand firmly and clearly by the side of international legitimacy and justice. 
In addition, there was support from the United Arab Emirates, which was represented by 
the Defence Minister Mohamed Ben Rashed Al Maktom, who called upon the Security 
Council to implement Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter against Israel, adding that 
“No one believes that the US is not able to oblige Israel to withdraw.”73 
On the other hand, there was US political support for Israel through usage of the veto in 
the Security Council in many draft resolutions that provide protection for Israel’s 
inadmissible policies towards the Palestinian people and against any move towards 
convicting Israel. Examples of this are the American veto against implementing 
Mitchell's plan and sending international observers to supervise the limitation of the level 
of violence.
74
 
In response to such accelerated developments, there came the closing statement of the 
twenty-third session of the Supreme Council of the GCC member states, held between 21 
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and 22 December 2002.
75
 The Council welcomed Prince Abdullah's Peace Initiative 
adopted in the Beirut Arab Summit in March 2002. The Council also welcomed the 
statement President Bush made in the United Nations that implied a US vision towards 
the establishment of a Palestinian state. In addition, the Council called upon the US to lay 
down a mechanism for carrying out such a vision and concepts in accordance with the 
legal rights of the Palestinian people. 
However, the Second Intifada indicated that all previous agreements and treaties had 
reached a deadlock, and it affirmed two things: first, the GCC states would never 
relinquish their responsibilities towards the Palestinian cause, and that was demonstrated 
by the official and public stand taken in support of the Intifada. Second, if it is guaranteed 
that the security and stability of the Middle East region are linked with a permanent 
settlement, it can also be said that the stability and security of the Gulf region are greatly 
tied with reaching a solution for the Palestinian cause. 
6.12 The Roadmap plan 
After the events of 11September, the policy of Bush’s administration changed toward the 
Palestinian cause. Its stand was based on the conviction that the failure of Camp David 
and Taba was merely attributable to Yasser Arafat. Consequently, according to Bush, the 
Second Intifada was no more than a terrorist act and Israel was entitled to deter and 
terminate it as a way of defending its security and the safety of its citizens. The American 
administration made Security Council issue Resolution No. 1373, which defines the 
obligations of the UN member states to exterminate terrorism without specifying its 
accurate definition, and this led to equating terrorism with the resistance of the 
Palestinian public to the Israeli occupation.
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Bush delivered his speech on 24 June 2002,
77
 clarifying that the concept of real peace 
meant ending the Israeli occupation in accordance with UN Resolution Nos. 242 and 338, 
giving a decisive solution to the refugees and Jerusalem issues, supporting the peace 
process and combating terrorism, and, according to the American viewpoint, changing 
the leadership of the late President Yasser Arafat and replacing him with a practical 
leader who complied with the Israeli and American perspectives on the settlement. This 
American perspective was the basis for peacefully changing the map of the region 
through establishing a Palestinian state capable of existing beside the Israelis. It is 
noteworthy that such a Palestinian state would be transitional or provisional, and the 
parties should negotiate afterwards about the most complex issues, such as the borders, 
Jerusalem, the refugees, and water.
78
 Later on, the Roadmap was declared, displaying 
Bush's own perspective previously expressed in this speech. 
The Roadmap is the official name the US Department of State gave to the Middle East 
peace plan on 30 April 2003,
79
 after two copies of it were delivered to the Palestinian and 
Israeli officials. It called upon them to start discussing how to reach a final peaceful 
settlement in three phases: the first phase from October 2002 to May 2003, the second 
phase from June 2003 to December 2003, and the third phase from 2004 to 2005), and the 
establishing of a Palestinian state at the beginning of 2005. The Roadmap laid out a plan 
for establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders by the end of 2003. After 
commitment to the ceasefire agreement was guaranteed, the Palestinians had to start 
acting to suppress the fundamentalists. As for Israel, it had to withdraw from the 
Palestinian cities and freeze the setting up of Jewish settlements on occupied lands. This 
plan was tailored by the Middle East Quartet Committee, which included the UN, the US, 
the EU, and Russia in accordance with Bush’s insight, which was declared in his speech 
on 24 June 2002. This plan underwent many adjustments in response to Israeli demands 
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and pressures, which included three main points.
80
 First was to eliminate the Saudi 
initiative, as it was considered part of the Roadmap. Second was to declare that the 
decisions reached by the Quartet Committee supervising the plan must be unanimous 
(responding to the Israeli fears of the European stance, which seemed to them to be 
biased towards the Palestinians).Third was to postpone the official declaration of the 
Roadmap plan until after the elections at the end of January 2003, and once again there 
was a further postponement until the aftermath of the appointment of the Prime Minister 
of the Palestinian Authority. 
Before the US officially announced the Roadmap plan, and before Secretary of State 
Colin Powell’s arrival in the region, Israel attempted to propagate an alternate plan 
through the scheme of Eilon, the Israeli Tourism Minister at that time. This scheme was 
based on a demand that the US and the Western countries set up a Middle East Marshall 
Plan, which aimed at settling the Palestinians residing on Palestinian land in Jordan, 
dismantling the Palestinian Authority, imposing Israeli sovereignty from the Jordan River 
to the Mediterranean Sea, and settling the Palestinian refugees in their places of existence 
through a compromise with the host countries in this regard.
81
 
The American administration released the third version of the Roadmap plan after the 
appointment of the Palestinian Prime Minister and the fall of Baghdad to the Western 
coalition. Thus, the Israeli route in dealing with the Palestinian resistance and the Intifada 
entered a new stage. The government of Sharon considered the Roadmap to be a political 
means of pressure on the Palestinian side in addition to the military pressure, as 
demonstrated by the bloody suppression. This was represented by the vague statement 
made by the Israeli government, which lacked the explicit and clear consent on the map. 
This statement was followed by a document containing 14 conservative points on the 
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map. Should those conservative points be adopted, the map would be eventually re-
structured as they leave it free from the political implications previously stated.
82
 
It can be said that the Gulf states “declared” stance towards the Roadmap was based on 
the commitment to international legitimacy and the 2002 Beirut Arab Summit 
resolutions, and the inevitability of implementing Prince Abdullah’s Middle East Peace 
Plan,
83
 even though there are still other undeclared stands that constitute a new Gulf 
political perspective towards the Palestinian cause.  
In the closing statement of the twenty-fourth session of the Supreme Council of the GCC 
member states, held on 21 and 22 December 2003,
84
 the Gulf leaders expressed their 
resentment towards Israel’s continuity in adopting techniques of state terrorism, as 
demonstrated by assassinating Palestinian leaders and symbols and exposing the 
Palestinian people to exemplary punishment, hunger, house demolition, and banishment. 
The Council demonstrated its follow-up on Sharon’s speech about the Israeli 
government’s determination to take a one-sided decision to carry out the so-called 
isolation plan or “disengagement”. Once again, the leaders affirmed their adherence to 
Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative, in addition to their insistence that commitment to the 
Roadmap plan was vital in order to reach a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Ministerial Council also appreciated the outcomes of the Sharm el-Sheikh and Al-
Aqaba summits on 3 and 4 June 2003, the support of the Roadmap, which promulgates 
the termination of the Israeli occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state on 
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the verge of 2005, and Prince Abdullah Ben Abdulaziz’s initiative, which was 
unanimously adopted in the 2002 Beirut Arab Summit.
85
 
It is worth noting that the plan included in its first stage ending in May “putting an end to 
terrorism and violence, restoring the Palestinian life to its nature and setting up the 
Palestinian foundations.” This could be interpreted as the Palestinians being required to 
promptly and unconditionally stop acts of terrorism and violence, restore Palestinian life 
to its normal course, set up the Palestinian foundations, and take up a comprehensive 
political reform process. All such measures were to be accompanied by Israeli supporting 
measures, and the Palestinians and Israelis would resume security cooperation on the 
basis of Tenet's plan for bringing violence and terrorism to an end.
86
 
The Arab countries were mentioned in the first stage, as they were required to withhold 
private and public financing, and all facets of support to groups that embrace or take part 
in terrorism and violence. However, as most of the Palestinian factions and organizations 
have military wings and conduct military acts against Israel, it seemed that the 
Palestinians were required to be stripped of any Arab support, even if such support was 
received from individuals or private associations. Should any violation occur, Israel’s 
non-commitment would be justifiable. In addition, all donors who were interested in 
providing budgetary finance were required to transfer such funds through the sole 
account of the Palestinian Finance Ministry, which meant domination over all foreign 
finance methods.
87
 
The second stage, June 2003 to December 2003, which was allocated to the establishment 
of a Palestinian State, was a transitional period where all efforts were to be concentrated 
to accomplish a transitionally bordered Palestinian state with sovereignty features that 
                                               
85The eighty-seventh round of the Ministerial Council held in Jeddah on 16 June 2003 on the GCC web site 
http://gcc-sg.org/mnstr1088.html 
86 Zakareyya Hussein, The Strategy of Israeli Negotiation: The Course of the Arab-Israeli Negotiation 
Throughout a Quarter of a Century 1977-2004, (Cairo: Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, Issued 2004), 
p.318.  
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Taha Khalil, The Roadmap and the Difficulties of Implementation, Awark AL Sharq Al awsat, (Cairo: The 
National Centre for Middle East Studies, Issue no. 31, June 2003), p.24. 
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were based on the new constitution as a step toward the permanent solution. However, 
the pace of progress towards this stage was governed by the Quartet Committee’s 
assessment of the efforts of both parties.
88
 
 What was required from the Arab side was that the Arab countries were to restore 
whatever ties they had with Israel before the Intifada (such as the commercial offices), 
and to revive the multilateral engagements related to water, environment, economic 
development, the refugees, and armament limitation.
89
 
The third stage “agreement on the final status and bringing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
to an end, 2004-2005” aimed at stabilizing the reform and stability of the Palestinian 
foundations and guaranteeing an effective security performance in addition to conducting 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, which aimed at reaching a permanent status agreement 
by 2005. As for the Arab side, the Arab countries were to accept complete and normal 
relations with Israel, and the recognition of the security of each state in the region within 
an Arab-Israeli comprehensive peace frame.
90
 
In accordance with the previously mentioned GCC member states stance towards the 
Palestinian cause and the multiple peaceful settlement projects and schemes, it is quite 
apparent that there was a vital and important connection between the GCC states and the 
peace process. The GCC perspective emphasizes supporting the comprehensive peace 
process that warrants for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state whose 
capital is Jerusalem, the rejection of settling the Palestinians in the territories of GCC 
states, in addition to the demand for a just solution for the refugee problem in accordance 
with the Arab Peace Initiative, and finally the resoluteness to financially and morally 
support and sustain the Palestinian legitimacy, “the Palestinian National Authority”. 
 The GCC states were influenced by great public support for the Palestinian cause, which 
could not be officially overlooked or surpassed. 
                                               
88 Zakareyya Hussein, p.322. 
89
 Taha Khalil, p.24.  
90Ibid, pp.324, 325. 
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6.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the relationship between GCC states and the Middle East 
peace process and the stance adopted by the GCC with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and the Middle East peace process. The chapter revealed the existence of a general vision 
that affected the stance of GCC states towards the Middle East Process, which entailed 
support for Arab and Palestinian rights, particularly the right of Palestinians to declare a 
national state with Jerusalem as its capital. This chapter also highlights the support of 
GCC states for the Middle East peace process form the onset and throughout all the 
attempts that followed the Madrid Conference and the attempts of GCC states to 
overcome the challenges that emerged during the peace process. At one point, GCC states 
even agreed to leave out the indirect boycott of Israel from the second and third degrees, 
which affected companies investing in Israel. The situation changed with the arrival of 
Benjamin Netanyahu at the helm of power in Israel in 1996 and in response to the 
increasing aggressive attitudes of his government, Arab states held the 17th Arab Summit 
and announced decisions to reconsider polices towards Israel.  
GCC states voiced support for the Wye Plantations and Wye River accords, while in the 
Second Camp David Accord, GCC states unanimously reasserted a past and immutable 
stance in support of Arab rights, including the right of refugees to return and the 
Palestinians right to declare a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and also to 
support Yasser Arafat as an elected Palestinian president. 
The GCC continued to support Arab and Palestinian rights. GCC justice ministers called 
on the international community to shoulder its responsibility and take measures to stop 
Israeli crimes against the Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Sultanate of Oman closed its trade 
office in Tel Aviv, and the Israeli trade office in Muscat. 
Saudi Arabia exerted efforts at the Arab, Islamic, and African levels to champion the 
Palestinian issue and to curtail Israel diplomatically. 
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Following the 11 September attacks, Saudi Arabia sought to re-crystallize its foreign 
policy, and in 2002 Saudi Arabia announced the Arab Peace Initiative in Beirut, while at 
the same time sharp differences emerged between the GCC states and the US on the 
definition of terrorism and distinguishing between terrorism and the legitimate right of 
armed struggle against occupation. However, despite such differences, GCC states at the 
institutional and official state levels continued to support the US peace efforts. 
This chapter has shown that GCC states were keen to support the Middle East peace 
process and champion Arab rights, as expressed by a number of summit and ministerial 
meetings. Due to regional and international conditions, GCC states were encouraged to 
engage more actively in the peace process and announced their commitment to peace as a 
strategic Arab choice. GCC states attended the Madrid Conference as observers, and later 
took part in the multilateral negotiation rounds, some of which were held in Qatar, 
Bahrain, and Oman. 
In 2003, the US announced plans to produce social, political, and cultural changes in the 
Middle East in what was known as the “Greater Middle East” or the “Colin Powell 
Initiative”, and which were received with scepticism and reserve by all GCC states except 
Qatar, which welcomed the initiative. Qatar’s stance proved to be a source of pressure 
against the ruling GCC regime and later led to a key split among GCC states. 
In Chapter Seven, the study will explore the political stances of GCC states on the Middle 
East Peace process and relevant US initiatives, and the support by GCC states of the 
Palestinian cause since the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Peace Process after the Death of 
Arafat 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter is an extension of the previous chapter to discuss the stances taken by GCC 
states on the Middle East peace process and analyse these stances with respect to the 
process after the demise of the Palestinian National Authority chairman Yasser Arafat, and 
in light of the US-backed democratization drive specifically targeting the structure of 
Palestinian national authorities as well as the Middle East democratization shift from a 
broader perspective. 
This chapter also includes analysis and examination of GCC state policies with regard to 
the issues of succession and the transfer of power of Palestinian national authority after 
the death of Arafat, and the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the GCC 
stance on the Roadmap, the obstacles facing the Roadmap, and attempts to revive the Arab 
peace initiative.  
The sources used in this chapter include secondary sources, which comprise academic 
periodicals, academic research, which has already been presented, and a limited number of 
primary resources, such as closing statements issued by GCC summit meetings, 
ministerial meetings, and related news articles published in GCC newspapers. 
On 14 February 2003, and under the pressure put upon him by Israel, the US, and the 
European Union, Arafat accepted the principle of appointing a prime minister, offering the 
position to Mahmoud Abbas, who formed the first Palestinian government on 29 
November 2004, amid Palestinian suspicion and an American-Israeli welcome. On 11 
November 2004, the death of Yasser Arafat was officially declared, and hence a new 
phase was initiated, known as the post-Arafat phase. 
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7.2 The new Palestinian leadership 
Mahmoud Abbas assumed the role of Prime Minister within the Palestinian National 
Authority in accordance with the context of the Palestinian amendments made to the 
Roadmap plan, which confirmed the appointment of a new Palestinian prime minister and 
restricted the authority and privileges of Arafat before he died. Mahmoud Abbas was one 
of the key catalysts in the peace process, and he is considered to be a practical leader in 
the Palestinian Authority. Further, Abbas enjoys solid connections in the US and Israel, in 
addition to his well-known views against militarizing the Intifada, and his strong 
relationships with the Palestinian opposing squads, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, 
including his talks with them despite their rejection of his directions regarding the route of 
the Intifada. Most important of all, however, is his strong base inside the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization.
1
 
Before the death of Arafat, all plans aiming at the continuation of political settlement were 
frozen, awaiting Arafat’s passing away in whichever manner, or at least, severely 
decreasing his privileges, through distributing them, as well as the dispossession of his 
financial and security privileges. In the light of this environment, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli 
Prime Minister, suggested the Unilateral Disengagement Plan, which entails the 
comprehensive unilateral withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip, along with the 
disengagement of four settlements in some areas of the northern West Bank. The term 
“unilateral” indicates what Israel considers to be “the absence of a Palestinian partner” 
that is fit for negotiations. Sharon’s plan has gained American and global approval, 
rendering it a part of the Roadmap.
2
 
The presence of Arafat was an excuse adopted by the Israeli government to delay, or even 
to avoid, the agreed peace commitments, being a part of the problem rather than being a 
                                               
1The Arab Strategic Report, 2002-2003, (Cairo: Center of Political and Strategic Studies, 2003) p.275. 
2
 Emad Gad. The Future of Settlement after Arafat, As-Siyasah Ad-Dawliyyah, (Cairo: Al-Ahram, issue no. 
159, January 2005), p.122. 
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part of its resolution, and under his commandership, Israel had no adequate Palestinian 
negotiator. What, then, was the Israeli attitude towards dealing with Abu Mazen? 
Israel does not view Abu Mazen as a true partner in the peacemaking process in the area, 
yet he is the sole person to converse with. Israel denounces his mildness and hesitance in 
facing the Palestinian Islamic movements. However, Israel knows that he is the only 
person with whom it can discuss some of its main issues, and after the events of Gaza in 
July/August 2007, the importance of Abu Mazen increased for Israel. Given this situation, 
the peace process moved at a slower pace until it was completely frozen, allowing Israel to 
confiscate lands and to build up the barrier wall, in addition to hardening the procedures of 
moving goods and Palestinian people across the towns of the West Bank, making it 
difficult for them to perform their Islamic rituals in Al-Quds, not to mention the increasing 
numbers of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. Such situations have presented several 
challenges to the Gulf Cooperation Council, as revealed in its 25th Summit, convened in 
Manama in December 2004, among which are the following points:
3
 
- Utilizing the Israeli actions against the Palestinians by some of the extremist groups to 
exert pressure on the Gulf governments, or to practice terrorism against the United States 
and the other countries siding with Israel. Reviewing the statements made by these groups, 
the most important of which is Al-Qaeda, the connection between their operations and the 
escalating conditions in Iraq and Palestine is clearly noticeable. 
- The negative impacts which the Gulf-Arab relationships may face due to the approval of 
some Arab countries to signing the economic Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) agreements 
with Israel and the US. This is a matter seen by several analysts as a reason, among others, 
that may cause damage to the Arab intra-trade in general and, in particular, the economic 
exchange between Gulf countries and the countries signing such agreements. This is in 
addition to the supposition that such agreements would initiate the Arab-Israeli 
                                               
3
Mamdouh Saber, Manama Summit: The Challenges and Results, Shoa'uon Khalejeh, (Cairo: Gulf Center 
for Strategic Studies, Issue no. 40, winter 2005), p.102. 
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normalization process, which is held frozen until reaching a fair resolution in respect of 
Palestine. 
With the absence of Arafat, the need, or at least the desire, emerged to hire staff members 
in the positions of the Authority's institutions. Some of these positions were official, such 
as the position Arafat was personally occupying, while others possibly emerged as a 
consequence of his absence, a matter that caused the anticipation of the impact of Arafat’s 
absence on the future of the relationships between the national Authority and the various 
Palestinian groups, and even within the Authority itself. This stems from the fact that the 
popularity of Arafat over the previous four decades was the most prominent element in 
achieving unity and solidarity of the interior bloc. Hence, the absence of Arafat and the 
lack of an alternative leadership with the same popularity gave rise to fears about the 
possibility of slipping into an interior conflict instead of directing the efforts towards 
political settlement,
4
 which already had happened in the events in Gaza in 2007. 
The Palestinian leadership proved successful in arranging for a streamlined transfer of 
power, and distributing the positions occupied by the late President Arafat harmoniously. 
In this context, Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the Executive Committee of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, after being the said Committee’s Secretary in 
Ramallah, soon after declaring the death of Yasser Arafat in Pearcy Military Hospital in 
France on 11November 2004. Thus, in their 25th Summit in Manama, from 20to 
21December 2004, the GCC leaders expressed their “wishes for the new Palestinian 
leadership to succeed in the continuation of bearing the responsibilities, integration, and 
cooperation in facing the future challenges” and they praised “the wisdom and sense of 
responsibility expressed by the Palestinian leadership in the streamlined manner in which 
the authority was transferred.”5 
                                               
4 (Al-Khalij: 16-11-2004:4) 
5
 The Gulf Summit Fails to Resolve the Manama Dispute – Riyadh, Islam Online Website, 21-12-2004, 
http://www.islamonline.net/arabic/news/index 
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Also, in its statement, and in addition to the wishes of the new Palestinian leadership, the 
Council asked President Bush to concentrate his efforts towards a peaceful process in a 
manner that would fulfil the commitments and promises made for establishing a 
Palestinian state that had the ability for Palestinians to live side by side peacefully with 
Israel. In the same context, the Council also addressed the Quartet Committee with an 
invitation to continue its efforts that aimed at setting up the appropriate environment to 
facilitate the work of the Palestinian political process, as well as moving the peace process 
in the Middle East forward according to the basics and requirements referred to in the 
Roadmap and the Arab initiative.
6
 
It was on 9 January that the new Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, was elected for 
the position, thus becoming the second president of the Palestinian National Authority, 
after President Yasser Arafat.
7
 The new president started his career by tackling a number 
of challenges, the first of which were the challenges inside the Palestinian internal bloc, 
which he referred to when saying, “I will move from the minor jihad to the major jihad”, 
which is concerned with reform, development, and paving the political route,
8
 in a manner 
that enabled him to shoulder the responsibilities of the coming phase. However, in mid-
March 2005,
9
 Hamas declared that it would participate in the legislative election that 
would be held in mid-July 2005. Nevertheless, the said election was held on 25 January 
2006, when Hamas won the majority of the Legislative Council seats. The reaction of the 
GCC was represented in congratulating and welcoming President Mahmoud Abbas for 
acquiring the presidency of the Palestinian National Authority, wishing the new 
government success in supporting integration and cooperation in facing the challenges, so 
                                               
6The closing statement of the 25thSummit, convened in Manama, 20-21 December 2004, on the Council’s 
website, (http://www.gcc-sg.org) 
7Subhy Esseilah, Palestine After Arafat: Challenges of Reform and Settlement, Mozakerat Estratejeah, 
(Cairo: Center of Political and Strategic Studies, Fifteenth Year, Issue 151, 2005), p.4. 
 
8
 (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: 14-01-2005:1) 
9Subhi Essilah, op.cit, p.18.  
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as to achieve the Palestinians’ ambitions towards establishing an independent state on 
their national land, with the Holy Quds as its capital.
10
 
This reaction is manifested in the closing statement of the 26thSession of the Supreme 
Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council state members, which was held in Kuwait from 
18 to 19 December 2005.
11
 The Council expressed its ambitions that the Israeli withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip and some settlements in the West Bank was a step in the right 
direction, provided that it was followed by more action towards full withdrawal from the 
occupied Palestinian territories. Once again, the Council asserted the adherence of its state 
members to the Arab Peace Initiative approved at the Beirut Summit in 2002, which 
originated in international legitimacy resolutions. The Council also confirmed the 
integration between this initiative and the Roadmap. This was in the light of its belief that 
fair and comprehensive peace in the Middle East could be achieved only through 
establishing an independent Palestinian state, based on its necessary constituents, along 
with stopping the settlement process, evacuating the settlements, giving up the building of 
the separation barrier, and removing what had been built up so far. 
7.3 The Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and its consequences  
On 5 January 2004, in front of the Central Committee of the Likud party, Ariel Sharon 
said:  
The best plan for the security of Israel, it is my plan, and I will execute it. 
Continue raising your banners that have the slogan “terrorism has won”, 
and I will assume my responsibilities to achieve peace and security on this 
land. Brave settlers are loyal to Zionism. However, Israel will have to give 
up some of the Jewish settlements in the context of peace with the 
Palestinians. However, if they refuse our suggestions, we will work on 
                                               
10The General Administration, News Section, a Comprehensive Report on the Achievements of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, issued on the occasion of holding the 26th session, the General Secretariat of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. 
11
The closing statement of the 26thSession of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council state 
members, Kuwait, 18-19 December 2005, the Council’s website (http://www.gcc-sg.org). 
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separating ourselves from them both militarily and politically, severing 
every possible form of communication with them.
12
 
He previously mentioned them in his speech, on18 December 2003, in front of the 
attendees at the Herzliya National Security Conference, in which he announced his plan to 
disengage from the Palestinians. On the surface, this shows that Sharon was determined to 
proceed with his unilateral disengagement through waiving some of the settlements for the 
safety and security of the Israelis. However, if this was only on the surface, the hidden 
intentions confirm the unwillingness of Sharon and his determination, after his assumption 
of power in 2001, not to get back to negotiations or any previous commitments. Sharon 
sought to reach a specific political position that enabled him to achieve political settlement 
with the Palestinians as he saw fit, yet after resolving the security, political, and economic 
issues, he used his statements to pretend that there was no Palestinian partner with which 
to negotiate.
13
 
The concept of final disengagement was not new. Rabin adopted the idea after a series of 
suicidal operations during 1994, yet the dominant political status made it impossible to 
execute the plan. Also, after the failure of the Camp David negotiations and the eruption 
of the Second Intifada, Barak initiated the plan once again under the name “Breathing 
Borders”. Then Sharon announced his disengagement plan, in an attempt to improve the 
security, political, economic, and even personal conditions. The said disengagement plan 
was based on the following considerations:
14
 
1. Full freezing of the current status is harmful. In order to disintegrate this frozen state, 
Israel should take the initiative towards stepping away from any Palestinian 
cooperation.  
                                               
12Ibrahim Ghali, Warning of Disengagement: A Dangerous Plan for a Critical Reality, Al-Quds, (Cairo: Arab 
Media Center, Issue no. 62, February 2004), pp.38-39. 
13
Ibid.p. 39. 
14(Yedioth Ahronoth: 30/05/2004), http://withdraw.sis.gov.ps/arabic/sharon-plan.html. 
177 
 
2. The aim of the plan is to move towards a better secured, political, economic, and 
demographic status.  
3. In any future constant settlement, there will never be an Israeli settlement in Gaza. In 
return, it is obvious that in Judea and Samaria there will remain areas belonging to 
Israel, including the central blocks of Jewish settlement.  
4. Israel supports the endeavors of the United States working side by side with the global 
community to push forward the march of reforms, so that a new Palestinian Authority 
will be established that proves its ability to fulfil its commitment according to the 
Roadmap. 
5. Getting out of Gaza and the area of northern Samaria will limit interaction with the 
Palestinian residents. 
6. Completing the gradual plan will deny the right for the Palestinians of any other claim 
against Israel in the future regarding its responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip.  
7. The gradual Disengagement Plan is not contradictory with the outstanding agreements 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Any related outstanding agreement remains valid. 
Israel expected some degree of wide global support regarding this separation process, as 
this support would be seen as an essential constituent in pushing the Palestinians towards 
performing their assigned tasks, in a practical manner, in fields pertaining to fighting 
terrorism, and implementing the reforms as outlined in the Roadmap, upon which 
returning to negotiations would be possible. On 7 June 2004, the Israeli government 
approved the Unilateral Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip and some parts of the 
northern West Bank. However, this approval was denounced by the Likud, Mefdal 
Religious Party, and the Jewish settlers groups, as well as the Central Commandership 
Meeting of the Ten Palestinian Squads in Damascus, on 17 June 2004, where the plan of 
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Sharon was viewed as a threshold towards the dissolution of the Palestinian case. Hence, 
the project should have been entirely rejected.
15
 
The Palestinian leadership expressed its viewpoint in a statement issued after its 
emergency meeting, held on 14 April 2004 in Ramallah, considering the conditional 
withdrawal from Gaza as an obvious clue that it was not a withdrawal, but, rather, was 
transforming the Strip into a huge solitary prison. Upon his acquiring the presidency of the 
National Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas confirmed, on 15 January 2005, the 
commitment of the National Palestinian Authority to the peace process, asserting its 
readiness to receive the areas in the Gaza Strip and West Bank from which Israel would 
withdraw, refusing to bargain this withdrawal with the national project, and accepting it 
only as a step in the Roadmap to be followed by the continuation of the peace process. 
Then, on another occasion, and in an interview with Al-Arabeya (satellite channel) on 28 
July2005, Abbas confirmed that the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the 
northern West Bank was unilateral, and that the Palestinian Authority was tackling the 
issue with great interest, “as we comprehensively prepare ourselves on the Authority level, 
as well as on the public and mass levels, so that this event will be accomplished as 
properly required by us.”16 
This was followed by the American reaction to the Unilateral Disengagement Plan 
prepared by Sharon’s government, in the statement made by the American President upon 
his meeting with Sharon on 14 April 2004, describing the plan as a brave one. The US also 
confirmed that it would remain committed to the vision of two states, as mentioned in the 
Roadmap, and that it would exert its best efforts to prevent the imposit ion of any other 
new plans, confirming, meanwhile, its solid commitment to the security of Israel as a 
Jewish state, including its safe borders that should be protected, and keeping the Israeli 
                                               
15Tareq Hassan, The Unilateral Disengagement and the Peace Process Future, As-Siyasah Ad-Dawliyyah, 
(Cairo, Al-Ahram Establishment, Issue 158, October 2004), p.132. 
16
The Palestinian Reaction to the Israeli Evacuation Plan, General Information Establishment, Palestine, 
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rights to defend itself against terrorism.
17
 It is notable that on 11September 2005, the 
Israeli occupation announced a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 
The reaction of the Quartet Committee was made clear in its statement in Brussels, dated 9 
May 2005, highlighting the following:
18
 
1. Withdrawal should be implemented within the execution of the Roadmap. 
2. It should be a step on the path to finding the solution for two states. 
3. The settlers who will be moved from the Gaza Strip should not be transferred to the 
West Bank. 
4. There should be a transfer process organized by negotiating with, and delivering to, 
the Palestinian Authority.  
5. Israel should streamline the Gaza reform reconstruction process.  
The reaction of the GCC was expressed in the 24
th
Summit, where the Council confirmed 
its rejection of the content of the speech delivered by the Israeli Prime Minister on 14 
September 2003, regarding the intention of the Israeli government to take a unilateral 
decision to implement the so-called separation plan, or the “Disengagement Plan”, while 
refusing any negotiations with the Palestinian side. The Council asserted its austere 
denunciation of such arrangements, which did not serve the Arabs, and international 
efforts were exerted to re-enliven the peace process.
19
 
The attitude of the GCC towards the unilateral withdrawal plan can be explained on the 
basis that the Council believed in fair and comprehensive peace, as well as in establishing 
a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem (Al-Quds) as its capital. The Israeli plan strongly 
                                               
17http://withdraw.sis.gov.ps/arabic/AA.html. Also refer to Islam Online website, in a citation from the 
French News Agency; an unofficial translation of the text of the announcement made by George Bush, 
the American President, on the Middle East, as issued after his meeting with Sharon, on Wednesday 14-
04-2004.  
18The official website of the Secretary of State, 10-05-2005. 
19
Media and Information Center, the Kuwait Summit concludes its agenda by denouncing the Israeli assaults 
and terrorism, as well as confirming the unity of Iraq, 22-12-2003, http://mic-pal.info 
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opposed all that the GCC council proposed. Moreover, it denied the idea of having a peace 
partner, thus entirely canceling the rights of the Palestinians, which the Council could not 
accept. 
7.4 The stumbling block in implementing the Roadmap 
In spite of the international commitment to the Roadmap, as represented in the Quartet 
Committee, realities proved that this commitment was not serious. After one year , 
following the announcement of the Roadmap and starting its relevant negotiations, the 
United States changed its attitude and sided with Israel, through the American acceptance 
of the 14 Israeli reservations over the Roadmap, as mentioned in Bush’s promise to 
Sharon issued on 14 April 2004. The Americans sought to relate the Israeli Unilateral 
Disengagement Plan to the Roadmap, in return for the American promise to Sharon, as 
represented in the letter of guarantees sent to him in April 2004.
20
 
The main points in the guarantees letter of 14 April 2004:
21
 
- The American approval of Israel’s keeping of military positions in the Gaza Strip. 
- Giving Israel the right to break into Gaza and pursue Palestinian individuals or 
organizations under the pretext of defending the security of Israel. 
- The vow to protect the security of Israel as a Jewish state. 
- Approving the cancellation of the right of Palestinian refugees to get back to their houses 
in Israel, and thus hinting that the return of the refugees would be to the newborn 
Palestinian state and not to Israel. 
                                               
20Mohamed Al-Deeb, The Second Balfour promise (Bush’s promise to Sharon): The American Guarantees 
Letter, Shoa'uon AL Sharq al awsat, (Cairo: Al Ahram, Issue 11, July 2004), p.119.  
21Ahmed Sayed Ahmed. Gaza between Sharon’s Plan and the Egyptian Initiative, As-Siyasah Ad-Dawliyyah 
(Cairo: Al-Ahram Establishment, Issue no. 157, July 2004), p.155. 
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- Confirming Israel’s right to annex settlements in the West Bank, with the necessity of 
modifying the borders, and hence, as stated by Bush, returning to the borders of 1948 is a 
totally unrealistic matter. 
- Bush vowed to confront any attempt to suggest any settlement plan proposed by any side. 
- Giving Israel the right to control the airfields, water sources, and land borders. 
Hence, this letter totally ignored the Roadmap, in addition to the fact that Bush gave 
himself the right to be the sole party concerned with proposing settlement plans for the 
peace process. Such promises were contradictory to both Security Council resolutions 
numbers 242 and 338. Also, being related to the issues to be resolved in the context of the 
final settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, the promises were also contradictory 
to the Roadmap, which stipulated that its third stage was designed to resolve the final 
status issues through direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis.  
On the other hand, the previously mentioned critiques expressed by the GCC regarding the 
guarantees offered by Bush to Sharon in April 2004
22
 represented the reaction of the GCC 
towards the US disavowal from its commitments, particularly the establishment of two 
states, one for the Palestinians and the other for the Israelis. Hence, the GCC described 
Bush’s statements as a serious and pitiable transformation that ignored the international 
legitimacy resolutions, which consider the Palestinian lands as occupied. Consequently, 
this would lead the extremist Israeli government to commit further violations of 
international laws,
23
 and this represented a serious setback in its approach towards the 
settlement process in the region. 
While Israel was connecting between continuing the pacifications from its side, and the 
progress Mahmoud Abbas was making in building up the squads dissolution program,
24
 in 
                                               
22Refer to the Disengagement Plan script – The American Guarantees document – Sharon’s memo to Bush – 
Bush’s speech in front of Sharon, The Palestinian Information Center, 17-04-2004, http://www.palestine-
info.info/arabic/palestoday/reports/report2004/wstheeqa.htm  
23Swiss Broadcast, http://www.swissinfo.org/sar/swissinfo.html 
24
Abdullah Al-Asa’al, After Sharm Al-Sheikh, Will Abu Mazen be the Leader of the Anti-Terrorism Front 
in Palestine?,Al-Quds, (Cairo, Arab Information Center, Issue 75, March 2005), p.79. 
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the light of the American statements supposing that the Palestinian resistance and Intifada 
were acts of terrorism hindering the peace process, Bush asked Abbas to fight what he 
called the “armed gangs”, referring to the resistance squads, considered as a serious threat 
to the chances of the establishment of the Palestinian state. Also, he implicitly referred to 
the impossibility of moving to the Roadmap or any further Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
regarding the final status before finalizing this issue. This obviously shows that Bush 
sided with Sharon’s policies and his insistence on the security part of the settlement 
process in general, and the Roadmap in particular.  
The GCC member states differentiated between “terrorism” on the one hand, which is 
religiously, lawfully, and morally rejected, and the legitimate armed struggle against 
foreign occupation, which is accepted by international treaties and religious legislation.
25
 
Hence, these states responded positively to the Security Council resolution No. 1373/2001 
regarding anti-terrorism, and confirmed their commitment to abide by the other related 
resolutions. Thus, in 2002, the security strategy of fighting extremism accompanied by 
terrorism was duly approved. It was approved by the Supreme Council in its 24
th
 session 
in Kuwait in 2003. Such a reaction obviously reveals the Gulf Council’s clear attitude of 
denunciation towards terrorism, yet not the type of terrorism viewed by the US and Israel, 
who tend to equate Palestinian resistance with global terrorism.  
In this context, the American administration vowed to support any future Israeli attack 
against the Palestinians, under the pretext of “hot pursuit” and the right to pursue those 
wanted by the Israelis. In practice, this meant enabling the Israeli occupation forces to 
undertake military operations against the resistance squads, even after the redeployment in 
the areas from which Israel was supposed to withdraw, claiming its right to “self-
defense”.26 
                                               
25Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, The Impact of 11/09 Events on the Arab World, p.15. 
26
Al-Sayed Awad Othman, ‘Bush’s Promise and the Validity of Settlement’, Al-Quds (Cairo, Arab 
Information Center, Issue 65, May 2004), p.40. 
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It was also noticeable that in September 2005, President Bush, while standing beside 
Mahmoud Abbas, announced his disavowal of Abbas’s opinion regarding the 
establishment of a Palestinian state before the end of his term of presidency in January 
2009. Further, Bush practically annihilated the peace plan, known as the Roadmap, 
through his full adoption of the Israeli security approach towards the settlement process 
and the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.
27
 
It became clear that this qualitative development in the American attitude was destructive 
to the basis of the peace process including the resolutions made by the United Nations and 
international legitimacy, or even previously adopted American attitudes. Such a 
development was contradictory to the American guarantees given to the Palestinian 
leadership, yet it was a push to Israel to continue the policy of imposing a new reality on 
the ground, and putting an end to the mediation role played by the American 
administration, not to mention losing its credibility, putting an end to the proposed 
Roadmap, and slamming the door in the face of real settlement.  
7.5 Attempts to revive the Arab peace initiative  
Since its outset, the Second Intifada has adopted violent and armed tools. Hence, the form 
of armed resistance has dominated the general view of its activities. Militarizing the 
Intifada, through suicidal operations and shootings, has not been an easy choice; however, 
it is the only effective weapon for the Palestinians, given the imbalance of forces when 
compared to the Israeli forces. All Palestinian wings have viewed the Intifada as an 
inevitable response to the occupation policy, and the targeting of civilians by Israeli 
forces.
28
 
Throughout the year prior to the war in Iraq, the Palestinian Authority faced an Arab and 
international campaign calling on it to reform, a matter that the Palestinian Authority saw 
as viable only through holding municipality and legislative elections. Hence, the 
                                               
27Maged Azzam, Has Meles Report Shot the Roadmap and Bush’s View? Arab Media Internet, 08-10-2005, 
http://www.amin.org/views/uncat/2005/nov/nov8-5.html 
28 The Arab Strategic Report 2002-2003, (Cairo: Center of Political and Strategic Studies, 2003), p.272. 
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regulations of the Authority changed “in an application of the Oslo Agreement, which 
promulgates the presidency of the Authority only”, so that they would include the position 
of a Prime Minister on 19 March 2003. Hence, the first Palestinian government was 
formed according to the new legislation on 20 April 2003, and the Roadmap was officially 
declared on 30 April 2003.
29
 
Mahmoud Abbas became the Prime Minister in the Palestinian Authority, through 
application of the requirements of the Roadmap regarding the Palestinian reforms, which 
stressed the formation of a new Palestinian Prime Ministry, introducing the position of a 
Prime Minister with powers as a step towards the reform of the Palestinian Authority, and 
limiting the powers of Yasser Arafat.
30
 
Based on the above, the American initiative called for the convening of an Arab-
American-Israeli Summit in Aqaba on 4 June 2003, so as to position both the Palestinians 
and Israelis on the American track towards the peace process. Sharon always prevented 
the implementation of the Roadmap, and yet continued his commitment to what was 
mentioned in Bush’s letter regarding the termination of the Intifada as the first condition 
to cooperate with any Palestinian government. This pushed Mahmoud Abbas to meet the 
Palestinian squads, so as to reach an agreement with them to announce a unilateral 
Palestinian truce, and called on both the United States and Israel to go ahead in 
implementing the second step of the Roadmap related to several Israeli entitlements, the 
most important of which was the withdrawal from the Palestinian self-rule areas.
31
 
The issue of political and economic reform in the Arab world was strongly suggested after 
the US issued its so-called proposal of the “Greater Middle East”, which the US 
afterwards confirmed in the Big Eight Summit, convened in the state of Georgia at the 
outset of 2004 under the title “Partnership for Development and a Joint Future with the 
                                               
29Belal Al-Hassan, Israel in the Light of War Results: A Seminar on the Occupation of Iraq and its 
Repercussions on the Arab, Regional and International Levels, (Beirut: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 
2004), p.384. 
30
The Arab Strategic Report 2002-2003, op.cit, p.275. 
31Belal Al-Hassan, op.cit, p.384-385. 
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Greater Middle East and North Africa Region”, after making some essential 
modifications.  
In contrast with this proposal, several Arab countries stated that the continuation of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict came on top of the elements that caused the stumbling block 
regarding democratic reform and the development process in the region.
32
 Meanwhile, 
others saw that postponing political reform under the claim of dedication to confronting 
the Israeli danger was no longer acceptable, neither internally nor externally. After more 
than fifty years of postponing the political reform based on this claim, nothing has been 
achieved in the context of liberating Palestine. On the contrary, the political situation has 
further deteriorated to the stage of internal political suffocation, which threatens to 
explode at any time, in addition to the noticeable aggravation of security risks.
33
 
Based on the above, democratic reform and development processes have occupied an 
advanced priority from Arab and the Gulf countries’ perspective. Some34see that 
developing political regimes towards democracy and political reform is an essential 
condition to increase the capacity of these regimes in meeting the internal, regional, and 
international challenges under the sole American control of the global system, that is, 
given the sole tackling of the peace process in the Middle East by the US. This reform 
issue was reiterated in the Tunisia Summit in May 2004, expressing a collateral Arab 
attitude in the face of external pressures. The Arab and Gulf countries
35
 re-confirmed the 
Arab peace initiative, as adopted in the Beirut Summit, and rejected the contradictory 
situations with this initiative and the rules of international legitimacy and the reference 
                                               
32Gulf Center for Strategic Studies,The Reality and Future of the Political Reform in the Arab World. Op.cit, 
p.70. 
33Mohamed Saad Abu Amoud, Determinatives of the Political Reform in the Arab Countries, in Democracy 
Issue in the Arab World, (Cairo: Cairo University, Faculty of Economy and Political Sciences, Center of 
Developing Countries’ Studies and Researches, 2004), p.6. 
34Mohamed Saad Abu Amoud, Democratic Development in the Arab World and the Arab National 
Security,Shoa'uon Khalejeh,(Cairo: Gulf Center for Strategic Studies, Issue no. 25, Spring 2001), pp.46-
47. 
35Refer to the closing statement of the 16thOrdinary Session, which was convened in Tunisia in May 2004, 
www.arab-summit.org; Ahmed Sayed Ahmed, Gaza between Sharon's Plan and the Egyptian Initiative, 
op.cit, p.158. 
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points of the peace process, in a hint at the stances adopted in the two letters exchanged 
between Sharon and Bush. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed issues related to the transfer of power and succession after the 
death of the Palestinian Authority leader, Yasser Arafat. In particular, it has focused on 
US proposals to restart the Middle East peace process in the hopes of settling the Arab-
Israeli conflict, including the Roadmap, the Gaza unilateral withdrawal, and the backing 
by GCC states of US Middle East peace efforts.  
This chapter has also highlighted the scepticism of GCC states about US plans seeking to 
tie the Middle East peace process to political and economic reforms in the region, as a US 
attempt to use democratization as a conflict resolution, which the GCC bloc viewed with 
concern and perhaps also resentment. GCC states declared that reforms must reflect 
internal needs, and must be linked to the native and domestic culture rather than being 
externally imposed. This was with the exception of Qatar, who backed the US 
democratization drive without reservation, as will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. GCC states also expressed reservations about the US attempts to link self-defence 
and resistance against occupation with terrorism. GCC states insisted on making a 
distinction between terrorism as a criminal act, which should be condemned, and the 
legitimate right of resistance against occupation. This chapter also discussed GCC efforts 
to salvage the Middle East process, including initiatives floated in Beirut, and how various 
circumstances led to the eventual collapse of the peace process.  
In Chapter Eight, the study will explore and analyse key features of Qatar’s foreign policy 
with respect to the Middle East peace process and Qatar’s decision on the initiative to 
normalize trade ties with Israel.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Qatar's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East Peace Process (1991-
2005)  
8.1 Introduction  
The previous two chapters explored and analysed the foreign policy of GCC states with 
regard to the Middle East peace process. This chapter engages with part of one of the main 
research question, which is what was the overall agreed upon foreign policy of the GCC 
towards the Middle East peace process, 1991-2005? As the previous two chapters engaged 
in exploration and analysis of the foreign policy of the GCC states towards the peace 
process, this chapter, explores Qatari foreign policy towards the Middle East peace 
process.  The main objective of this chapter is to engage with Qatar’s foreign policy on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict prior to the start of the peace process, its support for the first 
Palestinian Intifada and then how it reacted to what was perceived by GCC member states 
as the PLO’s negative stance with respect to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The 
chapter further evaluates Qatar’s support for the efforts that led to holding the Madrid 
Peace Conference, and the means with which it dealt with Israeli policies towards the 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Finally, it looks at Qatar’s stance with respect to 
the treaties and plans that followed the Madrid Conference.  
This chapter is one of the data analysis chapters that deals with two types of documents. 
The first category consists of the statements of Qatari officials, such as those of the Emir 
of Qatar and from Qatari ministers or diplomats, whether they were published in Qatari 
newspapers or were kept in archives.
1
 The second category consists of UN documents, 
including addresses delivered by Qatari officials, such as Qatari diplomats, the Foreign 
Minister of Qatar, and the Emir before the UN General Assembly. The time frame of this 
chapter extends from 1982 to 1993. 
                                               
1Statements attributed to ministers, diplomats, and the Emir of Qatar are revised by a specific office at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Emiri divan prior to publication; therefore, such statements are 
published pursuant to official procedures.  
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8.2 Qatari-Palestinian relations 
Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, later, the peace process, 
cannot be fully understood without thoroughly studying and analysing Qatar’s foreign 
policy towards the Palestinian question, and how Qatar pursued a peaceful solution to this 
cause in particular, which is a quest that has been tackled in different ways ever since the 
Egyptian President, Anwar Al Sadat, announced his peace initiative in 1977. 
 With regard to Qatari-Palestinian relations, Qatar’s foreign policy towards Palestine 
seems constant, and characterized by a clear Qatari backing for Palestinian rights. 
Furthermore, Qatar was fully aware of the complex nature of the conflict between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, and was also aware of Palestinian rights and the Israeli 
obligations towards the occupied territories.  
It is helpful to start with a quick historic review that goes a little further than the 
timeframe set for this study of the relationship between the two parties, in order to 
understand the state of steadiness that marked Qatar’s relationship with Palestine and then, 
the changes that took place in Qatar’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in later 
stages.  
Qatar was one of the first states that allowed an office for the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) on its territory in 1964. It was also among the first states that allowed 
expatriate Palestinians living on its soil to vote in the elections for the National Palestinian 
Council.
2
 
According to the ex-Emir of Qatar, Khaliah bin Hamad, in an interview with the German 
magazine Der Spiegel, relations between Qatar and Palestine had “stability and 
continuity.”3 
                                               
2
 (Al Raya: 3-1-1991:1) 
3The Emir Press interviews, (Doha: the Department of Publication and Press,1976), p.25. 
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The Qatari government supports the Palestinian struggle and the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people to establish their state on their homeland, with Jerusalem as its capital. 
Qatar’s support for the Palestinians has taken many forms, including the exchange of 
official visits between government officials from both sides, and the stances adopted by 
the Qatari government as represented by the Emir of Qatar, the Qatari cabinet, the foreign 
minister, and Qatari officials and diplomats in international organizations and arenas, as 
well as the material and moral support extended by Qatar, as evident in the rhetoric of the 
Emir, the prime minister, the Foreign Minister of Qatar, and the popular support extended 
by Qatari civil society organizations.  
8.3 How Qatar saw the Palestinian issue with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
According to the ex- Emir of Qatar, Khaliah bin Hamad, “Qatar has always perceived that 
the Palestinian question represents the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict.”4 Qatar 
attributed great importance to this issue, and held that the non-resolution thereof would 
make Middle Eastern stability impossible to attain. Many Qatari officials have reiterated 
this stance. For instance, during the UN General Assembly discussions over the 
Palestinian issue, Qatar’s UN envoy summed up the problem by saying that the 
Palestinian question represents the essence and the core of the conflict in the Middle East, 
adding that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state, must be recognized.
5
 Qatar reiterated the same stance in 
the closing statement at the conclusion of the visit by Tanzania’s Foreign Minister, Salem 
Ahmed Salem.
6
 During the visit of Donald Rumsfeld, the then US president’s special 
envoy to the Middle East, the Emir of Qatar told Rumsfeld that Qatar believed that it was 
necessary to arrive at a permanent and just solution to the Palestinian question.
7
 
                                               
4 Op.cit. The Emir Press interviews 
5 (Al Raya: 9-12-1982:2) 
      See appendix No: 1 
6 (Al Raya: 14-12-1982:1) 
      See appendix No: 2 
7 (Al Raya : 26-4-1984:1) 
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Furthermore, in an interview with Qatar’s Crown Prince Hamad Bin Khalifa during the 
Emir’s tour of West Asian nations, Sheikh Hamad said that:  
Given that the Palestinian issue is the essence of the Middle East conflict 
and the fact is the Palestinian issue is Arab nations' number one concern; 
therefore, it will be the priority among the issues that the Emir will discuss 
during his talks with the Asian heads of state.
8
 
In his address before the UN 40th session, the Emir of Qatar stated that “Qatar believes 
that the Palestinian issue is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that this part of the 
world will remain teeming with problems and risks until a just resolution is reached.”9 
In his address to Qatar’s Advisory Council, the Emir of Qatar reiterated the same point, 
that the GCC had to: 
…unite as a single entity to direct our maximum collective efforts to 
resolve the Palestinian issue, our central and most essential issue, by 
arriving at a just resolution based on our Arab vision as drawn by the 
resolutions of the Arab Summit held in Fez in 1982.
10
 
Thus the centrality of the Palestinian issue in the perception of Qatari officials meant that 
they have made remarkable efforts, and given care to this issue throughout the years of the 
conflict and thereafter during the years that were spent in pursuit of a peaceful political 
settlement. Qatar has maintained that the settlement of the Palestinian issue will be 
decisive in the stabilization of the Middle East region, and a key factor in resolving the 
remaining issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
 
                                               
8 (Al Raya: 12-4-1984: 1, 3) 
9
 (Al Raya: 12-10-1985:3) 
10(Al Raya: 12-10-1985:3) 
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8.4 The early years of Qatari foreign policy towards the Palestinians 
Qatar was among the first nations that opted for the actual recognition of the PLO when 
Qatar accepted the inauguration of the office of the PLO, even when it was under British 
rule during the tenure of Sheikh Ahmed Bin Ali in 1964, the same year that the PLO was 
established. In addition, Qatar was among the first nations that allowed Palestinian 
expatriates living on its soil to vote in the elections of the National Palestinian Council.  
Relations between the State of Qatar and Palestine continued to develop gradually, 
reflecting the growing capabilities of Qatar and the PLO.The principal governing Qatar’s 
foreign policy towards Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict was that “The State of Qatar 
accepts whatever the Palestinians accept regarding their cause and rights.” It is possible to 
discuss Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue in an objective manner, 
starting from the final years of the rule of Sheikh Khalifa Bin Hamad Al Thani, when 
Qatar’s foreign policy began to be formulated independently.  
8.5 Qatar and the invasion of Lebanon 1982 
The war of Lebanon in 1982 resulted in the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon to 
Tunisia, meaning a loss of political and military influence, and thus its ability to pose a 
threat to Israel’s security. Following the PLO’s departure to Tunisia on 1 October 1985, 
Israeli air forces raided the PLO headquarters in the Tunisian capital, wounding and 
killing 156 Palestinians and Tunisians. Qatar condemned the raid, but did not condemn the 
US and its protection of Israel, as Qatar had done previously. In addition, despite the fact 
that Israel had announced that the US had been previously notified of the raid, which the 
US considered an Israeli act of self-defence,
11
 Qatar did not criticize the US in any way. 
This signalled a shift in Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Qatar 
only condemned the raid in a statement issued by the Qatari cabinet, which announced 
Qatar’s solidarity with the Palestinian and Tunisian people. 12 
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 (Al Raya: 2-10-1985:1) 
12 (Al Raya: 3-10-1985:1) 
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In his address to the UN during the 40th session, the Emir of Qatar said that: 
While the Arabs show an honest and undisputable desire to bring peace to 
the Middle East, the Zionist entity continues in its defiant rejection and 
negative attitude towards any peace initiative. The evilness of this entity 
has been growing as it becomes more and more dependent on military 
might and the policies of persecution, domination and expansion.
13
 
The State of Qatar reiterated in its address before the UN General Assembly meeting that 
holding an international peace conference attended by all the concerned parties, including 
the PLO, was the most feasible path to lead to a comprehensive and just settlement of the 
conflict on the basis of restoring all the Arab occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and 
the Palestinian people’s right of self-determination and the establishment of an 
independent state on its national soil.
14
 The EU later supported the call for holding an 
international peace conference to be attended by all the concerned parties in the Middle 
East, and the Qatari cabinet issued a statement welcoming the EU stance.
15
 
The proposal to hold an international peace conference got a lukewarm reception from the 
US,
16
 and this signalled the actual end of the proposal.  
But despite the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the US, in a letter to US President Ronald 
Regan, the Emir of Qatar reiterated the call to hold the international peace conference, 
stressing the principle of general international law that prohibits the occupation of land 
through military force.
17
 In a clear manifestation of its rejection of the proposal to hold an 
international peace conference for the Middle East, the US closed the PLO media office in 
Washington DC in response to the adoption by the National Palestinian Council of the 
idea of the international conference for peace in the Middle East.
18
 
                                               
13 (Al Raya: 12-10-1985: 3) 
14 (Al Raya: 27-11-1986:1) 
15 (Al Raya 5-3-1987:1) 
16(Al Raya: 18-3-1987:1)  
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Despite the US rejection, the majority of Arab states and Qatar remained in favour of the 
proposal. The Emir of Qatar reiterated such support in a letter he sent to the UN 
Palestinian Rights Committee stating that: 
The best path towards resolving the Palestinian issue and ending the Arab-
Israeli conflict is through holding an international peace conference with 
the participation of the five UN Security Council permanent members and 
all the concerned parties, including the PLO. 
In the same letter, the Emir of Qatar described Israel as a “force of tyranny and aggression 
who is seeking to displace and irradiate the Palestinian people in order for the Zionists to 
take their place.”19 
 8.6 Qatar and the establishment of the Palestinian State  
As a result of the failure or the thwarting of all attempts to arrive at a political solution to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Palestinian issue in particular, and for other 
reasons, including Jordan’s decision to disengage from the West Bank, the eruption of the 
Intifada, and in response to the Palestinian aspirations, talks began on the possibility of 
declaring a Palestinian government in exile.
20
 The talks soon developed into an idea 
unilaterally to declare a Palestinian state.
21
 In his address on the occasion of Qatar’s 
Independence Day, the Emir of Qatar said “Qatar will support the declaration of a 
Palestinian state, if such a declaration was made.”22 
In a new breakthrough paving the way for a comprehensive peace process in the Middle 
East, the National Palestinian Council, through a majority vote during a meeting in 
Algeria, approved UN Security Council Resolution Number 242, and declared the 
                                               
19(Al Raya: 1-12-1987: 14,1) 
20 (Al Raya: 4-8-1988:1) 
21
(Al Raya: 9-8-1988:1) 
22(Al Raya: 3-9-1988:1) 
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establishment of an independent Palestinian state, a decision that represented a turning 
point in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
23
 
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat arrived in Doha with the Palestinian flag on his 
motorcade, signalling that he was the president of the State of Palestine. Arafat held talks 
with the Emir of Qatar over the Algeria resolutions. For his part, the Emir of Qatar 
reiterated Qatar’s immutable stance continuously to support the Palestinian people’s just 
struggle to restore their legitimate rights under the leadership of the PLO.
24
 The Emir 
officially welcomed the State of Palestine in his address to the Advisory Council on 28 
November.
25
Meanwhile, the PLO submitted Palestinian diplomatic passports to the US 
embassy in Tunisia, and requested the issuance of entry visas to the American territories to 
Palestinian diplomats who would attend the UN General Assembly meeting.
26
 
 A statement by the US Department of State announced that the US rejected the issuance 
of entry visas to Arafat and the accompanying delegation. Qatar criticized the American 
decision, and the Qatari foreign ministry expressed regret at the US decision and surprise 
over what it described as the negative stance that came in spite of the recent decisions 
adopted by the PLO, which confirmed that it would proceed along the path to peace. Qatar 
described the US decision as a violation of the treaty signed between the US and the UN 
in 1947, and expressed hopes that the US Department of State would reconsider the 
decision, which Qatar said it found unjustified and contradictory to any US efforts to 
prove the credibility and seriousness of its pursuit of a just and permanent solution to the 
Middle East conflict.
27
 In the end, the US did not yield to the Arab demands and the UN 
decided to move the session in which Arafat was to make his address to Geneva, where 
the Swiss government granted him an entry visa to Switzerland.
28
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However, in a surprising development, the US announced that it would start direct talks 
with the PLO, and appointed its ambassador in Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau, as its 
representative in these talks. Israeli minister without portfolio, Ezra Weizman, described 
the US decision as the beginning of a new era in the Middle East, and that the PLO, after 
having unequivocally recognized Israel, had become a probable partner in the Middle East 
peace talks.
29
 Qatar welcomed the US decision, and described it as a step along the right 
path and a major contribution in the acceleration of the holding of an international peace 
conference geared towards the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Qatari foreign 
ministry said Qatar hoped that the new US administration would one day exert more 
efforts to develop this stance in a manner proportionate to the gravity of the Middle East 
issue.
30
 The political path seemed to have finally witnessed tangible progress, paving the 
way for an international peace conference to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
For several reasons, the much anticipated breakthrough leading to the international peace 
conference never materialized, and the Qatari stance with respect to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict continued to reiterate that the comprehensive resolution of the conflict would only 
be through bilateral negotiations, whether direct negotiations between the concerned 
parties or through an international peace conference. Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Abdullah 
Bin Khalifa Al Attya, reiterated that “Qatar backs the Egyptian efforts to hold direct 
Palestinian-Israeli talks as a step towards a comprehensive solution to the conflict in a 
manner that achieves a just solution to the Palestinian cause.”31 Despite Qatar’s support of 
the two proposals, namely, the international peace conference and the holding of direct 
negotiations between the Palestinians on one side, and the US and Israel on the other, 
Qatar, at the same time, backed the Palestinian Intifada, which continued to rage for the 
second year at that time. This is what Qatar and Algeria reiterated in a joint statement 
released at the end of a visit by the Emir of Qatar to Algeria. In their joint statement, the 
two countries condemned “the oppressive and aggressive Israeli acts.”32 This indicated 
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Qatar’s clear desire that the Arab parties in general, and the Palestinians in particular, 
must use all means at their disposal in dealing with the conflict, namely the negotiations or 
the use of pressure. In line with the same Qatari approach in support of the holding of the 
international peace conference, Qatar, in its address before the 46th session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, called on the international community to “intensify efforts 
aimed at urgently holding an international peace conference attended by the five 
permanent UN Security Council member states and all the concerned parties, including the 
PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”33 
8.7 Post-war: In pursuit of the International Conference 
In a statement released on Sunday 9 March 1991, Qatar welcomed US statements 
confirming the US commitment to the exertion of efforts to solve the Middle East 
problems: 
The State of Qatar receives with great satisfaction the announcement of US 
President George Bush before congress last Wednesday to the effect that 
the US is committed to work towards a comprehensive and just settlement 
for all the Middle East problems and the Palestinian Cause in 
particular..President Bush’s address had many positive and constructive 
points, especially his call for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the 
basis of UN Security Council Resolutions No. 242, 338, the Land for Peace 
Principle and guaranteeing the safety of all the concerned parties, including 
Israel.
34
 
In a number of cables sent by the Emir of Qatar, Qatar called on the leaders of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, in addition to Canada and Germany, to 
work on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in the light of the new world order. The Emir 
of Qatar said that “the determination and resolve based on the principles of justice, which 
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 (Al Raya: 2-2-1990:1) 
34 (Al Raya: 10-3-1991:1) 
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were adopted by the coalition countries (in the Kuwait Liberation War, Desert Storm) in 
dealing with the Gulf crisis, was the key to achieving the goals of the international 
community.” The Emir of Qatar expressed hopes that the international efforts would 
achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.
35
 
In the meantime, the US and Israel concluded a preliminary agreement during the 
Regional Peace Conference for the Middle East, which was sponsored by the US and the 
Soviet Union. The Israeli Foreign Minister, David Levi, said that “Israel informed the US 
of its agreement on the holding of a regional peace conference”.36 In response to this 
statement, the Chairman of the Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate, Radwan Abu Ayash, 
said “The PLO does not object to an interim settlement that will eventually lead to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and the PLO will not reject a transitional self-rule 
period that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state.”37 Israel’s Defence Minister, 
Moshe Arens, however, stated that “Israel does not agree to the proposal to hold a regional 
peace conference”, adding that the “US proposal to hold a regional conference is 
progressively being transformed into a proposal to hold an international conference, which 
Israel rejects.”38 The same view was confirmed by the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak 
Shamir, who rejected the idea of holding a regional peace conference and retracted his 
earlier agreement with the US Secretary of State, which was to the effect that the 
conference should be a regional one consisting of a single session before turning into an 
international conference. Shamir said that “If subsequent sessions were held after the 
conference, then we will never enter into the stage of direct negotiations and if the 
conference turned into an international conference, then such conference must not 
authorize the (Palestinian) Authority to dictate any decisions.”39 
In this context, the Qatari stance was unchanged and supportive of holding an 
international peace conference: “The GCC states are willing to take part in the peace 
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conference if invited as an observer”, stated Qatar’s Foreign Minister,40 and this is what 
actually happened. The Emir of Qatar, Khalifa Bin Hamad, went on a Gulf tour that 
included Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, before being visited in Qatar by the UAE Crown 
Prince as the Palestinian issue took back stage, pushed back by the concerns with the 
security of the Arabian Gulf.
41
In the first political appearance for Hamad Bin Jassem, the 
Minister of Municipality and Agriculture, before the Islamic countries foreign ministers 
conference, Bin Jassem spoke of “Qatar’s insistence on the rights of the Palestinian 
people, led by the right of self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state 
with Jerusalem as its capital.” Bin Jassem also reiterated Qatar’s support of the Palestinian 
Intifada.
42
 At that time, and between the Madrid conference’s conception and the event 
itself, discussions took place and controversy ensued over a number of different issues, 
including the formation of the Palestinian delegation, the nature of the conference, the 
participants, and the venue and timing of the conference. Qatar was not involved in any of 
these issues, made no comments, did not side with any particular point of view, and only 
settled for the position of observer while waiting for the outcome of the intense public and 
often secret negotiations that dominated the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. 
8.8 The Madrid International Peace Conference  
When the negotiations on the outstanding issues related to the international conference 
were completed, US Secretary of State, James Baker, and his Soviet counterpart, Boris 
Pankin, announced in a joint press conference held in Jerusalem “the holding of the 
International Peace Conference in Madrid on 30 October 1991 and that US President 
George Bush and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev will send invitations to attend 
the conference to the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians.”43 
The official spokesperson for Qatar’s foreign ministry welcomed the US and the Soviet 
invitation to attend the conference, as well as the attendance of the US and Soviet 
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presidents: “Qatar expresses hope the conference will lead to the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and 338 on resolving the Palestinian issue and 
recognizing the Palestinians’ right of self-determination and ending of the Israeli 
occupation of the Arab territories”, said the spokesperson, who added, “Qatar views this 
conference as a starting point to solve the Middle East problems, particularly, the 
Palestinian issue.” The foreign ministry spokesman also called on the international 
community to support the conference and its anticipated outcomes, including the 
achievement of comprehensive peace, ending the Israeli occupation and the co-existence 
in peace of all the nations of the region.
44
 The Qatari cabinet expressed hopes in a 
statement that the conference “will succeed in finding solutions to the Middle East 
problems and ending the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of international legitimacy and 
the Land for Peace principle.”45 The Qatari cabinet also reiterated that any just and 
comprehensive peace had to be based on UN Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and 
338, ending the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, equality in rights and security for 
all the nations of the region, and recognizing the right of self-determination for the people 
of Palestine.
46
 
Against what was expected from the Madrid conference, and in an unexpected move, the 
Israeli Knesset passed a resolution ruling that the Golan Heights was Israeli land, whose 
status should be non-negotiable. In response to this proclamation, the Qatari foreign 
ministry spokesperson said that “It is regrettable that Israel is continuing with its 
expansionist policies while at the same time engaging in peace talks based on the principle 
of Land for Peace and UN Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and 338.” The 
spokesperson also described the Israeli decision as: 
a flagrant violation of UN resolutions, particularly Resolution No. 497, 
which holds as null and void Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. The 
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Israeli decision also represents a flagrant defiance of the peace conference 
and a provocation against the sentiments of all the parties taking part in the 
peace process.
47
 
In another act that negated the spirit and the objectives of the peace process, the Israeli 
government seized and confiscated the Islamic Court building in Jerusalem and all the 
documents kept therein. The Government of Qatar deplored the Israeli act, and a 
spokesperson for the Qatari foreign ministry expressed Qatar’s condemnation of the Israeli 
assault on Islamic sanctuaries, particularly at a time when the world was ushering in a 
comprehensive peace process focused on the determination of the future of Jerusalem and 
the other occupied territories: “The Israeli occupation authorities’ timing of this 
aggression is a clear indication that Israel is attempting to obliterate the facts and the 
historic evidence proving the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem”, said the 
spokesperson, who added that the Israeli authorities must return all the documents 
plundered from the Islamic Court building in Jerusalem and put an end to such 
practices.
48
Qatar once again renewed the call that Israel return the Islamic documents 
seized by the Israeli government from the Islamic Court in Jerusalem during the 
ministerial anti-crime meeting held in Paris, when the Qatari ambassador in Paris, Abdul 
Rahman Bin Hamad Al Attya, asked: 
How will it be possible for all the nations of the world to be optimistic over 
the possibility of achieving a just peace and a peaceful coexistence in the 
Middle East after the Madrid meeting when acts of plundering that violate 
the most basic human rights are still being committed?
49
 
In his address to the UN General Assembly meeting, Qatar’s envoy to the UN welcomed 
the peace conference and the launch of a comprehensive peace process in the Middle East. 
Abdulla Al Na’ema, speaking before the 46thround of the General Assembly, said that: 
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Qatar backed the peace negotiations out of its conviction with the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian cause and the State of Qatar reiterates its 
backing of the right of self-determination and the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state to be a welcoming home nation for the 
Palestinian people who, for a long time, have suffered from displacement 
and abuse…Peace will never be achieved in the region unless Israel 
withdraws from the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the 
return of all the rights unjustly taken away from the Palestinian 
people…The state of Qatar believes that unless the Palestinian issue is 
resolved, the situation in the Middle East will explode and the 
repercussions of such an explosion will be far reaching and will not only 
impact the Middle East.
50
 
Qatar also reiterated the same point of view during the Emir’s address on the occasion of 
the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, delivered before the 
committee concerned with the exercise by the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights. 
The Emir of Qatar stressed Qatar’s strong belief that resolving the Palestinian issue was 
the path to peace in the Middle East and if this was not resolved in a way that guaranteed 
the Palestinian people their legitimate rights, including the right of self-determination and 
the establishment of an independent state, then there would be no peace or security in the 
Middle East and the conflict, which threatened international peace and security, would 
continue. The Emir added that once a resolution to the Palestinian cause was reached and 
was satisfactory to the Palestinians, the Arab states would uphold and agree to whatever 
was satisfactory to the Palestinians. He added that if Israel wanted to live in peace, it must 
withdraw from the occupied Arab territories, not only from the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, but also from the Golan Heights, Sothern Lebanon, and Jerusalem. The Emir of 
Qatar also referred in his address to the documents plundered by Israel from the Islamic 
Court in Jerusalem, and accused Israel of resorting to acts of oppression with the aim of 
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derailing the peace process. At the same time, he expressed optimism at the success of the 
peace process, given the breakthrough in international relations that it promised to 
achieve. He said that “This breakthrough is a reason for hope that the efforts exerted along 
the path to peace shall finally succeed after the long wait for half a century, during which 
many lives were lost and many resources wasted.”51 
 
8.9 Multilateral negotiations  
Despite the conflict raging on the southern Lebanese front and Israel’s multiple shell 
attacks there on 11 January 1992, Qatar refrained from commenting on the escalation. 
However, Qatar accepted the invitation to attend the multilateral talks on regional 
cooperation, which were to be held in Moscow on 28-29 January 1992,
52
 which indicated 
Qatar’s implicit recognition of Israel. Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Mubarak Al Khater, did 
indeed arrive in Moscow for the talks.
53
 Qatar stressed that the multilateral talks could not 
be an alternative for bilateral talks, and at the same time, Syria refused to take part in this 
round, as it considered the talks as an early reward given to Israel before progressing in 
the negotiations on the political path. Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Mubarak Al Khater, said: 
Cooperation in the field of economic development, environmental 
protection, or the sharing of water resources cannot be achieved unless a 
tangible progress is made in bilateral talks towards the establishment of a 
comprehensive peace…Everything we will talk about in this round will 
become meaningless against the backdrop of the continued Israeli 
occupation and denying the Palestinian rights. 
He added that: 
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Peace is the basis for cooperation in all areas of life and Qatar’s acceptance 
of the invitation to take part in the negotiations was based on its 
fundamental stance calling for the resolution of international conflicts 
through peaceful means and Qatar’s wish to see an honourable and just end 
to the conflict that has beleaguered the Palestinian people and the Arab 
countries neighbouring Israel…We are advocates of a peace that is based 
on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the respect for the 
sovereignty and independence of nations, and justice, liberty, and equality. 
Whoever seeks peace must renounce any illegitimate greed and ambitions 
because there shall be no peace if there is injustice, persecution, and 
racism.
54
 
Following the conclusion of this round of the negotiations, five work groups were formed 
to discuss the key issues of the region. The first group was to discuss armament control; 
the second, economic development; the third, cooperation in the area of sharing water 
resources; the fourth, environmental issues; and the fifth, the issue of refugees. These 
work groups were to meet in Belgium, Canada, the US, and Japan.
55
 Qatar’s point of view 
with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process that started in Madrid was 
reiterated in the address of Qatar’s new Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, to the UN 
General Assembly. He said: 
The Palestinian issue is among the issues that are as old as the UN and it is 
an issue which remains unsolved. It is an issue to which my country 
ascribes great importance. Qatar looks forward to quick progress towards 
the resolution of this issue within the framework of the ongoing peace 
process. The Palestinian question and the unalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people represent the cornerstone of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
once a resolution for the Palestinian issue that is satisfactory to the 
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Palestinians is achieved, we will accept that solution. Moreover, if Israel 
wants to live in peace, it should withdraw from all the occupied Arab 
territories and not just from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but also 
from the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, and Southern Lebanon… The State of 
Qatar supports the peace efforts and expresses hopes that a just, 
comprehensive, and permanent solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the Palestinian issue can be reached based on UN Security Council 
Resolutions No. 242 and 338.
56
 
In his annual letter on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the 
Palestinian People, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, wrote that “The peace 
process, since its beginning in Madrid, has not made any progress due to Israeli rigidity”,57 
adding that “the Arab side has accepted the principle of the two states on the historic land 
of Palestine, and is also taking into consideration and reviewing the Israeli security 
concerns… The peace process cannot go on without achieving any progress.”58Qatar’s 
ambassador to the UN, Hassan Ali Al Na’ema, told the 47th General Assembly meeting 
that: 
The State of Qatar unconditionally and absolutely backs the brave Intifada 
of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian people’s continuous resistance 
against the Israeli occupation and its practices… I hope that the new US 
administration will take the appropriate measures for the success of the 
march for peace in the Middle East, for peace talks are not an objective per 
se but a means to establish comprehensive and permanent peace in the 
region, which is based on recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian 
people and the complete withdrawal from all the Arab territories, including 
Jerusalem…The State of Qatar reiterates the need to pressure Israel into 
performing its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention on the 
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protection of civilians during military conflicts… Qatar’s support of the 
peace negotiations in the Middle East stems from its support of the just 
Palestinian cause and Qatar’s constructive stance aimed at realizing the 
goal of the struggle of the Palestinian people, which is to establish an 
independent Palestinian state on its national soil.
59
 
 8.10 The Gaza-Jericho Agreement 
Despite the lengthy negotiation process that extended for ten rounds until the early 
summer of 1993, and despite the failure of the negotiations to produce any major 
breakthrough, the Qatari cabinet, during its meeting on 9 June 1993, welcomed the start of 
the tenth round of talks and reiterated Qatar’s fundamental keenness to create an 
atmosphere that was conducive for the continuation of these negotiations until positive 
outcomes that guaranteed the protection of the Arab legitimate rights were approved and 
the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in accordance with UN Security 
Council Resolutions No. 242 and 338 was achieved.
60
 
While the concerned parties were shuttling between Washington, Moscow, and the Middle 
East for the multilateral negotiations, and hopes for peace were growing increasingly thin 
without the achievement of any significant breakthrough, the Norwegian capital, Oslo, 
was the venue for twenty secret meetings between Israel and the PLO. In Oslo, the 
negotiations progressed rapidly and on a path that was different from the path taken by the 
public negotiations.
61
 The Oslo negotiations surprised the world with news of the 
imminent signing of what was to become known as the ‘Gaza-Jericho Agreement’, which 
coincided with the start of the eleventh round of bilateral talks and which was considered 
the first major achievement of the Madrid Conference.
62
 In the beginning of September, 
1993, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) made a visit to Doha, where he was received by 
Qatar’s Crown Prince, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa. Abu Mazen briefed Sheikh Hamad on 
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the latest developments in the Middle East peace talks, and Sheikh Hamad reiterated 
Qatar’s support of the Palestinian issue, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and 
sympathy with the daily suffering experienced by the Palestinians. The Crown Prince also 
reiterated the importance of recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in 
the light of US Security Council Resolutions No.242 and No. 383, as these two resolutions 
recognize the right to peace and security for all the people of the Middle East on the basis 
of the Land for Peace principle.
63
Qatar seemed cautious in announcing its stance with 
respect to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, settling for its previously announced stance to the 
effect that Qatar would accept whatever was accepted by the Palestinians.  
At the same time, the GCC Ministerial Council held a meeting in the Saudi capital, 
Riyadh. Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, returned to Doha after Abu Mazen 
concluded his visits to Qatar, and in comments on the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and in line 
with the closing statement of the GCC ministerial meeting, Bin Jassem said that the GCC 
countries welcomed the agreement on the grounds that the GCC countries backed any 
constructive efforts that served the interest of the Middle East peace process, guaranteed 
the legitimate Palestinian rights, and returned the occupied lands, including Jerusalem, to 
their rightful owners: “From this standpoint, the GCC council welcomes and supports any 
solution that is satisfactory to the Palestinians and which establishes a comprehensive and 
just peace in the region”, said Bin Jassem.64 In addition, in unequivocal comments as part 
of an interview with the MBC news network, the Qatari Foreign Minister reiterated that 
Qatar would eventually back all that the Palestinians opted for, particularly the choice that 
would eventually lead to a foothold from which the Palestinians would be able to form a 
Palestinian government able to recover all Palestinian rights. Bin Jassem added that this 
would be based on a number of Palestinian and Arab fundamental principles, including 
upholding the Arab identity of Jerusalem.
65
 In an official statement released at the weekly 
cabinet meeting, Qatar welcomed the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement: 
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The cabinet welcomes the Palestinian-Israeli agreement signed by the two 
sides in Washington on the thirteenth of this month as a first step towards a 
just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East that guarantees the 
legitimate national rights of the Palestinians in accordance with UN 
Security Council Resolutions No. 242 and 338, and paves the way for the 
return of all the occupied Arab territories, particularly Jerusalem.
66
 
A senior-level Qatari delegation was among 44 delegations to take part in the Middle East 
Peace Conference held in Washington, which aimed at giving economic support to the 
Palestinian self-rule authority. US officials said the conference was focused on providing 
adequate assistance to meet the needs of the Palestinians during the five-year transitional 
period, identifying urgent needs in the short run and creating a panel in charge of 
coordinating international aid. The delegates said they were confident they would raise 
US$ 400 million in annual assistance from the international community.
67
 Speaking before 
this conference, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Jassem Bin Hamad said that: 
It is important to make clear that for Qatar, the concept of peace represents 
the peace that advocates the creation of trust between the concerned parties 
and whose most prominent outcomes must be the equality among all 
nations in rights and obligations, and I am not talking about financial 
capabilities, but humanitarian initiatives. Therefore, we hope this first step 
towards peace will be a start to establish a comprehensive and complete 
peace for all the parties of the conflict. I am now certain that all our nations 
now understand the meaning of peace, which is based on economic and 
political development… On this occasion, I have the pleasure to announce 
that Qatar will contribute directly in supporting the activities of this 
conference and we will later announce what our contribution will be.
68
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8.11 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the first part of the central research question, namely, what was 
Qatar’s foreign policy with respect to the Middle East peace process, and to what extent 
was it convergent with, or divergent from, the rest of the GCC’s Middle East foreign 
policy? The chapter was divided into a number of subsections related to the Qatari stances 
with respect to the issues and subjects that constitute the peace process, both during the 
initial stage preceding the direct negotiations between the US and the PLO, and the Qatari 
role to encourage the US to engage in direct negotiations with the Palestinians, and the 
Palestinian Intifada phase, which Qatar viewed as a legitimate struggle against the Israeli 
occupation. The discussion included Qatar’s role and vision with regard to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state.  
The analysis of the historical data revealed that Qatari policy aimed to defend Arab rights 
and to exert pressure on Israel through condemnation of Israel’s policies related to the 
issues of settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian rights, and the other occupied territories. In 
addition, Qatar showed its strong support of the Middle East peace process after the 
Madrid Conference, when Qatar hosted the Arms Control Regional Conference, which 
was an offshoot of the Madrid Conference. In an unprecedented move, Qatar also received 
the Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, in Doha.  
The chapter has demonstrated that when the Gaza First Accord was announced, Qatar 
seemed cautious to declare a clear stance with regard to the accord. This caution continued 
until Qatar’s Foreign Minister returned to Doha after the GCC ministerial meeting held in 
Riyadh, to declare that Qatar supported any party working towards the establishment of 
peace in the Middle East. Qatar also reiterated its previous stance that it would accept any 
settlement that the Palestinians themselves accepted.  
In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to analyse the Qatari position with respect to 
several initiatives that aimed to revive the Middle East peace process, and to examine how 
Qatar began to push for new foreign policy objectives, such as the promotion of 
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democracy in the Middle East, and the inter-Gulf conflicts stemming from this stance with 
other GCC states.  
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                                    CHAPTER NINE  
The Emergence of a Distinctive and Divergent Qatari Foreign 
Policy towards the Middle East Peace Process 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East and 
how Qatar contributed to the process at different levels; first, in encouraging the US to 
recognize the PLO; second, in asking the US to establish direct negotiations with the PLO; 
third, in helping to prepare the environment to hold the Madrid Conference; and finally, 
how Qatar worked to support its outcomes and supported the US efforts in the peace 
process. The chapter aims to engage with Qatar’s repeated attempts to normalize trade and 
political ties with Israel, despite the fact that this decision was in deep conflict with 
principles upheld by GCC states regarding relations with Israel. 
This chapter has several goals. The first is to explore Qatar’s foreign policy towards the 
Middle East peace process, of which the normalization of Qatari-Israeli ties is considered 
a key component. This normalization reveals Qatar’s desire and expectations regarding its 
Middle East role, as well as US pressures on Qatar and how such pressures contributed in 
shaping the Qatari political stance that placed Qatar at a confrontational trajectory with 
other Arab states. The chapter also examines the Qatari non-governmental pressure 
exerted on the Israeli government as a form of political manoeuver to evict the Israeli 
trade representation office from its Doha headquarters.  
The timeframe of this chapter covers the years between 1993 and 1999, during which 
several issues arose in the context of Arab-Israeli relations, and other issues emerged after 
the Madrid Conference until the Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference was 
held in Doha.  
211 
 
The data analysis presented in this chapter is based on three types of documents, namely, 
the statements and addresses made by Qatari officials and Qatari institutions concerned 
with the subject of the research, such as the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Qatari Council of Ministers. These official statements were extracted from a Qatari 
newspaper that is regarded as semi-official and extensively covers Qatar’s stance, and 
officials’ statements with regard to the peace process and Qatari foreign policy towards it. 
There were also the statements of Qatar’s Foreign Minister or Qatari diplomats, made 
before the UN General Assembly or the UN Security Council. Finally, there were the 
documents containing statements made by the Prince of Qatar on different occasions.  
9.2 The Qatari initiative to normalize ties with Israel  
In  an unprecedented step for Qatar, and in what seemed to be a proactive Qatari initiative 
in line with its vision on building trust among the parties of the conflict, Qatar’s Foreign 
Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, met with his Israeli counterpart, Shimon Peres, on the 
sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting. Bin Jassem told reporters that the meeting 
tackled the means to encourage a path towards peace, particularly along the Syrian and 
Lebanese path, adding that the meeting was in the interests of Middle East peace efforts. 
In response to questions on the pan-Arab boycott of Israel, Bin Jassem said the boycott 
was a unanimous pan-Arab decision that could be lifted via a pan-Arab decision when the 
grounds for it no longer existed, and that if comprehensive peace was achieved in the 
Middle East, then all these issues would be subject to reconsideration and review. On the 
other hand, Bin Jassem also voiced support for the Palestinian-Israeli agreement and 
questioned the viability of any alternative in the absence of this agreement. In addition, 
Bin Jassem denied any visit by an Israeli official to Doha.
1
 However, the door opened for 
these visits, as well as for other secret and public meetings in the months to come.  
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9.3 The Natural Gas Agreement  
Among the Madrid Conference agreements was a specific mechanism to discuss regional 
issues during the multilateral talks. The Qatari capital Doha hosted the fifth conference for 
the armament control and regional security working group, which was attended by 43 
states, including Israel and Palestine. This was the first public appearance of an Israeli 
delegation in Doha, and in his address to the conference, Qatar’s Foreign Minister 
reiterated the Qatari stance by saying that: 
…any step in the area of the normalization of ties or regional cooperation 
cannot be achieved in the absence of a complete breakthrough in the 
bilateral talks on all paths…Peace is the strategic objective of all the 
region’s nations…There are concerns that the door for the peace which we 
all look forward to may close if no quick and tangible progress is made in 
the negotiations and along all negotiations paths… The task of this working 
group is to proceed along two parallel paths; the first has to do with arms 
control and the second with trust building.
2
 
After the conclusion of the conference, the Qatari Foreign Minister stated that:  
The Israeli delegation’s visit to Doha does not mean the normalization of 
ties between Qatar and Israel, as this meeting was scheduled at the Madrid 
Conference and Qatar participated in that conference and agreed to take 
part in the march for peace and the building of trust… Qatar’s cooperation 
with Israel in relation to the export of liquefied natural gas primarily 
depends on achieving material progress in the peace process along all its 
paths. 
According to the Al Raya newspaper, a statement made by the Qatari Foreign Minister 
also denied the conclusion of any agreement with Israel with respect to this issue and also 
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denied any agreements to hold meetings with Israel’s Shimon Peres in the upcoming 
stage.
3
 
After Hamad Bin Jassem concluded a visit to Cairo, during a press conference there he 
responded to a question on the nature of relations between Qatar and Israel by denying the 
existence of any political or economic ties: “There are only some delegations between the 
two sides, nothing more.”4 Speaking at the prevailing stage of the peace process during an 
interview with Qatari television, Bin Jassem said that:  
Qatar backs the Peace for Land principle because Qatar believes in peace. 
The will of the Arab countries that have common borders with Israel, who 
occupies parts of their land or has regional claims thereon, is sufficient to 
guarantee that these countries will recover their rights and free their 
occupied lands…Qatar went to the Madrid Conference to provide backing 
for the Arab negotiator… The Qatari concept of the peace process along 
the Palestinian path is the return of the Arab lands occupied in 1967, 
including Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian State.
5
 
In response to a question on reported Qatari plans to make the Israeli port of Eilat a transit 
point for Qatari natural gas exports, Qatar’s Foreign Minister denied these reports, and 
said:  
Israel offered to purchase Qatar’s natural gas and we responded by telling 
them “You are trying to drive a wedge between Qatar and Egypt because 
Egypt is geographically closer to you”. The Israelis’ response was that they 
cannot accept having only one source of energy according to the Israeli 
national security perspective. And I told them that progress must be made 
in the Syrian and Lebanese tracks in order, as for us, to be able to talk 
about this cooperation… and that Qatar has not, so far, made a decision on 
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the opening of an office to coordinate the relations between the two 
countries or with respect to the export of natural gas and this is for one 
reason, namely that Syria and Lebanon has not still made peace with Israel 
and we will take such a decision at the appropriate time. 
Bin Jassem also stated that “Qatar asked an American consultancy company and not an 
Israeli company to study the natural gas pipeline project”, adding that the meetings with 
Israeli officials only aimed at acquiring knowledge of the adversary and the thought 
process thereof.
6
 
This came as the Reuters news agency carried reports to the effect that progress had been 
made in the talks to export Qatar’s liquefied natural gas between Qatar and the US 
company Enron, which promised to export 5 million tons of natural gas annually, half of 
which would be exported to India.
7
 The news report, however, did not mention where the 
other half of the deal would go. At the same time, Israel announced that it would 
confiscate 530 dunams
8
of Arab land in Jerusalem.
9
 The spokesman for the Qatari foreign 
ministry said that “Qatar was watching these reports with concern and considers these acts 
a stark violation of international conventions.” The spokesman reiterated that “Qatar 
views Jerusalem as part of the Arab occupied territories and that the confiscation decision 
will cast negative shadows on the peace process.” 10 
On the other hand, the Qatari cabinet reiterated Qatar’s fundamental stance with respect to 
the confiscation of Arab territories in Jerusalem, and expressed its strong indignation over 
the Israeli actions, which the cabinet described as a grave violation of international treaties 
and conventions.
11
Taking advantage of US support and protection, Israel confiscated 120 
more hectares of Arab land in Eastern Jerusalem;
12
 at the same time, the US threatened to 
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veto any international resolutions or declaration if the issue of the confiscation of the lands 
in Eastern Jerusalem was discussed in the UN Security Council.
13
During the address 
delivered by Qatar’s Ambassador to the UN Security Council, Hassan Ali Al Ne’ama , the 
State of Qatar called on the UN to: 
…adopt a resolution that is binding to Israel to return all the confiscated 
Arab lands in Jerusalem, to put an end to Israel’s settlement activities there, 
dismantle all the Israeli settlements in Jerusalem, end the closure of the 
city, and to stop all the excavation activities that threaten the foundations of 
the Al Aqsa Mosque.
14
 
Qatar also demanded that the UN Security Council unequivocally declare that it did not 
recognize any amendments caused by Israel in its capacity as an occupying authority and 
that impacted the legal status, the demographic makeup, or the geography of Jerusalem, 
and it also demanded that Qatar refuse the ratification of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, 
which is a material violation of the ground rules of international law.
15
 
The US did use the right of veto to derail a resolution calling on Israel to stop the 
confiscation of lands and return the land it had already confiscated. At the same time, 
Doha hosted a forum organized by the Qatar Chamber of Commerce in cooperation with 
the US Council on Foreign Relations on the future relations between the Gulf states and 
the US.
16
 As a result of pressures related to the Israeli political system, and threats by 
Israeli political parties dominated by Arabs of a vote of no confidence against the 
government of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and perhaps as a result of 
unannounced and unseen US pressures, the Rabin government decided to freeze 
previously approved plans for the confiscation of more land.
17
 This direct interpretation 
does not explain the reality of the Israeli decision to retract its decision to confiscate more 
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land because threats by Arab-dominated political parties in the Israeli Knesset for a vote 
of no confidence in the government were repeated on other occasions. However, this did 
not produce the same outcome as the confiscated land had on the Israeli Government.  
With the rise of Hamad Bin Khalifa to the helm of power in Qatar to succeed his father 
Sheikh Khalifa in June 1995, the pace of mutual understanding and cooperation between 
Israel and Qatar began to accelerate, and in November 1995, and on the side-lines of the 
Amman Economic Conference, the US company Enron signed an agreement with Israel to 
supply the latter with liquefied natural gas from Qatar for US$ 2 billion annually.
18
 
Meanwhile, bilateral Qatari-Israeli relations began to take shape, and by the end of 1995, 
Israel’s Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, visited Qatar to sign the agreement to transport 
the Qatari liquefied natural gas from Qatar to Israel. Peres said, “The political process 
with Qatar has started; we took a small step forward and I believe we have just begun on 
the path towards a new relationship. I feel very optimistic in this regard.”19Peres, for his 
part, responding to questions from reporters on the reported discord between the Gulf 
countries over economic and political ties with Israel. Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad 
Bin Jassem, said, “I don’t believe there is any discord but rather differences in points of 
view held by each country on how to deal with this issue, and this is a healthy aspect.”20 
After the signing in Amman of the agreement to export the liquefied natural gas to Israel, 
Qatar’s Foreign Minister reiterated the same principles during his address before the UN 
General Assembly’s 50th round in December, which was after the conclusion of the 
natural gas agreement. During discussions about Article 42 of the meeting’s agenda, 
pertaining to the Palestinian issue, Qatar’s Foreign Minister stressed the importance of 
Jerusalem in any proposed settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, given the revered status 
of this city to Muslims and non-Muslims, and said:  
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Qatar is taking part in the peace efforts out of its commitment to the 
principles of international legitimacy and its fundamental support of law 
and justice… The achievements made in the peace talks are still surrounded 
by peril and threats as the issues on the agenda of the final negotiations are 
numerous and complex.
21
 
This final part of Hassan Ne’ama’s address is an indication that the Qatari foreign ministry 
was aware that the peace process did actually take off, but that it certainly had not risen to 
meet Qatari expectations in particular, and Arab expectations in general. So, if the peace 
process did not meet Qatari expectations, then why did Qatar sign a trade agreement with 
Israel, even if it was an indirect agreement that was signed by an intermediary? The 
signing of this agreement clearly contradicts the statements made earlier the previous year 
by the Qatari Foreign Minister, when he stated that “Any step in the direction of the 
normalization of ties or regional development cannot be achieved in the absence of a 
complete breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations on all paths.”22 
Moreover, the Syrian path was experiencing genuine and tough challenges, and the Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreement was also being met with difficulties in the actual 
implementation on the ground. So could the Qatari step be considered as an attempt to 
build bridges of trust with Israel? The answer is not clear and Qatar did not give any 
justification for this stance. Prior to the signing of the gas accord with Enron, the Emir of 
Qatar said that: 
Qatar supports the peace process in the Middle East…The region badly 
needs the establishment of a comprehensive and just peace that serves the 
interests of all parties…There are a number of proposals to discuss the 
project to transport Qatari natural gas to Jordan and Israel, and Qatar 
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doesn’t object to supplying Israel with natural gas after the conclusion of 
the peace process.
23
 
Meanwhile, Palestinian Minister of Culture and Media, Yasser Abdrabu, hailed Qatar’s 
support of the Palestinian Authority during his visit to Qatar and called on Qatar to take 
part in monitoring the Palestinian elections as part of the international supervision of these 
elections.
24
 
When the US congress adopted a resolution to transfer the US embassy to occupied 
Jerusalem,
25
 the Qatari cabinet denounced the decision describing it as: 
…a negative decision that will seriously damage the peace process and that 
constitutes a contradiction with international legitimacy, and in particular 
the UN Security Council Resolutions related to the status of Jerusalem. The 
Qatari cabinet calls on the US administration to maintain an impartial 
stance as dictated by its status as an effective partner in the peace process.
26
 
On the sidelines of the Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference, Qatar’s 
Minister for Industry and Energy met with Israel’s Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres.27In a 
press conference with the Qatari Foreign Minister, after the conclusion of the Israeli-
Qatari meeting, and in response to a question about feelings of unease on the Palestinian 
side with respect to this meeting, and that it presented Israel with an award that it did not 
deserve, Qatar’s top diplomat said: 
We in Qatar do not need permissions to hold meetings with any given 
party, and we are not trying to harm anyone or compete with anyone. We 
are not a direct party in the conflict but we are a party in the peaceful 
solution, whether on the Palestinian or the Syrian path, and there is no one 
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telling us who we should or shouldn’t meet, and this is clear from our 
practices for many years now.
28
 
In response to a question on a possible meeting between the Emir of Qatar and the Israeli 
Prime Minister, Qatar’s Foreign Minister said, “This is up to Qatar to decide.”29 
During February 1996, Hamas carried out three suicide attacks in Jerusalem and 
Ashkelon, killing scores in Israel. The official spokesperson for the Qatari foreign 
ministry said: 
The State of Qatar follows with great concern the recent deadly 
developments in Jerusalem and Ashkelon, and expresses regret for these 
acts and condemns them… Violence will only lead to counter violence and 
will derail the peace process…The State of Qatar condemns terrorism of all 
forms and from all sides.
30
 
Following the deterioration resulting from the actions by Hamas to derail the peace 
process, the US, Egypt, and the EU called for a conference essentially aimed at curbing 
the extremist armed resistance groups in Palestine and in the other states engaged in the 
peace process. This conference was dubbed the “Peacemakers Summit”, and was held in 
the Egyptian Red Sea resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh. Qatar confirmed that it would send a 
senior-level delegation to take part in this conference, headed by Qatar’s Prime Minister, 
Interior Minister, and Foreign Minister.
31
The delegation was not headed by the Emir of 
Qatar, despite the fact that nearly thirty world leaders attended the summit. Instead, the 
Emir of Qatar opted to stay in Doha to chair a meeting of the cabinet.
32
 This signalled the 
beginning of turmoil in relations between Cairo and Doha. In his address at the 
Peacemakers Summit, Qatar’s Prime Minister reiterated Qatar’s fundamental stance with 
respect to the peace process, while condemning the recent acts of terrorism: 
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Qatar condemns terrorism of all forms and from all sides regardless of the 
identity of its perpetrators, because terrorism is the same everywhere and 
the perpetrators deserve the same punishment. Our countries must unite in 
condemning these acts of terrorism, regardless of whether these acts were 
perpetrated by states, organizations, or individuals, because violence will 
only breed counter violence and will lead the region into an endless vicious 
cycle of violence that will derail the peace process.
33
 
In a move seen as an attempt by Qatar to give Israel something to encourage it to continue 
with the peace process following the devastating terrorist attacks, Doha extended an open 
invitation to Israel’s Prime Minister to visit Doha.34 This was exactly the explanation 
given by the Qatari Foreign Minister about this invitation one day after the conclusion of 
the summit, when he said “Our contacts with Israel aim at encouraging it to move forward 
with the peace process.”35 
In response to a question on whether or not Qatar would support a military strike against 
Hamas, Qatar’s Foreign Minister said:  
Qatar supports striking against terrorism anywhere and without any 
reservation, because many parties are involved in these acts of terror and 
not just Hamas, and at the same time not all the Hamas factions are 
terrorists. We simply reject and condemn terrorism in general.  
In response to another question about whether Qatar was carrying out a manoeuver to 
bolster its relations with Israel for the purpose of obtaining more concessions on the 
Palestinian issue, the Qatari Foreign Minister said that Qatar was sending a message to the 
Israeli people that if the peace process succeeded, and if rights were returned to all the 
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nations of the region, then there would be no problem in having cooperation between the 
nations.
36
 
9.4 The visit by Shimon Peres in the Gulf: The practical normalization of ties  
As the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations hit a blind alley, the Sultanate of Oman welcomed 
Shimon Peres, whose second leg of his Gulf tour took him to Doha in the first visit by an 
Israeli Prime Minister to Qatar. Peres were officially received in Doha, and conducted 
talks with the Emir of Qatar. Peres described the talks as “…very friendly…The door was 
opened to commercial trade…The economic aspect of Arab-Israeli relations is much more 
important than the political aspect.”37 Peres said the two countries concluded an agreement 
to avoid double taxation and the carrying out of joint research on desert regions and water 
usage.
38
 During a reception at Doha Palace, the two sides agreed to open commercial 
offices in their respective countries, and Israel’s Foreign Ministry undersecretary said that 
the agreement granted certain privileges and diplomatic immunities to officials from both 
sides.
39
 For his part, the Emir of Qatar Hamad Bin Khalifa described the visit by saying it 
was: 
…in line with the framework to bolster trust between the different parties 
in the Middle East to achieve a just and permanent peace…Permanent 
peace is the peace based on justice and comprehensive solutions on all 
paths, particularly the Syrian and Lebanese path, in line with the outcomes 
of the Madrid Conference and the UN Security Council Resolutions 
No.242 and 338, the Land for Peace principle, and the withdrawal from 
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Sothern Lebanon.
40
 
High hopes for peace vanished, however, as a result of the stalemate on the Syrian path 
and the Israeli offensive against Lebanon on 12 April 1995, which was aimed at the 
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disarmament of Hezbollah. Qatar condemned the Israeli attacks on Lebanon, and the 
spokesman for the Qatari Foreign Ministry reiterated the Qatari position by saying that:  
The State of Qatar views these assaults as a serious violation against the 
sovereignty, security, and stability of Lebanon, an obstacle to the peace 
process, an escalation of tensions and a threat to international peace and 
security… The State of Qatar calls on Israel to immediately abandon the 
policy of violence, which will only lead to counter violence and hindering 
the peace process.
41
 
The same stance was adopted by the Qatari cabinet, which called on Israel to withdraw 
from all occupied Arab territories and to respect UN Security Council Resolution No.425, 
which required Israel to withdraw from Southern Lebanon.
42
 As a practical response, 
Qatar, on the orders of the Emir, sent urgent humanitarian aid, including medical supplies, 
to Lebanon.
43
 During this round of Israeli hostilities, Israel bombarded the UN shelter in 
the town of Qana on 18 April, killing 97 people.
44
 Qatar’s ambassador to the UN called on 
the international community to condemn the Israeli assault, and demanded that Israel 
immediately withdraw from Southern Lebanon and respect the sovereignty and security of 
its territories, while criticizing the UN Security Council for failing to play its role in 
preserving the peace and security of a member nation.
45
 Following the signing of the 
ceasefire agreement by Israel and Lebanon, Qatar’s Minister of Justice visited Jerusalem, 
in the first visit of its kind by a Qatari official. Faisal Al Hussaini, the Palestinian 
Authority official in charge of the Jerusalem portfolio, said that the Qatari Minister of 
Justice’s visit to Jerusalem would thwart the Israeli attempts to distance Qatar from the 
Palestinian issue.
46
 In addition, in his address before the annual conference for the Jewish-
American Committee, Qatar’s Foreign Minister reiterated the importance of continuing 
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the march towards peace despite the obstacles, adding that dialogue was the best tool to 
resolve problems because wars lead to no achievements. He said that: 
Qatar hosted an arms control conference and received Israel’s Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres. Qatar also decided to open trade offices with 
Israel…All these steps were taken in support of the peace process. Qatar 
decided not to establish ties with Israel under the cover of another state and 
Qatar opened direct telephone lines with Israel last year. What Qatar has 
done must be considered a model for the relations between Arab states and 
Israel. The Israelis have the right to know what will they get in exchange 
for returning the Arab occupied lands…By the end of this year, Qatar will 
sign a final agreement to supply Israel with natural gas, which will be 
based on the agreement initialled by the two countries during the Amman 
Summit last year.
47
 
In addition to the doors being opened for these visits, other secret and public meetings 
would also be taking place in the coming months.  
9.5 Israeli election, peace process, and the stalling of Qatari-Israeli normalization  
When the Israeli general election took place, Shimon Peres competed against Benjamin 
Netanyahu. Netanyahu adopted a tougher stance towards the main negotiation issues, and 
as the US was not satisfied with his position, it therefore supported the candidate that 
Washington saw as moderate. Despite this fact, Netanyahu narrowly defeated Peres.  
The change in the Israeli Prime Minister was accompanied by a similar change within the 
Arabs, and the Arab states called for an Arab summit in Cairo, the twenty-first in the 
history of the Arab summits on the level of the heads of states, to consider the 
consequences of Netanyahu’s election as the Israeli Prime Minister. The Deputy Prime 
Minister of Qatar, the Minister of the Interior, flew to Cairo in order to represent the Emir 
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of Qatar at the Summit.
48
 This was the second indication that the relationship between the 
two countries was getting worse.  
The summit was held, and Qatar adopted a conservative stand against Israel due to 
Netanyahu’s political discourse in his electoral campaign. Such a stand was expressed in 
the final statement of the summit, which included four major points on the peace process. 
The first point was that Arabs adhere to peace as a strategic option; second, there was the 
seriousness of any deviation from the principles of the peace process, and the principle of 
land for peace in particular; third was the rejection of settlement activity and non-
recognition of its results; fourth was adhering to resolving the issue of Jerusalem and the 
refugees according to international legitimacy principles and the UN resolutions.
49
 
After the summit, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs stated: 
Qatar is currently considering the trends of the existing Israeli Government 
and the extent of its abiding by the peace process. Upon the results, we, in 
coordination and consultation with the Arab states, especially those 
engaged in the peace process, will take the appropriate decisions towards 
Israel. Netanyahu’s statements in the electoral campaign are discouraging 
and frustrating, and I ask him to reconsider them and to abide by the 
agreements and treaties signed by Israel. Qatar did not conclude a direct 
contract with the Israeli Government for supplying gas but it concluded a 
contract with a US company, and it is entitled to supply to any country. 
This company concluded a contract with Jordan and Israel.
50
 
The same fact was stressed by the Minister of Industry and Energy, Abdullah bin Hamad 
al-Attiyah, who stated:  
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Qatar did not conclude a direct agreement with Israel for gas supply. The 
agreement was concluded between Qatar and the US Company, Enron. By 
virtue of such an agreement, Enron is entitled to purchase five million 
tonnes of liquefied natural gas to whoever it is entitled to supply.
51
 
In the same vein, the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that: 
The government of Qatar may have to reconsider its relations with Israel if 
the peace process falters. We are monitoring the actions taken by 
Netanyahu’s government, and as for the Israeli commercial office in Doha, 
some Israeli elements are in Doha now to arrange opening of the office, but 
we have no elements in Israel and under the current circumstances, we may 
not open a commercial office for Qatar in Israel.
52
 
It seems that Qatar had to postpone opening its commercial office in Israel for various 
reasons. After Qatar had taken the decision not to open the commercial office, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs announced the decision on 23 September. Hamad bin Jassem 
stated that the relations between the two countries had experienced apathy since 
Netanyahu came into power as Prime Minister.
53
 
Within such a tense situation, Israel started digging on the Temple Mount, which caused 
violence in the occupied territories. Foreign Minister Qatar Hamad bin Jassem blamed 
Israel, and stated that it bore the responsibility for escalation and violent actions that had 
erupted in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Jassem further called upon Israel to abide by the 
resolutions reached. The spokesperson of the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 
“Qatar calls upon all countries to denounce the Israeli actions and to put an end to such 
irresponsible actions, which would harm the Islamic monuments and lead the region back 
to tension.”54 
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As a reaction to the Israeli practices, Qatar cancelled a meeting that Israel had called for 
between the Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy and the Qatari Foreign Minister, due to 
the deterioration of conditions.
55
 Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem further stressed that: 
Relations with Israel have completely halted since Netanyahu came into 
power. We will not develop such relations. I did not meet any officer 
representing an Israeli company or any government official, but I have met 
the Jewish associations and discussed the present situation. I hope the 
peace talks will not be threatened, and I further hope that Netanyahu 
reconsiders his stance as I see that the region has no option but to go for 
peace, and normalization with Israel is on hold at the present time.
56
 
It was clear that Qatar dealt gingerly with the Netanyahu government, and it seems that 
they were concerned about the policy. However, Qatar later insisted on holding the 
Economic Cooperation Conference in the Middle East and invited Israel to the conference. 
9.6 MENA Economic Cooperation Summit - Doha  
After the MENA Economic Cooperation Summits that were held in Morocco and Amman 
in Jordan respectively, and within the deteriorating conditions after Netanyahu became the 
Israeli Prime Minister, Cairo hosted the third summit. The difficulties with the peace 
process overshadowed the summit, whose goals include integrating Israel in the region’s 
economic cooperation. During the summit, the Qatari Foreign Minister announced that: 
Qatar has halted normalization with Israel and the Israeli Foreign Minister 
David Levy has been informed of this decision. Normalization will remain 
halted until Israel goes for a positive move towards the peace process in 
general and the Palestinian issue in particular.
57
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Shortly after that , Israel participated in the Milipol Qatar 96 Conference for Security, and 
the Qatari Foreign Minister clarified that Israel had participated in the conference because 
it had been arranged a year before, and the invitations had been sent to the countries a long 
time ago. Therefore, Israel participated in the conference like any other country, just as it 
participated in the Cairo summit.
58
 Then, the Minister stressed that “Qatar's stance towards 
Netanyahu’s government would not change, and Qatar’s support for the Palestinians 
would not stop.”59 After that, the Minister of Industry and Energy stated that “The next 
summit will be held in Doha.”60 This was another reason behind the tension between Qatar 
and some Arab states, such as Egypt and the KSA, and the United Arab Emirates to a 
lesser extent. After that, the Qatari Foreign Minister headed to Gaza in order to meet 
Yasser Arafat with reference to the continuance of Qatari political and economic support 
for the Palestinians. During the visit, it was evident that Qatar was ready to oppose the 
actions of Netanyahu’s government at all costs. Qatar’s Foreign Minister stated that if a 
cancellation of the gas agreement was in the interest of the Palestinians, Qatar would 
cancel such an agreement.
61
 
At the same time, Netanyahu’s government was expanding the Emmanuel Settlement in 
the occupied West Bank, in a challenge to the US objections in this regard. The Israeli 
Government’s spokesperson, David Bar-Ilan, stated, “I am sure the Americans will 
understand that expansion is meant to meet the normal growth of population in the 
settlement, and they should not object to such expansion.”62 In his statement to Qatari 
television, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, stated, “I rule out the possibility 
of severing relations with Israel, except if developments would give us a way to take a 
decision of severing such relations.”63 At the same time, the Sultanate of Oman informed 
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the League of Arab States that it had cut all means of communication with Israel after the 
faltering of the peace process.
64
 
The Qatari position remained steady regarding freezing normalization with Israel under 
Netanyahu’s government. Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem stated: 
In response to the practices of Netanyahu’s government, Qatar’s 
government stance is clear, which is: as long as the Israeli Government 
adopts a position that does not result in progress in the peace process, Qatar 
will halt its activity in this field, but it will not retreat in its undertakings 
unless the Israelis do so.
65
 
Netanyahu’s government continued its practices of expansion in HarHoma in the occupied 
territories. The Israeli practices were discussed in the UN Security Council, where Qatar’s 
representative in the Council, Mr Al–khalifa, stated, “The Israeli practices will waste the 
efforts exerted, and it is a serious breach of the UN Security Council resolutions and Oslo 
Accord.” He further stated that “Qatar calls upon the international community and patrons 
of the peace process to bear their responsibility in ensuring that Israel complies with its 
commitments.”66 The US voted against a resolution condemning Israel, which made 
Qatar’s representative state that the UN Security Council had become a tool of the US 
dictatorship, as it solely objected to the draft resolution supported by Sweden, Britain, 
France, and Portugal.
67
 He further stated that, “The US stance and using the veto right 
shall be deemed as US support for such practices. This jeopardizes the whole peace 
process.”68 
On the sidelines of the Qatar Gas Conference, the International Relations Officer 
for Enron, Kelly Kimberley, commented regarding the Gas Agreement signed between 
Enron and Qatar’s government, saying that Israel was not among the clients negotiating 
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the purchase of the gas deal.
69
After Israel insisted on continuing with expansion practices 
in Eastern Jerusalem, Qatar challenged Israel, as the Emir of Qatar had sponsored the 
Jerusalem Conference in Doha, which was inaugurated by the Qatari Foreign Minister. On 
the other hand, during the Islamic Summit Conference in Islamabad, Qatari Crown Prince 
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem, called for the adoption of a unified Islamic policy to confront 
the Israeli settlement expansion in Eastern Jerusalem.
70
 After the conclusion of the 
Ministerial Meeting of the GCC states, the Qatari Foreign Minister stated: 
Qatar will not hesitate to execute any Arab or GCC resolution that would 
benefit the Palestinian or Syrian issues. If the Israeli Government remains 
intransigent, we will immediately take whatever action is in the interest of 
our brothers in Palestine and Syria.
71
 
In his statement before the UN General Assembly, Qatar’s permanent representative stated 
“Israel’s settlement policy represents a flagrant breach of the fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949 on the Protection of Civilians and their Properties during Wartime and the Hague 
Convention of 1907.”72 
Qatar held the Israeli Government responsible for the obstacles with the peace process in 
the Middle East region, due to the intransigent policies it adopted, leading to a retreat from 
the principles agreed in the process since the Madrid Conference. Israel further ignored the 
agreements reached between the Israeli Government and its Arab neighbours. In Qatar’s 
statement before the UN General Assembly, the Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Jassem, stated that “The desired peace in the region is still a mirage.”73 He further called 
upon Israel to abide by the treaties signed thereby, and to undertake its commitments. In 
addition, he called upon the international community to alleviate the pain suffered by the 
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Palestinian people under occupation due to the daily cleansing practices exercised by the 
Israeli forces.
74
 
In the same month, while battles were occurring in Jerusalem, Qatar’s government invited 
the countries concerned with the peace process to attend the MENA Economic 
Cooperation Summit, and Israel was among those countries who officially accepted the 
invitation.
75
 The Qatari Cabinet met on Wednesday 10 April, discussed the situation in 
Hebron, and denounced and condemned the actions of the Israeli settlers that had led to 
the murder of three Palestinians.
76
 
As a result of the Israeli decision to build a new settlement,“HarHoma”, in one of the Arab 
areas of occupied Jerusalem, the UN General Assembly discussed the situation and 
condemned the Israeli decision and all illegal Israeli measures taken in all Arab occupied 
territories through a resolution passed by the General Assembly at the end of its special 
session. This resolution called upon Israel to accept the practice of the Geneva Convention 
of 1949 on the Protection of Civilians during Wartime in all occupied territories since 
1967, and to comply with the Security Council resolutions according to the UN Charter.  
Qatar, which headed the Arab Group in the United Nations, asked Kofi Annan, the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, to call for the holding of a UN General 
Assembly special session. Qatar further called upon the international community to force 
Israel to stop building settlements, and to stop preparing for the building new settlements 
in HarHoma in Arab Jerusalem, in order to make the peoples of the region avoid the 
hazards of such a foolish policy, which, if it continued, would completely hamper the 
peace process and lead the region to violence and chaos.  
In his statement delivered in the 10th special session of the UN General Assembly on the 
Illegal Israeli Actions in Eastern Jerusalem and all Palestinian Occupied Territories, 
Qatar’s Permanent Representative in the UN, Nasser Al Khalifa, stated: 
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Israel’s settlement policy represents a flagrant violation of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 on the Protection of Civilians and their 
Properties during Wartime, and the Hague Convention of 1949... The 
unfair use of the veto right encouraged the Israeli Government to continue 
challenging the international community again when, on 18 March, it 
started the execution of its plan in settlement HarHoma, occupied Eastern 
Jerusalem. This has led to a delay in the peace process in the Middle East, 
and the international community shall address this issue immediately and 
force the Israeli Government to stop its irresponsible actions, which 
contradict logic, truth, and justice.
77
 
Paradoxically, the Qatari Foreign Minister, who paid a visit to the US, met Madeleine 
Albright and discussed the importance for the peace process of holding the Economic 
Summit Conference in Doha.
78
 In conformity with the Qatari policy, which denounces and 
condemns settlement policy, the cabinet confirmed Qatar’s steady position against the 
Israeli settlement policy in Jerusalem and the occupied Arab territories. The cabinet 
further welcomed the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Israeli settlement 
activities in the Palestinian territories.  
On the other hand, during his visit to the US, Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem stated to 
CNN that Qatar was committed to the peace process in the Middle East. He further 
expressed the readiness of Qatar to help in the process if it was asked to play a role, 
provided that the two parties would be ready to meet and provide initiatives. He further 
stated that the status quo of the peace process was bad.
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In an interview with Voice of America on the peace process in the Middle East, bin 
Jassem stated that: 
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Peace in the region is a strategic option and Israel should believe in the 
principle of Land for Peace and stop building settlements, as the 
continuance of building such settlements is a violation of the Madrid 
Conference principles and Oslo Agreement, which was signed by the 
Israelis and the Palestinians. 
Bin Jassem further stated that: 
The establishment of peace in the region was inevitable, indicating that all 
wars in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world had ended with peace. 
The Middle East region witnessed various wars and this should make 
everyone believe that peace is a strategic option. Qatar believes that peace 
means that all parties abide by the peace principles in order to reach an 
optimal solution that gives the rights back to its real holders.
80
 
Regarding freezing Qatar’s relationship with Israel, bin Jassem stated that:  
We wanted to let Israel know that if it slows the peace process or retracts 
its commitments, we, as Arabs, will retract ours. Freezing relations with 
Israel is an indication that it shall stop the reckless construction of 
settlements and if it goes forward, we will consider taking other decisions 
to respond to such recklessness.
81
 
In a press conference on the sidelines of the Syrian Foreign Minister’s visit, the 
spokesperson of the Qatari Foreign Ministry, Fawaz Al-Attiyah, was asked the following 
questions: Did the Syrian Foreign Minister ask Qatar, during his visit to Doha, not to 
invite Israel to the Economic Summit, and is there any relationship between his visit to 
Doha and the Summit? Al-Attiyah’s answer was as follows: 
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Qatar has announced that it will hold the MENA Economic Summit next 
November. The State of Qatar expressed its national sense by freezing its 
relations with Israel nine months ago, even before the League of Arab 
States made its recommendations to freeze relations and communication 
with Israel. When Netanyahu’s government started execution of it 
settlement policy in Jerusalem, the Qatari position remained steady 
regarding freezing relations with Israel. Qatar denounces and condemns 
Israeli settlement policy, which does not encourage the continuance of 
negotiations. It is premature to speak about the participation of Israel in the 
conference, as Qatar has not invited any entity to participate in the 
conference.
82
 
Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem visited Riyadh in order to participate in the 63th 
session of the GCC Ministerial Council. The Minister stated that:  
Qatar has adopted a steady position towards the peace process in the 
Middle East, and Israel will not be a stumbling block to holding the MENA 
Economic Summit… Holding the summit was not among the matters 
considered by the Foreign Ministers of the GCC states during the 63th 
session of the Ministerial Council, which was held yesterday in Riyadh. It 
is difficult now to consider cancelling the Economic Summit, as only five 
months are left… We want to let the world know that in return for the 
Israeli intransigence and breach of commitments, we are going forward in 
the peace process but till when will we remain in such a position? This 
matter is under consideration right now, and analysts in Israel shall not 
think that we will go the same way at all times. It is premature to think 
about inviting Israel to the summit, as such an invitation is related to the 
progress achieved in the peace process... and if the peace process witnesses 
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an improvement, and the Israeli position changes. Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu may be invited to the summit.
83
 
Qatar’s Ambassador to Jordan, Nasser Abdul-Aziz Al Nasr, confirmed that: 
Just a denunciation of the international political and economic issues 
represented a negative approach, whose previous experience proves that it 
is ineffective. We should face the opponent and defeat it on the basis of 
self-confidence and the ability to continue fighting with a useful weapon. 
We will practically support the Palestinians in Jerusalem through the 
speedy execution of the approved projects, using the donations collected in 
the Jerusalem Week, whose events were held in Doha.
84
 
We see a swing in the Qatari stance towards Israeli intransigence. Tension was prevailing 
in the Middle East region due to the intransigence of Netanyahu’s government policies, 
which resulted in violent actions in the West Bank. Two blasts occurred in the West Bank, 
resulting in many being killed and injured. But the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
confirmed that the solution was to continue with the peace efforts. He further said:  
The State of Qatar monitors with great concern the developments in the 
occupied Arab territories in the light of two blasts which occurred in the 
West Bank. This resulted in the murder of many civilians, due to the 
faltering of the peace process in the region and continuance of Israel’s 
intransigence in execution of the peace agreements concluded with the 
Palestinian National Authority and continuance of building settlements in 
Jerusalem and the occupied Arab territories. Qatar appeals to the peace 
makers to bear their historical responsibilities…Peace is the solution that 
ensures security for all peoples of the region… Continuance of the peace 
process and resumption thereof by both parties in order to establish 
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comprehensive and permanent peace ensures stability and security for the 
region and its peoples… Qatar’s position is steady regarding denunciation 
and condemning all forms of violent actions against the innocent civilians, 
regardless of the perpetrator of such violent actions.
85
 
The GCC states had three viewpoints regarding participation in the Summit: supporting, 
boycotting, or calling for postponement. Such viewpoints were expressed by Jamil Al-
Hujaylan, Secretary General of the GCC, when he stated that the participation of the GCC 
states in the MENA Economic Summit was decided by each state according to its vision 
and conviction. He indicated that the GCC states did not declare whether they would 
participate or not, except for the KSA. Al-Hujaylan saw that the Qatari officials were 
serious regarding holding the conference, as they hoped that the following three months 
would witness an improvement in the peace process. He confirmed that there were no 
external pressures on the GCC states to participate in the Summit.
86
 Despite the above, the 
US Foreign Secretary, Madeleine Albright, interfered during her visit to the Gulf states 
and her meetings with the Arab foreign ministers, and stated that: 
Peace is the sole option in the Middle East region as conflict will only lead 
to sorrow, suffering, and hatred, and this will not be accepted by the 
region’s peoples. It is a fact that going forward in the peace process, peace 
makes the region’s future promising if all parties respect each other, which 
will definitely lead to an increase in cooperation and maintaining the 
dignity of all peoples. The lack of trust between the parties of the peace 
negotiations in the region shall be addressed by the leaders of the region’s 
countries and practical steps shall be taken to support the peace process.
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During the visit of the Emir of Qatar to Washington, the Chief of the Emiri Diwan stated 
that “Washington is determined that the Summit shall be held.”88 
                                               
85(Al Raya:1-8-1997:1) 
86(Al Raya: 6-8-1997:1)     See Appendix No: 10. 
87
(Al Raya:15-9-1997:1) 
88(Al Raya:6-8-1997:1) 
236 
 
At the same time, Palestinians and Syrians saw that all Arab countries should boycott the 
Summit. The Palestinian Economic Minister, Maher Masri, stated in a press conference 
held in Ramallah that “We call upon all Arab countries in the present conditions to boycott 
the Economic Summit in Doha, and to provide the Palestinian people with all forms of 
economic and political support.”89 
Israel did not attempt to create a positive atmosphere for the Summit to be held, and in 
fact it escalated tension. Among other targets, it seemed that Israel was testing the 
seriousness of Qatar’s intention to face the challenges of the Summit and determining 
whether Qatar would maintain relations with Israel (albeit minimal) or not. Israel 
continued its military operations in South Lebanon, where it faced extreme difficulties due 
to fierce attacks by the Lebanese resistance forces. Through the Qatari Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson, Qatar denounced the Israeli aggression, which had led to injuries among 
civilians and caused severe damage to facilities. The spokesperson further stated to the 
Qatar News Agency (QNA) that: 
Such aggression causes serious threat to the peace process in the Middle 
East and will get the region back to wars, violence, and tension. It further 
violates the international legitimacy resolutions and international 
conventions on protection of civilians.
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As settlement activities continued, the Israeli authorities enabled a group of Israeli settlers 
to seize Arab houses in Eastern Jerusalem. Such action was denounced by the Qatari 
cabinet in its statement. The cabinet further welcomed the call upon Israel by the US to 
stop expansion of Israeli settlements.
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Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jassem, discussed with the other foreign ministers of 
the Arab States the results of the intentional freezing of the peace process since Netanyahu 
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came into power as Prime Minister 15 months previously. Bin Jassem stated in an 
interview with QNA:  
it became evident to the Arab states and the international community that 
such a government was not only retracting their commitments and rejecting 
the resumption of negotiations, but also they were adopting a persistent 
approach against the peace process when it started expansion of settlements 
in the occupied Arab lands in general, and in Jerusalem in particular... 
Repeated attacks against Lebanon can be added to the above. Qatar 
believes that the MENA Economic Summit may be successful as expected, 
only if there is a tangible progress in the peace process and if the Israeli 
Government changes its current policy as previously stated.
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At the end of the interview, the Qatari State Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that “Qatar 
has invited the Israeli Foreign Minister to attend the Summit but it did not invite 
Netanyahu, the Prime Minister.”93 In an attempt by Qatar to clarify its stance towards the 
Summit, the Qatari Foreign Minister said in its statement before the UN General 
Assembly:  
The State of Qatar has no special interest in hosting the Summit, but its 
eagerness to hold the Summit stems from the belief that peace is a strategic 
option accepted by the Arab states since the Madrid Conference and in 
fulfilment of its commitment and to ensure its credibility as a state 
respecting its commitments…the Israeli Government shall be solely 
responsible for such a failure. The Israeli Government’s procrastination of 
implementing conventions and placing obstacles in the way of 
establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, 
through undermining the peace process by establishing settlements and 
retreating conventions concluded with the Palestinian Authority and 
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depriving the Palestinian people of their rights, and disrespect for the 
international legitimacy will result only in violence and counter violence.
94
 
At this point, we can understand that Qatar became certain that Netanyahu’s government 
would retract every promise made by Israel. It further became certain that Israel was 
adopting a policy contrary to the expectations of the Arabs and the international 
community, but the question was why did Qatar continue the preparation for the Summit 
and why had Qatar invited Israel? (Later, the Qatari Foreign Minister stated that the peace 
process was dead). 
9.7 Manoeuvers of closing the Israeli commercial office in Doha 
In an interview with Al Jazeera television, Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassem responded 
to a question regarding the opening of the Israeli commercial office in Doha, which aimed 
in the first place at encouraging Israel to go forward with the peace process. Now that 
Israeli’s stance on the peace process had become clear, why did Qatar not reconsider the 
existence of the Israeli office in Doha? The Foreign Minister replied: 
I would like to assure you that we still have hopes that we will reach a 
peaceful solution for the Middle East’s issue, as there is no alternative. Of 
course, the status quo is discouraging because of Netanyahu’s government 
and the early Israeli elections. Qatar sees that if a positive result cannot be 
reached, we will close the Israeli office, as we have already opened it to 
encourage the peace process, but will it be closed now or after one month? 
This depends on the development of the situation.
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Following Madeleine Albright’s statement that the US initiative to resume the peace 
negotiations was in the interests of Israel, Albright called upon the Jewish leaders in the 
US to help the US administration make the initiative that had been rejected by Netanyahu 
succeed. Albright threatened that the US was about to abandon the peace process. She 
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addressed the Jewish leaders saying, “The peace process is troubled and the US will not 
seek a fake process; we want to get ourselves out of this process.”96 Shortly afterwards, 
the Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that, “The Israeli office in Doha is 
witnessing very limited activity. The office may be closed if the peace process witnesses 
more deterioration.”97 This statement was a clear threat by Qatar's government against the 
Israeli Government, which was in harmony with the US efforts to exert more pressure on 
Tel Aviv.  
During the joint talks between the Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Syria, the Qatari 
Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jassem, responded to the question: “To what extent will the 
State of Qatar keep Israel’s commercial office in Doha open?” He answered: 
I think that all present Israeli practices lead us to seriously think of closing 
the office. The Israelis shall understand that we cannot continue in any 
relationship under the present circumstances, and the relationship between 
Doha and Tel Aviv is frozen. If the present conditions remain, we will take 
the necessary measures regarding the commercial office, and we are 
considering this matter right now. Qatar offered to open such an office 
because the peace process was going forward and if the process stops, there 
will not be cause for such an office to exist.
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Regarding the Israeli initiative that put conditions on implementing the UN Resolution 
No. 425 on immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, Hamad bin 
Jassem responded: 
The UN Security Council's resolution is clear, which is that Israel shall 
unconditionally withdraw, and we hope that Israel unconditionally 
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withdraws from Southern Lebanon and the west as there is no need for 
conditions in withdrawal.
99
 
Netanyahu’s government continued its escalatory measures, disregarding any regional or 
international reactions, as it approved new settlement expansion in Jerusalem and 
connected settlements already existing in occupied Jerusalem. Israel claimed that nothing 
had changed, as Israel already controlled such areas.
100
 Head of the Qatari Shura Council, 
Mohammed Al-Khulaifi, before the 8th Conference of the Arab Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, called upon the international community to exert pressure on Israel to stop its 
settlement activities in the occupied Arab land. He further stated, “The Israeli policy has 
caused the peace process to collapse.”101 
During the summer, the peace process severely deteriorated because of a set of policies 
adopted by the Netanyahu government. Such policies included the expansion of 
settlements in Jerusalem, changing its demographic composition, and expanding the 
borders of Jerusalem. For example, Israel confiscated six acres in Umm al-Fahm in 
neighbouring Jerusalem.
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In September, during the meeting of the UN General Assembly, the Foreign Minister 
stated:  
This is enough to make us more determined to exert more efforts in order 
to reach a just solution, which shall give back the Palestinian people their 
legitimate rights in establishing an independent state, whose capital shall be 
Jerusalem. Such a solution shall also ensure the withdrawal of Israel from 
all occupied Arab lands in Syrian Golan, South Lebanon, and the Bekaa on 
the basis of the UN resolutions and the international legitimacy principles, 
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in order to start talking about real peace in the region based on the 
principles of justice, inclusiveness, mutual respect, and security for all.  
I would like to say that the decision taken by the Israeli Government on 21 June 1998, by 
virtue thereof the municipal borders of Jerusalem will be expanded, will change the legal 
status of the sacred city in flagrant violation of the related UN Security Council and 
General Assembly resolutions. This step further violates the conventions concluded 
between the Palestinians and Israelis and breaches the principles of the peace process, 
which provide for leaving the Jerusalem-related matter until the two parties reach an 
agreement in this regard in the final negotiations. Therefore, we support the statement 
issued by the Security Council on 12 July 1998 on the rights of civilians during 
wartime.
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9.8 Wye River 
Based on the discussion mentioned above, it seemed that the Madrid and Oslo steps in the 
peace process had stopped. Therefore, the US decided to launch a new peace process, in 
which it led the negotiations. Qatar welcomed the convention, signed by the concerned 
parties on 23 October in Washington.
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In its regular meeting, held on 28 October, the Qatari cabinet, headed by Mohammed bin 
Khalifa Al Thani, the Deputy Prime Minister, praised the eminent role played by the US in 
this regard. It further praised the fruitful efforts exerted by US President Bill Clinton and 
His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan in order to reach an agreement. The Qatari cabinet 
expressed its hope to have such an agreement as a starting point to complete the peace 
process and withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab lands.
105
This agreement resulted 
in mutual responsibilities for the Palestinians and Israelis, but Benjamin Netanyahu 
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threatened to freeze the agreement or to execute it according to his own understanding, 
especially after the possibility of an early general election.
106
 
In the end, Netanyahu’s government adopted the agreement and started executing the first 
stage, which included withdrawal.
107
 In return, Yasser Arafat issued a decree to fight the 
incitement of terrorism.
108
 Therefore, the Palestinian Authority received 500kilometres 
from the West Bank from the Israeli occupation authorities in executing the first stage of 
the Wye River convention.
109
 Then, the Qatari Foreign Minister represented Qatar at the 
Conference of Donor Nations Supporting Peace, which was held in Washington to agree 
on the necessary economic assistance for the Palestinian Authority.
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Qatar reacted practically to the progress achieved in the peace process by allowing Israel 
to participate in Milipol Security, held in Doha, but the Qatari cabinet spokesperson 
stated:  
The Israeli participation in Milipol Qatar 98, whose events will start next 
Saturday, will be very limited, as only three companies will participate. In a 
statement to Al Raya, the spokesperson denied the statements of the 
director of the Israeli commercial office in Doha, who said that dozens of 
Israeli companies will participate. The State of Qatar only invited three 
companies, but the French company organizing the conference invited 
other companies as it is the organizing body of Milipol in Doha as well as 
Milipol Paris, which is mutually organized every two years. The French 
company took all procedures and measures, deciding on the participation of 
the companies as well as the space allocated for each company.
111
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In response to a question regarding the contradiction between Israeli participation and 
Qatar’s decision to freeze its relations with Israel, the spokesperson asserted that the 
Qatari Government was adhering to its decision and there was no relationship between this 
participation and the recent developments at the Israeli-Palestinian level. It also did not 
mean that Qatar would start dialogues with Israel. It was merely technical participation.
112
 
The question in this context is, had the French company had control over the Qatari 
territory to the extent that made the Qatari Government authorize it to invite companies 
without political and security revision? It can also be understood that the commercial 
office was still open and operating. Due to Israeli policies against Jerusalem, Qatar 
resorted to the UN General Assembly to get a resolution issued against the Israeli decision 
on Jerusalem and to protect it from the Israeli practices. The Qatari draft resolution had 
the majority of votes (149 votes); seven countries refrained from voting, and Israel 
objected to the draft resolution.
113
 
9.9 Leaving the headquarters of the commercial office 
Regarding the Israeli presence in Doha, a Qatari national who leased a villa for the Israeli 
commercial office to use it as headquarters filed a case to terminate the contract due to the 
harm they caused. The executive magistrate in the Civil Plenary Court decided to evacuate 
the Israeli commercial office in Doha by force. The executive magistrate further decided at 
the hearing of 20 June to follow up the ruling that was supported by the Court of Appeal 
on 8 May.  
Attorney at law, Rashid Al Boanin, representing the owner of the property, which had 
been rented by the Israeli delegation by virtue of a subcontract concluded with a Qatari 
national, stated that the judgement of evacuating the property was rendered on 25 August 
1998. Al Boanin followed up the judgement, but the delegation members did not leave. He 
indicated that after the decision the previous day to evacuate the property by force, “The 
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delegation members have no option but to leave the property leased by virtue of the 
subcontract.”114 
In response to a question as to what would happen if the office members insisted on 
staying in the office, Al Boanin stated that “This office is not subject to the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.”  
One of the attorneys at law taking part in the case commented that “The Israeli office 
members will face great difficulties in renting a new headquarters after this decision, 
especially as the Qatari nation deeply resented their presence. 
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In a statement to Agency France Press (AFP), the Head of the Israeli Commercial Office 
in Qatar, Sami Rafael, denied knowledge of such a ruling and said that no measure had 
been taken to evacuate the building. The court rendered the ruling after considering the 
dispute between a residential compound composed of 15 villas and the Israeli Commercial 
Office, which was occupying one of the compound villas. The owner stated that he/she 
had rented all the villas located in Rumaila neighbourhood in downtown Doha to a Qatari 
businessman, who leased one of the villas to the Israeli Commercial Office.  
The owner justified the complaint by the fact that since renting the villa to the Israeli 
Commercial Office, the compound had been subject to tight security measures. The 
attorney at law representing the owner stated that such tight security measures harmed the 
proper use of the property. The owner filed a case before a court of the first instance, 
which had rendered a judgement the previous October that required the Israeli delegation 
to evacuate the villa.
116
 
Rashid Al Boanin, the attorney at law representing the owner, commented on the lack of 
compliance with the ruling by the Director of the Israel Commercial Office: 
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The Director of the Office has no rights more than the rights granted by the 
MOU concluded between Qatar and Israel on 2 April 1996, which was 
classified. Consequently, such an MOU has not been given the force of 
law. All international conventions shall not come into effect or be executed 
unless a law is enacted to give it effect, and the legal form of this MOU is 
incomplete. Consequently, it cannot be legally invoked.
117
 
Regarding the Israeli-Qatari MOU and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
Al Boanin stated: 
The MOU is not subject to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
1963. If we refer to the Convention we will find that Article 43, Paragraph 
II of the Convention provides that members or officers having the rank of a 
consul shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the administrative of 
judicial authorities of the State thereto they are delegated especially in the 
consular affairs. Paragraph II of the same Article excluded the civil case of 
the effect of Paragraph I.
118
 
After a while, the Israeli Commercial Office found another place to use as a headquarters 
in downtown Doha.
119
 (Therefore, the comment of the attorney at law, who said that the 
Israelis would face difficulties in finding another headquarters due to people’s rejection, 
turned out not to be correct.)Israeli-Qatari relations remained stagnant until they faded 
totally. 
9.10 Conclusion 
The analysis of the data contained within the newspaper coverage, and other related 
official documents, shows that Doha, through its foreign polices with respect to the 
Middle East peace process, sent messages to indicate readiness to build bridges of trust 
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with a former enemy, namely Israel. To give credibility to this message, Qatar enlisted the 
help of a third party mediator, which was the US energy company Enron, with which 
Qatar signed a contract to export liquefied natural gas to Israel, despite statements from 
Qatar’s Foreign Minister to the effect that Qatar did not have any political or trade 
relations with Israel. Qatar’s Foreign Minister even rejected the idea of exporting Qatari 
natural gas through the Israeli port of Eilat.  
In November 1995, Qatar announced that it had signed an agreement to export natural gas 
to Israel. Because of this deal, Qatar met strong political resistance from several Arab 
countries. However, Qatar, insisted on its stance in a clear message to both the US and 
Israel that Qatar was committed to the signed and ratified agreements, as well as to the 
implicit understandings.  
Qatari-Israeli relations witnessed a surge of activity following the visit by Israeli Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres to Doha. However, the hope for progress in the peace process had 
almost entirely faded away following the Israeli offensive against the Lebanese territories 
in April 1995. Qatar’s condemnation of the Israeli military offensive was immediate.  
The data analysis further shows that the rise of Benjamin Netanyahu to power in Israel 
signalled a marked deterioration in the situation in the occupied territories. Netanyahu’s 
government engaged in a more extreme policy towards the Palestinians, and Qatar warned 
the Netanyahu Government that it could be forced to reconsider its ties with Tel Aviv if 
the Israeli Government insisted on such extremist policies. Qatar upped its diplomatic 
offensive against Israel and used every international diplomatic platform and arena to 
condemn the Israeli policies. Qatar described the Israeli policies as acts that would quickly 
doom the peace process. Because of the insistence of the Netanyahu Government in 
continuing its expansionist policies, particularly the Abu Ghunaim settlement of 
HarHoma, Qatar condemned such polices before the UN. Qatar, nevertheless, eventually, 
invited Israel to attend the Middle East and North Africa Economic Cooperation 
Conference held in Doha. 
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In a meeting between US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Qatar’s Foreign 
Minister in Washington, the two officials discussed the importance of holding the 
conference, and Washington insisted on holding the conference despite the extremist 
policies of the Netanyahu government, which seemed to put the entire peace process at 
risk. With the imminent approach of the Middle East and North Africa Economic 
Cooperation Conference, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, declared that 
Qatar’s only interest in holding such a conference was to show the world that peace was a 
strategic option, and this revealed Qatar’s other role as a peacemaker. Qatar eventually 
invited Israel to attend the Middle East and North Africa Economic Cooperation 
Conference held in Doha. This invitation demonstrated Qatar’s role as a loyal US ally. 
Nonetheless, and shortly after the invitation, Qatar declared that maintaining relations with 
Israel would not continue forever, if the Netanyahu government insisted on the same 
extremist policies. It must be stressed that Qatar continued to support all US efforts to 
revive the peace process, the last of which at that time was the Wye River Accord. 
Chapter Ten will discuss a number of Qatari foreign policy stances toward the peace 
process including a bold initiative: to address the conflict through pushing for democratic 
reform in the Middle East.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
Spreading Democracy:  
Terminating the Conflict or the Peace Process? 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents additional significant data that will help to clarify the overall picture 
regarding Qatar’s foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process. The analysis has 
identified seven key issues crucial to the emergence of overall Qatari foreign policy 
regarding the Middle East conflict: the Second Palestinian Intifada; diplomatic, economic, 
and moral Qatari support of this Intifada; the intensification of the pressure on Israel 
during all international occasions, including the Qatari proposal to send an international 
investigation commission to investigate Israeli actions and policies in the occupied Arab 
territories and Qatar’s proposal to shoulder the financial costs of dispatching this 
commission; the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; how Qatar dealt with the death of 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat; and the Qatari support of the new Palestinian 
government. The presentation in this chapter is structured around these core issues. 
The chapter also deals with how Qatar dealt with US political reform initiatives, and how 
it proposed its own Middle East political reform initiative to bring democracy in Arab 
countries into its foreign policy goals, which was a major cause of the crisis that occurred 
in the GCC, a crisis that was exacerbated later.  
The chapter analyses the data from the following documents in order to discern clear 
policy patterns illustrating the relevant Qatari foreign policy: first, the verbatim 
transcriptions of UN Security Council meetings, which include the addresses delivered by 
Qatari diplomats and the Qatari Foreign Minister during the deliberation on issues related 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process; second, the UN General 
Assembly documents, both during the ordinary and extraordinary sessions, which include 
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the addresses delivered by the Emir of Qatar, the Qatari Foreign Minister, and Qatari 
diplomats; third, the statements of Qatari officials and diplomats published in Qatari 
newspapers on issues related to the subject of the study; fourth, the addresses delivered by 
the Emir of Qatar on various occasions, using various diplomatic platforms and dealing 
with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process.  
10.2 The Second Intifada 
The analysis of the related documents shows that less than a month before the outbreak of 
the Second Intifada, which erupted as a direct result of Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple 
Mount guarded by hundreds of Israeli forces soldiers, and also for many other complicated 
reasons within the Palestinian territory, the Emir of Qatar delivered a statement before the 
UN General Assembly in the Millennium Summit, concluding the situation and giving 
Qatar’s perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rights of Arabs:  
We further welcome any efforts exerted outside the UN, provided that the 
rights of the Palestinian and Syrian peoples shall be respected as per the 
international resolution. In the same context, we see that the issue of 
Jerusalem shall be given the highest priority because of its importance to 
the Arabs and Muslims, and as it is the cornerstone in any prospective 
peace in the Middle East.
1
  
After the eruption of the Intifada and the start of violent actions, Qatar condemned the 
brutal attacks. A Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that Ariel Sharon’s visit to 
the Temple Mount was “a desecration of the holy places and an act of defiance of the 
feelings of the Muslim Ummah.”2 
In a statement delivered in a meeting held by the Islamic Group at the UN on the 
ambassadors’ level to review the Israeli aggression against the Temple Mount and the 
attack against the Palestinian civilians by the Israeli security forces, Qatari Ambassador 
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Nasser Abdul-aziz, the permanent representative of Qatar at the UN, expressed Qatar’s 
condemnation of the Israeli actions at the Temple Mount. He further said: 
We hold the Israeli Government responsible for the Jerusalem massacre. 
We assure you that Jerusalem is an Arab city and it is an integral part of the 
occupied Palestinian land, and it is subject to international law like other 
land under Israeli occupation. We confirm that Jerusalem is the capital of 
the Palestinian State and peace cannot be established without giving 
Jerusalem back to the Arabs. …The State of Qatar calls upon the UN 
Security Council, sponsors of the peace process, and all peace-loving states 
to immediately intervene to put an end to the Israeli provocations, condemn 
the brutal Israeli massacre, and stop violence and bloodshed, which go 
against the peace process. …Qatar calls upon all parties to resume the 
peace negotiations with good will and transparency in order to reach a just, 
inclusive, permanent settlement and to apply international legitimacy and 
enable the Palestinian people to get back their legitimate rights and 
establish their own independent state, whose capital shall be Jerusalem. 
Ariel Sharon’s visit was a means to stop the peace negotiations. Such 
tactics may succeed and may have negative results. … We see that this 
action is a defiance of the feelings of the Palestinians and the Muslim 
Ummah, and a violation of the international legitimacy resolutions and 
desecration of the holy places.
3
 
The International Human Rights Commission formed an international investigation 
committee to investigate the Israeli actions in the occupied lands. The Emir of Qatar 
decided that Qatar would bear the cost of the committee, which amounted to US$ 
850,000.
4
 Israel refused to receive the committee or to cooperate with it. Qatar responded 
to the Israeli refusal on two levels. The first was before the UN General Assembly and the 
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second was before the Islamic Summit Conference, which was held in Doha in early 
November and in which the Emir of Qatar held the Islamic states and the international 
community responsible for maintaining the safety and security of the Palestinians and 
their legitimate rights. He further addressed the Israeli Government and presented what he 
saw as the only two ways that Israel had to proceed: whether to continue occupying the 
Arab lands and lose any opportunity to establish peace or to seriously engage in the peace 
process negotiations, which would result in maintaining security in the region. The Emir 
of Qatar stated:  
While the Summit is held, the Islamic and Christian holy places in 
Palestine have been desecrated and many Palestinians murdered, and 
thousands have been injured in the blessed Intifada just for calling for their 
rights in life, their existence and national sovereignty. … I would like to 
tell you that we should all support the strong and determined people who 
face daily difficulties resulting from the occupation. I call upon the Summit 
to develop a practical strategy that helps the Palestinian people get back 
their legitimate rights. No solution can be reached in the Middle East 
region if Israel does not withdraw from all occupied lands in Palestine, 
Golan, and Lebanon. Israel shall also execute all the UN resolutions and 
abide by international legitimacy principles. Israel shall choose whether to 
stay in the region safely and securely or to continue in such a conflict for 
decades and bear all the disasters that will be inflicted upon the region’s 
countries and its peoples.
5
 
Later the Emir of Qatar asked the Foreign Minister to pay a visit to the Palestinian 
territory in order to show sympathy and support for the Palestinian people and its 
leadership. The Minister also visited some Palestinian organizations and hospitals.
6
 After 
he came back from the Palestinian territory, the Minister held a press conference to let the 
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journalists know the result of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) members, which at the time of writing are currently being 
held in preparation for the 9th Islamic Summit, which will be held in Doha.  
In this press conference, the Foreign Minister announced the closure of the Israeli 
Commercial Office and confirmed the non-existence of any diplomatic relations with 
Israel. He said, “We keep the ball rolling in the peace process and tried to keep the 
relations with Israel before issuing the Qatari statement. The State of Qatar still tries to 
maintain international relations.”7 
Regarding Qatar’s relations with Israel, the Foreign Minister stated that:  
Qatar started its relationship with Israel two years after the Madrid Summit. 
Before that time, i.e. before the Arabs launched the peace process with 
Israel to get back Arab rights, there was no cooperation with Israel. The 
Arabs agreed, through the peace process, to get back the lands occupied 
since 1967, which means getting back only 22 percent of Palestine.
8
 
In response to a question regarding Qatar’s stance towards the peace process, the Minister 
said, “Qatar has no plan. Washington has the plan, as the US is the sponsor of the peace 
process.”9 
The Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jassem, called upon the US Foreign Minister, sponsor 
of the peace process, to be just. He further stated, “The US biased stance for the interest of 
Israel is frustrating.”10 
The Minister clarified his point, stating that “The peace process sponsor is required to stop 
murdering the Palestinians through exerting pressure on Israel.”11 
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The Minister of Foreign Affairs denied press information that Qatar had previously 
informed the US of the decision to close the Israeli office. He indicated that Qatar had 
good relations with the US but said, “This does not mean that we agree with the US in 
everything. We are keen to maintain such good relations, not out of fear, and we thank 
them due to what they do regarding the Palestinian issue but it is not enough and the US 
should play a greater role.”12 He also stated that “Peace is a strategic demand and I assure 
you that Qatar wishes to see peace established everywhere.”13 
After Israel rejected cooperation with the committee, it further refused to allow the 
committee inside the occupied lands. Therefore, Qatar escalated the level of political 
response as it called upon all UN member states to bear their full responsibility and send 
international protection forces to ensure maintenance of the peace process in the Middle 
East. The State of Qatar further asked the UN to exert pressure on Israel to cooperate with 
the Human Rights Committee, which had been formed as per the resolution passed in the 
previous October in the 5th Session on Human Rights in Geneva.  
This was expressed in a statement delivered by Abdullah Sulaiti, the Secretary in the 
permanent delegation of the State of Qatar in the UN before the General Assembly, 25th 
Session, Item 6 of the Agenda “Bethlehem 2000”. He stated that:  
As the State of Qatar strongly believes in the establishment of peace in the 
Middle East, it has announced its readiness to bear the costs of the Fact 
Finding Committee of the Human Rights Commission. The escalation of 
violence prevailing in the region, and the use of various weapons by the 
Israeli forces and the killing of the Palestinian civilians, is a flagrant breach 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and it would lead to 
uncontrollable violent reaction by the Palestinian people.
14
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Following the meeting in Brussels with the EU’s High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, Qatar’s Foreign Minister said that he had:  
…discussed with the EU diplomat ways in which the EU can contribute in 
halting the Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.… After 
consultations with the Kingdom of Morocco, the chairman of the Jerusalem 
Committee at the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, which chaired the Arab Summit, it was decided to send 
a foreigner ministers’ envoy from the Organization of Islamic Conference 
member states to establish direct contact with the UN Secretary General, 
the US Security, and the Security Council member states… This is not a 
situation of friction but is a war situation against unarmed people, and a 
situation of inhuman and illogical murder…The international community 
that once backed and supported the peace process should now back and 
support the stopping of the bloodshed of people who cannot defend 
themselves.
15
 
The foreign ministerial delegation commenced its visit to New York on 27 November 
2000.  
At the level of the UN General Assembly, the State of Qatar stressed the gravity of Israel’s 
violation of international law, international human rights conventions, and the pertinent 
international legitimacy resolutions, pointing out that this represented a flagrant violation 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War and the responsibility of the occupying power to protect 
civilians.  
Qatar’s permanent UN Ambassador, Nasser Al Nasr, reminded the international 
community of the resolution passed by the Geneva Convention held the previous year, 
which clearly declared the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Palestinian 
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occupied territories including Eastern Jerusalem, and stressed the need to fully respect the 
provisions of this convention on the Palestinian territories.  
Nasr told the UN General Assembly session held to discuss Article No.41 that: 
The Palestinian people in their occupied territories are currently being 
subject to the most heinous and most cruel sort of assault, oppression, and 
torture by the Israeli occupying force…All the talks aimed at stopping the 
violence and restoring calm to the area …all the ceasefire agreements that 
resulted from such talks were never upheld by the Israeli side.... The 
political negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides have been 
transformed into violent engagement on the ground, where Israel is trying 
through the use of its barbaric military force to force the Palestinians to 
accept what they rejected during the political negotiations.
16
 
Following the visit by the foreign ministerial delegation for the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference, Qatar’s envoy to the UN Security Council deplored the Israeli human 
rights violations and the violations against the Palestinian people’s right to free and safe 
living, and he blamed the Israeli Government for its policies on the ground.
17
 
The Emir of Qatar addressed the Ordinary Arab Summit held in Amman, Jordan and 
condemned the Israeli policies, saying that the situation seemed to be almost completely 
devoid of the precepts of international law, and respect for sovereignty and human rights, 
in the light of the past and ongoing acts committed by Israeli Governments through their 
war machines, and that it constituted a flagrant violation of all international conventions 
and treaties: 
We have reached a strong conviction that the more statements of 
condemnations there are, the more careless Israel becomes. Such arrogance 
and intransigence even led Israel to issue explicit threats to the security of a 
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sovereign Arab state, which is by consequence a threat to our Arab national 
security. … Therefore, I call on the sponsors of the Peace Conference and 
the other permanent UN Security Council member states and the EU states, 
and all the peace-loving world states, to remind them that injustice is an 
omen for the destruction of nations and the birthplace of despair and the 
repellent of moderation. Maintaining stability in our region requires 
immediate commitment to guaranteeing international protection to the 
unarmed Palestinian people and to put an end to the Israeli arrogance in the 
same manner that the international community acted in other world spots 
that experienced less tense circumstances… a just and comprehensive 
peace requires the return of all Palestinian rights, withdrawal from the 
occupied Palestinian territories and the Syrian Golan Heights until the line 
of 4 June, and the completion of the withdrawal from the Lebanese 
territories until the internationally recognized border lines.
18
 
As a continuation of Qatar’s diplomatic efforts to pressurize Israel on the diplomatic front 
and push the international community to shoulder its responsibility to establish peace and 
security, on the occasion of the Israeli army raid on Orient House in Jerusalem, Qatar’s 
Ambassador to the UN Security Council stated before the Council the difficulties that the 
Palestinians are suffering to restore their rights, due to the actions of the Israelis. The Emir 
called for respect of the UN resolutions, and he referred also to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention relevant to protecting civilians in wartime and other Israeli practices in East 
Jerusalem. The Israeli forces had seized a historic manuscript from Orient House and 
eventually he urged Israel to comply with all the international legitimacy resolutions and 
treaties.
19
 
Using language of a calmer tone, on 10 November 2001, the Emir of Qatar called on the 
UN General Assembly to end the ordeal of the Palestinian people, and thanked the US for 
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its efforts while making a brief reference to Israel and holding it responsible for the 
oppression and massacres carried out against the Palestinians. In his address, he said: 
We believe the time has come in an urgent and critical manner to put an 
end to the ordeal suffered by the Palestinian people as exacted by the Israeli 
occupying forces and for the international community to provide the 
needed and necessary international cover and protection for the Palestinian 
people against the daily unjustified and unacceptable assaults it is subjected 
to. Therefore we encourage all parties to respond to the calls of their 
leaders to exercise self-restraint to protect innocent civilian lives to create 
the right environment to achieve a just peace in this region. In this context, 
we must laud the positive stance adopted by US President George Bush and 
his administration with regard to the establishment of the Palestinian State. 
We also hail the efforts in this field exerted by the governments of friendly 
European countries and the other international entities concerned with the 
crisis.
20
 
At the inauguration of the ordinary 30th session of the Qatari Consultative Council on 17 
November 2001, and in reference to the international pressures to arrive at a definition of 
terrorism that includes armed struggle against occupation (a definition required by Israel 
and the United States, and rejected by Qatar), the Emir of Qatar said, “The Arab and 
Islamic states hold a fundamental position involving the need to differentiate between 
terrorism as a criminal phenomenon and the right of people under military occupation to 
liberate their nations and exercise their fundamental right to resist occupation.”21 This 
principled position of the State of Qatar saw some changes in the future when the US put 
forward its initiative for democratic reform in 2003.  
In his address before the emergency meeting for the foreign ministers of Islamic states 
held in Doha, the Emir of Qatar, Hamad Bin Khalifa, spoke of the increasingly 
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complicated situation, and the ongoing Israeli aggression against the Palestinians and their 
national institutions. He called on the international community to shoulder its 
responsibilities towards the Palestinians and their rights, and to keep pressuring Israel to 
comply with international laws, to abandon its aggressive policies, to end its attempts at 
the Judaization of Jerusalem and changing its architecture, and eventually to end the 
occupation of the Syrian Golan and the complete and actual withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from the Lebanese territories in accordance with international legitimacy resolutions, most 
importantly UN Security Council Resolutions No. 242, 338, and 425.
22
 
With the increasing intensity of acts of resistance and Palestinian protests using all means 
during the Second Intifada, the Israeli authorities escalated their campaign against 
Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, and Yasser Arafat, which culminated in a siege of 
the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority amid increasingly vocal demands from 
within Israel to remove Arafat and replace him with a new leadership that was capable of 
controlling the security situation and curtailing the capabilities of Hamas.  
Qatar expressed its official stance in the following statement for the Council of Ministers:  
The Council of Ministers strongly condemns the barbaric Israeli assaults 
against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and the 
intransigent acts that are a stark violation of international conventions and 
treaties. The Qatari Council of Ministers calls on the international 
community as a whole with regard to this situation and to work to protect 
the Palestinian people, lift the siege, support the Palestinian Authority, stop 
the violence and oppression which is derailing the peace process and which 
is increasing the tensions, and exert efforts to resume the negotiations 
between the two sides in the hope of achieving a just peace in the region.
23
 
In the same context, in Washington, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, stated that: 
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The Palestinian people are subjected to a process of mass killing by the 
Israeli forces under flimsy excuses…The Israeli calls to replace the 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat cannot be accepted nor 
understood…Arafat is an elected president who represents the Palestinian 
people…I believe the only way out of this crisis in the Palestinian 
territories is for the Palestinian and Israeli parts to work diligently with US 
envoy General Anthony Zinni to diffuse the tensions, then start serious and 
direct talks between the two sides under US sponsorship and the backing of 
all the states of the region, because this is the only way to put an end to the 
suffering of the Palestinian people. 
24
 
10.3 Arafat’s siege: Terrorism or right of armed struggle  
According to the newspaper coverage, during the siege of Yasser Arafat’s presidential 
compound in Ramallah, the Israeli authorities deliberately destroyed the essential 
infrastructure, which were the facilities of the Palestinian Interior Ministry. Consequently, 
Qatar donated US$ 1 million to rebuild these facilities. Qatar’s Minister of State for 
Internal Affairs, Hamad Bin Nasser, told the second session of the 19th round of the Arab 
Interior Ministers Council in Beirut that:  
The Ministry of the Interior in Qatar is currently working to provide 
material aid for these facilities, as it is important to provide the necessary 
support to the Palestinian police to enable them to protect the security of 
the Palestinian people and the Palestinian internal front. Qatar’s 
fundamental and declared stance is to condemn terrorism of all types and 
forms…The state of Qatar hopes to formulate an international anti-
terrorism treaty that stipulates a clear definition of terrorism that is 
consistent with the objectives of the UN charter and the provisions of 
international human rights conventions and the pertinent UN General 
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Assembly resolutions, while taking into consideration the need to 
distinguish between terrorism as a criminal phenomenon and the right of 
people suffering under occupation to fight to liberate their land and 
exercise the right of self-determination.
25
 
In an effort to bolster the Palestinian Authority, Qatar’s Foreign Minister conducted a 
short visit to the besieged Yasser Arafat at the presidential headquarters in Ramallah and 
told reporters after the visit:  
It is important to exert efforts to stop the violence and the counter-
violence…There is no other option but to return to the negotiations table 
and discuss all the pending issues to spare the region further escalation and 
tensions and to create the right environment for the establishment of a 
comprehensive and just peace…This crisis will not be resolved through 
violence and the killing of women and children whether on the Palestinian 
or the Israeli side, and at the same time, we cannot say that the acts of the 
Palestinian side are violence. In fact, it is a natural reaction to the Israeli 
violence.
26
 
The Qatari Foreign Minister handed a cheque for the donation to Palestinian President 
Yasser Arafat during the Ramallah visit, and a spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign 
Ministry said, “This amount is part of the exceptional relief assistance to help the 
Palestinian leadership meet the requirements of its day-to-day affairs.”27 
On the day after the visit, the Emir of Qatar, in his capacity as the chairman of the 9th 
Summit for the Organization of Islamic Conference sent letters to the US Security Council 
permanent member states on the tragic situation suffered by the Palestinian people as a 
result of the ongoing Israeli violations and the recent escalation of these violations, and 
called for immediate action from the leaders of permanent members to stop the spiralling 
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violence, end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, and lift the siege imposed on 
the Palestinian president to enable him to perform his duties towards his people and the 
peace process. The Emir of Qatar reiterated that there was no way to end the violence 
except through going back to the negotiating table based on international legitimacy 
resolutions, the Madrid Conference formula, and the Land for Peace principle.
28
 
Qatar submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council with regard to the Israeli 
siege of Arafat and the overrunning of the Aqsa Mosque. The draft resolution called on 
the international community to stop the Israeli violation of international law and ethics.
29
 
In addition to the letters sent by the Emir of Qatar to the heads of UN Security Council 
permanent member states, the Emir met with the US Ambassador in Doha, Maureen 
Quinn, to discuss the serious developments affecting the Palestinian people and leadership 
as a result of the Israeli assaults on Palestinian cities and the headquarters of Palestinian 
President Yasser Arafat.  
The Emir of Qatar called for the immediate intervention by the US administration to stop 
these assaults and called on Israel to withdraw its forces form the Palestinian territories 
and to implement the relevant UN Security Council resolution, and warned of the 
consequences of the continued Israeli aggression, and the harm caused by the demeaning 
treatment of the Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat.
30
 Meanwhile, Qatar’s Foreign 
Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, in a telephone call with US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice, renewed his demands for the immediate lifting of the siege imposed on the 
Palestinian president, the withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces, and work towards 
defusing the tensions in the region.
31
 
At the same time, Qatar’s Ambassador to the UN Security Council raised a number of 
issues during the session held on the same day as the telephone conversation between 
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Hamad Bin Jassem and Condoleezza Rice, namely the Israeli aggression against the 
Palestinian people, the siege of Arafat, and the failure of the UN Security Council in its 
duties to maintain peace and security and protect civilians living under military 
occupation, as well as the double standards. Qatar’s Ambassador to the UN Security 
Council ridiculed the idea that the security of Israel could be achieved through military 
means, and reiterated that the security of Israel would only be achieved through 
negotiations to achieve a comprehensive peace that led to the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. With the eruption of a series of acts of violence planned and executed by 
the Palestinians in the heart of Israel, countries around the world differed on whether these 
operations were resistance operations or acts of terror. Qatar expressed its point of view 
through its foreign minister, who said the following in his address before the extraordinary 
session for the foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference on terrorism, 
which was held in Kuala Lumpur: 
The right to resist occupation must be the other face of the fight against 
terrorism; otherwise, any efforts that do not take into consideration this 
right will only feed the state of public rage in the Arab world against the 
West. We warned that this state cannot be avoided except if the 
international community agreed on a just and comprehensive solution to 
the Palestinian issue in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 
No. 242, 338, and 425…Qatar calls on the international community to 
focus the efforts to narrow the economic, technological, and social and 
other gaps between nations as a key step in the right direction to remove 
the causes that lead to the frustration of marginalized classes…The fact that 
Islamic nations have different customs and traditions compared to the West 
does not mean that we must be the scapegoat for all the repercussions of 
terrorism or the acts of terror that took place on September11.
32
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In a separate statement to the AFP news agency, Hamad Bin Jassem reiterated that it was 
the Israelis who were terrorists, not the Palestinians, who were fighting to liberate their 
territory. 
33
 
In the light of the international debate over terrorism and its definition, Qatar submitted 
the treaty adopted by the Doha Conference on the definition of terrorism for ratificat ion. 
Before the emergency conference for foreign ministers that was held in Doha in October 
2001, Hamad Bin Jassem said, “We condemned these heinous acts”. He said, “We must 
be able to conclusively differentiate between the struggle of oppressed and occupied 
nations and their right to resist to liberate their nations, and acts of terror.”34 
At the UN level, Qatar urged the international community to protect the Palestinians. 
Qatar’s Permanent Envoy to the UN in Geneva, Fahad Bin Owaida, told the 58th session 
of the Human Rights Commission, which convened to discuss human rights violations in 
the occupied Arab territories, that: 
The State of Qatar, in its capacity as the chairman state of the Organization 
of Islamic Conference, had condemned the serious Israeli escalation in the 
form of the overrunning of Palestinian cities, the headquarters of the 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, and acts of terror committed by the 
Israeli occupying forces in a flagrant violation of the obligations, 
undertaking, and treaties the Israeli authority is a signatory to, and the 
principles of international legitimacy and resolutions.
35
 
Following the Israeli attack on the Jenin refugee camp and the near complete destruction 
of the camp, which led to the death and injury of hundreds, the UN Security Council held 
a meeting that concluded with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1,405, 
calling for the formation of an investigation committee to investigate the extent to which 
Israeli forces adhered to international standards for the treatment of civilians under 
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occupation. Qatar’s Council of Ministers welcomed the resolution to send the fact-finding 
commission to investigate the actions of the Israeli force in Jenin, and the heinous carnage 
and the flagrant violations of Palestinian human rights. (The UN resolution stipulated the 
collection of specific information on the recent incidents in the Jenin refugee camp by the 
fact-finding commission, and required that the UN Security Council be kept informed.) 
The Council of Ministers called for the finding of a mechanism to implement the 
resolution, and voiced hopes that the fact-finding commission would be able to complete 
its mission soon. It also backed the UN Secretary General’s calls to send multinational 
troops to be deployed in the occupied Palestinian territories to protect the Palestinians and 
to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Palestinian territories and 
cities, and to establish a stable atmosphere that permitted the resumption of negotiations 
between the two sides. The Council also called on the international community to work 
hard to provide protection to the Palestinians and put an end to Israel’s repeated barbaric 
assaults against the Palestinian people, while stressing that compliance with the rules of 
international legitimacy and the performance of obligations and undertakings were the 
best way to achieve peace and security in the region.
36
 Israel’s decision to impose 
conditions on the fact-finding mission angered Arab states, while the Europeans expressed 
hopes that the task of the fact-finding commission would begin soon. 
Qatar continued its anti-Israeli diplomatic efforts. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Abdullah Al Mahmoud, addressed the Non-Alignment Movement Summit in Durban, 
South Africa, by stating that the requirements of peace and security in the Middle East 
would only be met by implementing international legitimacy resolutions that guaranteed 
the restoration of all the national and legitimate Palestinian rights, led by the right of self-
determination; the establishment of an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital; the 
withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights to the line of 4 June 1967; and the 
withdrawal from the remaining occupied part of the Lebanese territory. Al Mahmoud held 
Israel responsible for the erosion of the peace prospects in the region, stressing that this 
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required a tough international stance in the face of Israeli intransigence.
37
 The chairman of 
the Qatari delegation to the Non-Alignment Movement Summit voiced hopes that the fact-
finding commission formed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 1,405 would 
be able to expose the Israeli crimes against civilians in the city of Jenin as soon as 
possible.
38
 
Al Mahmoud called on the Non-Alignment Movement member states to express their 
solidarity with the Palestinian people and to focus efforts to support an end to the 
Palestinian occupation by pressuring Israel to comply with the peace process and 
implement the relevant UN resolutions. He stressed the urgent need to arrive at an 
internationally agreed upon definition for terrorism, while taking into account the 
differentiation between terrorism and the legitimate resistance to foreign aggression and 
the struggle of people living under foreign occupation to liberate their land and for self-
determination.
39
 
During their meeting in Paris, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, stressed to 
his Israeli counterpart, Shimon Peres, the need for Israel’s compliance with the treaties 
and undertakings signed with the Palestinian Authority and to make an effort to restore the 
peace process and to establish adequate mechanisms to implement the positive proposals, 
as per the statement issued by US President George Bush, through the Israeli withdrawal 
from the Palestinian territories re-occupied by Israel. Jassem reiterated to Peres the need to 
stop all intransigent acts by the Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians, and to ease the 
siege imposed on Palestinian territories and recognize the legitimate rights of Palestinians, 
including their right to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. Jassem 
reiterated his condemnation of the killing of innocent civilians on both sides, stressing that 
there would be no peace or stability in the Middle East except through recognizing the 
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legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Jassem concluded his statement by reiterating 
Qatar’s fundamental support of the Palestinian people and its legitimate leadership.40 
Following the issuance of the fact-finding commission’s report pursuant to UN Security 
Council Resolution No. 1,405, which Qatar criticized for bias towards Israel, Qatar 
exerted further diplomatic pressures through Abdullah Al Hanzab, the acting chairman of 
Qatar’s delegation to the UN General Assembly, who told the Assembly:  
Initiatives and negotiations pertaining to the Arab-Israeli struggle must 
succeed in the establishment of all facets of Palestinian and Arab rights, 
and the State of Palestine must be able to have a seat as a full member of 
the UN with complete and intact sovereignty and with its capital as 
Jerusalem based on international legitimacy. The State of Qatar calls on the 
UN to condemn state-sponsored terrorism exercised by Israel against the 
Palestinian people. Qatar has found that the report prepared by the fact-
finding commission contains many discrepancies and that it relied heavily 
on the version presented by the Israeli Government, while undermining the 
version presented by the Palestinian Authority and the international and 
human rights organizations, which renders the report unbalanced and unfair 
to the Palestinians.
41
 
Within the same UN perspective, Qatar's Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, addressed 
the ordinary session of the UN General Assembly saying that: 
Qatar rejects double standards or selective UN Security Council resolutions 
that allow Israel to evade the implementation of any resolutions adopted by 
the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly. Qatar is extremely 
regretful of the failure of the UN Security Council and the other UN 
components to put an end to the barbaric Israeli assaults in the Golan 
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Heights and Southern Lebanon…Qatar also regrets … the siege imposed 
on Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in flagrant defiance of the 
international community and international laws and customs, in addition to 
the targeting of civilian houses and the killing of innocent women, children, 
and the elderly…The massacres in Jenin and Gaza represent a flagrant 
violation of modern international laws… Israel will not achieve peace 
except through pursuing peace by respecting international legitimacy 
resolutions.
42
 
Qatar called on the UN Security Council to issue a binding resolution stipulating the 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the city of Ramallah, and the 
lifting of the siege against Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and members of the 
Palestinian Authority following the massacres by the Israeli occupation forces against the 
Palestinian people and the assaults against the Palestinian leadership.  
Qatar's Permanent Envoy to the UN, Nasser Abdulaziz Al Nasr, spoke during a session 
held by the UN Security Council to discuss the situation in the Middle East, including the 
Palestinian issue: 
You are well aware of the events and well aware of the losses to life and 
property. The aim is to undermine the Palestinian Authority and Palestine’s 
national security. This is happening at a time when Israel is calling on the 
Palestinian Authority to deter and stop the suicide bombings and violence. 
What kind of logic is that? How can the Authority play its role in 
maintaining security and deterring suicide attacks when Israel is destroying 
the infrastructure of the Palestinian security forces, apprehending and 
killing its members? Israel’s justifications for its acts of aggression against 
Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority compound, using the pretext of the 
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Palestinian Authority’s failure to stop the suicide bombings against Israel, 
are totally unacceptable.
43
 
Meanwhile, Hamas-affiliated Al Qassam Brigades militiamen ambushed Israeli settlers 
near Al Khalil and injured five in retaliation against the Israeli military operation in Khan 
Yunis in southern Gaza, which resulted in an Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip and the 
killing of 14 Palestinians during an expanded military campaign, in which tanks and 
fighter jets were used. In a statement, Hamas described the incursion as a barbaric 
massacre, and called for a harsh response from Palestinian factions.
44
 
For its part, the Qatari Council of Ministers deplored what it described as a heinous 
massacre and the barbaric acts committed by the Israeli forces in Khan Yunis in the Gaza 
Strip against the unarmed Palestinians and that led to the killing of tens of martyrs. The 
Council of Ministers reiterated during its ordinary session, chaired by Prime Minister 
Abdullah Bin Al Khalifa, that the latest massacre and the inhuman assaults against the 
Palestinian people represented a continuation of the oppressive policy maintained by Israel 
in a flagrant defiance of international legitimacy and international treaties and conventions 
and human rights laws. The Council of Ministers stated that these barbaric and inhuman 
practices committed by Israel required that the Arab world embody an effective solidarity 
with the Palestinian people going beyond mere rhetoric, which is of no use to the 
Palestinian people and which only serves to undermine the status of the Arab nation, but 
instead to cause concrete actions on the ground to defend the Palestinian cause, which is 
the common cause of all Arabs. The Council of Ministers called on the international 
community to shoulder its responsibility, provide international protection for the 
Palestinian people and put an end to the repeated Israeli assaults, while reiterating that 
compliance with the rules of international legitimacy and the performance of obligations 
was the best way to achieve peace and security in the region.
45
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During the US Islamic World Forum held in Doha, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad bin 
Jassem, criticized what he described as the contradictions in the statements used by the US 
administration to justify the military strikes against Iraq, and which ranged from toppling 
the Iraqi regime to the acquisition by Baghdad of weapons of mass destruction and links 
with terrorism. The Qatari Foreign Minister said in his address before the last session of 
the forum that he fundamentally disagreed with the principle of changing the regime in 
Iraq: 
We as a government, and myself as a person, stress the seriousness of this 
principle, because changing the regime must be through UN resolutions or 
through the International Court of Justice… I believe that linking Iraq with 
terrorism is wrong, since Iraq lacks the motives for such a link in addition 
to the ideological contradictions between the ruling Baath regime in Iraq 
and Al Qaeda…Why can't there be an international coalition to force Israel 
to comply with UN resolutions just like the international collation against 
Iraq? If the issue is that the Iraqi regime is oppressing its people and 
attacking its neighbours, then the same applies to Israel, who is oppressing 
the Palestinians on the land they gained through the Oslo Accord. We have 
two identical cases here that warrant identical action.
46
 
 (This marks the beginning of a significant change in Qatari behaviour with regard to 
Israel since Qatar assumed the chairmanship of the Organization of Islamic Conference.) 
In his address to the opening session of the Conference on Arab-US Relations in Doha, the 
Emir of Qatar called on the US to:  
…exercise greater balance, fairness, and equity in dealing with Arab and 
Islamic issues. Let me be clear on this, we do not call on the US to abandon 
its special relationship with Israel, but we call on the US, in its capacity as 
a superpower, to rise up to its international political and moral 
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responsibilities with regard to the Palestinian issue and the Israeli-Arab 
conflict in accordance with the rules of international legitimacy, and to 
exert the needed efforts and to pressure Israel into ending its occupation of 
the Arab territories.
47
 
There was another push. As part of the continuous efforts exerted by the chairmanship of 
the Organization of Islamic Conference with the world community to urge the countries of 
the world to rise to their responsibility with regard to the implementation of international 
legitimacy laws to avert further deterioration in the occupied Arab territories in particular, 
and the Arab region in general, the Emir of Qatar, in his capacity as the chairman of the 
9th Organization of Islamic Conference Summit, sent letters to the UN Security Council 
permanent member states, the UN Secretary General, and Pope John Paul II. Qatar’s 
official news agency said the letters were related to the serious developments and the 
deteriorating situation in the Arab occupied territories. The letters also called on UN 
Security Council permanent member states, the UN secretary general, and His Holiness 
the Pope to exert efforts to confront the Israeli assaults against the Palestinian people and 
Israel’s continued violations in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, and 
particularly the Israeli attempts to change the Christian and Islamic historic identity and 
features of the city of Jerusalem. For his part, Ambassador Saif Al Mokadem Al Buenain, 
the General Coordinator for the Secretariat of the Organization of Islamic Conference, 
said:  
His Highness the Emir of Qatar gives utmost priority to the Palestinian 
cause, and particularly the issue of Jerusalem, as the number one issue for 
Arabs and Muslims. In this context were His Highness’ letters to direct the 
world’s attention to the gravity of the situation in the occupied territories 
and Israel’s aggression against the Palestinian people, as well as the 
process carried out by Israel for the purpose of the Judaization of Jerusalem 
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by causing demographic changes to the city, which is a violation of the UN 
resolutions.
48
 
In a letter submitted to the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights,
49
 on 
the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, the Emir of 
Qatar called on the international community to shoulder its responsibilities to provide 
international protection to the Palestinian people and called on the UN to take the 
necessary punitive actions against Israel in application of the partnership treaty signed 
with Israel. The Emir urged the UN Security Council to take the necessary measures to 
pressure Israel to implement international legitimacy resolutions leading to the 
establishment of a just and comprehensive peace enjoyed by all the states of the region 
and the people of the region who aspire to having peace and stability. In marking the 
International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people, the Emir pointed out that it 
came during extremely difficult and delicate circumstances overshadowing the peace 
process in the Middle East. Most importantly, there was the very serious situation in the 
Palestinian occupied territories due to the incursions, the siege, the massacres, the 
assassinations, the kidnapping, and the oppressive acts committed by Israel against the 
Palestinian civilian population, in addition to the destruction of the Palestinian Authority’s 
infrastructure with the aim of undermining this authority. 
In his letter, the Emir voiced confidence in the UN as an intrinsic, fundamental, and 
impartial point of reference for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He held Israel 
and its allies responsible for the failure of the peace process. At the end of his letter, he 
also called on the international community and the UN to shoulder their obligations with 
regard to the establishment of international peace and security.
50
 
Following the Israeli attack on the Al Braij refugee camp in Gaza, which left five 
Palestinians dead and 35 others arrested, the Qatari Council of Ministers, in its meeting 
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presided over by Prime Minister Abdullah Bin Khalifa Al Thani, condemned these 
attacks. Al Thani called on the international community to protect the Palestinians and put 
an end to the Israeli attacks and threats, which were derailing the peace process, and to 
work on the resumption of the negotiations between the two sides in the hope of achieving 
a just peace in the region.
51
 
In his address before the opening session of the Supreme Gulf Cooperation Council, the 
Emir of Qatar lamented the deteriorating Arab situation and specified a strategic Arab 
choice for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause, which was at the heart of this 
conflict:  
We are witnessing a tragic situation in Palestine. The Arab world finds 
itself completely helpless, while the Israeli occupation forces continue with 
the hostilities against the people of Palestine and their leaders in a serious 
escalation of the situation in the region, which jeopardizes international 
peace and security, and makes the peace aspired for by the people of the 
region an unattainable dream… However, the Israeli escalation proves that 
Israel has chosen might and force over negotiations that are based on 
international legitimacy resolutions, which call for the Israeli withdrawal 
from all occupied Arab territories to the line of 4 June 1967, and the 
recognition of all the legitimate Palestinian rights led by the right to 
establish an independent state on Palestinian national soil with Jerusalem as 
its capital.
52
 
Israel raided Bait Hanoun, in what the Qatari Foreign Ministry called the Massacre of Bait 
Hanoun, which left 11 dead and scores injured. An official Foreign Ministry spokesman 
told the QNA official Qatari news agency: 
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These attacks represent a flagrant violation of international conventions and 
international and human rules and are an attempt by Israel to exploit the 
current regional circumstances to execute its plans that aim to destroy any 
prospects for peace in the region. We call on the international community 
to shoulder its responsibility and take the necessary measures to protect the 
Palestinian people against these attacks. Qatar’s fundamental stance is 
based on the premise that a comprehensive and just peace will never be 
achieved except by implementing international legitimacy resolutions and 
enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights and 
establish their independent state on their national soil with Jerusalem as its 
capital.
53
 
At the beginning of his visit to Egypt to attend the 15th Arab Summit meeting in Sharm 
el-Sheikh, the Emir said: 
My biggest hope is that we will all be able to unite our efforts towards 
unified stances for a correct vision, through which we can address the 
international community in order to reach acceptable and peaceful solutions 
that comply with the international resolutions adopted by the UN with 
regard to the national issues, led by the situation in Iraq and the occupied 
Palestinian territories.
54
 
The Emir seemed to be criticizing the past Arab vision and indirectly hinting that it was 
flawed. He also made a reference to the UN reference points, and the reference points for 
the Madrid and Oslo process, hinting that they no longer served as an adequate basis to 
rely on.  
The Emir returned to Doha after one day spent participating in the Arab Summit. In Doha, 
he began preparing for the Organization of the Islamic Conference Summit, planned to be 
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held in Doha, which was to be chaired by Qatar. This summit’s agenda focused on 
supporting clear ideas and fundamentals on the Iraqi and Palestinian issues.
55
 
10.4 The Roadmap 
The Roadmap was agreed upon in December 2002 to identify the practical measures 
required to resume the peace process and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state 
that could survive side by side with Israel. US President George W. Bush declared the US 
commitment to continue with the peace process through the Roadmap, which the US 
considered to be a step in the right direction towards establishing a just and 
comprehensive peace in the region. Qatar welcomed the joint statement issued by Bush 
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the Roadmap. An official foreign ministry 
spokesman told Qatar’s official news agency, QNA: 
The US must take immediate and active steps to implement the Roadmap, 
and take positive steps to advance the peace process in accordance with the 
grounds on which that process was established, namely, international 
legitimacy resolutions and the Land for Peace principle to end the Israeli 
occupation of all the Arab and Palestinian territories and recognize the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, led by the right to establish an 
independent state on the Palestinians’ national soil with Jerusalem as its 
capital.
56
 
During the second emergency summit for the Organization of Islamic Conference in 
Doha, and before the invasion of Iraq, the Emir of Qatar identified Israel as the main threat 
to the Palestinians, and the cause of the continued escalation against Palestinians. He also 
pointed out the siege of Arafat, and he demanded that the international community in 
general, and the US in particular, shoulder their responsibility to bring a fair and just 
settlement to the Middle East conflict. He referred to Israel's insistence on achieving peace 
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and stability through military force, but only through the UN resolutions would a fair 
peace be achieved.
57
 
The Emir of Qatar reiterated the same approach and vision, in addition to welcoming the 
US administration’s stance with regard to the establishment of a Palestinian state during 
Qatar’s Third Democracy and Free Trade Conference: 
We believe that it has become necessary to embark on a swift and effective 
international move to put an end to the hostilities and to enable the 
Palestinian people to attain their national and legitimate rights, including 
the right of self-determination and the establishment of an independent 
state with Jerusalem as its capital. In this juncture, I laud the stance 
declared by US President George W. Bush to support the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state as part of a final solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict.
58
 
Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, held a meeting in the French capital, Paris, 
with Silvan Shalom, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel. 
Following the meeting, Al Thani told reporters: 
The state of Qatar is attempting to play a role to return the Israeli and 
Palestinian sides to the negotiating table, and we believe the only solution 
to this crisis is through the mutual recognition of rights based on 
international laws and UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly 
Resolution No. 242. The State of Qatar is optimistic about the Roadmap, 
and particularly about US President George W. Bush’s stance in this 
regard. We believe both sides need to make sacrifices in order to achieve 
peace.
59
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Speaking about relations with Israel and the Israeli liaison office in Doha, Al Thani said, 
“I believe the march for the normalization of relations has begun and Arabs announced a 
decision in Beirut to normalize relations with Israel. I stress that Qatar is working in 
favour of the peace process.”60 
In response to questions on the agreement with Israel, Al Thani said: 
We do not object to making a deal with Israel. However, we don’t see this 
as necessary at the moment as we do not have direct borders with Israel. 
However, when we do have peace, everything will be possible. In Qatar, 
we have an open view with regard to establishing good relations with 
everybody including Israel, but there are many conditions that must be met 
before that.
61
 
Speaking on the Palestinian situation, the Foreign Minister referred to how difficult it was, 
saying that the news of the Palestinian fallen was heart-wrenching, and that the situation 
needed the pooling of all efforts to find a way out of the situation and a peaceful and just 
solution to the Palestinian cause.
62
 
After the meeting, the Israeli cabinet ratified the draft of the Roadmap, and the official 
spokesman for the Qatari Foreign Ministry commented in statements to the official Qatari 
news agency, QNA, saying: 
We stress that it is important for the Israeli Government to effect a practical 
implementation of this ratification on the ground in accordance with the 
Land for Peace principle and the international legitimacy resolutions, and 
the vision of US President George W. Bush to establish an independent 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. We appreciate the effort 
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exerted by the US president to push the Middle East peace process and 
peace and stability for the region’s states and people.63 
In Qatar’s address before the Economic and Social Forum in Geneva, Abdullah Al Slaity, 
the first secretary of Qatar’s permanent delegation to the UN said: 
The State of Qatar hopes that the Roadmap will create a new and real 
opportunity to achieve a conclusive and comprehensive settlement of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel must perform its obligations under the 
Roadmap in a practical way in accordance with the Land for Peace 
principle and the international legitimacy resolutions and the vision of the 
US President George W. Bush to establish an independent Palestinian 
state.
64
 
On the sidelines of his participation in the Detroit Economic Forum in the US, First 
Deputy to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, told the Al 
Jazeera channel, “I hold Israel responsible for obstructing the Roadmap.”65 He also 
stressed the importance of keeping the Roadmap on the negotiating table:  
The key question now is: Who derailed the Roadmap? I believe that 
Israel’s policy during the truce, which lasted for 51 days, is to be blamed 
for foiling the Roadmap... Who broke the truce?...It is the Israeli side that 
broke the truce. Nevertheless, no one held the Israeli side responsible, or at 
least attempted to blame the Israeli side for derailing the Roadmap… It is 
important now to know how to keep the Roadmap on the negotiating table, 
even without the impetus, until the right time comes to move it forward. 
Unfortunately, this is the reality of the situation right now.
66
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After the Foreign Minister’s interview with Al Jazeera, the Israeli Government ordered an 
airstrike against a site near Damascus. It claimed the site was a terrorist training camp. 
Qatar condemned the air raid by the Israeli forces on Syrian territories. The official 
spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry told Qatar’s official news agency, QNA, that 
“These acts represent a serious threat to peace in the Middle East and drag the region back 
to the atmosphere of war, violence, and tensions.” The spokesperson reiterated Qatar’s 
support of Syria, and called on the international community to exert pressure on Israel to 
stop these hostilities and to respect international legitimacy rulings stipulating the 
withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories.
67
 
In his address to the 10th round of the Islamic Summit Conference in Putrajaya, Malaysia, 
the Emir blamed the Israeli Government for failing to comply with the Roadmap. He said: 
We reiterate our rejection of any attempts by the Israeli Government not to 
comply with the Roadmap and limiting the approach to this Roadmap to 
the security dimension only. We also reject Israel’s decision to isolate the 
legitimately elected Palestinian President Yasser Arafat as undermining the 
entire peace process…We call on the international community and the 
Middle East Quartet to provide international protection for the Palestinian 
people and enable the Palestinians to exercise their fundamental and 
legitimate national rights, and to stop all that could derail the peace efforts 
in accordance with international legitimacy and the Roadmap and to 
pressure Israel to comply with its obligations and withdraw from the Golan 
Heights and the rest of the Lebanese territories.
68
 
On the other side, when a group of Palestinians attacked a US diplomatic vehicle, leaving 
three people dead, Qatar condemned the action and said it regretted the attack, describing 
it as criminal. An official spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign Ministry told Qatar’s 
official news agency, QNA, that Qatar expressed condolences to the families of the 
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victims, and the government and people of the United States, and reiterated Qatar’s 
fundamental stance to condemn terrorism of all forms and sources. Furthermore, the 
Qatari Council of Ministers strongly condemned the loss of lives during its ordinary 
session chaired by Prime Minister Abdullah Bin Khalifa Al Thani.
69
 
In his address to the 32nd ordinary session of the Qatar Consultative Council, the Emir of 
Qatar said that the Palestinian cause was Qatar’s first national issue.70 The Emir held 
Israel responsible for thwarting any opportunity to achieve peace, and he demanded that 
the international community and the Middle East Quartet provide international protection 
for the Palestinian people.
71
 
The escalating violence and counter violence gave a clear indication that the peace process 
was doomed to fail. Israeli forces invaded Ramallah, and Qatar called on the international 
community and all peace-loving nations to promptly intervene to push for an immediate 
stop to the massacres committed by the Israeli forces and the barbaric attacks by Israel on 
Palestinians, particularly the most recent attack on the Nusairat refugee camp in the central 
Gaza Strip. In a statement to QNA, an official spokesperson for the Qatari Foreign 
Ministry called on the international community to shoulder its responsibility and take the 
necessary measures to protect the Palestinian people against these assault , calling on the 
Middle East Quartet to promptly intervene and calling for the quick intervention of the 
US, in particular in its capacity as the sponsor for the peace process, to pressure Israel into 
putting an end to these assaults and to perform the obligations of the Roadmap to achieve 
peace and stability in the region.
72
 
Qatar condemned the Israeli acts that violated Palestinian human rights on an ongoing and 
daily basis, which have been witnessed by the entire world. The Third Secretary at the 
Foreign Minister’s Office, Khalid Ibrahim Abdulrahman Al Hamr, told the fourth 
committee for the 58th UN General Assembly round on Article 84, “The Report by the 
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Special Commission Appointed to Investigate the Israeli Practices that Affect Palestinian 
Human Rights and the Arab Population in the Occupied Territories”, that these 
illegitimate acts must be condemned so as to uphold the legitimacy of the Palestinians’ 
struggle to liberate their land and resist the occupation that seized their lands and 
displaced their people. Al Hamr reiterated the legitimacy of this resistance under 
international laws, which recognize resistance to liberate occupied land from occupiers.
73
 
10.5 The assassination of Ahmed Yassin 
On 22 March 2004, Israel assassinated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and Qatar’s Council of 
Ministers expressed its strong condemnation of the heinous crime committed by the Israeli 
forces, and the targeting of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his entourage.  
In a statement to the international community as a whole, the Council of Ministers called 
for the community to bear its full responsibility for the tragic suffering of the Palestinian 
people due to the ongoing Israeli escalations and the relentless campaign to target innocent 
and unarmed civilians.
74
 
Qatar used the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin to intensify the diplomatic rhetoric 
against Israel, and took the case to the UN Security Council, where Qatar’s Envoy to the 
UN Security Council expressed the State of Qatar’s condemnation and denunciation of 
this heinous crime, and blamed Israel for the deterioration of the situation in the occupied 
territories.
75
 
Before another international organization, the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, 
Qatar reiterated calls for finding a just and permanent solution in the Middle East on the 
basis of international legitimacy resolutions, and called for breaking the stalemate in the 
peace process, and for the return of the parties to the negotiating table.  
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Discussing Article No.8 of the agenda on the issue of the human rights violations in 
occupied territories, including the Palestinian territories, Jassim Abdulaziz Al Bouenain, 
the Minister Plenipotentiary of Qatar’s permanent delegation to the 60th Session for the 
Human Rights Commission, said: 
The State of Qatar condemns the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin…These operations only indicate Israel’s attempts to drag the region 
into a spiral of violence and counter violence and to abort any prospects for 
peace…Qatar calls on the international community to bear its 
responsibilities and to move immediately and effectively to put a stop to 
the repeated Israeli crimes and attacks and to provide international 
protection for the Palestinian people and its leadership…Qatar calls for 
putting an end to the spiral of violence and backing the efforts to revive the 
peace process and return to the negotiating table on the basis of the 
Roadmap, for the purpose of ending the occupation and establishing an 
independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital…the 
Government of the State of Qatar appeals to the international community 
and the Human Rights Commission to provide international protection for 
the Palestinian people and to push for an Israeli withdrawal from Arab 
occupied territories including Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights, and 
Lebanon’s Shebaa farms, and for finding a solution that guarantees an end 
to the occupation.
76
 
In his address before the 4th Doha Forum for Democracy and Free Trade, the Emir of 
Qatar deplored the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and defended Palestinian and 
Arab rights. He said:  
One of our strategic fundamentals is to defend the right of the Palestinian 
people to establish their independent state, which restores to these people 
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all their legitimate rights and protects them from the insolence and 
barbarism of the Israeli actions. The failure to resolve the Palestinian cause 
has led to a build-up of rage in our region that cannot be ignored. This was 
recently confirmed by the Arab frustration over the use of the veto right in 
the UN Security Council against a draft resolution to condemn the Israeli 
assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
77
 
10.6 The separation wall and the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza  
In 2002, in an attempt by the Israeli Government to control the security situation in the 
West Bank and to increase the pressure on Palestinians there, the Israeli Government 
sanctioned the plan to build a separation barrier to seal off Palestinian cities and towns, 
and to separate these towns and cities form Israeli settlements. The Separation Barrier had 
a major negative impact on the lives, and the economic and transportation activities, of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, and it created immense suffering for students, 
farmers, and people requiring medical treatment.  
The Palestinian Authority took the case of the Separation Barrier to the International Court 
of Justice, which rendered a consultative ruling to the effect that the construction of this 
barrier was illegal. Qatar called on Israel to respect the ruling of the International Court of 
Justice on the barrier, which Israel had begun constructing two years earlier at the heart of 
the West Bank and around Jerusalem. Qatar stressed that Israel’s failure to abide by the 
ruling rendered by the International Court of Justice constituted a violation of international 
conventions and a devastating blow to any prospects for peace in the region.  
Acting Charge D’affaires for Qatar’s Permanent UN Delegation, Jamal Nasser Al Badr, 
spoke before the General Assembly’s 10th Emergency Session on the legal consequences 
of the construction of the Separation Barrier by the occupation authorities in Palestinian 
occupied territories, including Eastern Jerusalem and its peripheries.
78
 
                                               
77(Hamed Bin Khalifa AlThani: 5-4-2004) 
78
General Assembly Emergency Special Session A/ES-10/PV.24 p 23, Appendix No. 18. 
 
283 
 
Meanwhile, Minster of state for Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Al Mahmoud, warned in his 
address to the Islamic Conference ministers’ meeting in Istanbul that Israel was attempting 
to execute its plan to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza without making any specific 
arrangements with the Palestinian Authority for the purpose of facilitating its plan to 
freely expand the settlement activities in the West Bank:  
Israel is attempting to exploit the international community’s preoccupation 
with Iraq to execute its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza for the purpose of 
being free to expand its settlement activities in the West Bank and 
extinguish the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their land. This is a 
serious development that poses a serious threat to the legitimate aspirations 
of the Palestinian people, and creates very significant political changes on 
the ground that undermine the security and stability of the region…The 
State of Qatar reiterates its solidarity with Syria and Lebanon, and calls for 
an end to the hostile campaigns against them… The Government of the 
State of Qatar expresses regret over the US decision to impose economic 
sanctions on Syria.
79
 
In his address to the 59th Round of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Emir of 
Qatar spoke in support of Palestinian rights and criticized the Israeli actions: 
The Palestinian issue is a model that embodies the suffering of a people 
who were denied their political and economic rights and who are trying, 
despite all the difficulties...the Israeli occupation remains a heavy burden 
and a major obstacle against the legitimate Palestinian dreams of liberty 
and development … the international community needs a serious pause to 
reflect and to awaken its consciousness with regard to a cause … It is of 
paramount importance and an undeniable duty to keep Israel under 
obligation to enforce international legitimacy rulings, which in my opinion, 
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cannot be viewed selectively or as optional, to be respected by some while 
disrespected by others. Furthermore, Israel must comply with all its 
pervious undertakings including the Roadmap. Israel must also halt the 
construction of the Separation Barrier, which has a detrimental effect on 
the livelihood of Palestinians as ruled by the International Court of Justice 
on 9 July... Israel must recognize the right of self-determination for the 
Palestinian people and their right to establish their independent state with 
Jerusalem as its capital under a peaceful coexistence with Israel.
80
 
Addressing the UN Security Council, Al Badr condemned Israel’s decision to continue the 
construction of the separation wall, which the entire international community had 
denounced, including a large proportion of Israeli society.
81
 
10.7 Arafat’s death  
Despite the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) stance with regard to the invasion 
of Iraq, and its support of Saddam Hussain at the expense of Kuwait, which is a Gulf 
Cooperation Council member state, Qatar downplayed this stance and forged strong 
relations with Arafat, the PLO, and, later, the Palestinian National Authority. Qatar 
supported the Palestinian Authority fully.  
Qatar’s stance with regard to the death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat reflected 
clear respect and sadness. The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa, offered 
condolences on the death of Arafat in the following statement issued by the Emiri Divan: 
With hearts filled with sorrow, we received the news of the death of His 
Excellency and our dear brother, freedom fighter, President of the State of 
Palestine and Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization Yasser 
Arafat…The Arab and Islamic nations have lost one of the most 
distinguished leaders, who dedicated his life and efforts to fight for the 
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cause of his people and to realize the aspirations of the Palestinians for 
liberty, independence, and the right of self-determination.
82
 
The Emir of Qatar declared a state of public mourning in Qatar for three days.
83
 
The Emir of Qatar also sent cables of condolence to interim Chairman of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, Rouhi Fatouh; Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen, the Chairman of 
the executive committee of the PLO; and Ahmed Qurea, the Palestinian Prime 
Minister.
84
Crown Prince Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani also sent cables of condolence to 
Rouhi Fatouh, Mahmoud Abbas, and Ahmed Qurae.
85
 His Highness Sheikh Prime 
Minister Abdullah Khalifa Al Thani sent similar cables of condolence to the head of the 
Palestinian Authority.
86
 
10.8 Qatar and the democratic reform initiatives and the Middle East peace process 
In late 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that US$29 million had been 
allocated for the US-Middle East partnership initiative, aiming to produce strong US 
support for change and reform, and a future of modernity in the Middle East. Powell 
vocally called for the emergence of a replacement Palestinian leadership in a reiteration of 
Washington’s implied wish to exclude Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, a wish that 
was rejected by the Palestinian leadership, who argued that it was the Israeli occupation, 
and not the Palestinian leadership, that was denying the Palestinians their political rights.
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Despite strong opposition from many Arab states, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE and the Palestinian Authority against this US initiative, Qatar welcomed the 
initiative and began to build on it. Meanwhile, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin 
Jassem stated during his participation on the first day of the Dead Sea Forum that: 
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Change in the Arab World has become inevitable and an urgent 
requirement that must stem from the internal needs of societies… We have 
to exercise more transparency and tell the truth to our people. The steps for 
qualitative change taken by the Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa since rising to the 
helm of power in 1995, and which were within the framework of his policy 
of openness, aim to consolidate the democratic alternative. This became 
clear through the abolition of censorship; the abolition of the Ministry of 
Information; recognizing the freedom of the press; conducting the elections 
for the Municipal Council; recognizing women’s suffrage and the 
preparation of the permanent constitution and the referendum on it, as it is 
a prelude to conducting the first parliamentary elections, which is an 
unprecedented move… The steps for change also included the education 
system, through the modernization of curriculums to be compatible with 
international changes in this area.
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In what was seen as a new Qatari vision that developed over the previous year after the 
Middle East reform initiative announced by Colin Powell, and in what seemed a quick 
response to the polices of US President George W. Bush’s administration to review the 
sources of tensions in the region and to review the methodology for resolution, Qatar 
announced the adoption of a new strategy. It was announced by Foreign Minister Hamad 
Bin Jassem in his address before the first session of the Doha International Forum, under 
the title of international political developments and regional challenges. Jassem explained 
the approaches adopted by Qatar, and the priorities dictated by these approaches: 
We cannot achieve developmental goals in a satisfactory manner in 
isolation from political circumstances, and the surrounding strategic and 
security conditions. The challenges facing the region in the form of the 
ongoing conflicts and regional crises continue to represent a source of 
instability, and obstruct democratization efforts and derail any effective 
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public participation in the political process and the march for 
democratization. This entails weak economic performance, cultural and 
scientific backwardness, and generates sentiments of public frustration and 
rage, in addition to providing an environment conducive to the emergence 
of radicalism, violence, and terrorism. The identification of these 
challenges and risks is the first step towards a serious and effective 
solution, which will be followed by actions to reverse the consequences of 
these risks and the negative repercussions thereof, through a process of 
development and modernization… The most important and most 
threatening conflict in the region is the Arab-Israeli conflict.
89
 
For his part, US Envoy Mark Grossman sought to dissipate fears that Washington was 
seeking to impose democratic reforms on Arab and Islamic countries, saying “The best 
ideas on change are expected to stem from within the region.”90 
Following talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, the US Deputy Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs said reform must not wait for the reaching of a settlement by 
the Palestinians and the Israelis. Grossman added that “Reform efforts in Arab states must 
not wait for comprehensive peace.”91 There seemed to be a US-Qatari understanding with 
regard to the US Middle East Reform Initiative, proposed by the US between late 2002 
and early 2004. In response to questions on the US initiative, which was called the 
“Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative”, Qatar’s Foreign Minister Hamad Bin 
Jassem said:  
We want to know about this initiative and whether it will contribute in 
changing the situation in the Middle East with regard to public participation 
and improving the economy…This would be good, and we must hold 
discussions with those proposing the initiative and develop this initiative if 
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it is in the interest of our region…We do not want to continue to reject; we 
do not have an alternative solution…Naturally, each state will do what it 
can in accordance with its internal circumstances…However, I am against 
any unjustified rejection before we know the content of the US or the 
European initiative. We must first know the details, and if such details are 
good, we will work with them on how to further and develop this work.
92
 
Responding to questions about beginning the reform without waiting to raise the issue of 
the Middle East Peace Process, the Foreign Minister said, “Why wait for the peace process 
to start reforms? If the peace process took another twenty years, then should Arabs wait 
for all this time to begin the reform process? Are we using the peace process as an excuse? 
We must begin the reform, then make demands.”93 
Bin Jassem then began to covertly criticize Arab states that rejected the US initiative, such 
as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt:  
We must admit that the Arab prejudice against the US initiative reflects a 
state of political bankruptcy. There is no harm in benefiting from the 
positive aspects of the initiative. 
The Foreign Minister pointed to the core issue by saying: 
We cannot reject something we are not acquainted with yet, and which we 
did not discuss. We must identify the pros and cons. There is no reason to 
reject the initiative if it would help with reform efforts. …What is 
important is to deal with the ideas being proposed, and not to preoccupy 
ourselves with the origin of these ideas. If we can combine the positive 
aspects of the US and Arab initiatives, then why must we adopt a negative 
stance under the pretext of rejecting foreign intervention? Arabs have 
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continued to reject this for the past fifty years and this has not led to any 
positive results.
94
 
Speaking before the Fourth Doha Forum for Democracy and Free Trade, the Qatari 
Foreign Minister spoke of the relationship between democratic reform and resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict: 
There is an approach that has been prevalent in our region for many years 
now, to excessively seek excuses in what others do to justify neglecting 
reforms and to offer justifications for the failure to join the march for 
advancement. Some blame the Ottoman dominance, while others blame 
Western colonialism and its consequences for our current status, or say that 
reform has to wait until a peaceful resolution to the conflict with Israel is 
reached, especially since Qatar has made significant advances during the 
last few years on the road to promote public participation in the political 
and reform process, which materialized last April in the referendum on the 
permanent constitution. The articles of this constitution act as safeguards to 
rights and freedom, and build a state of institutions and promote the rule of 
law. The articles of this constitution pave the way for parliamentary 
elections in the near future, where citizens will vote to form the 
Consultative Council, which will greatly improve the participation of the 
public in the political process.
95
 
Before the closing session of the Fourth Forum of Free Trade and Democracy, the Foreign 
Minister addressed the forum on behalf of the Emir of Qatar, about the Qatari vision of the 
relationship between reform, democracy, and making peace in the Middle East: 
We must state that the roots of anger in our region not only stem from the 
Palestinian cause but go even further and are due to problems we have that 
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are not related to the outside. We let those problems accumulate without 
attempting to find remedies... We plan general elections in the near future 
to establish the Consultative Council, which is an elected parliament in 
accordance with the permanent constitution, which grants equal rights to 
women, freedom of expression and freedom of the press, religious beliefs, 
assembly and education and other essential civic rights…A trend has been 
growing in our region for many years now based on a rationale to blame 
the actions of others to justify neglecting reforms. Some blame the 
Ottoman dominance, while others blame Western colonialism and its 
consequences for our current status, or say that reform has to wait until a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict with Israel is reached.
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Addressing the US Islamic World Forum held in Doha, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad 
Bin Jassem, commented on Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, saying: 
The withdrawal from Gaza under the pretext that Gaza is of no use to Israel 
aims at starting Palestinian infighting… I doubt the ability of Arab states to 
offer anything to the Palestinians or to control them, because the 
Palestinians have no future prospects nor logic…What is happening in the 
Arab states now is an obsession with democracy. The Palestinians do not 
need the Arab role as much as they need to depend on themselves.
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At this point, it seems that Qatar realized that there were limits to the role it could play, 
particularly after the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and that it was better for 
Qatar to stop making new proposals and let things proceed without intervention between 
the Palestinians and Israel and in the presence of an American role.  
This was the beginning of a new and major change in the Qatari role. After a few months, 
the Doha Declaration was announced. Among other things, Qatar called on regimes in 
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Arab states that had not drafted constitutions or political laws to immediately commence 
creating these constitutions or laws. Qatar called on regimes of states that have 
constitutions to reform or amend these constitutions so that monarchies would be changed 
into constitutional monarchies to cause a separation between hereditary rule and the 
executive authority. The Doha Declaration also called on regimes in states with republic 
political systems to amend the constitutional articles pertaining to the selection of the 
president to stipulate direct competitive elections, to curtail the authorities of the 
president, and to introduce constitutional articles that expressly stipulate mechanisms for 
supervising and holding presidents accountable and to regulate the withdrawal of 
confidence.  
In correspondence with the new Qatari proposals with regard to the Arab reform initiative, 
and during the opening session of the Democracy and Reform Conference, the Emir of 
Qatar, Hamad Bin Khalifa, said: 
It is no longer acceptable to take either the Arab-Israeli conflict or waiting 
for peace with Israel as an excuse to justify neglecting reforms, because the 
Arab-Israeli conflict or peace with Israel may take a long time to achieve, 
especially given that the sense of public resentment, rage, and frustration 
are not driven by the Palestinian cause alone. There are other, deep internal 
sources, having to do with the core issues of political and economic 
performance in the region…It is no longer logical or tenable to make 
excuses before the whole world that Arab states are maintaining the 
world’s interests in the region, and that if reforms were to take off, then this 
would destabilize the region. The world has realized over the course of the 
past few years that the risk of failing to carry out reforms far outweighs the 
risk associated with reforms.
98
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The text of the Doha Declaration is stated hereunder.
99
 The Doha Declaration was 
announced during a non-governmental press conference. However, this conference would 
not have been held without the approval and blessing of the Government of the State of 
Qatar. The name of the attendees of the Reform and Democracy Conference, and the press 
conference that followed, reveal the extent of the close relationship of the attendees with 
those in official government circles in Qatar. The attendees were: the Director of the Gulf 
Centre for Studies, Qatar University, Professor Hassan Al Ansary; Professor Saadeldin 
Ibrahim; and Director of the Office of the Emir of Qatar for Follow up Affairs, Dr Saad Al 
Rumaihi. The text of the final declaration suggests a political orientation mainly towards 
states that are outside the Gulf bloc. Nearly one hundred thinkers and politicians from 
various Arab countries and Arab migrants abroad deliberated over the obstacles to 
political progress in Arab states, and issued the following declaration to Arab leaders and 
people: 
Democratic change has become a non-negotiable choice which cannot be 
postponed. It has become unacceptable to confiscate the political and civic 
rights of the Arab people, which under diverse pretexts have been delayed 
at a time when most of the peoples of the world, including a number of 
Islamic countries, have undergone important democratic changes. 
Experiences throughout the world in recent decades have proven that 
politically free multi-party systems inclusive of political freedom are not 
the sole monopoly of any given culture or civilization. Hence any excuses 
to resist or delay democratic change in our Arab countries are but poor 
excuses.
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The history of some of the Arab countries during the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century proves the possibility of applying democratic 
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practices quite successfully whenever the opportunity arises, notwithstanding the varying 
economic and cultural differences within these countries. 
Hiding behind the necessity to resolve the Palestinian question before implementing 
political reform is obstructive and unacceptable. Historical experiences have proven 
beyond doubt that liberation movements throughout the world, and democratic reform 
movements that grant people their freedom of expression, are the best way to liberate the 
land and the nation. Autocratic regimes are unable or unwilling to deal seriously with 
outside threats and hegemonic designs. There is ample evidence that these same regimes 
are sometimes ready to surrender their sovereignty to ensure their own survival. 
Democratic practice hence becomes the primary rule for peace between nations, and an a 
priori condition for fulfilling true and real development. Democracies generally prefer 
peace and avoid aggression. Rarely do democratic countries go to war with one another. 
From this perspective, we observe that regimes that tyrannized their own people and 
ventured into irresponsible military forays ultimately led to foreign occupation of their 
country.
101
 
This declaration seemed to be more than merely an initiative launched by a group of 
intellectuals. Rather, it was a preparation for something that was acquiring increasing 
input in the Middle East, and an approach supported and sponsored by the state. This trend 
expressed itself later in the support of the Arab Spring, and perhaps contributed to some of 
these uprisings at a time when the Arab Gulf states had their reservations and concerns 
about these uprisings. 
In the same context, First Deputy to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Hamad Bin Jassem, at the Conference of Arab World Reforms and the Challenges Faced 
by the EU Polices in Helsinki said (in a speech delivered on his behalf by Nasser Bin 
Hamad Al Khalifa, Qatar’s Ambassador to the UK): 
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Reform is not an option but a law, considering it is a basic principle 
dictated by the logic of human life… Qatar has adopted reforms based on 
this approach since His Highness Hamad Bin Khalifa rose to the helm of 
power in 1995.
102
 
Hamad Bin Jassem said that the adoption by Qatar of reforms based on democratization 
was due to Qatar’s belief that reform is the ideal way to achieve peace, security, justice, 
and all-inclusive development. This seems to demonstrate Qatari agreement with the new 
US vision of the Middle East dilemma, to the effect that the Arab-Israeli conflict will not 
be resolved except through democratization in Arab states.
103
 
No changes in the Qatari approach to dealing with the peace process occurred throughout 
2005. In March 2005, Doha hosted a conference attended by various Islamic movements, 
with the majority of these movements representing the Muslim Brotherhood movement. 
This conference was entitled the Founding Conference for the International Anti-
Aggression Campaign and aimed at discussing alternatives to responding to the aggression 
against the Islamic world, using peaceful and legal means.
104
 
In Geneva, the State of Qatar called for the intervention of the international community 
and the UN Human Rights Commission to enforce international legitimacy resolutions on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to pressure Israel into withdrawing from all Arab territories 
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Shebaa farms.  
Qatar called for the recognition of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their land 
and property in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution No. 194, and the 
recognition of all national, political, and economic Palestinian rights, including the right to 
establish an independent Palestinian state of all the national Palestinian territories with 
Jerusalem as the capital. 
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Qatar expressed deep concerns over the ongoing Israeli violations in the Arab occupied 
territories, pointing out that the construction of settlements was still ongoing and at an 
even more accelerated pace, in addition to the destruction of farmland, the demolishing of 
houses, banishment, forced deportation, and assault on educational and health facilities. 
This was during a statement delivered by Jassem Abdulaziz Al-buenain, the Minister in 
Charge of Qatar’s Permanent Delegation in Geneva, to the 61st round of the UN Human 
Rights Commission on Article 8 of the agenda on human rights violations in Arab 
territories, including Palestine.  
Al-buenain said that Qatar had always sought to push the peace process forward through 
the negotiations path, by encouraging the two sides to forge ahead with these negotiations 
despite all emergent obstacles. He called on Israel to take more practical steps to prove its 
good intentions, to accept the Land for Peace principle, and to halt the construction of the 
Separation Barrier and all settlements in Arab territories occupied since 1967.  
During his visit to the US, Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, called on Arab 
states to send a message to Israel to confirm that all problems with Israel could be 
resolved if Israel returned the Arab occupied territories and recognized Palestinian rights. 
Jassem called on Arabs to abandon double standards when dealing with Israel, and warned 
against misinforming the Arab people, especially after the past practices of many Arab 
governments had been exposed, which led to further Arab deterioration and weakness.
105
 
Jassem reiterated the fact that Israel had a commercial representation office in Qatar, 
stating that: 
While Qatar adopted a public stance in this regard[relation with Israel], 
many other Arab and Islamic nations had secret contacts with Israel, while 
declaring the contrary before their people and international public opinion 
to claim political heroism…Israel’s intransigence and escalations since the 
Al Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000, have derailed the peace 
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process. Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was a marked 
development that breathed some hope into the peace process. But this step 
is not the end of the line and must be followed by other steps to restore 
Palestinian rights, leading to the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. This requires withdrawal 
from the West Bank, the dismantling of settlements there, the removal of 
the Separation Barrier, and resolving the refugee crisis in accordance with 
UN resolutions. All this requires serious dialogue between the Palestinians 
and Israel under Arab and international sponsorship.
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10.9 Conclusion 
This chapter contains the data analysis for a number of issues related to the formation of 
Qatar’s foreign policy with respect to the Middle East peace process from 2000 to 2005.  
Data analysis of the documents used throughout this chapter, such as those from the Prince 
of Qatar, ministers, and diplomats, and officials’ statements and UN documents, revealed 
that Qatar chose to adopt a policy based on defending and supporting Arab and Palestinian 
rights as unanimously expressed by all Qatari diplomats and that are: Israeli withdrawal 
from Arab occupied territories, the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as 
its capital, stopping the Israeli settlement activities, and dismantling the settlements 
constructed on occupied Arab territories.  
Qatar unequivocally expressed its stance with respect to the Middle East peace process by 
declaring that there would be no solution to the Middle East conflict except thorough the 
full withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories in Palestine, the Golan Heights, and 
Lebanon, and that Israel must choose between the possibility of peaceful coexistence in 
the region and the continuation of this conflict for decades and generations to come with 
all the tragedies such a continuation would entail.  
                                               
106 (Al Raya: 24-9-2005: 7-8) 
297 
 
On the other hand, Qatar insisted on encouraging the Israelis to move forward with the 
peace process by maintaining trade and diplomatic ties with Israel despite the pressures 
from several Arab states and, therefore, Qatar was wishing to be able to play the role of 
peacemaker.  
Despite encouraging the Israelis towards peace, Qatar never stopped using all the 
diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal, despite the limitations on such tools, to 
pressure Israel into stopping its extremist policies with respect to Arab rights in general, 
and Palestinian rights in particular. Qatar called on the international community in 
general, and the US in particular, to guarantee Palestinian rights and to attempt to change 
the direction of Israeli policies towards the occupied territories and the Palestinians living 
under occupation, and to stop what Qatar described as the “policies of killings and 
destruction being exercised against the Palestinians.” 
Qatar also warned of the consequences of undermining the safety and security of 
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat while under Israeli siege, and called on the US to exert 
efforts to guarantee the safety of Arafat and lift the siege imposed on the Palestinian 
presidential headquarters.  
After the collapse of the peace process and the announcement of a new US initiative to 
revive the Middle East peace process, which the US called the Roadmap, and due to the 
complex guarantees Israel demanded form the US to execute this initiative, Qatar accused 
Israel of attempting to empty the initiative of its content and transforming the initiative 
into a mere security agreement through the guarantees requested. Qatar held Israel liable 
for sabotaging the Roadmap initiative. Qatar also described the assassination by Israel of 
Palestinian leader Ahmed Yassin as an Israeli attempt to drag the region into a new spiral 
of violence and to eliminate any chances of achieving peace.  
With regard to terrorism and national liberation movements, Qatar exerted efforts to 
define terrorism and to distinguish between terrorism and movements of armed struggle. 
Qatar, in its capacity as the Chairman of the 9th Islamic Summit Conference, called for the 
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condemnation of all forms of terrorism, including state sponsored terrorism. In doing so, 
Qatar was referring to the Israeli polices in the occupied Arab territories against 
Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority, which Qatar described as state-sponsored 
terrorism.  
The analysis of the documents set forth in the introduction of this chapter also revealed 
that Qatar adopted the US political reform initiative, known as the Colin Powell Initiative, 
despite opposition from a large number of Arab states. Qatar also adopted the US 
approach based on the belief that there was hope in achieving progress in the peace 
process if Arab states adopted the political reform initiative. Furthermore, Qatar not only 
settled for adopting the US political reform initiative, but also launched its own initiative 
in 2005, known as the Doha Declaration, which called on Arab states to introduce 
significant changes in ruling regimes for the purpose of democratization. Qatar insisted 
that the Arab-Israeli conflict was no excuse for reluctance in the reform process. This 
declaration was negatively received by many Arab states, and strained Qatar’s relations 
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  
Qatar introduced major changes to the priorities of its foreign policy objectives, and 
introduced the promotion of democracy in the Middle East to its list of foreign policy 
objectives. Paradoxically, this objective was also one of the chief US foreign policy 
objectives for the Middle East and therefore, through the Doha Declaration, Qatar became 
the “loyal ally” of the United States in the region.  
Qatar also stressed that no one but the Americans and the Palestinians themselves could 
help the Palestinians; in doing so, Qatar thus stopped the proposal of any new initiatives to 
push the Middle East process forwards and settled for the US role in this regard. This 
stance was summed up by the Qatari Foreign Minister’s declaration that “We do not have 
a plan. Washington has the plan.”  
This new Qatari orientation in its foreign policy objectives represented the hallmark of the 
new distinctive and divergent Qatari foreign policy, not only towards the Middle East 
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peace process but even more towards the entire region, which led later to a deep and 
negative impact on the relationship between Qatar and the GCC on one side, and the 
relationship with the PLO and Israel on the other side. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Discussion of the Findings  
11.1 Introduction  
This chapter will highlight the key findings of the study revealed by the data analysis 
chapters and will discuss them further. These are: the prominent features of the foreign 
policy of both the GCC states and Qatar towards the peace process; the extent of the 
convergence and divergence between the GCC states, and Qatar's orientations and goals of 
their foreign policy towards the peace process in the Middle East; the discussions over the 
issue of the influence of the emergent changes in the political environment of the 
international order; the unprecedented increase in the influence of the new US concept of 
introducing democracy to the Middle East in order to provide a new horizon to settle the 
conflict and to achieve peace; and the secondary impacts of this new concept on the 
relationships between Gulf states. 
The analysis of the impact of the internal and external determinants on the decision-
making process for the foreign policies of the GCC states towards the peace process in the 
Middle East will also be discussed further. This will help to clarify the wider research 
context, as engaging with these dynamics offers a coherent historical framework for 
understanding the dynamics that influence the decision-making process for the foreign 
policies of GCC states in general. 
11.2 The significance of internal and external determinants in shaping GCC foreign 
policy  
The discussion presented in Chapters Four and Five showed the significance of the 
internal and external determinant factors structuring the foreign policy of the GCC and 
GCC member states. It must be noted that the GCC came together as a bloc in 1981, after 
the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year, and the 
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outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq in 1980, all of which created shared security 
challenges for the Gulf. The GCC’s founding first charter mainly focused on economic 
and cultural cooperation, but in 1984 it moved to set up a joint defence force, the Island 
Shield armed force. As such, defending the security of the GCC member states had always 
represented a major dilemma, which left members with no option but to seek the highest 
levels of coordination, boosting their joint defence capabilities in the face of what they 
perceive as serious threats, such as Iraq, Iran, and the consequences of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The study found that, in contrast to the findings of James Bill (1996),
1
 who did 
not consider Israel as one of the threats to the Gulf region, the concerns of GCC member 
states were obvious when the sources of threat to their security shifted from the classic 
source, namely Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, to relatively newer ones, that is Iraq 
and Iran. In this factor of the security equation in the Gulf, this study agreed with Bill’s 
perception of the new source of threat of this partial agreement, namely, that these new 
threats do not diminish the seriousness of Israel as one of the possible threats to GCC 
security. The study found that GCC member states were working towards adopting a 
unified foreign policy regarding these two emerging security threats. This in turn caused a 
convergence of GCC member states with US foreign policy, more than at any time in the 
past. Therefore, the GCC and the member states played the role of America’s loyal ally 
regarding these two threats, while, at other times, playing the role of the independent ally 
in some issues pertaining to the peace process in the Middle East. 
This study is in agreement with Hinnebusch’s (2003) argument about the strength of the 
influence of public opinion. He noticed that “public opinion in the Middle East normally 
plays little in the way of a direct role in foreign policy formulation.”2 The influence of 
public opinion in the GCC regarding foreign policy decision-making with respect to the 
Middle East peace process was strong, albeit temporary. The Palestinian Intifada was one 
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of the clear examples: public opinion that the Intifada generated throughout the GCC 
countries, including Qatar, was neither extended nor strong enough to make permanent 
changes in the foreign policy stances of Qatar and the GCC. 
It was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that connected internal and external determinants, 
which in turn affected the foreign policies of the GCC and GCC member states, 
particularly with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East peace process. 
This had a dual effect, both internal and external. The internal effect manifested in the 
negative impact on the interest in the Palestinian cause in the GCC and GCC member 
states, when the PLO took a position in support of Iraq in 1990. However, this negative 
impact was short-lived and the GCC member states resumed normal relations with the 
PLO and continued to support the Palestinian cause and Arab rights.  
As a result, and given that the military position of the GCC states was fragile at that time, 
GCC member states, both individually and collectively, sought defence coordination with 
the world’s superpowers through treaties. These treaties required the existence of foreign 
military bases, especially US military bases, on GCC soil. On one hand, the presence of a 
US military base in the GCC region created tension in relations among GCC member 
states and other Arab states. On the other hand, Iran was watching these treaties carefully. 
These tensions manifested in different forms across the peninsula, and particularly with 
states such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. On the other bank of the Gulf, the 
feelings of discomfort were prevailing, with repeated Iranian emphasis on the fact that the 
security of the Gulf was strictly a matter for the Gulf countries. This reflects Iran's 
rejection of any role that any country from outside the region might play in shaping the 
security of the region. 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the ensuing events, were among the 
external determinants that affected GCC foreign policy with respect to the peace process. 
Due to the US pressures to link terrorism and the right to armed struggle against 
occupation, GCC member states were forced to make efforts to redefine the concept of 
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terrorism, and to differentiate between terrorism and a legitimate struggle against 
occupation. To an extent, the US pressures on GCC countries triggered them to converge 
their foreign policy with respect to the Middle East peace process.  
As Smith and Light (2001),
3
 and Cook (2008)
4
 suggest, the US began to reformulate its 
new foreign policy towards the Middle East, revolving around the conception that the lack 
of democracy constituted the real threat for its interests in the Middle East. The lack of 
democracy causes a rise in the sentiments of injustice among the people, which in turn 
generates rage, leading to acts of violence that are directed against either Arab regimes or 
US interests. This conception entailed a US intervention in some form to introduce 
democracy to the political regimes of the Middle East. Thus, the US launched a number of 
initiatives to introduce democracy as a wise and effective system of ruling in Arab 
political regimes. Among these initiatives was the ‘New Middle East Initiative’, which 
was followed by the ‘Middle East Partnership Initiative’. Both initiatives were received 
with a great deal of scepticism on the part of a majority of GCC member states. They 
expressed a view to the effect that democracy cannot be imported, but must be grown 
from within each state in a manner that takes into account the religious and civic 
characteristics of each state.  
Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar almost unconditionally supported the US initiatives, and 
even introduced its own democratization initiative, the Doha Declaration of 2005. Despite 
the fact that it was introduced after the timeframe of this study, it is important to highlight 
that Qatar supplied the financial and technical resources to support this initiative, and 
created the Arab Democracy Foundation with the mandate of executing the Qatari 
initiative (2007).  
                                               
3Karen E. Smith and Margot, Light, Ethics and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), p.124-137. 
4
Steven Cook, in Markus Kaim, Great Powers and Regional Order: The United States and the Persian Gulf, 
(Hampshire. England: Ashgate, 2008), p.71. 
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Comparing the results of the previous studies of Tessler, Smith and Light, and Cook, and 
studying and analysing the statements of Qatari officials in addition to the efforts made by 
Qatar, the study found that the main reason for inter-GCC differences was not only 
Qatar’s insistence on normalizing trade ties with Israel, but also the differences in the 
foreign policy objectives of the GCC and of its member states with respect to the peace 
process. For the US, in addition to defending its own interests in the Middle East, its 
objective was to contain the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the conviction that “democracies 
do not fight other democracies” and, therefore, the belief that Arab democratic states will 
not go to war with Israel, the US began to pressure Arab states to adopt more democratic 
systems of governance. 
While the Qatari point of view may, to an extent, have coincided with the US, most of the 
Arab states differ significantly. Rather than a conflict between two politically different 
systems (democratic versus authoritarian), the conflict had objective reasons stemming 
from the Israeli violations and unjust treatment of Palestinians, as well as its occupation of 
Arab territories. 
With regard to the Middle East peace process, the foreign policies of the GCC and its 
member states were generally supportive of the idea of holding an international peace 
conference. The GCC member states believed that peace is a strategic and indispensable 
alternative, and that wars only lead to other wars, and, therefore, a vicious cycle of 
violence. In addition, they believed that there was a strong need for a reasonable approach 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, one that was based on respecting the rights of all the people of 
the region to live in peace within safe and internationally recognized boundaries for all, 
and that Israel’s security would never be achieved through violence or the building of 
illegal settlements. The view of the GCC and GCC member states was that Arabs in 
general, and Palestinians in particular, have immutable rights and that peace will never be 
achieved except through the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, 
and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. 
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The study found that the GCC and GCC member states supported all the US initiatives to 
achieve peace in the Middle East, while at the same time always protesting against the 
United States’ unconditional and unlimited diplomatic support of Israel. Moreover, they 
perceived this support as encouraging Israeli intransigence, while not achieving peace for 
the parties of the conflict in the long run. The GCC and its member states had always 
called on the US to adopt a more impartial attitude with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This demand was reflected in the role played by the GCC member states, specifically, the 
role of the independent ally that defends the safety and integrity of its region and the rights 
of Arabs in the face of the occupier – Israel.  
The GCC and its member states have also supported the initiatives proposed by the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, such as the Arab Peace Initiative in Beirut in 2002, which was 
upheld as part of the Roadmap, and the King Abdullah Initiative in 2004. Despite the 
simplicity and soundness of its logic, which required the full Israeli withdrawal in return 
for full peace and normalization of relationships, Israel sought to remove it from the 
Roadmap. The GCC member states continued to support all Arab rights and condemn 
Israel’s extremist policies during the time frame of this study.  
11.3 The foreign policy of Qatar and the internal/external determinants  
In the third part of the study, which focuses on examining Qatar’s internal and external 
determinants, the study concludes that Qatar tackled such determinants using a different 
approach. Qatar adopted an approach closer to, and more convergent with, the general US 
foreign policy approach, as well as its objectives for the region.  
In the beginning of its involvement with the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qatar played a limited, 
insignificant role. This role was centred on the defence of Arab rights in general, and 
Palestinian rights in particular, the demands for the withdrawal from Arab occupied 
territories, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. This 
was attested during Qatar’s independence address, which stated: 
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Qatar believes in Arab brotherhood and strives to bolster ties of 
consolidation with all Arab states…Qatar is exerting all efforts to support 
the joint efforts to achieve Arab unity and to support the fight for common 
Arab causes, most importantly the occupied Palestinian territories… Qatar 
absolutely supports the right of the Palestinian people to liberate their lands 
from occupation and absolutely supports Arab confrontation states in their 
struggle to liberate their territories.
5
 
Furthermore, Article No.5 Clause C of the Basic Charter for the State of Qatar, issued in 
1972, stipulates the same goals and meanings mentioned above.
6
 Qatar clearly and 
unequivocally expressed its support for these rights on all official occasions.  
Moreover, Qatar repeatedly condemned Israeli policies in the occupied territories, and 
called the international community to take its responsibility in maintaining international 
peace and security by pressuring Israel into abandoning its intransigent policies regarding 
Arab rights. In this respect, Qatar’s foreign policy was generally in line with the political 
stance of the majority of GCC member states. However, under the leadership of Qatar’s 
“new” Emir at that time, Hamad Bin Khalifa, the study found that Qatar began to adopt a 
more independent foreign policy position, which parted from the converged policies of the 
GCC and some of the GCC member states towards the Middle East peace process and 
became more in convergence with the US foreign policy towards the peace process. The 
more that Qatari foreign policy became independent of the foreign policy of the GCC 
countries towards the peace process, the more it became dependent on US policy, and it 
did not remain pragmatic, or autonomous. This finding is quite different from the finding 
reached by Steven Wright (2012).
7
 He described the foreign policy of Qatar as 
independent, pragmatic, and autonomous. However, the independent stance adopted by 
                                               
5Yusuf Obaidan, Features of the Modern Political Organization in Qatar.(No place of publication; no 
publisher),p.282. 
6 The basic charter is the equivalent of the Constitution. 
7
Steven Wright, in David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen (eds), The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics 
Economics and the Global Order, (London: Routledge, 2012), p.296. 
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the GCC was manifested in a number of ways, most broadly and comprehensively. It was 
seen in Qatar’s insistence to normalize trade ties with Israel despite the extremist policies 
of the Netanyahu-led government, which were against the Arabs, the Palestinians, and the 
peace process in general, and despite the Arab League’s recommendations to suspend any 
ties with Israel, to which other GCC states, such as the Sultanate of Oman, immediately 
agreed.  
A significant finding of this study suggests that within the same context, which called for 
encouraging the Israelis to engage in the peace process and build bridges of confidence, 
while at the same time supporting the Palestinians, during the multilateral negotiations – 
the Arms Control Conference – Qatar’s Foreign Minister declared that the indispensable 
rights of the Palestinian people were the cornerstone of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the 
other hand, and on the sidelines of the Arms Control Conference, Qatar received Israel’s 
Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, and Qatar’s Foreign Minister declared that Qatar had 
decided that there should be no unannounced or secret relations with Israel, adding that the 
Israelis were entitled to know what they would be getting, in consideration for returning 
the Arab territories. Thus, Qatar decided to go further in its plan to normalize trade 
relations with Israel. Through a third party, the oil company Enron, Qatar reached an 
initial agreement to supply Israel with natural gas. This major natural gas deal, which was 
seen by Egypt as an unpleasant turning point in Qatar’s foreign policy and an attempt by 
Qatar to assume the role of a major player in the Middle East peace process, was the main 
reason for the strained relations between Qatar and Egypt in 1997, as well as for several 
years afterwards, specifically when Qatar played the role of a key intermediary between 
Israel and Hamas during the Gaza War in 2009. In commenting on this Qatari deal, 
Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, said, “We welcome any attempt 
to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the Palestinian cause. But it must be 
done through us.”8 The comment of Aboul Gheit reflected two points: that Qatar was 
                                               
8 https://arabic.rt.com/prg/telecast/660321 
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willing to play a bigger role in the peace process, and that Egypt was unhappy about this 
Qatari desire. 
The Qatari-Enron deal clearly reflected Qatar’s desire to play a bigger role, especially in 
the Middle East peace process, and this is what might be interpreted as the orientations 
and goals of Qatar's foreign policy in the Middle East in the years to follow. 
Nonetheless, Qatar insisted on continuing this direct relationship, and even invited Israel 
to attend the Middle East and North Africa Economic Cooperation Conference, which was 
held in Doha in 1997. In response to this invitation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and other Arab states decided to boycott the conference to protest 
about the Qatari decision, which seemed to be devoid of any national interest, as Hamad 
bin Jassem announced. 
Unlike the study of Baskan (2016),who argues “that Qatar was the country least affected 
by the US response to 9/11 attack”,9this study found not only that reform in Qatar was an 
outcome of the pressure of the George W. Bush administration on the region, but that 
Qatar was also the country that accepted that pressure the most. There is much evidence 
supporting this claim: the reform steps that were taken within the Qatari political system, 
and the promises of general elections, took place during the George W. Bush 
administration, ideas of forming unions, political parties, and general election – ideas that 
receded and disappeared completely with time. In other words, the process of political 
reform in Qatar stalled after the political pressure on the region from the Bush 
administration ended. This, in turn, led to another significant difference in foreign policy 
between Qatar and the other GCC member states, something which was completely 
incompatible with GCC policies: Qatar’s support of the US foreign policy towards the 
Middle East after 11 September, the launch of the US New Middle East Initiative, the 
MEPI, the US push for the democratization of Arab regimes, and the unconditional 
                                               
9
Birol Baskan,Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle East,(New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan,2016), p.36. 
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support of the second US initiative, known as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, 
which drew strong criticism from many other GCC member states. Not only did Qatar 
support the US initiatives, but also Qatar, paradoxically, began to launch its own 
democratic initiatives, despite the fact that Qatar itself does not have, and does not allow 
the existence of, the least components needed to develop a proper democratic process, 
such as the right to form political parties or trade unions, or workers unions, not to 
mention opposition newspapers, or allowing parliament to exercise jurisdiction and 
oversight of legislation. 
In 2005, Qatar called for a conference for fostering the democratic environment in the 
Middle East. The conference ended with the Doha Declaration, which called on Arab 
republic states to adopt a democratic system of rule, allow the launch of political parties, 
recognize the freedom of the press, and distance military institutions from politics. 
Moreover, Qatar called on monarchical Arab states to shift to constitutional monarchies. 
In 2007, Qatar launched the Arab Democracy Foundation, whose main objective was to 
spread and support democratic values. The wife of Qatar’s former Emir still chairs this 
foundation. 
This simply meant that Qatar added a new objective to its foreign policy objectives: to 
spread and support democratic values in the Middle East, one of the main US Middle East 
foreign policy objectives. Qatar therefore reasserted its role as peacemaker by supporting 
the proposition that democracy is the way to achieve peace, and by supporting the 
proposition that Israel is a democratic state and that democracies do not wage wars with 
other democracies. Qatar also reasserted its role as the loyal ally of the US in the Middle 
East, or for some other hidden agenda that has yet to appear. 
In summary, the foreign policies of GCC member states including Qatar, towards the 
Middle East peace process were convergent until the Madrid Conference. It was after that 
conference that foreign policy differences among GCC member states began to surface. 
Such differences were related to the question of how to deal with Israel. For the reasons 
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discussed above, Qatar believed that it had to adopt a fixed approach based on the 
premises of continuing the normalization of ties with Israel, despite all the challenges 
faced by the peace process and despite all the actual Israeli anti-peace process politics, 
which disturbed Qatar and the other Arab states. As an expression of its pragmatic politics 
and self-interested choices, Qatar decided to continue with the normalization of ties with 
Israel, acting in the process as a role model for the strategic peace option that they 
believed should be adopted by all Arabs.  
11.4 The implications of the post-2005 political developments on GCC and Qatari 
foreign policy regarding the Middle East peace process.   
It was found appropriate to raise the issue of why the State of Qatar had entered firmly 
into the course of the war on Gaza in 2009, because the answer may provide an acceptable 
and reasonable basis to understand Qatar's foreign policy towards the Arab Spring later 
on. 
As discussed in the previous chapters of data analysis, Qatar’s policy towards the 
Palestine/Israeli conflict is based around efforts to establish itself as a mediator on the 
international stage. Qatar also emphasizes humanitarian concerns in its approach to 
Palestine. Its aid policy focuses on the infrastructure of Gaza, and building Palestinian 
infrastructure can be taken to be the expression of a desire to exert psychological pressure 
on Israel. In other words, building infrastructure on the ground conveys the message that 
Palestine and Palestinians are here to stay. As the current study demonstrates, Qatar’s 
foreign policy has shown significant divergence from other GCC foreign policy. It must 
be noted that the model adopted in the GCC framework, based around flexibility and 
compromise, permits it to respond to threats without unanimous consensus.  
In the 1990s, Qatar notably allowed Israel to open a trade office in Doha. Officials 
suggested that this was an attempt to help foster the peace process, as per the Oslo 
Agreement. It claimed that Israel was sceptical of a prospective Arab peace agreement; 
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hence the move was a goodwill gesture to fend off such concerns and give Israel 
incentives to follow through on the peace process. However, Rabin’s assassination put an 
end to the effort. After 2005 (and therefore after the period which is the main focus of the 
present study), Qatar engaged in a broader foreign policy with respect to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the peace process. During the war on Gaza in December 2009 and until 
January 2010, an Arab Economic Summit was scheduled in Kuwait City. On the sidelines 
of the summit, Arab leaders decided to deliberate on the issue of this war, and how to 
support Gaza and fend off the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian population. Qatar, 
which was to chair the next Arab League round, invited all Arab states to an emergency 
summit meeting in Doha exclusively to discuss this issue. Qatar’s view was that an 
important issue such as the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip could not be discussed 
on the sidelines of an economic conference, and that this issue must be at the heart of a 
dedicated summit meeting. This represented another episode of the Qatari-Egyptian 
discord with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt were not comfortable, as Qatar appeared to be ambitious to grab a 
bigger role. Egypt derailed the emergency summit meeting proposed by Qatar and only 13 
Arab states out of 22 members of the Arab League attended this meeting. This figure did 
not meet the required number of attendees. At that time, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Ahmed 
Aboul-Gheit, declared that “Yes, we exerted efforts to foil the Doha summit, and we 
succeeded.”10 Perhaps the statement of Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Hamad Bin Jassem, 
during an interview with Al Jazeera, best summarizes and justifies Egypt’s attitude with 
respect to some of Qatar’s positions on the Palestinian cause: “We know that Egypt is like 
the doctor who only has one patient, which is the Palestinian cause, and this doctor does 
not want us to take this patient from him.”11 As a matter of fact, one way or the other, 
Qatar was seeking to lure that patient to the Doha clinic, to use Jassem’s metaphor. The 
contentious issue between Qatar and other GCC member states was not the normalization 
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http://www.egypty.com/egypt-today/2009/january/28/87451 
11Hamed Ben Jassem, interview with al Jazeera, 2004. 
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of ties with Israel, but rather mainly its adoption and support of the US initiative calling 
for the democratization of the GCC and the Middle East region.  
The study concludes by echoing the view of some US officials, analysts, and thinkers that 
democratization in the GCC region and the Middle East will pose risks to US interests in 
this region. To minimize these risks, it was preferable that the shift towards 
democratization came from within the Arab states. These were the same concerns voiced 
by other GCC member states, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the late King 
Abdullah, and the UAE, who were critical of the Qatari adoption of the US initiative, the 
Qatari Doha Declaration, and the ensuing Qatari actions, such as the creation of the Arab 
Democracy Foundation, which aims at spreading the principles of democracy, and 
supports institutional and individual pro-democracy initiatives. It is true that the Arab 
Democracy Foundation does not engage in the GCC region; nevertheless, other GCC 
member states have concerns that the work of this foundation may extend to include the 
GCC region.  
As initially discussed, the US believes that it has a direct interest in causing such a shift 
towards democracy, and for the reasons discussed in the literature review, the GCC 
member states, and particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, continued to remain sceptical 
of the democratization initiatives that were wholeheartedly supported by Qatar. These 
concerns grew with time, particularly with the onset of the Arab Spring. While Qatar 
supported the uprising financially, diplomatically, and through the media, other GCC 
member states watched the unfolding events with great concern and distrust. The concerns 
of Saudi and the UAE continued to grow over Qatari backing of Arab Spring revolutions 
and calls for democracy, until these concerns climaxed in the termination of diplomatic 
relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain on one side and 
Qatar on the other side. This happened when Qatar supported Islamist President Mohamed 
Morsi’s regime in Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood used its media to pour vitriolic 
attacks on the new regime in Egypt. The pressures stemming from concerns over joint 
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GCC region security, the rise of ISIL, the so-called Islamic State challenge to the religio-
political establishments in the Gulf states, and the increasing Iranian influence in Syria, 
Lebanon, and Yemen left GCC member states with no option but to directly or indirectly 
interfere, even militarily, and to eventually restore diplomatic relations with Qatar. 
 
11.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarized the central research findings, and offered a critical reflection 
on the significance and the wider implications of the results for the GCC foreign policy 
regarding the Middle East conflict.  An attempt has been made to further contextualize the 
study findings within the wider framework of the post-2005 political developments in the 
region and the wider world.    
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Conclusions of the Study 
12. Main conclusions of the study  
The central objective of this study has been to investigate the foreign policy of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and its member states with special reference to the Qatari foreign 
policy towards the peace process in the Middle East from 1991 to 2005. It has been also 
within the core interest of this study to explore the range of divergence or convergence 
between the two foreign policies, and to engage with the broad rationale informing these 
policy positions.  
The study has raised three main questions, which revolve around its main objective. First, 
what were the main determinants, internal and external, facing the GCC states while 
formulating their foreign policies towards the Middle East peace process, particularly 
between 1991 and 2005? Second, what was the overall agreed foreign policy of the GCC 
states towards the Middle East peace process during the same period? Third, to what 
extent was Qatari foreign policy convergent with, or divergent from, the foreign policy of 
the GCC regarding the peace process between 1991 and 2005? 
The study adopted an overall qualitative research methodology to investigate its central 
questions. The research design of the study consisted of diverse data collection tools and 
analysis procedures, and made use of archival document analysis strategies. Data was 
collected from five types of primary sources, mainly the closing statements of the GCC 
summits, ministerial meeting statements, United Nations documents, the General 
Assembly leaders’ and diplomats’ speeches, and the Security Council minutes of 
meetings. It also made use of statements by Qatari officials on different levels, extracted 
from a semi-governmental Qatari newspaper, Al Raya, and the relevant speeches made by 
the Emir of Qatar. 
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Based on the analysis of the related official documents, covering the historical period 
between 1991 and 2005, presented throughout the chapters of data analysis, the study 
concluded that there were notable differences between the foreign policy of the GCC and 
the foreign policy of Qatar towards the peace process on two levels: the perception and the 
application. While the foreign policies of the GCC and the member states have linked the 
progress of the peace process with the normalization of economic and diplomatic relations 
with Israel, Qatar has worked to normalize its relations with Israel independently, 
regardless of the extent of progress made in the peace process itself. 
In many ways, Qatari policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Israel-
Palestine conflict in particular, has also reflected Qatar’s desire to establish itself as a 
significant mediator on the regional and international stage. Qatar considered that the 
normalization of its relations with Israel provided economic and diplomatic incentives, 
and was not an issue subject to political or diplomatic manoeuvrings; rather it was a 
genuine foreign policy orientation of Qatar to motivate Israel to move forward in the 
peace process. It is important to highlight that the incentives Qatar offered Israel during 
the period covered by the research, do not appear to have succeeded at any time in 
changing Israel’s political attitude towards the peace process. It seemed that the GCC 
countries were able to withstand this difference and to contain its effects on the 
cooperation and relations between the member states of the Council. 
The study revealed that this foreign policy divergence, which produced serious effects on 
the entire inter-GCC relations and threatened relations among the member states, was 
related to Qatar’s adaptation of US administration initiatives to introduce democracy to 
the Middle East as part of the plan to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The study showed 
that Qatar had endorsed this initiative without consultation and agreement with other GCC 
countries. Therefore, the foreign policy of Qatar related to this issue produced an 
important and serious impact on the Arab region in general, and the Gulf region in 
particular. The impact was manifested in the rising tension in relations between Qatar on 
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the one hand, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the 
Kingdom of Bahrain on the other, which ended with the severance in diplomatic relations. 
Like any research, this study had a particular focus and therefore is naturally subject to 
certain limitations. As a result, a number of relevant questions regarding the GCC and 
Qatari foreign policy need further investigation. Further research on the following central 
topics and issues is recommended. 
It would be relevant to explore the motivations and dynamics forming Qatari foreign 
policy regarding the peace process and to critically assess the degree to which such a 
foreign policy actually serves national interest. In this regard, Qatar’s initiative on the 
democratization of Arab states in 2004/2005, including the allocation of significant 
financial, technical, and human resources, and the creation of the Arab Democracy 
Foundation, to actualize this policy goal need to be rigorously researched. 
It would also be relevant to consider the political consequences of the crisis that hit the 
GCC in 2013, which climaxed in the withdrawal of the ambassadors of four of the GCC 
members for a number of reasons, and Qatar’s support of some groups in the so-called 
pro-democracy movement, particularly in Syria, which these states considered to be a 
misuse of Qatari media platforms, as well as the accusations made against Qatar of 
providing the Muslim Brotherhood with safe harbour, which threatened the security and 
stability of the neighbouring states, in addition to accusations that Qatar supported the 
opposition group of the Bahraini regimes. Egypt and Libya also deserve to be the subject 
of a distinct study. Further research projects need to critically examine the emergence of 
new security threats in the region, such as radical political Islam/transnational Jihadist 
movements and their impact on the formation of new patterns of alliances between 
countries in the region that in turn affect GCC foreign policy. In this regard, the so-called 
Arab Spring and the appearance of ISIL, and their effect on GCC foreign policy, as well 
as the wider fluctuating and competing foreign policies of the regional powers, need to be 
explored in depth.  
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Finally, it is often acknowledged that despite decades-long regional and international 
efforts, and countless initiatives on Middle East conflict, little has been achieved on the 
ground. In the light of this tragic fact, it is crucial to examine Israel’s perception of the 
peace process and to explore how it can contribute to getting closer to solving one of the 
most enduring and tragic conflicts in modern history that has far reaching implications for 
regional and world peace. 
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